Imperial Japan and National Identities in Asia, 1895–1945

Edited by
Li Narangoa and Robert Cribb

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IMPERIAL JAPAN AND NATIONAL IDENTITIES IN ASIA, 1895–1945

Nationalism was a powerful force in Asia during the era of Japanese imperial expansion (1895–1945). Asia's peoples sought freedom from the Western and Chinese empires which dominated the continent, while challenging each other over borders and systems of government.

From the earliest Japanese intrusions on the mainland in 1895 until final defeat in 1945, Japanese authorities had to grapple with the national identities of the people they sought to dominate. This book traces Japan's impact on these national identities, from its clumsy intervention in Siberia, through its ambitious attempts to create the new state of Manchukuo on the Asian mainland and to reshape the politics of the Chinese and Mongols, to its brief but dramatic foray into Southeast Asia. The book compares the perspective of societies such as India and Tibet, which observed Japan from a distance, with the experience of societies which experienced Japanese intervention at close hand.

The authors highlight the contradictions in Japanese policy, which sometimes encouraged other Asian nationalist movements, sometimes suppressed or undermined them, and sometimes sought to create new identities out of little more than romantic imagination. This book provides a valuable resource for students of East Asia.

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Preface

This volume has its origins in a workshop on the topic 'Imperial Japan and the identities of its Asian neighbours' held in Copenhagen in June 1999. Although the era of Japanese military expansion in Asia has been intensively studied, the complex relationship between the Japanese and the peoples they encountered in Asia still demands attention. There is still much to learn about the ways in which Japanese and other Asians imagined and tried to shape national identities – their own and those of other peoples – during the first half of the twentieth century. The workshop was organized by Li Narangoa (Nordic Institute of Asian Studies) and Christian Hermansen Morimoto (University of Copenhagen), with the help of other staff from both institutions. NIAS, the University of Copenhagen and the Toshiba International Foundation, Tokyo, kindly provided the generous financial assistance which made it possible to bring participants from four continents to take part in the discussions.

Turning the conference proceedings into a book has been time-consuming. It was not possible to include in this volume all the papers presented at the conference, while other chapters were specifically commissioned to ensure a balanced coverage. We would like to thank first the participants in the workshop for their stimulating contributions which led us to have confidence in the first place in the idea of producing a book. We would also like to thank the contributors to the volume for their patience and cooperation in responding to our many questions and suggestions, and to acknowledge the valuable contribution of two anonymous referees.

As always, it has been a pleasure to work with the editorial staff at NIAS.

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Note on Romanization

During the period covered by this book, the romanization of Chinese words followed a variety of systems. To preserve the flavour of the time, we have retained the spelling of the time for personal and place names, thus Chiang Kai-shek, Shantung; today's standard spelling (Pinyin) is provided in brackets on the first mention of each name (Jiang Jieshi, Shandong). Technical terms and bibliographical references are given in Pinyin only.

The romanization of Japanese names follows the Hepburn system. Romanization of Mongolian follows Uighur Mongolian transliteration (Poppe's *Grammar of Written Mongolian*), but using gh for γ, ch for č, and sh for š. The romanization of personal and place names from northern Mongolian follows standard romanization from Cyrillic.

Map 1: Eastern Asia, 1939

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INTRODUCTION

Japan and the Transformation of National Identities in Asia in the Imperial Era

LI NARANGOA AND ROBERT CRIBB

When Tokugawa Japan opened its doors to the West after 1854, Asia was a world of empires in flux.[1] The ailing Chinese empire still dominated East Asia but was already feeling the intrusion of Western powers, while Western colonial empires were taking shape in South and Southeast Asia. During the century which followed the opening, Japan not only transformed itself into a modern industrial power but also attempted to create an empire of its own in Asia and the Pacific. Beginning with the conquests of Hokkaido and Ryukyu, proceeding to the acquisition of Taiwan and the annexation of Korea, and eventually embarking on an ill-fated invasion of China, Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific, Japan subjugated neighbouring territories and sought to construct a new imperial order in its region.

Japan created its empire by force of arms, but like most imperial powers it aimed to give its dominion a more enduring basis than mere military might. The Japanese sought to convince their new subjects that they really belonged in the new order they had created. In part, they tried to have people believe that Japanese rule was materially better than any of the alternatives. They also sought, however, to recr uit their subjects' sense of identity to the imperial cause.[2] They did this by creating a variety of discourses about the nature of their empire. At times the empire was to be a constellation of different nations under Japanese leadership; at others, its eventual goal was to be the imparting of

Japanese culture to subject peoples, perhaps even to the point of complete assimilation, as was sought in Hokkaido and Okinawa; at still other times the empire was presented as an expression of a common Asian culture, of which Japanese culture was the highest, but not the only, form. In this discourse, the Japanese prized some aspects of other Asian cultures while marking other aspects for improvement or elimination. These discourses changed and intertwined, varying in accordance with the scope of Japan's imperial ambitions and the visions of individual Japanese authorities and institutions. Sometimes these discourses operated together, sometimes they appeared to be in conflict. They were driven both ideologically and by practical considerations: for some purposes, such as general administration, it suited the Japanese to have subjects who were very much like them; for other purposes, such as labour management, it was more convenient to keep a clear distance from their subjects. For these reasons, Japan's policies affecting the national identities of other peoples often seemed to be contradictory: sometimes selflessly encouraging them (at least on the surface), sometimes transparently recruiting them in the Japanese interest, sometimes seeking to transform them, sometimes blocking them. This was a challenging strategy, because it involved combining an anti-imperialist rhetoric – directed against the Chinese and Western empires – with an imperialist one in support of Japan's own ambitions.

Japan's influence on national identities in Asia both fell far short of its intentions and was much more far-reaching. Its influence fell short of its intentions partly because Japan's rule was relatively brief and partly because much of what might be called Japanese identity propaganda was poorly conceived. Most of all, however, it fell short of Japanese intentions because the peoples whom the Japanese sought to influence were not merely the passive recipients of Japanese manipulation. In every society which the Japanese encountered, people made use of Japanese models, actions and ideas for their own purposes. In some cases, Japan's achievements inspired admiration: Japan's early success in industrializing and its spectacular victory in the Russo–Japanese War of 1904–1905 inspired many Asians. In other cases, especially among peoples who had been ruled by other powers, Chinese or Western, Japan's presence offered an opportunity to change the balance of power in favour of the subject people, and these people sought to manoeuvre or persuade the Japanese into granting them support. In still other cases, however, the brutality of Japanese authorities in the occupied

territories turned sentiment against Japan and stimulated identities which were fundamentally hostile to Japan's war aims.[3]

This volume examines the relationship between Japan and changing national identities in the rest of Asia during the era of Japan's territorial expansion in Asia, approximately 1895 to 1945. There are three important features in this relationship. First, Japan's achievements in industrializing and resisting Western encroachment added extra dimensions to the way in which other Asian societies considered the possibilities for their own futures. The rise of the West in East Asia in the nineteenth century had presented societies there with a complex set of dilemmas. Especially those societies with a Confucian heritage had a long tradition of regarding themselves as unquestionably superior to outside societies, yet some Western societies had clearly overtaken Asia, at least in areas of technology and military organization. In the era of European expansion, Asian societies began to address a complex set of questions: was Westernization the only path to restoring their former power and prosperity? Or was the problem that Asia had strayed too far from its own traditional values, so that a rejection of the West was the surest path to success? Or was there some means of blending the best from each civilization so that Asia might not simply catch up to the West but eventually overtake it?

These questions had arisen well before Japan's emergence as an industrial or military power. Japan's apparent success in modernizing without discarding its distinctive national identity, however, encouraged Asian thinkers to reflect on what they could learn from it for their own countries. Japan played an important role, consciously and unconsciously, as a model for people in other Asian nations who wished to make their countries or regions – whether colonized or not – strong and free. The electrifying effect on other Asians of Japan's victory in the Russo–Japanese War of 1904–1905 is well known.[4] Japan now drew close attention from Asians seeking the key to Japan's success against a western power and its growing prominence in East Asian affairs. Of course they took the general lesson that Japan's success showed it was possible for Asian societies to modernize, but they also wondered what features of Japanese culture and social organization might account for Japan's success and might be adapted to their own societies. In other words, they sought ways of shaping their own national identities to resemble more closely those features of the Japanese identity that seemed to have produced such success.

As Japan began to implement its imperial ambitions, however, it ceased to be simply an admirable model for the rest of Asia and became also part of the problem. Japanese rule was everywhere accompanied by a programme of Japanization. In some cases, most notably Korea (as earlier in Okinawa and Hokkaido), this programme involved the deliberate imposition of Japanese culture and suppression of indigenous cultures. In other cases, such as Manchukuo, it entailed the selective use of Japanese-style institutions to increase the cultural compatibility of the rulers and the ruled, within a hierarchical order placing Japan at the summit, while leaving other institutions from the pre-colonial order intact. In still other cases, such as Indonesia, the Japanese largely retained existing institutions, adapting them to the difficult conditions of the war and adding no more than a flavour of Japanese style. As people in different parts of Asia gained closer experience of Japanese policies and institutions, they began to reject Japanese models, in some cases precisely because of their association with the harshness of Japanese rule, in others because those models seemed to work less well when examined closely. Japan's expansion into Asia thus shaped the national identities of its neighbours both positively, providing a model to be followed, and negatively, presenting an example to be avoided.

Second, there was no real consensus in this era on which identities should be considered to constitute a nation. Although the assumption had begun to take root that nation-states were the natural unit into which peoples should be distributed, it was difficult to say how many nation-states there should be and where their appropriate boundaries might run.[5] Most political units incorporated many different ethnic groups, and several large ethnic groups like the Mongols and the Malays sprawled across the political boundaries created by the imperial powers. The presence of a large Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia further complicated the problem. Nor was it easy to say just which groups properly constituted a potential nation. Some ethnic groups were generally considered to be too small or too 'primitive' to form the basis for a state; few people imagined, for instance, that any of the small ethnic groups in eastern Indonesia could ever form a state in its own right.[6] Even large ethnic groups such as the Mongols, the Tibetans, the Javanese and the Vietnamese could be the victims of such denigrating attitudes on the part of Russian, Chinese, Dutch and French imperialists. And the Japanese came to have much the same attitude towards China, believing that Chinese backwardness disqualified China from proper nation-statehood. Another issue was the relative importance of broad ethnic identities over narrow ones. The Chao Phraya river valley was the centre of Siam,

the kingdom of the Thai people of mainland Southeast Asia, but the category 'Thai' could also encompass the Lao of the middle reaches of the Mekong, the Lanna Thai of Chiangmai, the Shan of eastern Burma, and several smaller groups in China and Vietnam. Similarly, the term 'Mongol' sometimes included, sometimes excluded, groups such as the Kalmyk of the Volga basin, the Buriyat of the Transbaikalia and the Daur (Daghur) of northeastern Inner Mongolia. In many parts of Asia, in fact, the different ethnic groups were so intermingled that it was impossible to imagine drawing borders which would satisfy any principle of ethnic self-determination. Instead, most notably in Indonesia, it was necessary to imagine nations built on some other idea, such as modernity or religion.

Japan complicated this already tangled situation because it redrew many of the political boundaries in the region. During its long incursion outside the Japanese archipelago, Japan took control of Okinawa, Taiwan, Korea, Karafuto (Sakhalin) and the Pacific islands of Nan'yō, backed puppet administrations in Siberia and the Russian Far East, created a wholly new state in Manchukuo, sponsored quasi-autonomous governments among the Mongols and in various parts of China, dramatically expanded the borders of Thailand and correspondingly contracted those of Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Malaya, and ended the political unity of the Netherlands Indies by establishing separate administrations over Sumatra, Java and eastern Indonesia. They did all these things moreover in the context of challenging and defeating the Western colonial powers and creating a broad Asian empire under Japanese hegemony. This willingness and power to redraw boundaries forced the Japanese to consider just what the basis for nation-building might be in the various parts of Asia they dominated and opened to the people of those regions new opportunities to imagine different kinds of national futures.

Finally, discussing national identities allows us to set them against Japan's attempts – for the most part unsuccessful – to create a pan-Asian imperial identity. It was one thing for Japan to propose itself as a developmental model for other parts of Asia or for Japan to intervene ostensibly in support of unfulfilled national aspirations of Tibetans, Mongols or Southeast Asians. Neither of these proposals, however, created a clear justification for imperial rule in the eyes of their new subjects. On the other hand, the persistently heard argument – even if it was unevenly promoted and often inconsistent – that Japan's Asian identity gave it a special role in the region put forward a different kind of identity which was both trans-national and quasi-national.

JAPAN AS MODEL

While the late twentieth century interest in Japan was as an economic model, in the period from 1895 Asians at first saw Japan primarily as a political, social and technological model. Asian observers were struck most of all by the fact that Japan appeared to have taken the technological strengths of Western civilization and yet had preserved the best of its own culture. By contrast, Indian observers of Japan, as Van Bijlert shows in his chapter for this volume, believed that their own society had absorbed the worst of Westernization while remaining mired in obscurantist tradition. The aspiration to blend the best of East and West was a widespread phenomenon across Asia in this period. Koreans talked of 'Eastern ways, Western machines' (*Dong-do Seo-ki*) and the Chinese of 'Chinese learning, Western technology' (*Zhongti Xiyong*), both echoing Japan's own 'Japanese spirit, Western talent' (*Wakon Yōsai*). Even in The Philippines, whose people were uncomfortably aware that they had absorbed much Western civilization during the long period of Spanish and American rule, there was a strong feeling that the most appropriate path was to draw from both traditional values and Western achievement.

Many Asians also admired what they saw as a sense of discipline among the Japanese. They felt that their own societies were disordered and divided, and that disorder and division had allowed the West to dominate them. The discipline of Japanese society seemed to arise both from inner values and from means of organization. Indian observers drew hope from what they saw as connections between Japanese *Bushido* – literally the way of the warrior, which they saw as the essence of Japanese self-sacrificing discipline and devotion – and the Vedanta, a set of ancient Indian precepts and insights which provided much of the underlying philosophy of Hinduism. In Thailand, General Phibun developed a national code, the Fourteen Wiratham, which he seems to have based partly on interpretations of Japanese-style discipline as it could be applied to Thai society.[7]

In those Asian societies which felt the immediate effects of Japanese expansionism – China after 1895, Korea after 1910 and Southeast Asia after 1941 – this rather spiritual admiration of Japan quickly gave way to a much more utilitarian, calculating and limited view of Japan's possible usefulness, even to a determination not to use Japan as a model. Japan became as much a threat as a model.[8] Some Chinese intellectuals were unwilling to regard Japan as anything but a convenient means by which they might get access to Western technology and training. Even though Japan was one of the main channels by which China

learnt of the West and even though it was often difficult for Chinese to tell what was 'authentically' Western and what was Japanese, these intellectuals were not prepared to concede that China might improve its position by learning from the Japanese model. However, this reluctance to learn from Japan was not simply a matter of refusal to consider ideas from a supposedly derivative culture but also a consequence of the very different social and economic conditions in the two countries that made Japanese 'lessons' very difficult to adapt to Chinese circumstances. In societies which were actually ruled by the Japanese, this resistance to the Japanese model became still stronger. Jose's chapter in this volume describes a multitude of ways in which Filipinos resisted Japan's attempts to strengthen its cultural authority in the archipelago. Caprio's chapter shows how strong, shrewd and varied was Korean resistance to the Japanese policy of assimilation.

Even in regions where there was no especial aversion to learning from Japan, the Japanese model was often seen as offering specific technical example rather than broader cultural lessons. As Hyer's chapter demonstrates, whereas the Japanese were interested in Tibet because of a perception of common Buddhist culture, the Tibetans were mainly interested in the technical aspects of Japan's modernity, such as military training. Much the same applied to the Mongols, Indonesians and Burmese, who learnt Japanese techniques in areas as diverse as military discipline, hygiene, agriculture and animal husbandry, without imagining that they thereby acquired Japanese culture. At most, the Japanese sponsorship of modern education among the Mongols may have strengthened the value attached to such education after the Japanese departed, while the closure of schools and colleges in Indonesia may have weakened the intelligentsia, but it is hard to see these changes as part of any adoption of Japanese views of the world. Satō's chapter indicates that Japan's brief period of rule in Java was barely enough even to transmit a few Japanese technical skills, let alone deep-seated elements of Japanese culture. It is true that after the Second World War, the sudden strength of Southeast Asian nationalist movements led some observers to believe that the Japanese had somehow inculcated militaristic values into Southeast Asian societies.[9] For the most part, however, what the Southeast Asians, like the Tibetans and Mongols, learned were technical skills not worldviews, though for the Mongols educational opportunities expanded greatly under Japanese influence.

The Japanese themselves at first had no idea that other parts of Asia might see them as a model. In the late nineteenth century the Japanese thinker Fukuzawa

Yukichi still saw Japan as a semi-civilized country, inferior to Europe in most respects.[10] As they looked beyond the shores of Japan, however, the Japanese could hardly help but notice the far greater chaos and decay in neighbouring China and they began to imagine that they could 'escape' from Asia by modernizing. Still, the idea that Japan might lead other countries along the same path had not yet emerged. Especially after their victory in the war with Russia in 1904–1905, however, the Japanese increasingly became aware of the admiration which their achievements aroused in the region. As Japan began its process of territorial expansion in the twentieth century, it began to regard itself not just as a model for the rest of Asia but also as the destined leader of Asia. It began to make considerable use of the argument that it was bringing to the rest of Asia the social and political values that had delivered it such success. Japan's march into Taiwan and Korea was accompanied by a rhetoric reminiscent of the contemporaneous 'White Man's Burden'.[11] Japan claimed to have come to these regions to raise them from poverty and ignorance and to reshape them as modern societies in the Japanese image. Japan's developmentalist order in Taiwan, as Huang's chapter shows, left many Taiwanese with at least a grudging appreciation of the order and prosperity of the Japanese period.

The idea of Japan as a model for modernity was especially important in Japan's construction of a platform for establishing Manchukuo after 1931 and in creating a new political order elsewhere in northern China thereafter. Manchukuo, created to detach Manchuria from China and bring it under Japanese domination, had the superficial form of a successor state to the Manchu dynasty expelled from China in 1911. With Chinese constituting a large majority of the population, however, it was difficult to justify Manchukuo's existence on ethnic grounds alone. Instead, the Japanese constructed Manchukuo as an explicitly multi-ethnic state in which the two indigenous ethnic groups, Manchus and Mongols, were to be in partnership with the immigrant Chinese, Japanese and Koreans in a state nominally dedicated to delivering modernity and prosperity to all and peace and harmony among the ethnic groups.[12] Mitter's chapter describes how the Japanese and various Chinese groups constructed competing paradigms of modernity in the Manchurian arena. Similarly, Dryburgh shows how Japan sponsored local autonomy movements in North China not by promoting cultural Japanization but by presenting what was meant to be a paradigm of modernity and peace which they were sure would be attractive in the war-torn and poverty-stricken region.[13]

The Japanese model, however, was not always as successful in reality as it seemed to promise in theory. Practices which were effective in the Japanese social environment could not always be transferred to other societies with different customs and cultural or social forms. Many Muslims in Indonesia, for instance, objected to being required to bow in the direction of Tokyo because this action seemed to be one of paying religious respect to a human being. Mongols objected to Japanese medical practices which did not have the approval of the Buddhist lamas. Language difficulties alone were often a major obstacle to the transmission of information and techniques. The hygienic practices, too, which worked well enough in Northeast Asia were totally inadequate when Japanese troops arrived in Southeast Asia. Thousands of Japanese troops and tens of thousands of Southeast Asians in their charge died as a result of inadequate sanitation and hygienic precautions in the tropics.[14] Even when the technology available was appropriate, the Japanese empire soon became so large that Japan had insufficient technical experts available to cover every region properly. Technical instruction in the colonies was therefore often in the hands of people with less than adequate knowledge and experience.

JAPAN AND THE REDRAWING OF POLITICAL BOUNDARIES IN ASIA

Japan's earliest imperial encounters with other ethnic groups took place in sparsely populated northern Honshu and Hokkaido, where it displaced, absorbed and assimilated the indigenous Ainu.[15] The people of the Ryukyu Islands to the south of Japan, conquered in the 1870s, were also absorbed into the Japanese ethnic identity without any thought of giving them a distinct status. Sparsely populated Karafuto, ceded by Russia after the Russo–Japanese War, was treated much the same way as Hokkaido. The acquisition of Taiwan from China under the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 and the annexation of Korea in 1910, however, presented Japan with new challenges because the populations of these territories were so much greater than those of Hokkaido or Ryukyu. In both territories, Japan adopted an official policy of assimilation, ostensibly seeking to turn Taiwanese and Koreans into Japanese by having them learn the Japanese language and adopt Japanese culture and, particularly in Korea, by suppressing the indigenous language and culture. This policy, however, was never consistently pursued. On the one hand, the Japanese could see clear advantages in

binding the Taiwanese and Koreans as closely as possible to the Japanese nation, both for the sake of security in the colonies and in order to use them as reliable officials and soldiers in their wider empire. On the other hand, the Japanese had constant doubts about whether millions of Taiwanese and Koreans could or should become fully Japanese.

The reasons for these doubts are complex and have never been fully explored. They seem to have included a racial feeling that the blood of Koreans and Taiwanese was different and could not – or should not – be absorbed into that of the Japanese (although the Ainu were ethnically even more remote from the Japanese). They also appear to have included the suspicion that Chinese and Korean cultures could never be fully erased from the souls of Chinese and Koreans whereas supposedly less advanced cultures – Ainu and Ryukyu – were less deeply engraved. Japanese attitudes to Chinese civilization were particularly ambivalent: they often regarded Chinese civilization as worn-out and hidebound, but they nonetheless had to acknowledge the achievements of Chinese civilization and Japan's long cultural debt to Chinese models. Since Japanese respect for Korean culture was distinctly less than their respect for Chinese culture, the assimilation programme was correspondingly much stronger in Korea than in Taiwan. The Japanese were probably also aware of the enormous cost in time and energy involved in seriously attempting to assimilate large populations. The Taiwanese were always more reconciled to Japanese rule than were the Koreans – partly because dissatisfied Taiwanese could flee to the mainland – whereas colonial rule faced determined resistance from the Koreans, perhaps encouraging the conclusion that assimilation was the only strategy likely to guarantee Japanese rule in the long term. (Assimilation, of course, has been a common strategy of imperial powers seeking to deal with unruly minorities.) The Japanese may also have felt that leaving subject Koreans and Chinese with fewer civil rights than Japanese would facilitate the total mobilization of human and natural resources in the new territories, although Japanese subjects in Japan had few enough political and economic rights in this era. And they may have felt that if the full assimilation of the Taiwanese and Koreans could not be achieved, then it was better to make the distinction between them and the 'true' Japanese as clear as possible in order to avoid practical and administrative uncertainties.

During the first half of the twentieth century, both colonies were gradually integrated more closely into the Japanese political structure. In 1919, the governor-general of Korea became responsible to the government of the day,

rather than directly to the Emperor and in 1929 a new Minister of Colonial Affairs began to supervise colonial administration from within the cabinet. In 1942 the governors-general of Taiwan and Korea were brought under the direct authority of the Japanese home affairs minister, as well as under the authority of the ministers of finance, agriculture, education, commerce and industry, communications, and transport in their respective areas. In principle, the governors-general were thus reduced to the same level as a prefectural governor.[16] Koreans and Taiwanese were Japanese subjects but they still remained less than Japanese, both in the colonies and in Japan itself. Corporal punishment, although abolished in Japan, was a standard part of the repertoire of punishment in Taiwan, and only for Taiwanese. Access to higher education for Koreans was limited, in Korea and Japan, and Koreans and Taiwanese were never permitted to rise to senior posts in the Japanese armed forces.[17] On the other hand, Koreans living in Japan could vote in Japanese elections and one Korean was even elected to the Imperial Diet.[18] The contradictory processes of assimilation and exclusion in the Japanese empire formed a constant theme throughout the imperial era and were a major element in the dissatisfaction of colonized peoples with Japanese rule: to be pressured to abandon their own cultures for Japanese culture was traumatic enough, but to find that familiarity with Japanese culture still did not lead to equal rights or to social acceptance was every bit as destructive of confidence in colonialism as earlier Western racial discrimination had been.

The relative indigestibility of Korea and Taiwan, and defeat in Siberia, described by Stolberg in this volume, helped convince Japanese policy-makers that a more subtle political strategy would be needed if they were to create a larger sphere of influence in Asia. As Stegewerns points out, too, by the end of the 1910s the global environment had turned decisively against the creation of new colonial empires. Self-determination had become an accepted principle in international affairs. It might not yet have been strong enough to dismantle the Western colonial empires, but it became a significant obstacle to any Japanese ideas of simply annexing new territories as they had annexed Korea. Japan did expand its empire after the First World War by acquiring control of former German colonies in the northern Pacific but it ruled them under League of Nations mandates which required Japan to develop those territories for eventual independence. The irony of Japan committing itself to the eventual independence of small Pacific islands while refusing to contemplate independence for Korea was not lost on Korean nationalists.

Japan's expansion into Taiwan and Korea resembled the colonial expansion of the Western powers, but after the First World War Japan had to take a different approach to spreading its influence. As Japan extended its power into Manchuria and further afield in Asia, it was constrained by practical and diplomatic considerations from simply making further annexations. In place of straightforward colonialism, therefore, Japan sought to construct its larger Asian empire as a constellation of states, regions and peoples under a broad Japanese political and cultural hegemony. In some respects, this new order in East Asia simply involved a shift from the hierarchical European and Chinese colonial orders to a still hierarchical Japanese colonial order. As Stegewerns shows, however, Japanese hegemony was to be based partly on Japan's claims to superior cultural capacity to deliver modernity, and partly on the idea that Japan shared cultural values with the rest of Asia which it did not share with the West. In this respect, Japan drew from the dominant discourses of both Western and Chinese imperialism.

After 1931, therefore, Japan worked to create a series of regional governments which were neither colonial territories nor truly independent. The 'jewel in the crown' of Japanese imperialism[19] was the state of Manchukuo, founded in 1932. At its height in the early 1940s, however, the Japanese empire consisted of a complicated hierarchy of allied and subordinate states and governments. Thailand, which had been an independent state before the war, was formally an ally of Japan, though Japanese troops were present on Thai soil and the Japanese exercised considerable influence on Thai policy as far as it affected the war effort. Manchukuo, together with the Republics of Burma and the Philippines, both created in 1943, have generally been termed 'puppet states', implying that although they were nominally sovereign, independent states they were subject to Japanese military occupation and their policy in practice was subject to Japanese instruction. The isolated Andaman and Nicobar Islands were formally handed to the puppet of India (Azad Hind) under Subhas Chandra Bose, though there was evidently not even a symbolic change in the administration of the islands. In Indochina and Macao, the Japanese retained European colonial administrations effectively also as puppet governments under Japanese instruction.[20] Between 1935 and 1945, the Japanese established dependent governments, administrations, territories and councils in various parts of China, some of them based on ethnicity (Mongol) but most of them regionally focused. These included the East Hopeh Anti-Communist Autonomous Council, founded in 1935, the

Mongolian Military Government (1936), the South Chahar Autonomous Government (1937), the North Shansi Autonomous Council (1936), the Mongolian Allied Leagues' Autonomous Government (1937) and the Mongolian Allied Autonomous Government (1939). Finally, the rest of Japan's empire was under military rule, generally flanked with some kind of local consultative council.

The term 'puppet state' is contentious. It appears to have entered the English language initially as a description of the state of Manchukuo and is mostly used to refer to the nominally independent states created within the German and Japanese empires during the Second World War.[21] The phenomenon, however, is both older and broader. At the end of the eighteenth century, Napoleon established a series of nominally independent republics in parts of Europe not annexed to France – the Batavian, Helvetic, Cisalpine, Ligurian, Roman and Parthenopaean Republics – though these states are not usually referred to as puppets. The states dominated by Soviet Russia and later the Soviet Union – Mongolia, Tannu Tuva and the short-lived Far Eastern Republic between the wars and the Warsaw Pact countries after the Second World War – were generally called satellites rather than puppets, while states similarly affiliated with the United States have generally been called neo-colonies or client states. This variety of terminology, of course, indicates that the category of puppet state can shade imperceptibly into other forms of domination and alliance. Although state sovereignty is a formal principle of international affairs, only superpowers are ever in a position to act with unfettered sovereignty. In all these cases, the terminology is pejorative and tends to obscure the complexity of the relationship between the hegemonic power and its local subjects. Puppets, satellites and clients did the bidding of the dominant power in some respects, but they generally existed because the dominant power could not simply exercise its authority directly, mainly because of the strength of local nationalism and international criticism. They can be interpreted as an attempt to conceal the reality of external hegemony but they could often also serve local interests distinct from, and even in conflict with, those of the hegemonic power. Manchukuo, the various Japanese-sponsored governments in North China and the 'Reorganized National Government' of China headed by Wang Ching-wei (Wang Jingwei) did the bidding of the Japanese in most respects but they also reflected and responded to the legitimate and long-standing interests of their subjects. Still more so, the Japanese-sponsored Republics of Burma and The Philippines, and later the Empire of Vietnam and the Kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia built on

and reflected the interests of Southeast Asian nationalist and aristocratic elites. Guillemot's chapter makes clear that major differences of opinion and conflicts of interest could develop between the Japanese and local nationalists within a puppet state framework. Dismissing local leaders as puppets of the Japanese was also a convenient way of dismissing the emerging national identities which they represented.

In constructing puppet states and puppet governments, the Japanese demonstrated the same ambivalence towards ethnic and national identity which they had shown in Taiwan and Korea. They had a strong inclination to regard national identity as highly malleable but equally they saw the unfulfilled aspirations of national groups as a significant force which could be used to recruit people to their side. This ambivalence was strikingly expressed in Japan's policies towards the Mongols of Manchukuo. The Japanese valued the Mongols, the territory's second largest ethnic group after the Chinese, as a counterweight to that Chinese majority, enabling the Japanese to demonstrate that Manchukuo was a multi-ethnic state.[22] At the same time, they realized that there was an opportunity to win the support of Mongols in the central and western parts of Inner Mongolia by promoting the idea of a larger independent Mongol state. They even had vain hopes, as Batbayar's chapter shows, of using Manchukuo to help detach Outer Mongolia from the Soviet orbit, even if, as Nakami indicates, there was never any coherent plan to bring Outer Mongolia under Japanese suzerainty. The Japanese encouraged the Mongols of western Inner Mongolia, led by Prince Demchughdongrob (generally called De Wang or Prince De), to establish the Mongolian Allied Leagues' Autonomous Government under Japanese sponsorship in 1937. After 1937, however, the Japanese launched their full-scale war on China and political considerations relating to China began to overshadow those relating to the Mongols. Particularly after the creation of the government of Wang Ching-wei in Nanking in 1940, the Japanese realized the political importance to the Chinese of preventing further erosion of China's borders. Accordingly, they refused to allow the Mongols to proceed towards independence and created instead a so-called Mongolian Autonomous Dominion which remained formally a part of the Chinese Republic.[23]

In Southeast Asia, the Japanese showed a similar mixture of calculated exploitation of and disregard for ethnic identity. They permitted Thailand to expand its borders to encompass territories which it had lost to the British and French in the early twentieth century, but these territories included both regions

which were Thai in the broad sense – parts of Laos and some of the Shan states in Burma – and regions whose people were ethnically very different from the Thai – the northern states of British Malaya and the eastern provinces of Cambodia. When the Japanese granted independence to Vietnam in March 1945, they retained control of the southernmost part of the country, the former French colony of Cochin China, despite clear messages that this decision was an affront to Vietnamese nationalism.

The new borders which Japan drew in Asia did not themselves create new identities. Manchukuo, in particular, was conspicuously unsuccessful in creating a sense of national identity among its diverse peoples, and Japan's division of the Netherlands Indies into three separate administrative zones failed to fracture the broad sense of Indonesian national identity which had developed in the archipelago under Dutch rule. Rather, the Japanese actions created a wider sense of opportunity among peoples who felt that they had not yet achieved national fulfilment in a nation-state of their own. Tibetans saw a chance to consolidate their de facto independence into internationally recognized sovereignty. Mongols imagined a larger Mongolian state free of great power domination. Local Chinese politicians imagined a China in which decentralization would mean efficiency and progress, rather than the corruption, brutality and disorder of the warlord era. Thais imagined a state restored to its former centrality in mainland Southeast Asia, and Indonesians toyed briefly with the idea of extending their boundaries to encompass closely related peoples in the Malay peninsula, northern Borneo and eastern Timor.

With military defeat in 1945, Japan's attempts to reshape the borders of Asia came to nothing. The only borders that Japan ended up changing were its own. Japan's influence on national identities, however, was much more significant and lasting, although largely unintended. Japan's engagement with Siberia and Outer Mongolia (see the chapters of Stolberg and Batbayar) contributed to cementing those two regions into the Soviet world. Without Japan's aggressive movement towards the Russian Far East in the 1920s and 1930s, it is doubtful whether the Soviet Union would have been interested in investing such energy in securing the formal independence of Outer Mongolia from China. Japan's involvement with the Mongols in Manchukuo and western Inner Mongolia encouraged Mongol hopes for greater autonomy from China. In consequence, the Chinese Communist Party reversed the absorption of Mongol lands into Chinese provinces and in 1947 reconstituted Inner Mongolia as an autonomous

region. Similarly, the puppet independence which Japan granted to Burma in 1943, and to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in 1945 and which it had planned for Indonesia later in 1945, sharpened the hopes of nationalists in all those regions for a speedy end to colonialism.[24] In both Indonesia and Inner Mongolia, however, the alliance of local nationalist aspirations with the broader strategic plans of the Japanese created grave difficulties for the local nationalists once the Japanese were defeated. Prince De fled to Outer Mongolia; he was later jailed by the new communist government in China and was made to confess that his actions during the war years had been traitorous to China.[25] Indonesia's foremost nationalist leader, Sukarno, who had worked with the Japanese and who was chosen as president of the independent Republic of Indonesia declared after Japan's surrender, was anathematized by the Dutch and other Western powers and the Republic was contemptuously dismissed as 'made in Japan'.[26]

THE FAILURE OF A PAN-ASIAN IDENTITY

Japan's imperial venture shows intriguing parallels to the empire-building of Napoleonic France in Europe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Both societies were initially successful in sweeping away an old international order because they combined both technical military skills and the ability to mobilize their own people for a sustained war effort. Both stimulated the rise of nationalism beyond their original national borders and presented themselves as liberators from older oppressive orders: Habsburg in Europe, Chinese and European in Asia. Then, when imperial expansion had brought them control of some of those regions, they used a 'puppet state' format to accommodate the nationalisms there. The Batavian Republic in the Netherlands, for instance, was not merely a Napoleonic puppet, but a reflection of anti-oligarchic political forces in Dutch society. Both empires foundered partly because they were overextended; they encountered determined resistance on a variety of fronts, both from well-established older powers and from conquered peoples. Each of them, moreover, placed the political unification of a continent on the agenda. Just as Napoleon clothed French imperialism in a vision of a united Europe, so Japan clothed its expansion in a pan-Asian vision.

The Chinese tribute system had long offered a vision of (East) Asian unity, based on China's position at the core of East Asian culture.[27] Japan's empire-building was the first major sign of the emergence of a broad new ideology of

'Asianism'. The concept of Asianism included the idea that Asian societies might have something fundamental in common and that the depth of Asian civilization might provide a basis for modern achievement. As Van Bijlert's chapter shows, by the early twentieth century, Indian thinkers were beginning to lay the basis for an ideology of common Asian values in which Japan had an important, though not dominant, role. By the time of its annexation of Korea, Japan had begun to employ a sentiment summed up by the wartime slogan 'Asia for the Asians'. The argument that Japan was liberating Asia from the twin menaces of Western imperialism and malign communism became increasingly prominent in Japanese imperial discourse. Whereas the discourses describing Japan as a model and as a benefactor of nationalism placed Japan and Asia on opposite sides of an exchange, this formulation gave Japan and Asia identical interests. Both wanted to exclude the West and exclude communism; Japan claimed leadership on the grounds that it was the most developed of Asian countries at the time, not because it was somewhat different from the rest.[28] In the case of Manchukuo, the Japanese used neo-traditionalist concepts such as 'the kingly way (*ōdō*) and 'harmony of the five ethnic groups' (*gozoku kyōwa*) to portray Manchukuo as a Pan-Asian polity guided by classical Confucian political principles, but Confucian principles were not especially useful in seeking to include the countries of Southeast Asia which, apart from Vietnam and the Chinese diaspora, were well outside the Chinese cultural world. The discourse of Asianism culminated in the concept of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, launched in 1940 on the eve of the invasion of Southeast Asia. The Co-Prosperity Sphere implied that Japan and its Asian empire had complementary interests and that bringing them together in a single framework would be beneficial to all.

In reality, however, most of this discourse remained no more than discourse. The idea of liberation from the West was enormously popular in Indonesia, where Dutch rule had seemed deeply entrenched.[29] The Japanese were much less welcome in the Philippines, however, where the Americans had promised to grant independence in 1946 in any case, or in Vietnam, where the Japanese allowed the Vichy French colonial administration to retain power. Policy-making in the Japanese empire, moreover, was always diffuse. Local authorities often pursued policies which had little direct connection with the intentions of the government in Tokyo. The confused and often contradictory actions of different authorities made it virtually impossible to develop any sense of overall imperial purpose apart from winning the war. Under pressure of war, Japan lacked the

opportunity to develop institutions which might have opened up the imperial administration to capable people from all across the empire. As such, while local elites in the Japanese empire sometimes found that their interests coincided with those of the Japanese, they never developed durable interests in the imperial enterprise as a whole. The economic dimension of the empire, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, proved particularly unrewarding. In Manchukuo and North China, Japan created what has been described as a modern enclave economy which was highly integrated with the domestic Japanese economy but which brought fewer benefits to local communities.[30] Japan's rule left a significant legacy in Korea, Taiwan and Manchukuo in the form of infrastructure and expanded agricultural and industrial production, but while the empire was in place the benefits of these developments were less clear. Japan's modern economy, moreover, was still much too small to absorb the agricultural and artisanal production of the vast hinterland which Japan had acquired, especially with its Southeast Asian conquests. Establishing close connections between the Japanese economy and the economies of other regions was made still more difficult by wartime disruption, particularly American submarine activity in the South China Sea. As a result, vast plantation areas in Southeast Asia went to ruin because there was no market for their crops.[31] But even if the Sphere had worked more as it was intended, the result would hardly have been favourable for the durability of the empire, because Japan had in mind no more co-prosperity than would be created by centralizing industrial production in the north (that is Japan, Taiwan and Korea, with Manchukuo and North China) and leaving the outer colonies as producers of raw materials.

NOTES

1 We would like to thank Mark Selden and an anonymous reviewer for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this Introduction.

2 By the term 'identity' we refer to a sense of distinctiveness from others. All people operate, of course, with multiple identities, public and private, but our concern here is with those identities associated with ethnicity, territory and culture. We refer to this cluster of identifications as 'national identities', and we use this term, rather than 'nationalism', because it allows us to deal with more than one level of identity and with overlapping identities, whereas nationalism is generally understood to be exclusive and to operate only in relation to a (sometimes imagined)

nation-state. In many definitions, too, nationalism implies a political programme, whereas national identity may or may not be linked to direct political aspirations. In some contexts, as in some chapters in this book, the two terms can be used almost interchangeably.

3 The role of Japanese actions in intensifying nationalism in the territories they occupied or how they may have changed the balance of power between various potential bearers of the nationalist banner is a complicated and controversial. In the case of China, there is a substantial literature arguing for and against the proposition that Japanese intervention was decisive in helping the Chinese communists to claim leadership of Chinese nationalist aspirations. This literature is ably summarized in the Epilogue of Mark Selden, *China in Revolution: The Yenan Way Revisited* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 222–258.

Similar issues have been raised for Vietnam, where it has been suggested that Ho Chi Minh's ability to cast himself as anti-French and anti-Japanese during the war years enabled him to become the main expositor of Vietnamese nationalism. Sukarno's position in the Indonesian nationalist movement, on the other hand, is said to have been strengthened by the public prominence he achieved as a leading collaborator with the occupation authorities. In the case of Indonesia there has also been considerable discussion of the role of Japanese military training in shaping the political attitudes of the later Indonesian armed forces. On Vietnam, see David Marr, *Vietnam 1945: The Quest for Power* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); on Indonesia, see J.D. Legge, *Sukarno: A Political Biography* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972).

4 The defeat of the British, Americans and Dutch in Southeast Asia in 1941–1942, and the Japanese coup de force against the French in Indochina on 9 March 1945 had a similarly electrifying effect in those regions as demonstrations of the limits of Western power. The circumstances of war, however, gave Southeast Asians less opportunity to reflect on the nature of Japan's power.

5 Shamsul A.B. has coined the useful term 'nations-of-intent' to describe the many overlapping nations which can sometimes be imagined in a single geographical space. See Shamsul A.B., 'Nations-of-Intent in Malaysia', in Stein Tønnesson and Hans Antlöv (eds), *Asian Forms of the Nation* (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1996), pp. 323–347.

6 And when a separatist Republic of the South Moluccas was declared in 1950 it was widely assumed to be a puppet of the Dutch. Similar attitudes dismissed the viability of an independent East Timor after 1974.

7 Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, *Thailand's Durable Premier: Phibun through Three Decades, 1932–1957* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995).

8 Peter Duus (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Japan. Vol. 6. The Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 6–11.

9 See, for example, Mas Slamet, *Japanese Souls in Indonesian Bodies* (Batavia: s.n., 1946). For a more scholarly presentation of this argument, see Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, *Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics under the Japanese Occupation, 1944–1945* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Department of Far Eastern Studies, 1961).

10 W.G. Beasley, *The Rise of Modern Japan* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1990), p. 97.

11 'The White Man's Burden' was the title of a poem written by the British arch-imperialist Rudyard Kipling to encourage the United States to establish colonial rule in The Philippines after the Spanish-American War of 1898. For the full text of the poem, see *McClure's Magazine* 12 (Feb. 1899).

12 After a long period of neglect, Manchukuo is beginning to attract considerable attention from Western scholars. Important recent studies of the state include Gavan McCormack, 'Manchukuo: constructing the past', *East Asian History* 2 (Dec. 1991), pp. 105–124; the four chapters collected under the heading 'Japan's wartime empire and Northeast Asia', in Peter Duus et al. (eds), *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 71–186; Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Mariko Asano Tamanoi, 'Knowledge, Power, and Racial Classifications: The Japanese in Manchuria', *Journal of Asian Studies* 59:2 (May 2000), pp. 249–276; and Rana Mitter, *The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance, and Collaboration in Modern China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

13 See also Ramon H. Myers, 'Creating a modern enclave economy: the economic integration of Japan, Manchuria, and North China, 1932–1945', in Duus, et al. (eds), *Japanese Wartime Empire*, p. 159.

14 Shigeru Satō, *War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation, 1942–1945* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994).

15 See Richard Siddle, 'The Ainu and the discourse of "race"', in Frank Dikötter (ed.), *The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997), pp. 136–157; Tessa Morris-Suzuki, *Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998); and Kayano Shigeru, *Our Land was a Forest: An Ainu Memoir* (translated by Kyoko Selden and Lili Selden) (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1994).

16 Edward I-te Chen, 'The attempt to integrate the empire: legal perspectives', in Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (eds), *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 241–241, 264–265.

17 E. Patricia Tsurumi, 'Colonial education in Korea and Taiwan', in Myers and Peattie (eds.), *The Japanese Colonial Empire*, pp. 275–311; Seong-Cheol Oh and Ki-Seok Kim 'Japanese Colonial Education as a Contested Terrain: What Did Koreans Do in the Expansion of Elementary Schooling?', *Asia Pacific Education Review*, Vo1.1 (2000), pp. 75–90; Louise Young, 'Rethinking race for Manchukuo: self and other in the colonial context', in Dikötter (ed.), *The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan*, pp. 158–176.

18 Matsuda Toshihiko, *Senzenki no zai Nichi Chosen/jin to sanseiken* (Tokyo: Akashi shoten, 1995).

19 Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, p. 21.

20 The same was formally the case in Portuguese Timor, but because of fighting on the island the Portuguese administration was largely confined to the capital, Dili.

21 Slovakia, Croatia and Vichy France were the archetypal puppet states of Nazi-occupied Europe, with the status of existing states which were forced into alliance with the Nazis (Denmark, Hungary and Bulgaria) considered to be more ambiguous.

22 Reliable population figures for the number of Mongols in Manchukuo are not available, but it appears that they may have numbered around one million out of a population of about 30 million in 1932. The other minorities numbered only a few tens of thousands. During the next decade, large numbers of Japanese and Koreans migrated to Manchukuo, and it has been estimated that their numbers had reached 1.5 million by 1945.

23 On this complicated period, see Sechin Jagchid, *The Last Mongol Prince: The Life and Times of Demchugdongrob, 1902–1966* (Bellingham: Western Washington University Press, 1999).

24 See Alfred W. McCoy (ed.), *Southeast Asia under Japanese Occupation* (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies Monograph Series 22, 1980); Geoffrey C. Gunn, *Political Struggles in Laos (1930–1954): Vietnamese Communist Power and the Lao Struggle for National Independence* (Bangkok: Duang Kamol, 1988), pp. 123–125. The independence granted to The Philippines in 1943 had little effect on nationalist aspirations, because before the war the United States had already promised independence in 1946 and had devolved most of the functions of government to the Philippine elite.

25 Domuchokudonropu, *Tokuō jiden* [A biography of Prince De] (transl. by Mori Hisao) (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1994).

26 P. S. Gerbrandy, *Indonesia* (London: Hutchinson, 1950), pp. 65–71.

27 It is sometimes suggested that the Chinese tribute system also covered large parts of Southeast Asia, but this perception was more in the eye of the Chinese court than in the minds of the Southeast Asians.

28 There was also a Japanese discourse at that time which focused on Japan's alleged spiritual and cultural uniqueness and its qualities as a god-protected land, but this discourse was limited in its appeal to anyone who was not Japanese.

29 See Anthony Reid and Oki Akira (eds), *The Japanese Experience in Indonesia: Selected Memoirs of 1942–1945* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University, 1986), p. 34.

30 See Ramon H. Myers, 'Creating a modern enclave economy: the economic integration of Japan, Manchuria, and North China, 1932–1945', in Duus, et al. (eds), *Japanese Wartime Empire*, pp. 136–170.

31 See for instance G. Rodenburg, 'De suikerindustrie op Java tijdens de bezetting', *Economisch Weekblad van Nederlandsch-Indië* 12:5 (13 April 1946), pp. 38–40, and 12:6 (20 April 1946), pp. 145–146.

CHAPTER ONE

The Icon of Japan in Nationalist Revolutionary Discourse in India, 1890–1910

VICTOR A. VAN BIJLERT

RADICAL NATIONALISM IN INDIA

The late nineteenth century in colonial India witnessed a period of rapid cultural and political change. Within a few decades, Indian nationalism transformed itself from cultural opposition to the West into political activism aiming at total independence from the British Empire. This chapter will deal with a little analysed source of inspiration for early Indian anti-colonial nationalism, namely Japan. We will look at Indian radical nationalism (sometimes also called 'Extremism') as it was theorized and disseminated between 1890 and 1910 and the ways in which Japan was presented within it as a model and an iconic example. The year 1890 marks the beginning of the dissemination of radical nationalist discourse in colonial India. This discourse was predominantly Hindu religious and exhortatory in tone and remained so for several decades. It tried to impart self-confidence and a feeling of self-worth in the Indian public. The year 1910 witnessed a dramatic increase in nationalist terrorism. Indian nationalism had moved from cultural discourse to revolutionary action.

Commenting on Benedict Anderson's powerful thesis of nationalism as the construction of an 'imagined community', Partha Chatterjee argues that Anderson leaves the 'non-West' with nothing of its own:

> If nationalisms in the rest of the world have to choose their imagined community from certain 'modular' forms already made available to them by Europe and the Americas, what do they have left to imagine?

> History … has decreed that we in the postcolonial world shall only be perpetual consumers of modernity. Europe and the Americas … have thought out on our behalf not only the script of colonial enlightenment and exploitation, but also that of our anti-colonial resistance … .[1]

In an earlier book, Chatterjee articulates the same problem in the form of a rhetorical question:

> why is it that non-European colonial countries have no historical alternative but to try to approximate the given attributes of modernity when that very process of approximation means their continued subjection under a world order which only sets their tasks for them and over which they have no control?[2]

Chatterjee points to a major historiographical problem, namely: how do we recognize different forms of nationalism? This problem leads to a string of related issues: how much do non-Western nationalisms owe to Western hegemonic models of modernity? Is it possible to conceive of anti-colonial self-definition and nationalist struggle without following master-models designed by the West? Is it possible to have modernity without Western hegemony? In a very pertinent way, Indian anti-colonial nationalism made this problem manifest and tried to answer it. I will discuss this nationalism as if it is a single phenomenon but I admit this position is an oversimplification. In fact, Indian nationalism consisted of a mix of different conceptions of what the nation had been and ought to become. But to the extent that these conceptions were all based on total rejection of British rule and the demand for full independence of India, they can be treated as various modes of the same intention. Thus these 'nationalisms' were modes of cultural and political emancipation.

In the nineteenth century the urbanized intelligentsia in and around Calcutta accepted Western modernity as far as the natural sciences, progressive political theory and economic theory were concerned. However, towards the end of the nineteenth century, when British rule did not offer much more to the indigenous intelligentsia than a 'subaltern' role in colonial society, the latter became increasingly critical of Western hegemony. They more and more resented the colonial state and the imposition of Western cultural models.

Cultivation of the indigenous languages through 'print-capitalism' and the creation of a modern indigenous written culture were the only means by which

Western hegemony could be resisted.[3] Culture was thus the earliest battleground for the clash between the West and Indian civilization. This clash was often formulated in terms of Western materialism versus Indian, mainly Hindu, spirituality. It was thought that India particularly excelled in the latter. Spirituality, especially understood as the philosophy of Vedanta, symbolized for many Indian intellectuals the feature that distinguished India from the materialist West. The term Vedanta primarily refers to the mystical insights and realizations recorded in the Upanishads (between the fifth and third centuries BCE) and the *Bhagavad Gita* (first century CE). The Upanishads are the philosophical portions of the earliest sacred Hindu texts, the Vedas. The *Bhagavad Gita* is not a portion of the Vedas, but is held in equally great reverence. Vedanta is a blend of monistic and monotheistic intuitions with various spiritual disciplines to 'realise' the Divine essence or Self within oneself and the cosmos. This aim is one of the key concepts of Vedanta. In the minds of many Hindu intellectuals, the ideas of self-improvement through spiritual disciplines and self-realization represent an Indian ideology of modernity.

Modernity, in whatever mode, can be interpreted as increasing self-awareness and the desire to gain control over one's own destiny; thus advancing towards modernity entails a universal trend towards greater individuality. Individuality and recognition by others of one's individuality can be gained on a personal level but also collectively. If a large collective like the nation seeks this individuality, we could call it the search for national identity. But we should never forget that the construction of a national identity is an imposition of homogeneity on to a non-homogeneous mass of persons.

Bankimchandra Chatterjee (1838–1894), the famous Bengali novelist, was one of the first Indian modernizing intellectuals who tried systematically to tackle the problem of western colonialism.[4] In his best-known Bengali novel *Anandamath* [Abbey of Bliss] (1882), Bankim (the usual shorthand for Bankimchandra) offered for the first time an imaginative blueprint for a successful uprising against the British.[5] The philosophical dialogue *Dharmatattva* [Essence of Religion] (1888), contains Bankim's theoretical search for the Indian nation on the basis of his understanding of the *Bhagavad Gita*. Bankim's importance lies in the fact that his writings became major sources of inspiration for anti-colonial nationalism. By propagating the Vedanta as modern Hinduism *par excellence* and as an ideology of modern Indian nationhood, Bankim set the tone for at least two decades of radical nationalism. Many later nationalists, among them M.K. Gandhi (1869–

1948) and Subhas Chandra Bose (1897–1945), referred to the Vedanta and the *Bhagavad Gita* as sources of inspiration for nationalist struggle.

INDIA'S SPIRITUAL SELF-DEFENCE: SWAMI VIVEKANANDA AND SISTER NIVEDITA

The Bengali religious leader, Swami Vivekananda (1863–1902) rapidly rose to all-Indian and international fame during the last decade of the nineteenth century.[6] Where Bankim wrote mostly in Bengali for the Bengali urban middle class, Vivekananda preached his messages of Hindu religious empowerment, Indian regeneration and cultural pride mostly in English to a global audience, including British, Americans, and of course the Indians at home. Whereas Bankim had never ventured outside India, Vivekananda travelled to Europe and America to preach his message of modern Vedanta. Although Japan did not figure much in his public speeches and writings, he referred to Japan in his letters and newspaper interviews. Vivekananda regarded Japan as the model for India: politically and culturally independent from Europe and yet a modern nation.[7] Japan was what India ought to become. In an interview in the newspaper *The Hindu* from February 1897 Vivekananda is reported to have said:

> The world has never seen such a patriotic and artistic race as the Japanese … [w]hile in Europe and elsewhere Art goes with dirt, Japanese Art is Art *plus* absolute cleanliness. I wish that every one of our young men could visit Japan … .[8]

The 'key to Japan's greatness' according to Vivekananda was the 'faith of the Japanese in themselves, and their love for their country. When you have men who are ready to sacrifice their everything for their country, sincere to the backbone – when such men arise, India will become great in every respect'.[9] But this greatness would not happen 'until all the three hundred millions of India combine together as a whole nation'.[10] Vivekananda regarded the whole of the then British Indian Empire as the realm out of which the Indian nation had to be moulded. The Indian nation of the future would have to form an unbroken unitary community. And Japan was one of the examples of successfully welding together a nation.

In Vivekananda's estimation, Japan was in a process of modernizing without losing its sense of self-identity. Japan was not senselessly copying the West like

the urban educated Indians, by which Vivekananda primarily meant Calcuttans. In a recorded conversation held probably around 1900, Vivekananda stated:

> in Japan, you find a fine assimilation of knowledge, and not its indigestion, as we have here. They have taken everything from the Europeans, but they remain Japanese all the same, and have not turned European; while in our country, the terrible mania of becoming Westernised has seized upon us like a plague.[11]

Japan had modernized itself but the Japanese national identity was kept intact, according to Vivekananda. He had briefly visited Japan in 1893 when he was travelling from India to the United States. In a letter dated 10 July 1893 he wrote approvingly of Japan in contrast to China. His brief experience of Japan had revealed to him the stark contrast with India. In his opinion Indians had been sitting down 'these hundreds of years with an ever-increasing load of crystallized superstition' in their heads. In the same letter he continued his diatribe: 'Kick out the priests who are always against progress. … They are the offspring of centuries of superstition and tyranny. … Come out of your narrow holes and have a look abroad. See how nations are on the march'.[12] What Japan offered to Vivekananda was the vision of an Asian nation that was powerful enough to rise to modern standards. The sole purpose of his sharp criticism of Indians (of which this letter offers only one example) was to exhort them to become strong on the basis of their own religious traditions. These, according to Vivekananda, culminated in the philosophy and spirituality of the Vedanta.

In his preaching, Vivekananda taught modernity and a gospel of national regeneration on the basis of the Vedanta, but he carefully formulated this new Vedanta in such terms as would fit the challenges posed by Western modernity. Vivekananda transformed the Vedanta from a highly scholastic Brahminical theology or philosophy into a message of spiritual and social empowerment with universalist claims. In a letter to Sarala Ghosal dated 6 April 1897 he complained: 'We have the doctrine of Vedanta, but we have not the power to reduce it into practice'.[13] In a second letter to Sarala Ghosal dated 24 April 1897 he wrote about the Indian lack of self-respect and self-reliance:

> the Indian people have not yet the least faith in themselves, not to speak of self-reliance. The faith in one's own self, which is the basis of Vedanta, has not yet been even slightly carried into practice. It is for this reason that the Western method … discussion about the wished-for end, then

> … carrying out … by a combination of all the forces – is of no avail even now in this country; it is for this reason that we appear so greatly conservative under foreign rule.[14]

Sister Nivedita (Margaret Noble 1867–1911) is the direct link between Vivekananda's teachings and nationalist revolution.[15] Nivedita had been a convert to Vivekananda's Vedanta and she had come to stay in India. She is often mentioned as an early source of inspiration for armed revolt against British rule. Nivedita was a prolific writer on Indian culture, religion (especially the Vedanta as taught by her guru, Vivekananda), history, education and nationalist politics. According to her, Indian culture itself sufficed for modern Indian nation-building. Her references to Japan as an example are very scant. In a lecture for students she held at Patna on 27 January, 1904 she is reported to have said:

> Strength and manhood is the secret of life. … A foreigner cannot help you and you must help yourselves. You can well take Japan as your ideal for the present. In Japan any boy can get the University Education, the highest education that Japan can offer for a sum of 12 yen (18 Rupees) a year. … You must take an effective interest in the government of the country. You must have before you high ideals. If you do not stir yourselves … you must blame yourselves … .[16]

For Nivedita, Japan represented a standard example of an Asian nation that was able to help itself effectively. Self-reliance and education were the keys to modernity. Japan had accomplished both. Therefore Japan could be held up for admiration and emulation. But by 1907, Nivedita had already lost much of her admiration for Japan after the latter's takeover of Korea:

> Indian readers cannot watch too closely the accounts which come from the unfortunate empire of Korea, of the Japanese and their treatment of that country. … What we see here is no friendly suzerainty … but on the contrary, an invasion and spoliation so cruel … that it is more like brigandage. … [W]e see here the heart that Japan has for Asiatic countries.[17]

Nivedita, like other observers in India, had turned from admiration for Japan to a critical and sober assessment of the real help that could be expected from Japan. Not expecting outside help, but trying on the basis of one's own strong points to struggle for a new India, was the lesson that Nivedita could read in these developments of Japanese foreign policy.

KAKUZO OKAKURA, EXHORTATIONS FROM A JAPANESE

Around the turn of the century, however, Japan was still regarded in a positive light. Calcuttan nationalist circles had their first direct acquaintance with a Japanese person of note when scholar and art-historian, Kakuzo Okakura (1862–1913) arrived in India in December 1901 and stayed for eleven months. He had come to study Indian antiquities at first hand. Okakura met Vivekananda and had talks with several leading Bengali intellectuals. There is doubt about the exact role of Okakura in the formation of the revolutionary groups in Bengal. Peter Heehs summarizes the different positions about this issue.[18] In any case, Okakura had put the idea of revolt before the Bengali intellectuals and indicated that Japan might be sympathetic to an Indian revolt.[19] Okakura's main contribution to Indian nationalism at the time, however, was the positive opinion of Indian art and Indian culture in general he expressed in his book, *The Ideals of the East*, published in 1903 from London. Nivedita wrote an introduction to this book in which she makes some bold statements about India and Asia. Heehs thinks the role of this book by Okakura has probably been overestimated:

> 'Asia is one', the book begins; 'Victory from within, or a mighty death without' it ends. These sentences are often cited as having inspired Bengal's budding revolutionaries. This is possible, but the 227 pages that separated them contained little to excite the imaginations of students uninterested in academic art history.[20]

The importance of the book for Indian nationalism lies not in art history for its own sake, but in the fact that it offers a positive assessment of India as part of an East Asian realm of ancient civilizations.[21] The book actually tries to sketch the growth and spread of East Asian culture as exemplified in the production of art over the centuries. Buddhist art formed an important part of this production. Because India was the cradle of Buddhism, Indian culture exercised a moderate form of cultural hegemony over East Asia for centuries. This message was not lost on Indian nationalists. Sister Nivedita in her introduction to *Ideals of the East* made Okakura into a downright supporter of what in her opinion Swami Vivekananda had accomplished in the very recent past, namely a revival of 'aggressive' Hinduism:

> it is of supreme value to show Asia, as Mr. Okakura does, not as the congeries of geographical fragments that we imagined, but as a united

> living organism, each part dependent on all the others, the whole breathing a single complex life.
>
> Aptly enough, within the last ten years, by the genius of a wandering monk – the Swami Vivekananda – who found his way to America and made his voice heard in the Chicago Parliament of Religions in 1893, Orthodox Hinduism has again become aggressive, as in the Asokan period.[22]

Okakura in his book expressed his admiration for Indian culture. After all, Buddhism originated in India. But Buddhism was no longer exclusively Indian. Okakura regarded Buddhism as a unifying cultural principle in East Asia, with Japan in a unique position to realize this Asian unity and fulfil a historically important role:

> Buddhism – that great ocean of idealism, in which merge all the river-systems of Eastern Asiatic thought – is not coloured only with the pure water of the Ganges, for the Tartaric nations that joined it made their genius also tributary, bringing new symbolism, new organisation, new powers of devotion, to add to the treasures of the Faith.
>
> It has been … the great privilege of Japan to realise this unity-in-complexity with a special clearness. The Indo-Tartaric blood of this race was in itself a heritage which qualified it to imbibe from the two sources, and so mirror the whole of Asiatic consciousness.[23]

In the second part of Okakura's argument, Japanese aspirations to cultural and political hegemony over East Asia are apparent. A plea for the cultural and political leadership of Japan may not have endeared Okakura to Indian revolutionary nationalists. But Okakura as an important foreigner and fellow Asian once more showed that strength was needed in a country if it wished to play a visible role in world history. Whenever Okakura mentioned India, he made a cultural connection with Japan. Even modern national Indian aspirations were related to Japan. Okakura was aware of the fact that Buddhism had died out in India itself long ago. In his view the cultural impact of Buddhism in India had been taken over by 'Hinduism' and more specifically by the Vedanta:

> Hinduism – that form into which the Indian national consciousness had been striving to resolve Buddhism ever since its appearance as a creed – is now recognised once more as the inclusive form of the nation's life. The great Vedantic revival of Sankaracharya is the assimilation of Buddhism,

> and its emergence in a new dynamic form. And now, in spite of the separation of ages, Japan is drawn closer than ever to the motherland of thought.[24]

Okakura makes Vedanta stand in for the whole of modern Indian culture. He even calls the Vedanta (as an assimilation of Buddhism) 'the nation's life'. He also hoped for more direct relations between India and Japan. Okakura was interested not only in Buddhism but also in contemporary Asian politics. Here he seemed to desire Japan to play an active role in shaping future Asian politics. Okakura's comments on India's loss of independence must be read in this light. In his opinion India lost her independence 'through her political apathy, lack of organization, and the petty jealousies of rival interests'.[25] Gradually Okakura built up his argument for greater patriotism. The best example he could offer was the Meiji restoration, which 'glows with the fire of patriotism, a great rebirth of the national religion of loyalty, with the transfigured halo of the Mikado in the centre'.[26] Okakura ended his book with an exhortation to the effect that Asia had to renew herself on her own, through her own strength:

> We await the flashing sword of the lightning which shall cleave the darkness. For the terrible hush must be broken, and the raindrops of a new vigour must refresh the earth before new flowers can spring up to cover it with their bloom. But it must be from Asia herself, along the ancient roadways of the race, that the great voice shall be heard. Victory from within, or a mighty death without.[27]

These quotations may suffice to establish the thesis that Okakura's book contained more than just a few casual remarks on the desirability of a cultural and political revival of East Asia as a whole and India in particular, even if under Japanese guidance. In fact, if read in a distinctly Indian nationalist mood, Okakura seems to support the Indian national aspirations towards independence, for 'we await the flashing sword' which 'shall cleave the darkness'. Even if Okakura intended this remark to refer to Japan rather than India, to Indian nationalists this exhortation was still a boost to their self-respect and a call to action. Okakura in a widely read publication in English offered respect to, and recognition of, India as an ancient civilized nation, which was more than the average British civil servant in India would concede. He also indicated the road to India's renewal and modernization: unity and patriotism, the twin causes, as he saw it, of Japan's rise to prominence after the Meiji restoration.

As has been indicated above, the direct involvement of Okakura with Indian revolutionary conspiracy is a matter of debate. Sister Nivedita, on the other hand, was involved in revolutionary work from 1902 onwards. She was consulted on political work and gave lectures for the early Anushilan Samiti 'Self-culture Society'. Sister Nivedita got rather deeply involved with the work of this group.[28] The Samiti was originally founded as a cultural society to propagate Bankim's idea of political Hinduism derived from the *Bhagavad Gita*. But already around 1902 the Samiti had as its goal the overthrow of British rule in India. For this purpose the leaders of the Samiti began secretly recruiting young Bengalis and training them in martial arts in order to prepare for revolution.

REVOLUTIONARY PROPAGANDA: AUROBINDO GHOSH

Even though revolutionary conspiracy from 1902 onwards involved different persons, one figure was constantly in the background as organizer and instigator: Aurobindo Ghosh (later Sri Aurobindo, 1872–1950). Sister Nivedita kept in regular touch with him on revolutionary political matters. Aurobindo had already written radical nationalist articles in the English language press between 1890 and 1894. Between 1906 and 1908 Aurobindo wrote numerous inflammatory editorials in the English language nationalist newspaper *Bande Mataram*. In the same period he occasionally wrote for the Bengali nationalist paper *Yugantar*. In these writings Aurobindo argued for the total separation of India from imperial British bonds. With these articles and editorials in both papers he reached a sizeable audience. In this period British intelligence reports often mention Aurobindo as an important ideologue of the revolutionary movement.[29]

Aurobindo began his explicit nationalist propaganda campaign in 1905 with an anonymous pamphlet called *Bhawani Mandir* [Temple for the Goddess Bhawani].[30] In this work, Aurobindo argues for Indian nationalism and independence from foreign rule. He described the process of India's regeneration and nation-building in terms of realizing the strength inherent in the great Goddess, the mother of the universe. In Hindu mythology this Goddess is associated with power and warfare against demons.[31] British intelligence regarded *Bhawani Mandir* as an influential summary of the concept of religious revolutionary nationalism.[32] It is thought that Aurobindo wrote this pamphlet at the instigation of his younger brother Barin Ghosh who was actively involved in underground militancy.[33]

In *Bhawani Mandir* Aurobindo mentions Japan as the stock example of Asian nation-building on the basis of strength and self-respect. The praise Aurobindo lavishes on Japan was obviously inspired by the Russo–Japanese war of 1904–1905, especially the succesful Japanese attack on the Russian fleet in Port Arthur on 8–9 February 1904. In *Bhawani Mandir* Aurobindo states that there was 'no instance in history of a more marvellous and sudden upsurging of strength in a nation than modern Japan'.[34] According to Aurobindo the source of this strength was a Japanese form of religion which contained elements akin to the Indian source of religious strength, namely the Vedanta:

> the intellectual Japanese are telling us what were the fountains of that mighty awakening. … They were drawn from religion. It was the Vedantic teachings of Oyomei[35] and the recovery of Shintoism with its worship of the national Shakti [power and a name of the Mother Goddess in Hinduism] of Japan that enabled … [Japan] to wield the stupendous weapons of Western knowledge and science … .
>
> India's need of drawing from … religion is far greater than was ever Japan's; for the Japanese had only to revitalise and perfect a strength that already existed. We have to create strength where it did not exist before.[36]

Aurobindo constructed here a Japan after his own desire: Japan became a standard example of Asian empowerment and success because it had been able to blend teachings that resembled the Indian Vedanta with Shintoism which resembled the Indian cults of the Mother Goddess whose essence is *shakti*, 'energy' or 'strength'. It matters little if Japan did not actually do what Aurobindo indicated here. He thought he could trace Japan's success to the fact that Japan had its own brand of Vedanta thought and a cult of the Goddess of power. Both components of Indian religious culture – Vedanta and the Goddess cult – Aurobindo considered to be nationally empowering.

Aurobindo's immediate sources for his praise of Japan here were twofold: Vivekananda's teachings and the book *Bushido* by the Japanese author Inazō Nitobe (1862–1933).[37] This book purports to explain Bushido, that is Samurai ethics, to a Western audience. Nitobe regarded these ethics as the Japanese equivalent of Christian ethics. *Bushido* first appeared in 1899. Up to 1905 the book had already run into ten editions; a clear indication of its popularity. It contains the following reference to the doctrine of Ōyōmei (in the 1905 edition spelled as Wan Yang Ming):

> 'The spiritual light of our essential being is pure, and is not affected by the will of man. Spontaneously springing up in our mind, it shows what is right and wrong: it is then called conscience; it is even the light that proceedeth from the god of heaven.' … I am inclined to think that the Japanese mind, as expressed in the simple tenets of the Shinto religion, was particularly open to the reception of Yang Ming's precepts.[38]

Such pronouncements could easily convince Indian authors like Aurobindo that there was an overtone of Vedanta in this teaching, for it presents similar ideas. Nitobe states that 'Shinto theology has no place for the dogma of "original sin". On the contrary, it believes in the innate goodness and Godlike purity of the human soul, adoring it as the adytum [temple sanctum] from which divine oracles are proclaimed'.[39] Shintoism, for Nitobe, included 'Patriotism and Loyalty'.[40]

In his numerous editorials for the nationalist English language daily *Bande Mataram*, Aurobindo often commented on British rule, on European forms of government and on Asian political matters. In one of these editorials Aurobindo referred again to Japan and in particular to the ethics of Bushido. On 28 May 1907 Aurobindo commented on British educational policies:

> They [the British] do not care very much if certain academical ideas of liberalism or nationalism are imparted to the young by their teachers but they desire to stop the active habit of patriotism in the young. … The Japanese when they teach Bushido to their boys, do not rest content with lectures or a moral catechism; they make them practice Bushido and govern every thought and action of their life by the Bushido ideal. This is the only way of inculcating a quality into a nation. … This is what we have to do with the modern ideal of patriotism in India.[41]

Obviously, the patriotism which Nitobe described in terms of Shinto and Bushido was what Aurobindo regarded as representative of Japanese culture. And this patriotism was precisely what Aurobindo thought India needed. With his insistence on patriotism and India's apparent lack of it Aurobindo voiced a complaint similar to that of Vivekananda (quoted above). In spite of his admiration for Japanese patriotism, Aurobindo, like his associate Nivedita, was not uncritical of Japan. Two months later in another editorial in the *Bande Mataram* he commented on Japan's aggression against Korea:

> The chorus of jubilation with which the English Press receives news of any danger to the last shred of independence of any ancient people is

> characteristic. The Koreans cannot see their way to acquiesce in Japanese rule, ergo, they are arch-intriguers. … Europe is a worshipper of success, and we need not wonder if she is glad to see an Eastern power [Japan] taking a leaf out of her book, in threatening the liberty of Nations.[42]

Remarkably, Aurobindo expected Japan and China to be the great Asiatic nations that would challenge the might of European colonial rule in Asia. In April 1908 he wrote: 'The awakening of Asia is the fact of the twentieth century, and in that awakening the lead has been given to the Mongolian races of the Far East'.[43] He even predicted a kind of world war against British India: 'When the inevitable happens and the Chinese armies knock at the Himalayan gates of India and Japanese fleets appear before Bombay harbour, by what strength will England oppose this gigantic combination'. British armies and fleets 'will be broken to pieces by the science and skill of the Mongolian'.[44] He assumed that India could play a role of mediation in this coming Armageddon: 'If … India decides to be free, it depends on the present action of the [British Indian] bureaucracy whether free India will be a friend of England and a mediator between Europe and the triumphant Mongol or an ally of the latter …'.[45] In its own interest England should not crush Indian nationalism, and India should realize very well that it needs to cultivate its own strength in order to be a determining factor in the coming conflict between Europe and the Far East.[46] In later years, however, Aurobindo no longer believed in this great Mongolian conflict with Europe.

THE SPREAD OF REVOLUTION AND BRITISH APPREHENSIONS

Since the revolt in North India of 1857 and the problems with thuggee, the British wished to remain informed of criminal and political activities of their Indian subjects.[47] Between 1903 and 1906 the British set up Criminal Investigation Departments (CID) in the provinces and a central Department of Criminal Intelligence (DCI) at Simla under direct control of the Government of India. The DCI and the provincial CIDs acted as the secret service of British India.[48] This service was the chief opponent of revolutionary nationalists, as the CIDs especially had to prevent and prosecute what they considered to be criminal and seditious activities. How did they view Aurobindo's exhortations to the Indian nation and his evocation of Japan's influence? We have an interesting passage in a secret report from 1911 of the Special Branch, Bengal, by F.C. Daly

(*Note on the Growth of the Revolutionary Movement in Bengal*). Writing about the military achievements of the Japanese against the Russians between 1904–1905, Daly states:

> While the partition of Bengal was under contemplation by the India Government between the end of 1903 and the middle of 1905, the minds of the young men of India had been strongly influenced by the success of the Japanese in their victorious war with Russia; if one oriental power could thus overcome European domination, it seemed to the young men of Bengal that there was no particular reason why any other oriental nation should not be equally successful. Arabindo Ghosh had by this time made his appearance with the doctrine of 'India a Nation.' He was sufficiently far-seeing to understand that the only hope of success to the agitation of violence lay in spreading the doctrine of discontent throughout India, and uniting the people of all different provinces. … He also had the sagacity to see that the surest … ground … would be religion. … He cleverly interpreted the *Bhagwat Gita* to fall in with his doctrine, and … developed … the idea that any action is justifiable, if its object be the attainment of some benefit to humanity … that death is of no more consequence … than changing … clothes … that every man has within him the power of a god, if by meditation and self-abnegation he likes to develop it.[49]

In this long quotation we find all the elements most disturbing to British perceptions: the Japanese victory over Russia; the danger that other Asian nations may copy the Japanese example; the seditious influence of Aurobindo over the minds of Bengali youths by means of his writings in the press; and Aurobindo's seditious use of Hindu religious texts to legitimate violent acts of defiance against British authority. Especially in his last remarks, Daly summarized his understanding of what he thought Aurobindo taught on the basis of the *Bhagavad Gita*. The message of the *Bhagavad Gita*, Daly thought, could be interpreted as sanctioning the killing of enemies, even in terrorist assaults.

By 1910 the British Raj had understood that there was an anti-British nationalist force in the making in India. Radical Indian nationalists had stepped forward, determined to fight British rule. Expatriate Indian revolutionaries from different parts of the world such as London, Paris, Tokyo, Berlin and Geneva began to publish journals to stir up revolution in British India itself. Tokyo as a centre of Indian revolution is interesting. In 1910, an Indian Muslim, Mohamed Barakatullah began to publish from Tokyo a seditious paper called *The Islamic*

Fraternity.[50] British intelligence took careful note of the internationalization of the anti-colonial revolution. According to Popplewell, this internationalization led to the creation of a worldwide British spy-network.[51] Towards the end of the First World War, British intelligence had a book translated from Japanese into English on Indian nationalism as interpreted by a Japanese observer, Shūmei Okawa. The summary translation is marked 'confidential, for official use only'.[52] Okawa's book brought British knowledge up to date about suspected Indo-Japanese cooperation after the beginning of the First World War. The purpose of the Japanese original was 'to set forth … the actual facts connected with the present unrest in India … [in] … the hope that … [this] … may result in bringing a clearer understanding … to the minds of all intelligent Japanese, both civilians and officials, who, placing too much reliance upon British official report … have misunderstood the true situation in India'.[53] British suspicions of Japan's intentions regarding India only proved justified in the course of the Second World War when Japanese troops launched attacks on British India from Burma.

CONCLUSION

Japan was an example of an Asian nation that had successfully modernized itself without Western colonial interference. Therefore Japan played a role as model in the early phase of Indian nationalism, but not a crucial one. In later years, right up to the final stages of the Second World War, the importance of Japan as a model for Indian national aspirations remained secondary.[54] In 1943 the militant nationalist leader Subhas Chandra Bose had sought Japanese help to overthrow British rule in India. Bose hoped that India would be free if General Tōjō was prepared to attack the British Indian Empire.[55] But there was a large section of Indian nationalists under the inspiration of Gandhi and Nehru who did not want to join hands with the Japanese.

Japan was very useful as an example of Asian success and power, but Japan was never considered to offer an exclusive model for India on her road to independence.[56] Indian anti-colonial nationalists had to undertake their own struggle. Initially they did so by violent means, thus posing a threat to the stability of the British Raj. This threat remained intact also after 1917 when Gandhi came to the centre of Indian nationalist politics. His non-violent techniques of struggle against the British Raj effectively mobilized large masses in movements of civil disobedience and non-cooperation.[57]

What have we gained from the foregoing discussion in connection with the problematic of Indian modernity as proposed by Partha Chatterjee? His problematic, as we will remember, ran: 'why is it that non-European countries have no historical alternative but to try to approximate … modernity … under a world order which only sets their tasks for them and over which they have no control?'[58] The apparent answer would be that early Indian anti-colonial nationalists saw no other way out but to resist the West largely with the West's own weapons: the printing press, the creation of a national language and a national audience, and most importantly: armed struggle. There were hardly any alternatives to these, unless Indians were willing to remain under the hegemony and political control of Europeans forever.

The example of Japan acted as a leaven for the Indian national movement, as a source of inspiration. Indian nationalists thought that Japan's key to success had been a spiritual doctrine of self-worth, patriotism in the sense of the Samurai ethics of Bushido, and self-reliance.[59] For all three, Indian nationalists thought they could find parallels in Indian culture. It was even thought that Japan had adopted some of its most advantageous cultural patterns from ancient India via Buddhism. What had been possible in Japan during the Meiji restoration ought to be possible in colonial India as well. Japan had proved to early Indian nationalists that Asian nations need not be colonized by the West in order to modernize. They could and should do it on their own. In order to have pan-Indian impact, early nationalists thought that modernized Hinduism, understood in terms of the philosophy of the Vedanta and the *Bhagavad Gita*, might offer a binding cultural ideology that would motivate and inspire national struggle.

AUTHOR'S NOTE

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NOTES

1 Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 5.

2 Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World, A Derivative Discourse* (London: Zed Books, 1986, reprint 1993), p. 10.

3 Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments*, p. 6.

4 See Sudipta Kaviraj, *The Unhappy Consciousness: Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay and the Formation of Nationalist Discourse in India* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995). This book is the most recent and penetrative study of Bankimchandra's nationalism.

5 See Jiban Mukhopadhyaya, *Anandamath o Bharatiya Jatiyatavad* [The Abbey of Bliss and Indian Nationalism] (Calcutta: Orient Book Emporium, 1982); V.A.van Bijlert, 'Nationalism and violence in colonial India: 1880–1910, in: Jan. E.M. Houben and Karel R. van Kooij (eds), *Violence Denied: Violence, Non-Violence and the Rationalization of Violence in South Asian Cultural History* (Leiden, Boston, Köln: Brill, 1999), pp. 322–324; Cittaranjan Bandyopadhyaya, *Anandamath: Racana Prerana o Parinam tatsaha Bankimcandrer Anandamather pratham sanskaraner fotocopy* [The Abbey of Bliss: Its composition, inspiration and transformation together with a photocopy of the first edition of Bankimchandra's Abbey of Bliss] (Calcutta: Ananda Publishers, 1993), pp. 3–6.

6 For details about his life and career see Tapan Raychaudhuri, *Europe Reconsidered: Perceptions of the West in Nineteenth Century Bengal* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 219–331.

7 Japan had formal relations with British India since 1899 when the latter was included in the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Britain and Japan signed in London in 1894. This treaty helped to promote the image of Japan as a major power in East Asia.

8 Vivekananda, *Selections from the Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda* (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1988, sixth edition), pp. 377–378.

9 *Ibid*., p. 378.

10 *Ibid*., p. 377.

11 *Ibid*., p. 457.

12 Vivekananda, *Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Mayavati Memorial Edition*, Volume V (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1964, eighth edition), p. 10.

13 Vivekananda, *Complete Works*, p. 126.

14 Vivekananda, *Selections*, p. 526.

15 On the life of Sister Nivedita, see Pravrajika Atmaprana, *Sister Nivedita of Ramakrishna-Vivekananda* (Calcutta: Sister Nivedita's Girls' School, 1967, second edition).

16 Sister Nivedita, *The Complete Works of Sister Nivedita*, Vol. V (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, no date), p. 338.

17 *Modern Review*, July–December 1907, Nivedita, The Complete Works, Vol. V, pp. 242–243.

18 See Peter Heehs, *The Bomb in Bengal: The Rise of Revolutionary Terrorism in India, 1900–1910* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 260–262 and Peter Heehs, 'Foreign Influences on Bengali Revolutionary Terrorism 1902–1908', *Modern Asian Studies* 28(3) (1994), pp. 537–544.

19 Peter Heehs, 'Foreign Influences', p. 540.

20 Peter Heehs, *The Bomb in Bengal*, p. 28.

21 The importance of Okakura's book for Indian audiences is already argued by Stephen Hay in *Asian Ideas of East and West: Tagore and His Critics in Japan, China, and India* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 39–41.

22 Kakasu (Kakuzo) Okakura, *The Ideals of the East with Special Reference to the Art of Japan* (London: John Murray, 1903), pp. XIX–XXX.

23 *Ibid*., pp. 4–5.

24 *Ibid*., pp. 80–81.

25 *Ibid*., p. 212.

26 *Ibid*., p. 215.

27 *Ibid*., p. 244.

28 See Heehs, *The Bomb in Bengal*, pp. 32–33.

29 See James Campbell Ker, *Political Trouble in India: 1907–1917* (Delhi: Oriental Publishers, 1917, reprint 1973). Ker's book was a confidential summary report for C.R.Cleveland, the Director of Criminal Intelligence at Simla.

30 Bhawani is another name of the Great Goddess also known as Durga and Kali.

31 For the Goddess imagery in connection with early Indian nationalism see my forthcoming article, 'Bankim's Mother: Imagery of the Indian Nation'.

32 Ker, *Political Trouble in India*, pp. 33–43. Ker in this report quotes the whole text verbatim, indicating that British intelligence attached some importance to the pamphlet.

33 Heehs, *The Bomb in Bengal*, p. 73.

34 Sri Aurobindo, *Bande Mataram: Early Political Writings* (Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1972, 4th impression 1995), p. 67.

35 Ōyōmei (Wang Yangming, 1472–1528) was one of the great Confucian scholars of the Ming dynasty. His school, the Yangming xue, was introduced to Japan in the seventeenth century. Its teachings emphasized the spontaneous development of spiritual insights in the human mind and down-played the role of formal instruction.

36 *Bhawani Mandir* in: Sri Aurobindo, *Bande Mataram*, pp. 67–68.

37 I owe the reference to Nitobe's booklet on Bushido to Dr Ricardo Jose of the University of the Philippines.

38 Inazo Nitobe, *Bushido: The Soul of Japan. An Exposition of Japanese Thought* (New York and London: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1905, tenth edition), p. 19.

39 *Ibid*., pp. 11–12.

40 *Ibid*., p. 14.

41 Sri Aurobindo, *Bande Mataram*, p. 379.

42 *Ibid*., p. 487.

43 *Ibid*., p. 814.

44 *Ibid*., p. 815.

45 *Ibid*., p. 816.

46 See *ibid*., pp. 816–817.

47 On thuggee, a form of highway robbery in which the victim is strangled, see George Bruce, *The Stranglers: The Cult of Thuggee and Its Overthrow in British India* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc, 1969).

48 On the CID and the DCI, see Richard J. Popplewell, *Intelligence and Imperial Defence: British Intelligence and the Defence of the Indian Empire 1904–1924* (London: Frank Cass and Co, 1995), pp. 42–56.

49 Source: Amiya K. Samanta (ed.), *Terrorism in Bengal: A Collection of Documents*, Volume I (Calcutta: Government of West Bengal, 1995), pp. 8–9.

50 For some details about this little researched figure, see: Ker, *Political Trouble in India*, pp. 132–135; and Emily C. Brown, *Har Dayal: Hindu Revolutionary and Rationalist* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1975), pp. 165, 181.

51 Popplewell, *Intelligence and Imperial Defence*, p. 5; pp. 166–167.

52 The full title in English is: 'The Nationalist Movement in India, its Present Condition and Origin' (*Indo ni okeru Kokumin Undo no Genjo oyobi sono Yurai*). A copy of this English summary is preserved in the India Office Library. The publication is registered as a manuscript and contains 14 printed large-format pages.

53 *Ibid*., pp. 13–14.

54 It is true that some famous Bengalis remained admirers of Japan. One of them was the poet Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941). Tagore visited Japan in 1916, 1924 and 1929. For details about Tagore and Japan, see Stephen N. Hay, *Asian Ideas of East and West*, pp. 52–118. On the relation of Subhas Chandra Bose and Rash Behari Bose (not brothers!) with Japan, see: Leonard A. Gordon, *Brothers Against the Raj: A Biography of Indian Nationalists Sarat and Subhas Chandra Bose* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), pp. 462–463, 491–547.

55 Gordon, *Brothers Against the Raj*, p. 493. In 1943 Bose became the supreme commander of the Indian National Army, later rebaptized Azad Hind Fauj (The Army

of Free India). This military body had been recruited by the Japanese in December 1942 out of Indian prisoners of war who had fought as soldiers on the side of the British; see Gordon, op. cit., pp. 466–472; 495–499.

56 Rabindranath Tagore had already been rather critical of Japan in 1916, accusing the Japanese of revering 'national self-interest' and being 'influenced by power-worshipping philosophers'; see Gordon, *Brothers Against the Raj*, p. 463.

57 Non-violence as a weapon of resistance was not universally adopted. The terrorist Anushilan Samitis remained in existence up to the Second World War in certain areas in Bengal. CID reports give figures of terrorist attacks throughout India even long after 1917. Gandhi's non-violent techniques were as often rejected as followed.

58 Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World*, p. 10.

59 It matters little if the notions of Bushido ethics and Shinto religious practices were misunderstood by Indian nationalists or that their understanding of Japanese culture rested on the slim basis of perhaps one or two popular English books as we have discussed in this chapter. The point here is the way these allegedly Japanese cultural phenomena helped create a sense of patriotism in India and may have stimulated to some extent the revolt against British rule.

CHAPTER TWO

Japanese Strategic and Political Involvement in Siberia and the Russian Far East, 1917–1922

EVA-MARIA STOLBERG

During the ninety years from 1855 to 1945, a cataclysmic struggle took place for control of Northeast Asia. At stake was a vast area encompassing the Korean peninsula, the Manchurian plain with its surrounding mountains, the Mongolian plateau and an enormous tract of eastern Siberia stretching from Lake Baikal to the island of Sakhalin and the Sea of Japan. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, this entire area was under the hegemony of the Manchu dynasty in China, but it lay outside the Chinese empire proper. Competing for control of this region, with its rich natural resources and potential for agricultural and industrial development, were three outside powers, Russia, China and Japan, and various indigenous peoples, including the Mongols and Koreans. The struggle was waged using a wide variety of strategies and tactics; all three powers used force to capture and hold parts of the region, and they sought to flood key areas with settlers, so as to create new demographic realities. All three made extensive use, too, of the railway as a tool of economic and administrative control.

Both Russia and Japan, however, also developed political strategies to promote their hegemony in the region. Japan's creation of the state of Manchukuo is the best known of these strategies. The Japanese presented Manchukuo as a successor state to the Manchu empire, as a modern developmentalist state and as a carefully balanced multi-ethnic society. As Nakami discusses in his chapter in this volume, they also toyed with the Mongols of Inner Mongolia, holding out to them the prospect of greater autonomy, or even independence, within their

Map 2: Far Eastern Republic, 1920–1922

Greater East Asian empire. It is well known, too, that the Russians gave crucial support to Outer Mongolian independence in order to keep Outer Mongolia out of the hands of both China and Japan. Less well known, however, is the clash between Russian and Japanese political strategies in the northern part of the Northeast Asian conflict region, in eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East. This conflict played out during a relatively brief period immediately after the Bolshevik Revolution, when Japan saw an opportunity to establish its hegemony over a zone that had previously seemed to be firmly in the Russian sphere. Japan's little-known involvement in the region was striking for the weakness of its attention to political matters and the strength of the Russian political strategy. Despite the muddle of the Russian civil war, Japan failed to win effective local allies and saw its influence in the region completely paralysed by 1922. The main legacy of Japan's 'northern adventure' may have been the realization that an effective expansion on the Asian mainland would require a coordinated strategy of combining political and military elements.

Although political maps always showed Northeast Asia as divided between relatively distinct political zones, in practice Russian, Japanese, Chinese and indigenous societies were thoroughly intermingled. Japanese settlements were a part of the social landscape on the Pacific coast of Siberia from at least the 1860s, and within two decades there were small Japanese communities, mainly consisting of merchants and prostitutes, in most of the towns east of Lake Baikal. Among the Japanese retailers who settled in the Russian Far East were joiners, smiths, tailors and owners of laundries.[1] Japanese industrial trusts such as Mitsubishi and Mitsui, eagerly interested in the exploitation of timber and oil on Sakhalin, were also forerunners of Japan's economic expansion in the region.[2] Russian Transport minister K.N. Pos'iet foresaw that Japan's rising economic vigour might detach Siberia and the Russian Far East from 'mother' Russia and make a Japanese colony of the eastern territories. Moreover, he thought, like Priamur Governor Pavel Unterberger, that the influx of Japanese migrants and entrepreneurs would undermine 'Russian culture and civilization' in Siberia.[3]

The first sign of Japanese political involvement in the region came in 1892–1893, when Captain Fukushima Yasumasa led a reconnaissance mission to Siberia, the Russian Far East, Mongolia and Manchuria. The Japanese Army headquarters (Sanbō honbu) in Tokyo cooperated with nationalist secret societies such as the Kokuryūkai (Amur River Society) and the Genyōsha (Black Ocean Society) and recruited agents not only among ordinary Japanese residents, but also among

prostitutes, whom the Kokuryūkai praised as Japan's 'Amazon army'.[4] In 1896, Uchida Ryōhei, co-founder of the Kokuryūkai, established a judo school in Vladivostok, evidently for conspiratorial work. Even Japanese Buddhist priests such as Ōta Kakumin from the Nishi Honganji Temple in Vladivostok were engaged in espionage for Japanese authorities.[5] Japanese espionage became so evident that it added fuel to the fire of anti-Japanese fears among the Russian population in Siberia. There was a widespread perception among Russians in Siberia that 'we held the line of Western civilization against the onsweeping yellow hordes since Jenghiz Khan'.[6] An image of Japanese and other Asians as 'yellow reptiles and ants' became widespread when it became known that the Japanese secret service (*kenpeitai*) was recruiting agents among Chinese and Korean migrants, and even among the indigenous peoples of Siberia. The Russians viewed the Asian communities in Siberia, migrant and indigenous alike, as culturally inferior, and those communities were therefore attracted by the Japanese slogan of 'Asia for the Asians'.[7]

Until the Russo–Japanese War of 1904–1905, the main arena for conflict between Russia and Japan was further south, in Manchuria and Korea. The Japanese victory in that war, however, not only established Japanese dominance on the peninsula and in southern Manchuria but unleashed a wave of revolutionary tension in Russia which opened up new opportunities for Japanese intervention in the Russian territories.

The turmoil caused by the fall of the Tsarist regime in March 1917 (February according to the old Russian calendar) led other powers to hope that they might be able to expand their interests in the region at Russia's expense. The new Chinese Republic hoped to reverse what it saw as the unequal treaties of the Tsarist era and establish control over Manchuria; the Americans had begun to see new opportunities for commerce in Northeast Asia if national tariff restrictions could be brought down; and the Japanese began to imagine bringing the whole of eastern Siberia into their sphere of influence. The Japanese General Tanaka Gi'ichi proposed the creation of an independent Siberian state, free from Communism. This Siberian republic, he suggested would flourish economically through an alliance with Japan and the yen would become the key currency in the whole of Northeast Asia. Tanaka's ideas thus foreshadowed the later concept of a 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere'. In addition, the Japanese general staff was convinced that the establishment of a Siberian republic would add to the pressure on China to accept Japanese economic and strategic influence in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.[8]

The initial focus of this new contest was the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER), constructed by the Russians from Transbaikalia across Manchuria to Vladivostok at the end of the nineteenth century. The railway, which reduced the journey from Irkutsk to Vladivostok by hundreds of kilometres, was a key element in Russian power in the region. The United States was keen to prevent the CER from falling into Japanese hands, fearing that control of the railway would strengthen Japan's interests in Manchuria. In the summer of 1917, the United States sent a railway commission to Siberia and Manchuria under the leadership of John Stevens and made clear that it favoured internationalization of the line.[9] Japan and China, of course, each wanted to bring the line under its own control, while both the Provisional Government of Aleksandr Kerenskii and then the Bolshevik government under Lenin sought to preserve Russian influence. After the Bolshevik revolution of October 1917, Lenin ordered the Harbin Soviet to assume power over the railway, but in December 1917 China sent an army corps into the Russian railway zone and on 2 January 1918, the governor of Kirin (Jilin) province, Guo Xiangxi, became president of the CER.

At the beginning of 1918, however, Japan's strategies moved on to a different plane with a decision to intervene militarily in Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East. On 4 January, the first Japanese cruiser appeared at the Golden Horn, the famous bay of Vladivostok, and during the next months Japan dispatched several troop contingents to a vast region from Vladivostok to Irkutsk on Lake Baikal. Japan's determination to intervene increased in February 1918, when the Bolshevik regime cancelled all foreign obligations and debts. This act damaged Japanese enterprises such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi which had been active in the Russian Far East since Tsarist times and whose property was now confiscated by the Bolshevik government. The Japanese saw their economic interests seriously violated. Moreover, political and military circles in Japan saw a real threat of bolshevization, not only of their own country, but also of occupied Korea.[10] Japan's intervention was formally part of a broader international effort to crush the Bolshevik revolution. To destroy what was widely seen as a global menace, the United States dispatched 9,000 soldiers, Great Britain 7,000, China 2,000, Italy 1,400 and France 1,200.[11] Japan's participation, however, was on a much greater scale. According to Western sources, the Japanese deployed approximately 73,000 soldiers in Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East (Soviet figures of 120,000 to 175,000 are exaggerated). But one should add that the Japanese had a further 60,000 soldiers deployed in nearby Manchuria from May 1918 onward,

and these troops constituted an additional threat to the Russian Far East, especially to the Amur valley and the coastal province of Primorye.[12] Unlike the other powers, Japan also undertook its intervention not merely with the idea of defeating the Bolsheviks but as well with the ambition of separating the region from Russia and establishing a new sphere of influence there. The Japanese general staff did not simply see Siberia as a battleground in the struggle against Soviet Russia and Bolshevism. Generals such as Uehara Yūsaku and Tanaka Gi'ichi argued more broadly that Siberia would be the site of a fundamental clash between different civilizations (*bunmei teki sensō)*, that is the clash of the 'Yellow' and 'White' races in the Far East. Thus, the Japanese intervention into Siberia was not only directed against Russia, but also against United States engagement in the region.[13]

The idea of detaching eastern Siberia from Russia was by no means far-fetched in the context of the times. The fall of the Tsarist regime had enabled several regions on the edges of the Russian empire to obtain their independence, including Finland, Poland and the Baltic states. Many other regions in southern Russia and Central Asia also achieved a short-lived independence. Japan's failure to achieve its aims was, to a significant degree, the result of its failure to develop an effective political strategy in the region. Instead, it relied principally on military force and never managed to create more than short-lived alliances of convenience with local forces.

The reasons for this uncertainty in Japanese policy included both a lack of consensus in Japan over whether the Siberian intervention was a good idea, and a lack of models for using the intervention to create new political realities. Within the Japanese Diet, opinions were sharply divided over the Siberian intervention. The *hantai shuppei* (anti-interventionist) faction was dominated by the liberal Seiyūkai under Hara Kei and warned that the Siberian intervention would be a financial disaster. [14] The *kyōchō shuppei* (allied intervention) faction, dominated by older Genrō statesmen, was not against military action in principle, but they demanded cooperation with the United States. The *tandoku shuppei* or *jishu shuppei* (sole intervention) faction was represented especially by the chief of the general staff, Uehara Yūsaku, and his second in command, Tanaka Gi'ichi. They insisted on an exclusively Japanese operation, emphasizing Japan's need to take control of Siberia's abundant resources. This third faction was supported by the secret societies Kokuryūkai (Amur River Society), Dai Nippon Sekkabō-shidan (Society of Greater Japan for struggling against Bolshevism) and Tai-Ro

Dōshi kai (Anti-Russian Society).[15] These anti-Russian secret societies already had a strong foothold in southern Manchuria. In the summer of 1918, at the beginning of Civil War in Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East, these societies, whose agents were commonly officers of the Kwantung Army, established a school in Mukden to prepare for a push to the north by teaching Russian to officials of the Southern Manchurian Railway (SMR).[16] Cooperation between the Japanese military and the secret societies dated back to the Russo–Japanese War of 1904–1905. Its purpose was military and industrial espionage in Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East (especially along the Trans-Siberian Railway and in Vladivostok), as well as in China, Turkestan and even Afghanistan. This network of agents existed until the 1940s.[17]

The main initiative for the Japanese intervention in Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East, however, came from the Japanese military. They played their own game directly on the spot and presented the civilian members of the government and the Diet with faits accomplis, as Count Ishii Kikujirō, a member of parliament, pointed out in his later autobiography.[18] In imagining a future Japanese empire in Siberia, however, the Japanese military recalled earlier Japanese expansionist strategies. In the early Meiji era, Hokkaido and Okinawa had been incorporated into Japan without regard for the will or distinct identity of their indigenous people. The same had been done with Taiwan and Korea in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Now, in contemplating the opportunities in Siberia, the Japanese army began to talk of a New Inland Sea (*Shin-naikai*). The Inland Sea lies between Shikoku and southeastern Honshu. It is the ancient 'core' of Japanese culture, the place where Amaterasu Omikami, the legendary goddess of the sun, 'founded' the Japanese Imperial dynasty according to the oldest Japanese chronicles, *Kojiki* and the *Nihon shoki*. The slogan 'a New Inland Sea', therefore, had a special significance for the Japanese people. Its proponents meant that the Sea of Japan was to become the cradle of a new, greater Japan, embracing Manchuria, Sakhalin, Primorye and, if necessary, Transbaikalia. Even though the Sanbō honbu and Kwantung Army did not plan to annex this vast region immediately, their vision implied a process of absorption into Japanese civilization which would have no place for, and indeed leave no trace of, other cultures. This vision therefore offered the Japanese military no guidance at all on how they might construct lasting alliances with local forces or how they might construct a colonial administration which did not rely simply on force.[19]

In the tangled and violent politics of post-Tsarist Siberia, Japan had many contending parties it could choose from as local allies, but it chose a strategy of alliance with the anti-Bolshevik Whites, and a subsidiary strategy of cultivating the national aspirations of the indigenous peoples. The Whites, however, were actually rather uncongenial allies. Representing the more conservative elements in Russian society, they tended to harbour strong patriotic, and often racist, suspicions of the Japanese, seeing them as no more than a potentially useful force in the struggle against Bolshevism. They saw no long term advantage at all in an alliance with Japan. This situation contrasts with both Korea and China, where Japan had a high standing in some circles as a model for Asian modernity. Whereas Chinese and Koreans who wanted to see a process of accelerated modernization in their own countries could see natural grounds for learning from and collaborating with Japan, the Russian Whites had no such interest.

In their dealings with the Whites, moreover, the Japanese authorities made no pretence of concealing their ambitions. Instead, they made it clear that they saw the weakness of the Whites as offering an opportunity to extort concessions from them. In March 1918, Colonel Kurosawa Jun of the Kwantung Army approached Dmitrii Horvath, the Russian director of the CER, with the following demands: dismantling of the fortifications in Vladivostok, opening of the port, free navigation for Japanese ships on the Amur, unlimited fishing rights for Japanese entrepreneurs in all coastal waters of the Russian Far East, and exclusive rights for the Japanese to exploit Siberia's mining and timber resources. Although the Japanese General Staff offered military and financial assistance to Horvath in the civil war against the Bolsheviks, Horvath rejected the proposals because he feared they would lead to Japanese predominance in the region and it was beneath his dignity to sell out Russia's national interests. Instead, through the American consulate in Harbin, Horvath asked the United States for help.[20]

Meanwhile, the Russian Civil War quickly eliminated central authority from Siberia and the Russian Far East. In May 1918, units of the Czechoslovak Legion in transit through Siberia[21] seized the Trans-Siberian Railway, and shortly afterwards the Whites established a major headquarters in the west Siberian city of Omsk, under Admiral Aleksandr V. Kolchak. Although Kolchak was bitterly opposed to the Bolsheviks and enjoyed some support from the United States, he was a patriot and shared with many Russians a strong suspicion of Japanese ambitions in the Far East. The Japanese presented Kolchak with the same demands as they had made to Horvath some months before: the demilitarization of

Vladivostok and unlimited access to mining, timber and fish resources. Like Horvath, Kolchak saw in this catalogue a threat to Russian suzerainty over Siberia. Moreover, the Siberian press, local Russian merchants and intellectuals showed a great aversion toward the Japanese presence in the region. Russian upper classes in Siberia feared a sell-out of resources, and the enslavement of the population by the 'Japanese pygmies'. Instead, they hoped for cooperation with the United States. Kolchak had to consider popular opinion and so he too rejected the Japanese demands.[22]

In the face of these unpromising experiences, the Japanese turned to the cultivation of what they saw as local political forces. Just as Japanese intelligence operations in Siberia in the early twentieth century had made use of Pan-Asianist rhetoric, so Japanese intellectuals cast the military intervention in similar terms. For example, Torii Ryūzō, an ethnographer at Tokyo University argued in a study on Siberian tribes that Russia represented an alien element in Siberian history. In contrast, he argued, many Siberian tribes including the Buriyats, the Tungus and the Yakuts had the same blood as the Japanese race and it was Japan's duty to liberate them from the Russian yoke. Torii Ryūzō also emphasized that the Siberian tribes had suffered a catastrophic decline in population under Russian colonial rule and that only Japan's intervention would save them from dying out.[23] From the very beginning, these ideas had been subordinate to Japan's calculation of its own interest. Japan's Siberian policy was contradictory. Although the Japanese army wanted to appear as the rescuer of the Siberian tribes, the generals did not hesitate to negotiate with anti-Bolshevist leaders in the region who were by no means interested in the rights of the indigenous population.

In fact, the Japanese themselves had no concrete idea of how to win over the Siberian nationalities for Japan's expansionistic aims in Siberia. Despite their pan-Asianist rhetoric, they regarded Siberian nationalities as simple 'tribes' without a national consciousness. In Japanese view, the Siberians were 'wild' peoples like the Ainu on Japan's northern frontier. Japanese soldiers and officers felt a cultural superiority toward the natives they encountered in Siberia. There were numerous cases where natives were plundered by Japanese soldiers. The exploitation of the fish resources drove the natives out of their homeland and into remote areas. With no means of survival, many indigenous Siberians joined the Red partisans' fight against the Japanese occupying forces.[24] In short, the claim of the Japanese generals to be the saviour of the Siberians from the Russian 'yoke' was far from reality.

By mid-1918 the territories further east were nominally under Kolchak's control but in fact were dominated by Cossacks and other warlords – often called 'atamans' – and by foreign expeditionary forces, including Americans, British, Chinese, French and Japanese. The atamans were ambitious, charismatic figures, fiercely opposed to central Russian authority. They had what appeared to be strong local roots and they had no qualms about cooperating with the Japanese army, which came to see them as representing the political aspirations of the region. The Japanese, therefore, began to support the atamans in order to paralyse Kolchak's authority in Siberia.[25] In 1919, for instance, the atamans received ¥18 million for the formation of a 'Russian army' as an auxiliary corps to the Kwantung Army.[26] In fact, however, this strategy proved to be thoroughly destructive, eventually weakening Japanese influence in eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East rather than strengthening it. The atamans, such as Grigorii Semenov, Ivan Kalmykov and Baron Roman F. von Ungern-Sternberg, quickly earned a reputation for using extreme violence to maintain their local power. The brutality of the atamans toward the Russian population meant that there was no possibility of using them as the basis for shaping a new political order in the region. The Russian population in Siberia ascribed the brutality of the atamans to the support they received from the Japanese, who were regarded as representatives of 'oriental despotism' with an innate sense of brutality.[27] Japanese were commonly described as 'arrogant'. For example, Japanese soldiers and officers did not pay in Russian shops. If the Russian owners did not allow them goods, the Japanese would often beat them with rifle butts. Russian women were raped by Japanese soldiers.[28] Americans were more popular among the Russian population and were regarded as 'friends of the Russian people'. There were also reports of pogroms against Japanese shopkeepers in Siberia.[29]

The only 'tribe' in Siberia which gained serious assistance from the Japanese were the Mongols in Transbaikalia. The Japanese generals tried to shore up a Buriyat Mongol Republic east of Lake Baikal, including Buriyatia and Inner Mongolia (the Chinese provinces of Ningxia and Kalgan/Zhangjiakou). Here, the Japanese supported the White ataman Grigorii Semenov, a half-Buryiat and his pan-Mongol movement. Semenov believed himself to be a reincarnation of Chinggis Khan with the destiny of again turning Mongolia into a world empire. However, Semenov's pan-Mongolism was a complete failure for several reasons. His arbitrary rule and the mass executions of opponents and of the general population carried out by his roaming troops had alienated the Russian and

Buriyat population in Transbaikalia. Both groups, moreover, saw him as an agent of the Japanese, whom the Russians had long despised and whom the Buriyats feared. The Buriyat nationalists, who had a strong base in the Buddhist clergy, wanted an independent Mongol state, not a Japanese vassal. Moreover, the Buriyat population increasingly supported the Bolsheviks and Red partisans. The Japanese on the other hand also grew suspicious of Semenov's ambitions to create his own independent dominion and feared that he might block their plans in Inner Asia. Semenov also aroused the animosity of the Chinese, especially the warlord Chang Tso-lin (Zhang Zuolin), who resisted Semenov's claim to the Barga area of northwestern Manchuria.[30] The structure of Semenov's forces was modelled on the Kwantung Army and the Japanese provided the training. But as the Japanese generals were only interested in military affairs, they failed to construct a political administration in Semenov's puppet regime.[31] The regular confiscations of property by Semenov and his Japanese advisors alienated the entrepreneurs and ruined the economy of Buriyatia.[32]

Throughout eastern Siberia, therefore, Japanese support for the atamans, as well as abuses by the Japanese army itself against the Russian people, drove the local Russian population into the arms of the Bolsheviks. From April 1919, Kolchak's forces were in retreat; in November he withdrew his administration from Omsk to Irkutsk but was overthrown in December by the Bolsheviks who shot him in February 1920. By January 1920, the Western powers had withdrawn their forces from the Russian Far East, and the conflict became increasingly one between Bolshevik partisans and the Japanese army. The conflict was sharpened in April 1920 when guerrillas under Jakov Triapitsyn successfully attacked the town of Nikolaevsk, an important harbour at the mouth of the Amur River and also a key point on the Japanese lines of communication between Sakhalin and the Priamur district. After seizing the town, the partisans razed its fortifications and massacred about six thousand people, men, women and children. The victims included the Japanese consul, Ishida Toramatsu, his family, and about 700 other Japanese civilians.[33]

Japan's political ineptness in Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East contrasts sharply with the deft way in which the Bolsheviks made use of the local political character of the region. The elimination of Kolchak and the withdrawal of the Western forces did not mean that the Bolsheviks could now control the terrain east of Lake Baikal. Under the pressure of Polish offensives in the Ukraine and that of White General Ferdinand von Wrangel in southern Russia,

Lenin could not spare forces for the occupation of eastern Siberia and had, therefore, to postpone its sovietization. He wanted to avoid a military confrontation with Japan. In January 1920, therefore, the Bolsheviks began negotiations with the Siberian Social Revolutionaries, opponents of the Bolsheviks and the main politically coherent force in the region, for the creation of a nominally independent Far Eastern Republic, whose capital was at Verkhneudinsk (today Ulan Ude). The world view of the Social Revolutionaries was deeply rooted in the traditional Siberian thirst for freedom and democracy.[34] To the outside world, the name Siberia stood for exile, oppression and hardship, but in the Russian context it was a frontier, a land of opportunity, free from the traditional social hierarchies which blighted the Russian heartland. Many Siberians regarded the region as more suited to democracy and social progress than the heartland, in much the same way as Americans and Australians regarded their lands as more progressive and democratic than Europe. The Siberian Social Revolutionaries did not give up their hope for a non-Bolshevik state on Russian soil: '*Dal'nii vostochnyi bufer dolzhen sluzhit' opytnym polem demokratii*' (The Far Eastern buffer must serve as a training ground for democracy). The Social Revolutionaries expected support for their Siberian democracy from the United States and from China and Japan. In fact, ever since the Russo–Japanese War of 1904–1905, a strand in Russian social democratic thought had looked at Japan with the same approving interest that other Asians showed. The Japanese victory in that war unleashed a wave of revolutionary tension in Russia which included an interest in the reform and modernization path followed by Japan. In the spring of 1906, a retired officer of the Japanese army, Kayano Nagatomo, who was both an anarchist sympathizer and an agent of the Kokuryūkai, arranged a meeting between the Chinese nationalist leader Sun Yat-sen and a certain 'Dr Russel' (actually N.K. Sudzlovskii) and Grigorii Gershunii, members of the illegal Russian Social Revolutionary Party, to discuss tactics for promoting revolution in Russia and China. It was a strange alliance, for anarchists and social revolutionaries were also active in Japan and in 1910 were even involved in a plot to assassinate the Meiji emperor. Nonetheless, groups within the Japanese army clearly believed that revolution in Russia and China would facilitate Japanese expansion on the Asian mainland, while Russian intellectuals saw Japan as offering perhaps a partial model for the path that Russia might follow.[35] Russian radicals like N.K. Sudzlovskii viewed Japan's Meiji constitutionalism as more progressive than Tsarist autocracy and as an example for Russia.[36] The Japanese

emperor had given his people civil rights and in this way had fostered national spirit and national unity. The oppositional journal *Osvobozhdenie* (Liberation) shouted: 'Remember this: in Japan public life is in full swing!'[37] Among Russian socialists in Siberia, therefore, rather than with the conservative Whites, there was a real possibility for Japan to develop some kind of shared agenda.

This option, however, was of no interest to the conservative, anti-democratic generals who ran Japan's Siberia policy. They had no sympathy with democracy, and they feared that an independent, democratic Siberia might come under the political and economic influence of the United States.[38] Japanese banks even issued bank notes for local use inscribed 'Province of the Japanese Empire', a tactless gesture which only confirmed the impression of local Russians that Japan had only its own interests at heart. Nonetheless, it is striking that Japan failed to send economic and technical advisers and experts to Siberia in order to build up the local economy and to create a reservoir of local respect for Japanese expertise. These were techniques which Japan later used to great effect in expanding its influence in Manchuria, Mongolia and China. Without international support, the Social Revolutionaries were left completely alone in their dealings with the Bolsheviks. The creation of the Far Eastern Republic (FER) in April 1920 was based, therefore, on a compromise, worked out in arduous negotiations between January and April 1920. It actually favoured the position of the Bolsheviks in Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East.[39]

The embryonic state, which only existed for two years, was independent and democratic on the surface but actually under the strong influence of Soviet Russia. From Lenin's perspective, the satellite should carry out three tasks: to eliminate the influence of the Siberian Social Revolutionaries, to curb the regional impulses of the local Bolsheviks, and to gain the FER's recognition by the United States in order to generate international pressure on Japan for a withdrawal of its troops. Despite the coalition with Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, the Bolsheviks held the most important positions in the FER government, including the posts of president, prime minister, foreign minister, army chief and head of the State Security organization (GPU). The FER army was actually a conglomerate of the fifth Soviet Army (headquartered in West Siberian Omsk), some partisan units, and deserters from different White armies (mainly those of Kolchak and Semenov). The FER army and State Security were established on Moscow's instructions in March 1920, before the official proclamation of the FER. The FER's elections, held in April 1920, were never representative,

because of manipulations by the Bolsheviks. The Bolshevik-controlled army and State Security terrorized the population and their political opponents, the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who responded by boycotting the elections. Moreover, in the eastern parts of the FER, including Khabarovsk and Vladivostok, the Japanese imposed a curfew which hindered the Russian population from going to the polls.[40] Moreover, even though the Japanese had found funds to support the Cossacks and atamans in their depredations, they did not provide any financial help for the non-Bolshevik parties in the election campaign. In this way, the Japanese lost the chance to influence political life in the Far Eastern Republic.[41]

The function of the Far Eastern Republic was defined clearly in the 'Short Theses on the Far Eastern Republic', adopted by the Bolshevik Central Committee in Moscow on 4 and 12 January 1921: until the Japanese withdrawal, 'the activities of the bourgeois and petty bourgeois parties' were to be tolerated, but the real political power in the Far Eastern Republic had to be kept in the hands of the Bolsheviks. The pseudo-democratic but anti-Japanese character of the Far Eastern Republic was also intended to signal to the United States and China its reliability as an ally in the Far East against Japan. Sooner or later, Lenin thought, the strategic and economic rivalry between Japan and the United States would drag the two powers into war, and then the Japanese would be compelled to withdraw their troops from the Russian Far East.[42]

The Far Eastern Republic was thus clearly a puppet state of the Soviets, and the Japanese, seeing it in this light, dismissed it as a real political force in North-east Asia.[43] Their intelligence work in the FER made its dependent status all the more clear to them.[44] What they failed to appreciate, however, was that this puppet state nonetheless had serious political meaning for the people of the region.

By the middle of 1920, it was clear that although the Japanese army was still an important military factor in the Far Eastern Republic, Japan's presence had no significant political support in the region. The Japanese military authorities therefore gradually became more receptive to the idea of reducing the scope of their involvement. In May 1920, FER War Minister Vladimir Shatov suggested to the commander of the Japanese expeditionary corps in Transbaikalia, General Ōi Shigemoto, that if he withdrew his contingent, the FER would demilitarize the region. On 15 July, in Gongota, a village near Chita, the two sides signed an agreement along these lines. This agreement marked the end of Japanese hopes

of using Semenov to build up a vassal state in Central Asia. The Japanese withdrawal from Transbaikalia in October 1920 left Semenov completely exposed, and he fled to Manchuria. The FER capital moved from Verkhneudinsk to Chita, strategically located at the junction of the Trans-Siberian and the Chinese Eastern Railways. The Japanese residents of Chita, however, were evacuated not to Japan but to Vladivostok and Manchuria (Changchun and Harbin).[45]

Soon the Japanese abandoned Priamur and Khabarovsk, too. Incessant partisan activities and the bloody guerrilla warfare made the decision easy. The Japanese preferred to concentrate their troops in the economically and strategically more important Primorye (including Vladivostok). Some Japanese units were also withdrawn across the Amur River to Heilungkiang (Heilongjiang) in Manchuria. With the Japanese withdrawal from Transbaikalia and Priamur and in view of the partisan rule in the Amur region, by the end of 1920 the FER controlled a vast territory in the Russian Far East, including much of the Trans-Siberian Railway. Despite criticizing the partisans' high-handedness, the FER government and the Bolshevik centralists in Moscow profited from them. The guerrilla warfare forced the Japanese to withdraw their troops. As a result, the restoration of the Trans-Siberian Railway from Chita to Khabarovsk succeeded rapidly.[46]

The gradual withdrawal of the Japanese troops from Siberian soil exemplified the weakness of Japanese expansionism in the region. In contrast, through the puppet regime in the Far Eastern Republic Soviet Russia formulated an active policy toward East Asia. In summer 1920 a Far Eastern secretariat of the Comintern had been established in Irkutsk with strong ties to the FER government. With a fund of US$30 million the Bolsheviks created special sections of Mongol, Korean, Chinese and Japanese communists who lived in Siberia and had to work as agents for the envisaged revolution in East Asia. The overall slogan was that the working peoples of East Asia should unite in order to fight against Japanese hegemony.[47] Especially through Korean communists in Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East, the Bolsheviks increased their infiltration of and psychological attrition among the Japanese troops.[48] Socialist and pacifist ideas spread widely among Japanese soldiers. Because their homeland was occupied by the Japanese, Koreans in the Russian Far East felt a strong hatred toward Japan and many came under the influence of Bolshevism. The leading figure in agitation among Japanese soldiers was Yoshihara Tarō, who was responsible for distribution of communist pamphlets within the Japanese expeditionary force, but also was

boss of Soviet Russia's intelligence network in Japan. But Yoshihara's first task was to establish communist cells among the Japanese migrants.[49]

Japan's last political venture in the Russian Far East was to support a 'provisional government' in Vladivostok, established by the Merkulov brothers, Nikolai and Spiridon, both merchants. In March 1921, they organized a congress of all non-Socialist parties and organizations. The participants favoured a prolongation of the Japanese occupation of Primorye and called for military engagement to overthrow the FER government in Chita. By this time, the Japanese had clearly become suspicious of the political reliability of the Social Revolutionaries. They feared that the Social Revolutionaries had become sympathetic to the Bolshevik-dominated Far Eastern Republic and therefore they relied on the Kadets (Constitutional Democrats). The Bolsheviks and the FER government called the Merkulov government a reactionary *chernyi bufer* ('black buffer') state of the Japanese.[50] Even in this case, however, the Merkulov 'provisional government' received very limited authority from the Japanese generals. Japan controlled the telegraph and post service, and censored the press. Some bourgeois newspapers like the *Golos Primor'e* (Voice of Primorye) were forbidden by the Japanese,[51] making clear how little authority the 'government' actually possessed'.[52] Moreover, the Japanese had their agents in the rightist parties like the Monarchists and the Constitutional Democrats. The generals of the Kwantung Army agreed with the Russian conservatives to convoke a parliament without the participation of the Bolsheviks but under the tutelage of the Japanese army. With the Red Army approaching, however, the assembly never met. Moreover, the Japanese generals and Russian conservatives recognized that Vladivostok was an enclave and they did not possess any political control over the hinterland which was actually ruled by the Red partisans. The vassal state of which Japanese generals had dreamt became an illusion.[53]

In June 1921, the Merkulov government in Vladivostok launched an offensive against the Far Eastern Republic, after the Japanese had given it approval to use arms stockpiled in Vladivostok. The soldiers of the White army, however, were tired of the fratricide of the last years and wanted peace, even if this meant submission to Soviet rule. Thus, even the military basis of this last pro-Japanese vassal state disappeared.[54] The Whites began well enough by conquering Khabarovsk and Priamur but, lacking discipline, they were soon forced on the defensive by the FER army under the command of Vasilii Bliucher. By February 1922 the Whites had been driven back to Vladivostok. Coordinated attacks on

the FER by Semenov and Von Ungern-Sternberg from their footholds in Manchuria and Mongolia also failed. For the Japanese generals, it became clear that their 'White experiment' in the Russian Far East was a complete failure and all the financial and military support invested in it during the previous four years turned out to have been futile. Even in defeat, however, the Japanese turned the White retreat to their own purposes. After the failure of the offensive against the FER, they pressured the Merkulov government into leasing the Ussuri line to the Japanese-owned South Manchurian Railway Company for 24 years.[55] Moreover, the Japanese even disarmed the White troops along the Ussuri line.[56] Two reasons explain these actions. First, the Japanese wanted to show the Whites that they were the real masters in Primorye and, second, Japanese negotiations with the FER government concerning a Japanese withdrawal from the Russian Far East were in progress. The Japanese generals understood that a pro-Japanese vassal state had no real chance on Siberian soil and therefore sought a *modus vivendi* with the Bolsheviks.

Ever since August 1921, the Japanese and FER had been negotiating in Dairen on a troop withdrawal in exchange for economic concessions. And it was obvious that the Japanese used the FER and the Whites alike as 'bargaining chips' in order to increase their demands in that game of poker. The goal of Japanese policy in the Russian Far East was no longer military annexation, but economic influence. While petty merchants such as retailers saw the writing on the wall and considered giving up their businesses and returning to Japan, the trusts (*zaibatsu*) Ōkura, Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Takaga envisaged forming a Siberian syndicate with an investment capital of ¥ 20,000,000 for exploiting the timber, mineral, fish, fur and agricultural resources of the Russian Far East. In September 1921, entrepreneurs of the Far Eastern Republic visited Osaka and Kobe, negotiating with the Chōsen Bank and the Russo–Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry for a loan for joint ventures in the Russian Far East.[57] There were even ideas of cultivating rice in Primorye near Lake Khanka. However, to make these plans possible and to restore the prosperous Russo–Japanese trade of the Tsarist era, the zaibatsu needed peace in the Russian Far East and for the sake of peace they demanded the withdrawal of the Japanese from the region.[58]

The Japanese agenda at the Dairen negotiations between the Far Eastern Republic and Japan during 1921–1922 was to settle a commercial agreement on joint exploitation of Russian Far Eastern resources, the protection of Japanese

property in the Russian Far East, and the prohibition of communist propaganda in Japan and in Korea – a demand which is to be seen against the background of Comintern activities. The negotiations became deadlocked, however, because of the firm policy of the FER. The Conference of Genoa in April-May 1922 had broken the diplomatic isolation of Soviet Russia, giving it greater international strength. It could therefore give the FER more protection than before against Japanese claims. Soviet Russia encouraged the FER to push militarily into Primorye and insisted that its own representative, A.I. Ioffe,[59] take part in the FER-Japanese talks. The Japanese found themselves in an impasse. Uncertain of the situation in the Russian Far East and somewhat reluctant to make a decision, the government in Tokyo failed to authorize its diplomats to conclude a final agreement with the Far Eastern Republic. The hands of the Japanese diplomats in Dairen were tied. The real decision-makers on the Japanese side were the generals who finally – through their lack of diplomatic skill – were responsible for Japan's losing 'face' at home, in the Russian Far East and in the international community.[60] The tide had turned against Japan at the Washington Conference for Disarmament and Far Eastern Problems, which opened on 21 November 1921 but did not discuss the Siberian problem until the end of January 1922. The most outstanding questions dealt with Japanese predominance in Manchuria; Siberia seemed to be no more than an annex. The conference highlighted the antagonism between the United States and Japanese in the Far East. The United States feared that Japanese control of the Manchurian railways and harbours would come at the expense of free access for all nations to the Manchurian market. However, for the sake of Japanese economic concessions in Manchuria, Baron Shidehara Kijūrō was willing to accept a withdrawal from Primorye and Vladivostok.[61] In the meantime, the Japanese occupation of northern Sakhalin continued because of the rich oil deposits there. Since the summer of 1920, northern Sakhalin had been incorporated into the Japanese province of Karafuto. Under the Japanese administration, colonists from Japan were systematically settled there.[62]

The breakthrough in Japan's Russian Far Eastern policy came in summer 1922 and cannot be explained without reference to the Japanese domestic scene. Hara Kei, prime minister since 1918 and an anti-interventionist without any effective control of the army, had been assassinated in November 1921. Because elections had to be held and a new government had to be formed, Admiral Baron Katō Tomosaburō was not chosen as premier until June 1922. Katō was a high-ranking representative of the Japanese navy, which had always been

suspicious of the far-reaching activities of the Kwantung Army on the Asiatic continent. In the navy's view, the Siberian adventure had wasted a great part of the state budget at the expense of naval expenditures. Moreover, Katō came from the generation of Genrō statesmen who favoured a policy of détente toward the United States. The Siberian adventure had poisoned the atmosphere between the two powers. Thus, it is not surprising that on 24 June 1922 the new government issued the following proclamation: 'The Japanese government has decided to withdraw all Japanese troops from the Maritime Province [Primorye] of Siberia by the end of October 1922. Suitable measures will be taken for the protection [i.e. evacuation] of Japanese subjects'.[63]

These words marked the end of the Japanese intervention in Siberia, of the last White 'governments' there and finally of the Far Eastern Republic. In a tragicomic episode – or rather epilogue – the mediaeval monarchistic assembly 'Zemskii Sobor' resurrected by the last White despot in the Russian Far East, General Mikhail Diterikhs, sent a delegation to Tokyo, begging the Japanese to postpone their withdrawal from the Russian Far East and calling for a renaissance of the 'cordial friendship' between the long gone Russian monarchy and the Japanese emperor. Diterikhs' gesture, however, had no local support. The plot between Japanese generals and 'White' atamans had turned Russians and Siberian natives alike against the empire of the 'Rising Sun'.[64] Finally, the Japanese had lost hope in their 'northern adventure' and their difficult White vassals. Instead, they showed a sense of *Realpolitik* and were willing to recognize Soviet Russia. Under the Nisso Kihon Jōyaku (Japanese–Soviet Basic Convention) of 1925, Japan formally recognized Soviet Union and the Bolsheviks achieved the reestablishment of Russia's pre-revolutionary borders in Northeast Asia. By this time, too, the Far Eastern Republic has served its purpose as Soviet Russia's puppet state. On 14 November 1922 – after the withdrawal of Japanese troops – the FER government asked Soviet Russia for reunification and one month later the FER became part of the newly established Soviet Union.[65]

The collapse of Tsarist rule in Russia in 1917 opened up to Japan an opportunity to expand its influence in Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East, regions which appeared likely to become a profitable source of natural resources for Japan's industrialization. Furthermore, the Bolshevik seizure of power and their use of Siberia as a springboard for revolutionary activities in East Asia represented a threat to the Japanese monarchy and its imperial goals in the region. However, Japan's Siberian intervention in the years 1917–1922 lacked a

grand strategy. Instead, the 'northern adventure' was executed haphazardly from the very beginning. Neither the Japanese army nor Japanese business had a coherent blueprint for colonial rule in Siberia. Rather than establishing a civil administration and constructing alliances with local social and political forces in the name of economic development and self-determination, the Japanese relied on military force and superficial alliances of convenience with unsavoury partners. The Japan army failed to consider any kind of rapprochement with the Siberian social democrats who might have had an interest in Japan's developmental model, and it failed to develop any significant constituency among the indigenous peoples of Siberia who had good reason to resent the Russians after decades of colonial rule. Japan's actions alienated all its potential allies, leaving it eventually with no choice but to withdraw from the region. By contrast, the new Bolshevik government in Russia shrewdly constructed the Far Eastern Republic as a puppet state which made, at least initially, a plausible show of meeting some of the political aspirations of the people of the region. It is striking that the Japanese army subsequently used a rather similar set of techniques in constructing a political basis for the puppet state of Manchukuo.

Political shortcomings, of course, were not the only reason for the failure of Japan's Siberian adventure. Japan did not encourage the migration of Japanese settlers to Siberia in order to create new demographic realities as they later did in Manchuria. Moreover, Japanese policy was plagued by serious disagreements between the military and the civilian authorities in Japan. While the general staff favoured the military occupation of Siberia, the civil government in Tokyo was strictly against the 'Siberian intervention'.

Instead of annexing the vast region of the Russian Far East, Japanese generals preferred to count on White warlords whose arbitrary rule and mass executions of civilians alienated the Russian and native populations. Hatred for the White atamans – and by extension for their Japanese masters – forced the Siberians into the ranks of Bolshevik partisans. A bloody guerrilla warfare in the endless, cold taiga – under the tutelage of the Bolshevik puppet state of the Far Eastern Republic on the eastern shores of Lake Baikal – finally forced the Japanese to withdraw from the region in 1922.

NOTES

1 P.G. Vaskevich, 'Ocherk byta iapontsev v Priamurskom krae', *Izvestiia Vostochnogo Instituta (Khabarovsk)*, vol. 15, no. 1 (1906), pp. 1–31; Katō Kyūzō, *Shiberia ki*

(Tokyo: 1980), pp. 120–126; Eva-Maria Stolberg, 'Prostitution, Disease, Opium Dens and the Yellow Peril along the Transsiberian Railway in Tsarist Era', unpublished paper for the German Study Group on Siberia, Hannover, February 1998, p. 2; Brokgauz'-Efron *Iaponiia i eia obitateli* (St. Petersburg: 1904), p. 156.

2 John J. Stephan, *The Russian Far East* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 77.

3 K.N. Pos'iet, 'Prekashchenie ssylki v Sibiri', in: *Russkaia starina*, no. 99, July 1899, p. 54.

4 Katō, pp. 87–93; Iriye Toraji, *Hōjin kaigai hatten shi* (Tokyo: 1982), vol. 2, pp. 431–433.

5 Stephan, *The Russian Far East*, p. 78. On Uchida Ryōhei see also Hatsuse Ryūhei *Uchida Ryōhei no kenkyū* (Fukuoka: 1980).

6 Ferdinand Ossendowski, *Man and Mystery in Asia* (London: E.P. Dutton, 1924), p. ix.

7 Pavel F. Unterberger, *Priamurskii krai 1906–1910gg* (St. Petersburg: 1912), p. 519; Eva-Maria Stolberg, 'The Prelude: From the Russo–Japanese War of 1904/1905 and the First Russian Revolution to World War I: Revolution and Civil War in Siberia/Russian Far East and the Impact on East Asia, 1917–1922', unpublished paper for the British Study Group on Russian Revolution, Leeds, January 1998, p. 1; Stephan, *The Russian Far East*, p. 79.

8 John Albert White, *The Siberian Intervention* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950 [Reprint: 1969]), p. 97; *Tanaka Gi'ichi kankei monjo* (unpublished manuscript in the Parliament Library, Tokyo), no. 49; *Uehara Yūsaku Kankei monjo* (Tokyo: 1976), p. 483.

9 Joseph E. Greiner, 'The American Railway Commission in Russia', *Railway Review* (Chicago), vol. 63, no. 5 (1918), pp. 170–172. Greiner was one of the American observers on the Trans-Siberian Railway.

10 On the 'Korean factor' as one factor for Japan's intervention in Siberia, see Kan Dokusan 'Nihon teikoku-shugi no Chōsen shihai to Roshia kakumei, *Rekishigaku kenkyū* (Tokyo) no. 329 (1969), pp. 37–76.

11 William S. Graves, *America's Siberian Adventure, 1918–1920* (New York: Peter Smith, 1941), p. 79.

12 M.I. Gubel'man, *Bor'ba za Sovetskii Dal'nii Vostok 1918–1922gg.* (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1958), p. 133; A.I. Krushanov, *Grazhdanskaia voina v Sibiri i na Dal'nem Vostoke 1918–1922gg.,* tom 2 (Vladivostok: Akademiia Nauk SSSR/Sibirskoe otdelenie, 1984), p. 15. As to the Soviet figures, see the critique by Hara Teruyuki *Shiberia shuppei: kakumei to kanshō, 1917–1922* (Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 1989), p. 373.

13 Report of an unknown Soviet military agent in Tokyo, in Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi voennyi istoricheskii archiv (RGVA), f. 1558, op. 2, d. 45.

14 In May 1918 – some months after the dispatch of the first Japanese cruiser to Vladivostok – the Socialist Yoshino Sakuzō joined the criticism of the intervention, arguing in the well-known journal *Chuō Kurōn* that the government should respect the interest of the Japanese people, instead of being involved in faraway cold Siberia. Yoshino Sakuzō, 'Tai Ro seisaku ni tai suru kokumin to shite no kibo', *Chuō Kurōn*, no. 356, May 1918, pp. 43–45.

15 Hara Teruyuki, 'Shiberia shuppei', p. 140. One of the most energetic advocates of the Siberian intervention was Kawakami Toshitsune, then director of the Southern Manchurian Railway Company, who stressed the economic importance of the Trans-Siberian and Chinese Eastern Railways for Japan's industrialization. This strongly economic approach was also reflected by the numerous publications published by the Japanese Foreign Ministry, the Southern Manchurian Railway Company and the Chōsen (Korea) Bank, the traditional rival of the Russo–Asiatic Bank, between 1918 and 1923: Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha (ed.), *Shiberia keizai jōtai to Nichiro bōeki shiryō* (Tokyo: 1918); Nichiro kenkyū-kai (ed.), *Shiberia annai* (Tokyo: 1918); Chōsen ginkō chōsakyoku (ed.), *Shiberia keizai jijō gainen* (Tokyo: 1918); Gaimushō Shiberia keizai enjo-bu chōsaka (ed.), *Kyokutō roryō ni okeru nōgyō no gaiyō* (Tokyo: 1919); Gaimushō Shiberia keizai enjo-bu chōsaka (ed.), *Uraijo kai-un jōkyō* (Tokyo: 1919); Chōsen ginkō Tokyo Chōsa-bu (ed.), *Kyokutō rokoku zaisei keizai shisetsu* (Tokyo: 1923).

16 United States Government (ed.), *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Russia 1918,* vol. 3, pp. 239, 280.

17 O. Tanin and E. Yohan, *Militarism and Fascism in Japan* (New York: 1931), pp. 43–44, Tsentral'nyi Arkhiv Ministerstva Oborona, f. 32, op. 65589, d.3. The mentioning of Afghanistan leads to the assumption that the Japanese had a keen eye on British Inner Asian policy. This is to be seen against the background of strategic and economic interests in Xinjiang (Sinkiang), especially in the period of the Russian Civil War. As Nyman has pointed out, the Japanese pressed the Chinese governor Yang Zexin for dispatching troops to Tashkent before the British did so. Lars-Erik Nyman, *Great Britain and Chinese, Russian, and Japanese Interests in Sinkiang, 1918–1934* (Stockholm: Esselte Studium, 1977), p. 49.

18 Ishii Kikujirō, 'Gaikō Yoroku', pp. 59–61.

19 Yoshi S. Kuno, *What Japan wants* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1921), p. 93.

20 United States Government (ed.), *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Russia 1918*, vol. 2, pp. 98–99

21 The Czechoslovak Legion comprised deserters from the armies of the Austro-Hungarian empire who had been allowed to form their own units by the Tsarist authorities during the First World War. They bore the name 'Czechoslovak' even before the creation of the state of Czechoslovakia in October 1918.

22 Hosoya Chihiro, 'Nihon to Koruchaku seiken shōnin mondai', *Hitotsubashi daigaku hōgaku kenkyū* (Tokyo), no. 3 (1961), pp. 13–15, see also the documents in Gaimushō kiroku (Meiji-Taishō), 1.6.3.24.13.57; *Omsk Daily*, 15 May 1918, p. 2.

23 I wish to thank Wada Haruki of Tokyo University for this point. See also Kikuchi Masanori, *Roshia kakumei to Nihonjin*, (632457; umk)Tokyo: 1973, pp. 216–218.

24 Gosudarstvennyi, Arkhiv Chabarovskoi Kraia (GAChK), f.1700, d.35, l.9.

25 Japanese policy resembled the so-called *Randstaatenpolitik* of the German General Staff which supported 'White atamans' in the Ukraine in 1918. See Udo Gehrmann, 'Der „Südostbund": ein Ordnungsversuch im Spannungsfeld zwischen Randstaatenpolitik und Regionalismus zur Zeit de Umbruchs im russländischen Reich (1917–1920)', in Harald Heppner and Eduard Staudinger (eds), *Region und Umbruch 1918: zur Geschichte alternativer Ordnungsversuche* (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 2001), pp. 149–202.

26 Rossiiskii Tsentr Khraneniia Dokumentov Noveishei Istorii (former CPSU archive in Moscow, RTsKhIDNI), f. 71, op. 35, d. 946, l.5.

27 Iapontsy v Sibirii (The Japanese in Siberia), unpublished manuscript, author not known, Vladivostok 1919.

28 National Archives (Washington, D.C.): file 21–33.5.

29 Frederick F. Moore, *Siberia Today* (New York and London: 1919), p. 29.

30 I.I. Korostovets, *Von Chinggis Khan zur Sowjetrepublik: eine Kurze Geschichte der Mongolei unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Neuesten Zeit* (Berlin: W. de Gruyter 1926), pp. 293–295. On Semenov's rule see for details N.P. Daurets *Semenovskie zastenki: Zapiski ochevidtsa* (Harbin: 1921).

31 Sanbō Honbu, *Shiberia shuppei shi*, I (Tokyo: 1972), pp. 275–276.

32 Ernest L. Harris Papers (Hoover Institution Archives/Stanford), box no. 1, accession no. XX072–9.23, S.7.

33 I.A. Gutman (alias Anatolii Gan), *Gibel' Nikolaevska-na-Amure* (Berlin: 1924); A.Z. Ovchinnikov, 'Memoirs of the Red Partisan Movement in the Russian Far East', in E. Varneck and H.H. Fisher (eds), *The Testimony of Kolchak and other Siberian materials* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1935), pp. 299–301; Hara Teruyuki 'Nikō-jiken no sho mondai', *Roshia shi kenkyū* (Sapporo) vol. 23 (1975), pp. 2–17.

34 The Siberian Social Revolutionaries were strongly influenced by the ideas of Grigorii N. Potanin (1835–1920), as well as Nikolai M. Iadrincev (1842–1894), the

'father' of the Siberian *oblastnichestvo* (regionalism). As a participant in expeditions to Tuva, Tibet, Mongolia and China in the period 1876–1899, Potanin stressed the importance of Central and East Asia for the development of Siberia. In December 1917, Potanin was elected president of the Siberian Regionalist Congress in Tomsk, where Siberian Bolsheviks also took part. The congress, however, was dispersed by Lenin's *agents provocateurs* in February 1918. For details, see Paul Dotsenko, *The Struggle for a Democracy in Siberia, 1917–1920: Eyewitness Account of a Contemporary* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983), pp. 18–19, 110–111.

35 Kayano Nagatomo, *Chūka minkoku kakumei hikyū* (Tokyo: 1941), p. 85; Wada Haruki, 'Bōmei narōdniki, Russeru-Sujirofusuki. Kakumei tei narōdniki shugi shi shomondai', Wakamori Tarō, *Kakumei Roshia to Nihon* (Tokyo: 1976), pp. 8, 118–122; N. Masokin (Acting member of the Society of Russian Orientalists in Harbin), 'Iaponskaia pechat' i vnutrennoe polozhenie v Rossii), *Kharbinskii Vestnik*, 18 May 1917, pp. 5, 7.

36 Adrian Jones, 'Easts and Wests Befuddled: Russian Intelligentsia Responses to the Russo–Japanese War', in David Wells and Sandra Wilson (eds), *The Russo–Japanese War in Cultural Perspective, 1904–05* (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1999), p. 150.

37 *Ibid*., p. 151.

38 RTsKhIDNI, f. 372, op. 1, d.2, l.174. The Siberian Social Revolutionaries thought of the Far Eastern Republic as a buffer between Soviet Russia and Japan. Actually, the FER became a Soviet satellite.

39 The negotiations between the command of the fifth Bolshevik division and the so-called 'Political Centre' (PC), an SR–Menshevik coalition, started shortly after the arrest of Kolchak by the PC. See Marc Jansen, *The Socialist-Revolutionary Party after October 1917: Documents from the P.S.R. Archives* (Amsterdam: Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, 1989), pp. 373–375.

40 *Zabajkal'skaja nov'* (Transbaikalian News), 20 April 1920, p. 4.

41 RTsKhIDNI, f.372, op. 1, d. 141, l.5.

42 V.V. Sonin, *Stanovlenie Dal'nevostochnoi Respubliki 1920–1922* (Vladivostok: 1990), p. 133; A.N. Babai (ed.), *Gosudarstvenno-pravovoe razvitie Dal'nevostochnogo regiona i rol' organov vnutrennykh del v etom protsesse* (Khabarovsk: 1994), pp. 14–17; A. Azarenkov and Ernest Shchagin, 'Some pages from the History of the Far Eastern Republic, *Far Eastern Affairs* (Moscow), no. 1 (1992), pp. 123, 125.

43 Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Novosibirskoi Oblasti (GANO), f. 1, op. 2, d.17, l. 52–53.

44 On Japanese intelligence work in the FER, see RTSKhIDNI, f. 71, op. 35, d.653, l. 77.

45 RTsKh IDNI, fond 71, opis' 35, delo 946, l.27; Hayashi Saburō, *Kantōgun to kyokutō Sorengun* (Tokyo: 1974), pp. 27–28; B.Z. Shumiatskii *Bor'ba za russkii Dal'nii Vostok* (Irkutsk: 1922), pp. 32–33.

46 Orrin Keith, 'Rebirth of Industry and Commerce in Eastern Siberia', *The Far Eastern Review* (Shanghai), vol. 18, no. 2 (1922), pp. 127–129.

47 GANO, f. 1, op. 2, d. 43, ll.64–66.

48 Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii/Dal'nego Vostoka (State Archive of the Russian Federation/Far East), f. 602, op. 1, d. 4., ll.32–35.

49 Rossiiskoi Gosudarstvennyi Voennyi Arkhiv (Russian State Military Archive) , f. 221, op.1, d. 31, l.1–2; A.I. Pogrebetsky Papers (Hoover Institution Archives/ Stanford), p. 92; GANO, 1, op. 2, d. 30, ll. 10–11; GANO, f. 1, op. 2, d. 30, ll.53–56.

50 White, *The Siberian Intervention*, p. 388.

51 RTsKhIDNI, f. 71, op. 35, d. 633, l. 16.

52 RCChIDNI, f. 71, op. 35, d. 653, l.44; excerpts from General Oi's answer, dated 26 June 1920, to the Verkhneudinsk DVR government of May 31, in Far Eastern Republic: Documents concerning the establishment of the Far Eastern Republic, box 1, accession no. XX317–8.28.

53 RTsKhIDNI, f. 372, op. 1, d. 39, l.28.

54 V.M. Molchanov, 'The Last White General' (unpublished manuscript), Bancroft Library, University of California (Berkeley), p. 117; White, *The Siberian Intervention*, p. 389.

55 G.K. Reikhberg, *Iaponskaia interventsiia na Dal'nem Vostoke* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1935), p. 102.

56 B. Filimonov, *Belopovstantsy: Khabarovskii okhod zimy 1921–1922gg* (Shanghai: 1932), vol. 1, pp. 95, 100.

57 *Dal'nevostochnaia mysl'* (Vladivostok), 25 September 1921, p. 1.

58 *Dal'nevostochnaia Respublika* (Chita), 19 May 1921, p. 2. However, the Japanese zaibatsu were not the only potential investors in the region. They competed with Chinese trusts from Shanghai. *Ibid*., 18 May 1921, p. 4.

59 Adol'f A. Ioffe (1883–1927) was the chairman of the Soviet delegation at the Brest-Litovsk armistice talks with the Central Powers in March 1918. In 1920 he sucessfully negotiated peace treaties with the Baltic states and Poland. In 1922 Ioffe participated in negotiating the Treaty of Rapallo.

60 George Lensen, *Japanese Recognition of the USSR: Soviet-Japanese Relations, 1921–1930* (Tokyo: Sophia University, 1970), pp. 142–143.

61 United States Congress, Senate Hearings, *Conference on the Limitation of Armament* (Washington D.C.: 1922), pp. 1395–1397.

62 Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sakhalinskoi Oblasti (GASO), f.58, op.2, d.4, l.37.

63 FRUS, Russia 1922, *op. cit*., vol. 2, p. 853.

64 Dmitrii I. Abrikossow, *Revelations of a Russian Diplomat: The Memoirs of Dmitrii I. Abrikossow.* Edited by George A. Lensen (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), pp. 298–299.

65 *FRUS, Russia 1922, op. cit.*, vol.2, pp. 861, 864, 866. It is worth mentioning that in 1938 against the background of the Great Purges in the Soviet Union and at the peak of Soviet–Japanese border clashes, Marshal Vasilii Bliucher who in 1922 expelled the Whites from Siberian soil and reunited the Far Eastern periphery with Soviet Russia after the Japanese withdrawal, and other representatives of the former Far Eastern Republic were purged as 'Japanese spies'. For details see Stephan, *The Russian Far East*, pp. 32, 340.

CHAPTER THREE

Japanese Expansion and Tibetan Independence

PAUL HYER

Japan's rise and fall as a major military power in East Asia coincided with Tibet's half-century attempt at independence. Throughout East and Southeast Asia, and even as far as South Asia, Japan used its reputation as the only Asian state which had achieved rapid modernization to present itself as the natural ally of progressive and modernizing forces in colonial and traditional societies. It also presented itself as the champion of Asian peoples struggling for independence from the Chinese (in the case of the Mongols) or the Western powers (in Southeast and South Asia).

As a country powerfully dominated by traditional institutions and uneasily carrying the diplomatic burden of former subordination to the Manchu rulers of China, Tibet might appear to have been an obvious target for, and partner in, Japan's ambitions in Central Asia. In fact, however, throughout the stormy years from 1895 to 1945, Japanese–Tibetan relations were meagre and relatively insignificant for both sides. Japan largely ignored weak Tibetan overtures for closer relations and the few Japanese active in Tibetan affairs were there mainly for a variety of personal reasons rather than as agents of the Japanese state. This limited relationship reflected strategic calculations in both Japan and Tibet as well as the geographical distance between the two countries.

Tibet's strategic significance lay in Central Asia, rather than East Asia. In the 1880s, the mountain region had played a key role in the 'Great Game' – the power struggle between an expanding Russia and an expanding British Empire for control of Inner Asia.[1] Neither side had more than slight, indirect influence

in Tibet, but each was fearful of the strategic consequences if the other were to gain a real foothold in the hermit nation. Tibet's long-standing religious connections with the Mongols, and its position on the edge of the Manchu empire in China drew it in limited ways into the cauldron of East Asian politics and into Japan's political strategies. Japan's grand strategy, however, tended to focus on coasts and islands, not mountain heartlands, and in this strategy Tibet's role was always marginal. Contrary to the report of such writers as Ma Ho-tien and Lai Tse-sheng,[2] there is nothing indicating that the Japanese plotted to carry out in Tibet the types of policy they followed in other nations of East Asia. Japan in turn was a source of inspiration, an ideal, to such progressive Tibetans as the Thirteenth Dalai Lama and Tsarong Shappe, but the rapid modernization which had made the Japanese model so intriguing to East and Southeast Asians – based as it was on the mobilization of a large labour force, the development of large capitalist corporations and access to foreign markets – was less immediately relevant to a sparsely populated mountain theocracy.

When the Japanese began to rediscover the outside world following the Meiji restoration, Tibet attracted some attention as a repository of Buddhist texts lost during the decline of Buddhism in India. Japanese were interested in rare sutras and in studying 'Lamaism' as a special esoteric tantrayana or mantrayana form of Buddhism.

The first few Japanese to visit Lhasa therefore were all Buddhist priests primarily interested in Buddhist texts and the Lamaist cult. The subsequent development of Tibetan studies in Japan also tended to be dominated by this orientation. These visitors, however, remained few in number because they were forced like other aliens to enter the country secretly, not only to avoid detection by the British and the Chinese, who wanted to exclude outside meddlers, but also to avoid the Tibetan authorities, who had maintained a strong policy of seclusion since 1793. In fact this problem never changed – every Japanese known to have entered Tibet did so secretly, and several were unsuccessful in their attempts. The Japanese Buddhist priest Naomi Kan was killed in 1899 while trying to enter Tibet from the China side. The British guards on the northern India border were the biggest obstacles to entry.

The first and best known of these religiously inspired Japanse visitors was Kawaguchi Ekai.[3] Kawaguchi departed Japan to travel to Tibet via India in June 1897. He spent an extended period of time in preparation in India and Nepal. He became acquainted with Sarat Chandra Das, a legend in his time for his secret

surveys of Tibet commissioned by the British and for his Tibetan dictionary among other things. Das assisted Kawaguchi in obtaining Tibetan tutors.[4]

In making careful preparations, Kawaguchi studied the Tibetan language for almost two years with several different teachers. Finally, after devious movements to divert the attention of border guards, he entered Tibet via Nepal posing as a Chinese lama on a pilgrimage from Lhasa's Sera Monastery. Following a circuitous route, he travelled two years and three months to reach the Tibetan capital. In Lhasa, Kawaguchi continued to pass himself off as a Chinese monk. He had some acquaintance with modern medicine, which served him well in gaining acceptance in Sera Monastery. His medical expertise gained him some recognition in Lhasa, including an interview with the young Thirteenth Dalai Lama, who discussed having Kawaguchi join the Potala medical staff. Eventually, Kawaguchi left the monastery and was sponsored by Chan-ba Choe-sang, a former Minister of Finance, whose concubine he had successfully medically treated. Through a circle of friends with status in the society he gained considerable insight into Tibetan politics and continued to advance his own studies of Buddhist texts.[5]

Kawaguchi was in Tibet at a critical time, at the turn of the century. He not only saw Chinese influence rapidly declining but also witnessed at first hand the Russian intrigue that was becoming a concern of the British and Chinese. He also recorded the dawning of a positive consciousness of Japan on the part of the Tibetans, prompted by Japan's victory in the Sino–Japanese War (1894–1895) and by Japanese actions favourable to Tibetan Buddhism at their great temple in Peking at the time of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. Another Japanese, Teramoto Enga,[6] had studied for a year at Yunghogung, the important Tibetan Buddhist centre in Peking in 1898 but the following year failed in an attempt to enter Tibet from the China side. In Peking when the Boxer Rebellion broke out, Teramoto was an unsung hero to Tibetans and Mongols for his efforts in getting Russian troops evicted from the Yunghogung temple where they were quartered. In addition he obtained some tons of rice to sustain the starving lamas and arranged for a delegation of thirteen leading Tibetan and Mongol 'living Buddhas' and Lamaist dignitaries to visit Japan. Later, with the assistance of some of these Buddhist leaders he was able to make his way through Inner Asia to Lhasa in the autumn of 1901.[7] This positive perception, however, marked the emergence of an awareness of Japan, rather than a feeling that it might in any way become important to Tibet's interests.

Kawaguchi was very perceptive and became well informed, and for many decades for those interested in Tibet his reports were a primary source of information on the intrigues of the Tsarist Russian agent, Dorjieff (Aguan Dorji). This Buriyat Mongol lama from Siberia was a tutor of the young Thirteenth Dalai Lama. Dorjieff tried to persuade the Tibetans that the Tsar was a defender of Tibetan Buddhism and that Shambala, the mythical, sacred city of Tibetan Buddhism, was in Russia.[8] Kawaguchi was critical of him but also considered him a genius. He reported that at least two large caravans of guns were brought into Tibet from Russia. He also learned that the Tibetans had quietly established a small arms arsenal and were smuggling in iron to make guns. Defence of their 'hermit' nation was a high priority of the Tibetans.[9] Lhasa was a city of intrigue and paranoia and when Kawaguchi's true identity began to be known, not only was he in danger but his Tibetan friends were also placed in jeopardy. Finally, in June 1902, while Lhasa was absorbed in an important festival, Kawaguchi departed for the border of India and eventually made his way back to Japan. He subsequently visited Tibet under very different circumstances in 1914 to obtain special sutras and meet the Panchen Lama.

The Russian threat, real or imagined, soon prompted the British to dispatch a contingent of troops into Tibet – the notorious Younghusband Expedition of 1904. Since this was the period of an Anglo-Japanese alliance directed against Russia, one may speculate as to whether Kawaguchi played any role in inciting British action. No evidence has surfaced either for or against this suspicion, but Kawaguchi's observations regarding Russian activity were no doubt available to the British. A contemporary of Kawaguchi, the Tibetologist Teramoto Enga, reportedly did converse with Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India, on the political situation in Tibet.[10]

Both the Dalai Lama and Dorjieff fled from Lhasa ahead of the Younghusband Expedition, and the Dalai Lama took up residence in the Mongolian city of Urga (now Ulaan Baatar), where he may have been in contact with Russians. His arrival more or less coincided with Japan's defeat of Russia in Manchuria in the war of 1904 and later that year he met Japanese officials for the first time to discuss mutual interests. More important, however, were his later contacts with Teramoto Enga, Kawaguchi's contemporary and the saviour of the Yunghogung temple in Peking. With grandiose pan-Asian visions, Teramoto was the most politically minded of the various Japanese Tibetan specialists and was more closely associated with official circles.

Teramoto had entered Tibet again during the chaos following the flight of the Dalai Lama, to observe the situation in Lhasa and its major monasteries and to send reports to Japan. In May 1905 he met the Panchen Lama in Gyantze, left Tibet by way of Darjeeling and met Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India, at Simla to discuss the Tibetan situation.[11] After a brief stay in Japan, Teramoto left again in April 1906 for the Tibetan border areas of China. He studied at the famous Labrang monastery in Gansu Province for a time, then moved on to the equally famous Kumbum (Taerhsuu) Tibetan Buddhist centre in Amdo (Qinghai). There he finally realized his ambition of meeting the Dalai Lama, who had moved to Kumbum from Urga, partly to be closer to Lhasa, partly because both the British and the Chinese were keen to distance him from his Russian contacts, partly perhaps because of reported friction with the Khutukhtu, the senior Buddhist leader in Urga who may have felt threatened by the Dalai Lama's superior status. Through many conversations Teramoto gained the confidence of the Tibetan leader. They had broad ranging discussions touching on such matters as Japanese history, the problems facing Tibet and the possibility of a Japan–Tibet Buddhist alliance. An account by a Buriyat lama, Zerempil, claims that the Dalai Lama, to whom he was an adviser, was impressed with Teramoto and the contacts he had in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Zerempil reportedly engaged the Japanese priest as a counsellor to assist him in negotiating with the Chinese. Hugh Richardson, a long-time British political officer in Lhasa, says that Teramoto was more likely a lower level 'private adviser'.[12]

The extent of Teramoto's shadowy influence is not entirely clear but, working with Japanese officials in Peking, Teramoto was able to facilitate the Dalai Lama's reception in the Chinese capital although the Tibetan leader had been under a cloud due to earlier problems with Chinese officials in Tibet. During this visit, the Dalai Lama spent time in the Japanese embassy and also made contact with American and Russian diplomats. Moreover, Teramoto is credited with achieving a modus vivendi between the British and the Tibetan leader which facilitated the latter's return to Lhasa. From this time the Tibetans began developing a new perception of the British and to see them as a support rather than as an enemy. This relationship between the Tibetans and the British continued until the latter quit India in 1947.

Before going to Peking, Teramoto accompanied the Tibetan leader to Wutaishan, the most venerable site of Tibetan Buddhism on the Mongolian border, and here they discussed plans for the Dalai Lama to visit Japan. In

Tokyo, Teramoto discussed the plan with such important leaders as Ōkuma Shigenobu (former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister), Foreign Minister Komura Jutaro, General Fukushima Yasumasa and others. Teramoto returned to Wutaishan with official invitations for the Japan visit and brought with him Ōtani Sonju, a leader of Nishi Honganji, Japan's largest Buddhist sect and a delegation including several other officials. The delegation discussed various plans with the Tibetan leader including his visit to Japan and an exchange of student representatives.[13] Preparations continued when the venerable Lama moved to Peking but near the end of 1908 complications arose. News of the plan to visit Japan leaked out and a diplomatic struggle erupted between the British and the Russians over the Tibetan leader's return to Lhasa. There were yet greater complications with the death of Emperor Kuang-hsu (Guang Xu) and the Dowager Empress Tzu Hsi (Si Xi) in November 1908. Teramoto perceived potential danger for the Dalai Lama in the situation and advised him to return to Tibet.[14] Japan's conservative Ambassador to China, Ijuin Hikokichi, reportedly a supporter of the rising future warlord, Yuan Shih-kai, and influenced by Britain's ambassador John Jordan, arbitrarily cancelled the visit. Teramoto complained that Japanese circles did not appreciate the importance of the proposed visit and the lama Tada Tokwan informed the writer that in the end the Chinese forbade the Dalai Lama to visit Japan. It sounds reasonable that the Chinese sense of propriety would have been offended if the Tibetan leader had gone to Japan on a sight-seeing excursion while the imperial court was mourning the death of the empress dowager and the emperor, seen traditionally as a patron of the Tibetan ecclesiastical leader.[15]

The Dalai Lama was very disappointed and displeased, it seems, with the way Japanese officials had handled the matter. He soon departed for Tibet leaving a disgruntled Teramoto who later took up a productive academic career at Kyoto Imperial University.[16] At this same time Kawaguchi was teaching in Tokyo. After Japan's conquest of Manchukuo, Teramoto was called by that government's Ministry of State Affairs (Kokumushō) to aid in the development of basic policy for Lamaist Buddhism in eastern Mongolia.

In a few short years during the Dalai Lama's first exile to Mongolia, Kumbum and Peking (1904–1909), Japan became a world power and Tibet became a buffer state between China, British India and Russia. In the judgement of Zerempil, the Buriyat Mongol Lama close to the Dalai Lama, Teramoto's influence gave Inner Asia's Tibetan Buddhist community a favourable perception of Japan. Previously this community had looked more favourably on Tsarist Russia.

Teramoto's influence on the Dalai Lama contributed to a lasting Tibetan interest in Japan's modernization and rise following the Meiji Revolution. On his return from five years in exile, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama had spent barely two months in Lhasa before a Chinese invasion forced him to flee again, this time to India. These two enforced exiles profoundly influenced the Dalai Lama by bringing him in contact with the outside world. He was favourably impressed with what he had learned of the rising power of the Buddhist nation of Japan and the positive aspects of British rule in India and their apparently benign interest in Tibet. He was especially interested in Japan's Meiji Revolution and the new era it had ushered in for a once isolated, backward country. He saw a number of similarities in the historical background of the two countries. The Dalai Lama depended upon Japanese aides to assist him in some progressive projects in the second decade of the century.[17] Tsarong Shappe, progressive leader of the Young Tibet group, reportedly wanted to play a role in the modernization of Tibet similar to that of Itō Hirobumi in Japan. He saw the modern world being forced upon Tibet as it had earlier been forced upon Japan. It was clear that if Tibet wanted to maintain its independence as Japan had done, it must change and the Japanese experience was instructive. Charles Bell and Hugh Richardson both note that Tsarong had visited Japan, although no record of this journey is available.

The Dalai Lama also saw the Japanese as potentially valuable diplomatic allies against China. The writer has a copy of a letter from the Dalai Lama to the Meiji Emperor of Japan which has a bearing on the subject at hand – in it we find a very respectful salutation and a solicitous concern for the emperor's health. He expresses gratitude for the assistance given to a special student or Tibetan representative resident in Kyoto in 1911, discusses China's violation of Tibet's borders and threat to Tibet's independence. He closes with a request for Japan's assistance in the matter and expresses a desire to correspond with the Meiji Emperor from time to time.[18] Tibet's interest in Japan, however, was not reciprocated. Japan's public support for the self-determination of Asian peoples never extended beyond those regions where Japan had a military and political presence capable of influencing events. Whatever sympathy individual Japanese may have had towards Tibet, there was no significant advantage to Japan in Tibetan independence. Throughout the decades when Tibet was struggling to secure international recognition for its independence, therefore, the Japanese authorities displayed complete indifference to Tibetan aspirations. The Japanese

who assisted the Dalai Lama, with one exception, were generally not the usual free-booting, 'China *rōnin*' type associated with ultra-nationalist secret societies like those who aided Sun Yat-sen.[19] There is nothing to support the notion that the Japanese were 'fishing in muddy waters' in Tibet with the hope of gaining some benefit for Japan. It was rather Tibet that hoped to gain from a closer relationship with Japan. The most important Japanese individuals to aid the Tibetan modernization project were Yajima Yasujiro and Aoki Bunkyō.

Yajima Yasujiro[20] was a veteran of the Russo–Japanese War and seems to have been a freelance adventurer. He was smuggled into Lhasa by Tibetan merchants, and was soon directly involved in efforts to strengthen Tibet's military capabilities, which had top priority. Among Yajima's activities were training troops, advising on defence strategy against Chinese incursions, building barracks and forming an honour guard for the Dalai Lama. His base of operations was at Norbulinka, the area of the Dalai Lama's summer palace. His training approach is described as using Japanese commands and Japanese methods. While confirming judgements would be helpful, he reportedly had better success in training troops than did a Buriyat Mongol using a Russian approach or a Tibetan who was trained in British methods.

The Dalai Lama made several attempts to obtain the assistance of additional Japanese in military and technical matters but was unsuccessful. It was decided that the Tibetan troops would receive training based on a combination of Japanese and British methods. The Japanese part of the plan was later given up due to British pressure and the inability of Lhasa to obtain Japanese cooperation. Yajima spent some six years in Tibet and his compatriots say he was treated very well. He returned to Japan in 1919 with a Tibetan wife, the daughter of a merchant. Their only son was later killed during the Second World War in the Pacific and Yajima's wife died prematurely.

Aoki Bunkyō,[21] on assignment in India in 1910, had gained an audience with the Dalai Lama in Darjeeling and they discussed the implementation of a student exchange programme. Such a programme had been discussed some two years earlier at Wutaishan by the Dalai Lama and Japan's Honganji Buddhist leaders. The Dalai Lama concurred and a special student, actually an 'incarnation' from the Sera Monastery, identified in the Dalai Lama's letter quoted above as Ngawang Lobsang, was dispatched to Japan with two attendants under the care of Aoki, arriving in May 1911. For some eight months the party studied Japanese in Kyoto while Aoki and Tada Tokwan studied Tibetan. But when the Chinese

began retreating from Lhasa, the Tibetan representatives were suddenly called back to Tibet in January 1912. Returning to Darjeeling on the Tibetan border they were accompanied by Aoki Bunkyō, Tada Tokwan and Fujitani Sei.

In a meeting with the Dalai Lama at Darjeeling, Aoki and Tada were prevailed upon to journey to Lhasa to study and this they did, though entering secretly through Nepal to avoid the British border patrols. Surprisingly, Yajima Yasujiro showed up on the border at about the same time. He was entering Tibet for the second time and preceded all of them, including the Dalai Lama. He soon saw action against the Chinese who were being driven out of the country. Once in Lhasa all these Japanese lived and worked openly.

Aoki was a young Buddhist priest associated with Ōtani Kōzui, nationalistic head of the Nishi Honganji sect. This sect had inaugurated the Tibetan student-exchange programme by agreement with the Dalai Lama. It appears that the Tibetan leader hoped that his relationship with Buddhist leaders of Japan would lead to Japanese Government contacts and assistance but in this he was disappointed. Nevertheless, one of Aoki's assignments was to brief the Dalai Lama on foreign affairs. Later Tada Tokwan served in a similar manner by translating news items for the Tibetan pontiff. Among his other activities Aoki worked with Tibetan officials on educational materials in preparation for educational reforms. He was also assigned to procure Japanese army manuals and translate them into Tibetan. It is unclear just what other Tibetans and Japanese were involved in this matter or how the army manuals were obtained from Japan but surely someone in Tokyo had to cooperate in such a matter. Aoki's record reports that he also assisted in designing Tibet's national flag. An examination of the flag seems to confirm that it combines Japanese as well as Tibetan and Buddhist symbols.[22]

Aoki seems to have acted in a private capacity in these matters, not under orders from Tokyo or Kyoto, as far as we are aware. The sources do not reveal what sort of mandate or instructions his superiors gave him when he left Japan. Though Aoki represented the most important Japanese Buddhist sect, it does not appear that he shared the chauvinistic views of Ōtani Kōzui, head of the sect. He was most likely motivated by a desire to help the Tibetans strengthen themselves against Chinese invaders and to assist in developing the country, and because he felt indebted to the Dalai Lama for his patronage. Aoki, too, like his Japanese compatriots, could see the obvious feudalistic nature of Tibetan society, not unlike that of Japan before its opening and modernization. Reforms were imperative for the survival of the society.

Aoki attempted to aid the Tibetans in developing an education system patterned after Japan. The Dalai Lama realized the importance of education and had Aoki translate Japanese texts and other useful books. At the request of Tibetan leaders, Aoki was also involved to some limited extent in mining. The Dalai Lama hoped the mining development would be a source of revenue and fuel, but it failed, primarily because of the lack of experts knowledgeable in the field. Apart from these various activities, Aoki concentrated particularly on a study of the Tibetan language, both colloquial and classical. As a guest of the Dalai Lama, he was lodged in the home of an aristocratic family where he was exposed to the best Lhasa dialect and given careful attention, tutors and the like. When he left Tibet the Tibetan government gave him a special award in recognition for his work.

Tada Tokwan, a contemporary of Yajima and Aoki in Lhasa, stayed in Tibet the longest of all the Japanese. When this writer met him later in his life he was still known in Japan and abroad as 'Lama Tada Tokwan'. He lived for some ten years in the famous Sera Monastery, and reportedly rose to a position of some significance. He complained about the difficult discipline he suffered during his stay in the monastery, especially while his fellow countryman, Yajima, was enjoying a notoriously sensual life in the capital. One of Tada's assignments was translating news items for the Thirteenth Dalai Lama so that the Tibetan leader could to be informed on what was happening outside the 'hermit nation'. He came to know the lamaist cult better than any Japanese before or since and was recognized as an authority on Tibetan Buddhism, though it seems he was never awarded very significant recognition in Japan.[23]

The Tibetan leaders who approached Japan were primarily interested in reforms and in strengthening their country, whereas the Japanese who came to Tibet – Kawaguchi, Teramoto, Aoki and Tada – were Buddhist priests with limited or no real technical expertise and with a primary interest in the Tibetan language, textual studies and the Lamaist cult. The role of Yajima was an exception. The possibility of greater Japanese influence was limited by the fact that so few Japanese were ever resident in the country, in contrast with East and Southeast Asia, where large communities of Japanese traders, farmers and service-providers provided a conduit. Tibet's geographical isolation and the continuing obstacles put in the way of access by Tibetan, Chinese and British Indian governments meant that this situation did not change. The reform programme in Tibet, moreover, might have had support from the Dalai Lama and

a few other leading figures, but it had very shallow roots in Tibetan society. In common with other powerful pre-modern elites in Asia, the Tibetan establishment was wary of an over-enthusiastic adoption of modern technology and institutions. Leading Tibetans realized that modernization could undermine the traditional structures of power in Tibetan society, and like so many other elites they were keen to adopt technology only if this could be done without changing social structure. Their interest in modernization was also weakened by the unpalatable fact that in the Tibetan context the most important external agents of modernization were Chinese. In particular, the imperial commissioner appointed to Lhasa in 1906, Chang Yin-t'ang (Zhang Yintang), was an enthusiastic modernizer who secularized the administration, founded schools and a military academy and promoted modern agriculture. In eastern Tibet, Chao Erh-fang (Zhao Erfeng) earned a reputation as a butcher of Tibetan opponents but he also abolished corvee labour, introduced compulsory education and established new economic enterprises. All these policies had strong potential to undermine the power of Tibet's traditional rulers, and under these circumstances the Japanese model of modernization was no more attractive than that of the Chinese.

For some fifteen years after the last Japanese left Tibet in 1923, contact between the two peoples was negligible. There are reports that the Japanese supplied arms to Tibet and that fairly large amounts of weaponry were transported indirectly via Mongolia during the 1920s but these reports are sketchy and unconfirmed and in any case they seem to have been without consequence. Only in the late 1930s did Japan briefly renew official contact with Tibet, but even then this contact derived from Japan's interests in Inner Mongolia, rather than from any direct intentions towards Tibet itself. The Buddhism that was the religion of most Mongols was a branch of Tibetan Buddhism, and the Japanese recognized in the many monasteries throughout Mongolia and in a number of important monastic centres such as Wutaishan and the great Mongolian-Tibetan temple of Yunghogung in Peking an important source of influence over the Mongolian people, whom they would need to bring over to their side. [24]

Many Japanese officials, however, regarded these monasteries as decadent, mediaeval institutions with an unwholesome influence on the entire society and economy. A large percentage of the male population lived as illiterate, unproductive lamas. The Japanese were determined to make reforms and to restructure the religion and manipulate it to serve their own purposes. For example, they felt that

a married clergy like that found in Japan would be better and they planned to increase literacy, to elevate Mongolian as the liturgical language and to reduce the percentage of the male population living unproductively in the monasteries. This strategy could be facilitated if Tibetan cooperation or influence could be enlisted.

The problems Japan faced in occupying Mongolia and the challenges of making reform were a concern of Goshima Tokushiro, a Japanese adviser in the administrative centre for eastern Mongolia (western Manchukuo) located at Wangin-süme (present Ulanhot). He was the planner or promoter of a scheme for an expedition to Tibet to place two Japanese agents in Lhasa. In an interview with the writer he noted that: 'A base for Mongolian operations had to be established in Tibet … so Nomoto's charge or function was to become a Tibetan, marry a Tibetan wife and live in Tibet'.[25] Goshima's discussion regarding the reasons for this operation to place agents in Lhasa seems very vague. It appears to have been part of a longer term, undetermined contingency plan, rather than having any specific immediate goals. A Foreign Ministry record of 1938 quotes Goshima as reporting 'success in developing close relations with the An-chin Khutukhtu', the 'living Buddha', or presiding lama of the Yunghogung centre in Peking. This Khutukhtu was among the Tibetans who cooperated with the Japanese and was persuaded to include two Japanese disguised as Mongol lamas in his entourage in a journey to Lhasa.

In August 1938, two young Japanese, Nomoto Jinzo and Yoshitomi Yoshitsugu, were selected for the Lhasa assignment. Special training for them was arranged by the Wangin-süme Military Intelligence Unit (Tokumu kikan) including a stay in the Beitsemiao monastery for conditioning in the life of a lama and training in the Mongolian language and culture. They were given briefings by the old Japanese lama Tada Tokwan, and briefings in intelligence techniques. They also had Tibetan language study with an administrative assistant who had served both the Panchen Lama and the An-chin Khutukhtu.

In his report Nomoto writes: 'I became conscious of the heavy responsibility resting on me of having to somehow establish relations between our empire and Tibet and, if possible, to aid the national policy.' Several years after the expedition Aoki Bunkyō notes in a Foreign Ministry report merely that 'Nomoto Jinzo entered Tibet secretly charged with a special mission'. The South Manchurian Railway Company financed the 1939 trek to Tibet. The journey was via India, first by ship to Calcutta where Yoshitomi was found to have some serious abdominal disorder that eliminated him from the plan.

Nomoto spent a year and nine months in Tibet, associating with the elite of Tibetan society, particularly the Yabshi Punkhang noble family and relatives of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama among others. Most of his time was spent in Shigatse, base of the Panchen Lama and the An-chin Khutukhtu but he also spent some time in Lhasa. In his report Nomoto comments on pro-Chinese elements in Lhasa, their intelligence organ, Chinese troops, the new Fourteenth Dalai Lama and so forth. There may be more to the story yet to be discovered.

Nomoto left rather abruptly with the An-chin Khutukhtu – just why is not entirely clear. Goshima says it appears to have become known that he was Japanese but other factors may have been involved. There was a prolonged power struggle in Tibetan politics during Nomoto's stay between an ultra-conservative, pro-Chinese lama faction led by the regent of the youthful Fourteenth Dalai Lama and the opposing anti-Chinese, 'Young Tibet' group led by Tsarong Shappe, confidant of the former Thirteenth Dalai Lama. Li Tieh-tseng, former Chinese ambassador to Thailand, comments on the An-chin Khutukhtu's anti-regent involvement in these intrigues and speculates that 'the status of Tibet might have changed radically' had his activities really been connected with the Japanese. Since Nomoto's entry into Tibet was sponsored by the An-chin Khutukhtu, one wonders if Nomoto's departure was related to this Tibetan's involvement in Tibetan political intrigues. Whatever the case, Japan's first attempt to establish connections in Tibet in a new era failed but was a prelude to other ambitious plans.

In 1938–1939 the Japanese made several attempts to gain Tibetan cooperation in a plan to institute a new incarnation of the Jebtsun Damba in Inner Mongolia.[26] This *khutukhtu* (Mongolian *hubilghan*, 'incarnation' or 'living Buddha') was the central figure of Tibetan Buddhism in Mongolia traditionally based in Urga in Outer Mongolia. His role was roughly analogous to that of the Dalai Lama of Tibet; both were temporally and religiously dominant in their respective spheres. Six of the Jebtsun Damba's incarnations had been Tibetans, whereas only two had been Mongols, so it was logical to involve the Tibetan hierarchy.

When the Eighth Jebtsun Damba died in 1924 following the communist takeover in Outer Mongolia, the Soviets forbade a search for the next incarnation, and a ninth incarnation was thus never installed. The Japanese, however, now saw the usefulness of sponsoring a new Jebtsun Damba in Inner Mongolia under their own auspices: such a living Buddha would be useful to them as an instrument of socio-political control. Assuming that the incarnation could be

manipulated, he could legitimize Japanese policies and thus facilitate the reforms and restructuring the Japanese hoped to accomplish in their occupation of Mongolia. In addition Japanese support for a new Jebtsun Damba was likely to win backing from people in the Mongolian People's Republic, then a satellite under Russia. In this way they could appeal to pan-Mongolian sentiments throughout the fragmented parts of Mongolia.

The Japanese made their first attempt to carry out the Jebtsun Damba scheme in 1938. A key figure was a close associate of the Tibetan An-chin Khutukhtu named Lang Tsang, described as a minor 'living Buddha' from the important Labrang monastery in Gansu. Both the An-chin 'living Buddha' and Japanese planner Goshima Tokushiro were again the main planners. Lang Tsang discussed the proposal with Prince De (De Wang, Demchugdungreb) head of the Kalgan Inner Mongolian government that the Japanese had set up under their auspices. This rather conservative Prince De generally approved of the plan if it were properly handled according to tradition and with the approval of the Tibetan authorities.[27]

The venerable Dilowa Khutukhtu informed the writer that Lang Tsang went to Tibet and obtained a very vague oracle from the Sa-kya 'living Buddha' giving directions as to where the new incarnation was to be found. When he returned to Inner Mongolia in 1939 to report on the oracle, he also brought a self-serving letter from the head lama of his Labrang monastery noting that there was a candidate for the new Jebtsun Damba in a certain place in Amdo. Prince De was displeased with the obviously opportunistic proposal and disapproved of the arrangement.

In spite of this fiasco, dispatches from Japan's Foreign Office reiterated the importance of controlling or manipulating (*soju*) the lamas in order to win the support of the Mongolian people. The next attempt at ecclesiastical engineering in Mongolia involved the Dilowa himself, a senior 'living Buddha' from Outer Mongolia. In the fall of 1939, the official Sainbayar proposed to Prince De again that the Dilowa Khutukhtu should handle the matter of gaining a Tibetan approval for installing a new Jebtsun Damba in Inner Mongolia. The Dilowa had been close to the last Jebtsun Damba before his death in 1924. When Mongolia, as a satellite of the Soviet Union, carried out brutal purges of the lamas in the 1930s, he had escaped into the Japanese sphere of Inner Mongolia.

The new plan was approved and preparations were made for another expedition to Tibet. The Dilowa had desired all his life to make a pilgrimage to

Lhasa and this was his opportunity. Some speculate that he may have had his own agenda to escape from under the shadow of the Japanese. The plan again was to obtain an oracle from the head of the Sa-kya monastic centre with which the Mongols had traditional ties. Moreover, the Dilowa was 'authorized to persuade [the] Dalai Lama to announce the new incarnation of the Jebtsun Damba in Inner Mongolia'. A son of one of the princes was to be the candidate. Kwantung army intelligence officer Yano Mitsuji informs the writer that according to his information it was to be a son of Prince De.

The Dilowa's attempt to reach Lhasa, however, was short lived. According to a Japanese agent's postwar report, a Mongolian official, no doubt disaffected by pressures of the Japanese occupation, leaked word to the Chinese and when the Dilowa's plane landed in Hongkong, where he was to transfer, he was diverted to Chungking. Here he was placed under Kuomintang detention for the rest of the war at Omei-shan a temple in Sichuan Province. This was the last known attempt to install a new incarnation of the Jebtsun Damba in Inner Mongolia or to involve Tibet in such a scheme.[28]

Apart from the special situation concerning Mongolia just discussed, civilian and military officials in Japan gave only slight attention to Tibet from the time of their invasion of mainland Asia until the broadening of the Pacific War. The activity and initiatives discussed above came from Japanese in Mongolia dealing directly with local problems that only tangentially concerned Tibet. In 1941 a Tibetan specialist, Aoki Bunkyō, was belatedly engaged as a special adviser in Japan's Foreign Affairs Office. It will be recalled that Aoki had been in Tibet from 1912 to 1916. He complained that 'Japanese generally had a low opinion of Tibet and had absolutely refused to consider Tibetan overtures' for closer relations over the years. Aoki had lobbied officials to give greater importance to establishing relations with Tibet stressing the various past contacts that had been made. Among other contacts he cited the visit to Japan in 1939 of a party of 'living Buddhas' as representatives of various important temples of Mongolia and Tibet and their laudatory reports about Japan after returning home.[29]

As the scope of Japan's Greater East Asia plan was expanded in 1942, a 'Tibetan operation' (*Chibetto kōsaku*) was finally begun. It remained a low-level commitment relative to Japan's involvement in other areas of Asia but is worth attention. Foreign Minister Tōgō Shigenori sent a dispatch to three consulates in Inner Mongolia and to Shanghai instructing them to begin a search for experts with skills and experience related to Tibet. Aoki's lobbying was successful and for

the next six years he was associated with this 'operation'. The *Chibetto kosaku*, however, seemed to be more of an academic project linked with some fieldwork in an effort to gather intelligence data about Tibet that might be useful if closer relations with Lhasa materialized. The Nihon lama kenkyu honbu (Headquarters for Japanese Lamaist Studies) was soon involved in the work. Agents were dispatched secretly into Qinghai to recruit specialists and gather information. Half a dozen Tibetans or related men with impressive language skills and experience were brought in and others were sent out to bring in lamas from Tibet to aid the work, hopefully some day in Lhasa.

Aoki travelled to Mongolia to check the Tibetan operation and meet the persons involved. Japan's old 'Tibet hands' were called upon for assistance. Kawaguchi Ekai refused to be involved though Tada Tokwan was of some limited assistance. Map and dictionary projects on Tibetan dialects were undertaken. In addition, a 'special operations' group in Shanghai was called on for support by working with Tibetan merchants. In this latter connection, a most important recruit was Manang-abo (Meng-na-chang) a capable and influential eastern Tibetan (Khampa) merchant who worked closely with Aoki until the end of the war. After extensive contacts in China he had come to the conclusion that the Japanese were the best to work with in view of the great changes in the power structure of Asia and the necessity for political reforms for Tibet's survival in the new world that was emerging. On another front, close relations were pursued with the Panchen Lama, resident in Peking. One of the most active groups on the Tibet initiative was based at Yunghogung, the important centre of Tibetan Buddhism mentioned earlier. In Foreign Ministry reports, Aoki made much of the visit to Japan in June 1942 of Tempa Targye (Bstanpa Dar rgyas?), referred to as a 'representative of the Tibetan Government', who had been cut off from Tibet by the war. He was also referred to as a Jasak Khanpo, the highest prelate of a monastery, who had authority over all Tibetan Buddhist temples of North China. He met with a host of Japanese Government and military officials. Aoki notes that this lama had means of being informed on affairs in Lhasa and that important intelligence data was gained from his visit as well as a commitment to be supportive of Japan. Among the topics discussed were the development of relations and communication between Tibet and Japan and Tibet's status as a member of Japan's East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.[30] With the flurry of interest in Tibet, Aoki and others cautioned against ill-advised initiatives and counselled for a rational approach to any undertaking. Some Japanese interviewed later by

the writer reported that as Japanese troops reached upper Burma, plans were made for air drops into Tibet but without success. Manangabo was somewhere in Southeast Asia with a special intelligence group at the end of the war and made his way back to Tibet through upper Burma with various useful items turned over to him by the Japanese.

Near the end of the war two Japanese agents, Kimura Hisao and Nishikawa Ichizo, made their way overland to Lhasa from Mongolia disguised as monks.[31] Unlike earlier Japanese, their objectives were purely political in nature. We know of Kimura's activities, but Nishikawa's are still unclear. Their presence in Tibet is of interest but their activities were not significant in Japan's war effort.

Kimura had worked in his early twenties for four years on an experimental pasture at a monastery in Inner Mongolia and had then worked for an investigation or intelligence section of the Japanese embassy to Prince De's Kalgan government. A need arose for information on Inner Asian regions between Mongolia and Tibet so Kimura accepted the assignment, purchased five camels, persuaded a Mongol friend and his wife to accompany him and departed for the western regions disguised as a lama. Kimura informed the writer that his original assignment was to gather information on the situation among the Tienshan (Tianshan) Mongols of China's Xinjiang Province. When his way was blocked in that direction, he turned his small caravan towards Tibet arriving in Lhasa about the time of the end of the war. The other Japanese, Nishikawa Ichizo, spent a year in the great Kumbum Monastery of Qinghai. After he arrived in Lhasa his life was quite uneventfully spent in the famous Drepung monastery. He and Kimura met occasionally but do not seem to have spent much time together.

The war was over when Kimura arrived in Lhasa but hearing that war-ravaged Japan was not a good place to be, he stayed on in Tibet until the eve of the invasion of Tibet by Chinese troops. He made friends in Lhasa, Kalimpong and Darjeeling and survived by working in a Tibetan print shop and by merchant activity conveying goods between the Indian border and Lhasa. Kimura, like earlier Japanese, saw a Tibet that reminded him of mediaeval Japan before the modernization of the Meiji Revolution. His idealism led him to think of reforming Tibetan society and he was attracted to progressive, reform-minded Tibetans interested in reforming their country. Some of Kimura's friends were among those who cooperated with the Chinese in the takeover of Tibet to their later regret.

The presence of Kimura and Nishikawa in Lhasa on the eve of the takeover of Tibet by the People's Republic of China in 1950 marks the fact that Tibet had come full circle in a half century. Kawaguchi, the first Japanese in Lhasa in 1900, witnessed the decline of Chinese power in Tibet. Kimura and Nishikawa saw its return with the People's Liberation Army in 1950. At the request of Tarchin, who put out a Tibetan newspaper in Kalimpong, Kimura even made a two-month expedition to the eastern Tibet–China border area to make first-hand observations of the situation there and rumours of Chinese preparations to invade Tibet.

Tibet was on the fringes of Japan's strategic and political interests in East Asia during the age of Japanese military expansion, and Japan's strategic importance to Tibet was always overshadowed by that of China, Britain and the Russian/Soviet empire. Japan's engagement in Tibetan history therefore is an intriguing footnote rather than a substantial chapter in either country's history. Nonetheless, the character of Tibet's relationship with the Japanese empire reflects important features of both. The weakness of Japan's official interest in Tibet and the barely concealed self-interest of its occasional forays into Tibetan affairs suggests that Pan-Asian idealism was ultimately little more than a cloak for Japan's national ambitions. Tibet's brief flirtation with a Japanese model for modernization, on the other hand, highlights enormous obstacles which such modernization would have faced in Tibet. It was virtually impossible in the conservative 'sacred' society of Tibet to institute the reforms which had modernized Japan's 'secular' society. Although Tibetan traditional culture survived longer as the dominant element in daily life and political and social structures, the changes necessary to turn Tibet into a modern society capable of maintaining itself as an independent state were far more difficult to implement.

NOTES

1 Peter Hopkirk, *The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia* (New York: Kodansha, 1992).

2 See Ma Ho-t'ien, *Gan Ching Zang bien-chu kao-cha chi-kao* [A study of the frontier districts of Gansu, Qinghai and Tibet] (Shanghai: Shang wu yin shu kuan, 1947); Li T'ieh-Cheng [Lai Tze-sheng], *The Historical Status of Tibet* (New York: King's Crown Press, Columbia University, 1956).

3 See Kawaguchi Ekai, *Chibetto ryokō-ki* (Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1904). A more readily available English language reference is Ekai Kawaguchi, *Three Years in Tibet* (Benares: The Theosophical Society, 1909).

4 Sarat Chandra Das, *Narrative of Travels in Tibet* (Calcutta, 1885).

5 Kawaguchi, *Chibetto*, I, p. 344.

6 A summary of Teramoto's involvement in Tibetan matters may be found in Kuzū Toshihisa, *Tō-A senkaku no shishi kiden* [Biographical accounts of pioneer patriots of East Asia] (Tokyo, 1935) Vol. II, pp. 266 and 270.

7 *Ōtani Gakuhō*, XXII, p. 8.

8 For a discussion of Dorjieff's controversial role, see Helen Hundley, 'Tibet's part in the "Great Game"', *History Today*, vol. 43 (Oct. 1993), pp. 45–50.

9 Kawaguchi, *Chibetto*, II, pp. 168–182. The early Japanese–Tibetan contacts made by Kawaguchi and his compatriots, Teramoto and Aoki, and Tada, laid the foundation for Tibetan studies in Japan, more particularly Tibetan textual studies and Buddhism. These monks all gained first-hand experience in Tibet and all taught Tibetan language courses in the better universities of Japan.

10 For British views on Russian intrigue in Tibet, see Sir Charles Bell, *Tibet Past and Present* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924).

11 Kuzū, *Tō-A senkaku*, p. 270.

12 Wilhelm Filchner, *Sturm über Asien: Erlebnisse eines diplomatischen Geheimagenten* (Berlin: Neufeld and Henius, 1924), pp. 225ff; Hugh Richardson, former British Political Officer, Lhasa, personal letter to the writer, 12 September 1957.

13 Kuzū, *Tō-A senkaku*, p. 271.

14 Filchner, *Sturm über Asien*, p. 230; Teramoto, *Chibetto-go*, p. 9; Kuzū, *Tō-A senkaku*, p. 271.

15 Tada Tōkan, private interview with the writer.

16 Teramoto, *Chibetto-go*, p. 9; Yamaguchi Susumu, 'Ko Teramoto sensei to Chibetto-gaku' [The Late Professor Teramoto and Tibetan Studies], *Ōtani Gakuhō*, XXII, p. 98

17 Aoki Bunkyō, *Himitsu no kuni Chibetto yuki* [Journey to the secret country of Tibet] (Tokyo: Naigai Shuppan Kabushiki Kaisha, 1920), pp. 134–135.

18 Letter from the Dalai Lama to the Meiji Emperor, copy in the possession of the writer. The letter was obviously written not knowing that the Emperor had already died on 30 July 1912. The writer found the letter in the papers of Aoki Bunkyō in Tokyo University. A partial translation, by my Tibetan friend Rapten Chazotsang, reads: 'Respected and Meritorious Great Emperor of Nihon, That Your Majesty's health has recently improved leaves my mind at peace. Because of our common bond in the precious teachings of the Lord Buddha, Your Majesty … has most generously given assistance to our student, reincarnate lama, Ngawang Lobsang,

with his work in Nihon last year [1911] for which I am very grateful … [comments follow concerning 'China's repeated violation of Tibet's border']. I request Your Majesty's good influence on China for the withdrawal of their forces to once again restore Tibet's status as an independent country. With this khatak [ceremonial silk scarf] I pray for our continuous good relations. It would give me immense joy to hear from Your Majesty from time to time.' Sealed, the Dalai Lama. (Dated 23rd day, 5th month of the Water Buffalo year – this would fall in July 1913 of the Western calendar).

19 Marius Jansen, *The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1954).

20 Information regarding Yajima comes from an interview with him and a personal letter from lama Tada Tōkan. See also Yajima Yasujiro, 'Toyo no himitsu kuni seizo sennyuko,' [Journey into Tibet, the secret country of Asia] in Yomiuri Shinbunsha, *Shina henkyo monogatari* (Tokyo,1940), pp. 25–58.

21 The main source of information on Aoki Bunkyō is his *Himitsu no kuni Chibetto yuki* [Journey to the secret country of Tibet] (Tokyo: Naigai Shuppan, 1920).

22 Aoki, *Chibetto*, pp. 134–135.

23 The activities of Tada Tōkan are the least well documented of the Japanese who lived in Tibet. I have drawn on personal interview data recorded in Paul Hyer, 'Japan and the Lamaist World: Japanese Relations with Tibet' (unpublished manuscript).

24 Background information for this section is found in Paul Hyer, 'Lamaist Buddhism and the Japanese Occupation of Mongolia' (Master's thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1953).

25 Special information in this section comes from interviews with Goshima and Nomoto Jinzo, also Nomoto Jinzo's account, 'Nyu Chi-ki' [Record of entering Tibet], a top secret dispatch to Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru, dated 21 June 1943, Library of Congress Microfilm S 1.6.1.3–4, reel S656, frame 1121.

26 Special data in this section is from interviews with the Dilowa Khutukhtu, the senior living Buddha from Outer Mongolia; with Gombojab Hangin, administrative assistant to De Wang, head of the Kalgan government under the Japanese, and with Colonel Yano Mitsuji, Kwantung army intelligence.

27 Personal interview with Goshima Tokushiro. Information regarding this matter is to be found in a report by Furukawazono Shigetoshi, 'Jebtsun Damba Khutukhtu tensei mondai' found in Man-Mō Seikyō kankei zassan: Nai Mōko Kankei [Miscellaneous documents relating to political conditions in Manchukuo and Mongolia], Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs L.C. microfilm, S1.6.1.2.12, exposure 1414–1418.

28 Interviews with Kimura Hisao.

29 See Aoki Bunkyō, 'Chibetto seifu daihyō hō-Nichi no kekka to Chibetto no chōsa ni kansuru shokan' [Impressions regarding results of the visit to Japan of a representative of the Tibetan government and research on Tibet], Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, report dated September 1942 (L.C. microfilm, reel S656, frames 491–525).

30 *Ibid*.

31 Information in this section is taken from extensive interviews with Kimura Hisao. See also Kimura's *Chibetto senkō jūnen* [Ten-year secret work in Tibet] (Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1958).

CHAPTER FOUR

Mongol Nationalism and Japan

NAKAMI TATSUO

INTRODUCTION: CHANGING PHASES OF 'NATION' IN MONGOLIA

For a long time, the term 'nationalism' has been a sensitive one in the Mongol lands. In the socialist Mongolian People's Republic, the words 'nationalism' and 'nationalist' carried a connotation of dangerous thoughts, subversive of socialism and of solidarity with the Soviet Union. For this reason, until the democratic changes of the 1990s, the university and museum established by the central government were designated as 'state', rather than 'national', institutions. In the People's Republic of China, the situation was more complex, but 'nationalism' and 'national' were also something less than generally acceptable terms. The Chinese Communist Party uses the term *Zhonghua minzu* ('nationalities of the Middle Kingdom') but speaks at the same time of 'national unification' which encompasses all these nationalities, including the Mongols, as minorities. The term 'nation' (*guomin*) is compromized by its association with the Kuomintang (Guomindang) and, in the case of the Mongols in China, by the potential link which might be created between Inner Mongolia and the now-independent Republic of Mongolia in the north. Mongol nationalism was considered to lead directly to separatism.

During the first half of the twentieth century, Japan was a third force in the international politics of the Mongols. The Japanese military and civil authorities engaged on the Asian mainland before 1945 had political dealings with forces

in Mongolian society, especially in today's Inner Mongolia, which had been hostile to Chinese and Soviet hegemony. This engagement, however, fell far short of Japanese promotion of Mongol nationalism: on the one hand the Japanese had no real interest in promoting Mongol national identity, and on the other hand the forces they dealt with had divergent ideas of the Mongols' place in the Northeast Eurasian world. The political movements among the Mongols in this era emerged before a clear sense of a Mongol nation had taken shape, even though it is possible to speak of a Mongol identity in this period.

JAPANESE–MONGOL RELATIONS DURING THE IMPERIALIST PERIOD: THE REALITY

That the Mongols resided in the central part of the Asian continent and had formerly set up a world empire, and had furthermore launched their attacks as far as Japan, that it was also likely that there was a connection between the origin of the Japanese and the Mongols, the Japanese language being related to the Mongol language: these facts were already part of the Japanese national consciousness when in the mid-nineteenth century Japan set up a modern nation-state. Given the significance of the Mongols in the recollection of past history and in the myth of their own ethnic origin, it may be said that the Japanese were acutely aware of the existence of the Mongols. At the beginning of the Meiji period, Suematsu Kenchō published an absurd book which described how the tragic hero of mediaeval Japan, Minamoto no Yoshitsune, was not in fact killed but escaped via Hokkaido and Sakhalin to Mongolia where he became Genghis Khan (Chinggis qaghan) and was said to have staged the 'Mongol invasion' of Japan by way of revenge. Suematsu had first written his *Identity of Great Conqueror Genghis Khan with the Japanese Hero Yoshitsune* in Britain. Only later was it translated into Japanese and published (in 1885). The book became a best seller,[1] in spite of the fact that the Japanese and Mongols had scarcely any contact in the nineteenth century.

Regarding the early exchanges between the Mongols and the Japanese, the tour to Japan of Prince Gungsangnorbu of Qarachin Right Banner in Inner Mongolia is well known. In 1903, he was invited to Japan along with a number of Manchu nobles and, mindful of the Japanese example of promoting 'modernization from the top', he went on to set up female and military schools within his Banner, inviting teaching staff from Japan in an attempt to implement reform.

He also started a set of 'modernization' plans in his Banner. His reform programme, however, was not successful because of lack of revenue and conservatism inside the Banner.[2] Gungsangnorbu also sent some students to Japan or to Peking (Beijing); among them was Altan Ochir, in later years a leader of the Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and a cabinet member of the Mongol Allied Autonomous Government. However, Gungsangnorbu's passion for education should not be exaggerated. In his later years, he was very wary of the younger generation of Mongols who had received a modern education, because he thought that they had turned into potential enemies of his rights and interests as a Mongol noble.[3] Moreover, the number of Mongol youths sent by Gungsangnorbu to Japan was very small. The period in which a fair number of Inner Mongolian students were studying in Japan, or studying in local schools founded by Japanese, was limited to the ten years between the mid-1930s and the defeat of Japan in 1945.

After the Russo–Japanese War of 1904–1905, Japan began to extend its imperialist influence into a part of Inner Mongolia. Then, in the Third Russo–Japanese Entente of 1912, the Russian Empire as well as Britain and France acknowledged the eastern part of Inner Mongolia as belonging to the Japanese sphere of influence. From this time on, many Japanese used the term 'Man-Mō' – 'Man[churia] and Mo[ngolia] – to describe their sphere of influence, but this term in fact did not embody ambitions as broad as might at first appear. 'Man-Mō' at that time covered only southern Manchuria and eastern Mongolia, the territories in which the other Great Powers had acknowledged Japan as having 'special interests'.[4]

Around this time, in 1911, with the fall of the Qing empire, a declaration of independence was issued in Qalq-a Mongolia and the Bogdo Khan (Boghda qaghan) government was set up, aimed at establishing an independent state unifying all the Mongols. The Mongols expected help from Russia, but did not receive it as the Russian government had no intention of supporting the independence of all the Mongols. The question of Mongolian independence was finally resolved in 1915 by giving the Bogdo Khan government a high level of autonomy under Republic of China's suzerainty but only in Outer Mongolia.[5]

The Bogdo Khan government tried to establish contacts with the Great Powers including Japan with a view to cementing diplomatic relations. In fact, between 1912 and 1914, several approaches were made to Japan but on every occasion the Japanese government gave no positive response.[6] The Japanese

government did not recognize the Mongol declaration of independence as an act of independent initiative on the part of the Mongols but viewed it in the light of Russian activities aimed at taking advantage of the confusion following the fall of the Qing empire to extend its influence over Mongolia. The Japanese government, however, along with the other Great Powers, recognizing Outer Mongolia as being within the 'sphere of influence' of the Russian empire, did not venture to interfere by taking further action. When approached by the Bogdo Khan government, Japan, wary of Russian diplomacy, paid no attention whatsoever. Rather, from the Japanese point of view, this question of Mongol independence acted as a warning that there might be repercussions in Inner Mongolia. In these circumstances, in July 1912, the above-mentioned Third Russo–Japanese Entente, regarding Inner Mongolia, was established, confirming the 'spheres of influence' of Japan and Russia. Accordingly, Japan in no way acknowledged the hopes of the Mongols for independence and ethnic unification.

In the same second decade of the twentieth century, some Japanese sources[7] mention that the Japanese expansionist group, in concert with Manchu and Mongol partners, aimed to build a puppet Manchu and Mongol Kingdom under the Japanese control. This plot was designated the 'Independence Movement of Man[churia]-Mo[ngolia]'.[8] This 'independence movement' took place in two stages: 'the first movement' in 1911, and the 'second movement' in 1916. On both occasions, at the centre of the conspiracy were Kawashima Naniwa, a Japanese *tairiku rōnin* (mainland adventurer) and the Manchu noble, Prince Su, with the complicity of a section of the Japanese army.

Kawashima and Prince Su, in the political confusion following the fall of the Qing dynasty, dreamed of restoring the Qing dynasty with the backing of the Japanese army. Prince Su, who immediately fled to Port Arthur (Lushun) after the fall of the Qing, and Kawashima, with the involvement of the Japanese army, would have created a 'Manchu-Mongol Kingdom' in the Chinese Northeast (Manchuria).

The Japanese government, however, noticing the stabilization of the Chinese political situation under President Yuan Shikai (who was supported by Britain), put a strict prohibition on the activities of Kawashima and his associates. On the other hand, following the demise of the Qing dynasty and subsequent declaration of Mongol independence in Qalq-a Mongolia, Prince Su's brother-in-law, Gungsangnorbu, initially intended to link up with the Bogdo Khan government – in short, to participate in the idea of 'Greater Mongolia'. In

contrast with Outer Mongolia, which was still a nomadic region, the majority of the population in Gungsangnorbu's domain of Qarachin in Inner Mongolia was Han Chinese and the area had become a region of settled agriculture. Furthermore, whereas Outer Mongolia had retained some political cohesion during the long rule of the Qing dynasty, Inner Mongolia's proximity to China had left it politically fragmented. Gungsangnorbu soon abandoned his alliance with the Bogdo Khan government and concentrated on activities aimed at uniting the power of the local nobility in Inner Mongolia and, for the same reason, hoped to strengthen his own military power. Then, in the spring of 1912, when the Japanese government had already prohibited the activities of Kawashima's group, Japanese army officers in Peking concluded an agreement with Gungsangnorbu to supply him with arms. Although arms shipments began secretly, the clandestine arrangement was exposed by the Peking government, which was warned of Gungsangnorbu's activities. With the arrest of the Japanese involved, the incident came to an end. Judging from what is now known, we may say that to call this a 'first independence movement' is definitely wide of the mark.

The 'second independence movement' was said to have been planned by Kawashima Naniwa in 1916. At that time, Yuan Shikai, the President of Republic of China, was laying plans to become the emperor of China. At first the Japanese government and army watched tacitly, but with anti-imperial restoration movements emerging all over China, they decided that Yuan, who was not necessarily uncooperative with Japan, would be toppled from power. How this actually happened was that all manner of anti-Yuan factions, from the Revolutionary Party in southern China to Prince Su's group for the restoration of the Qing dynasty in northeastern China, aided in fomenting chaos and, at a stroke, Yuan met his downfall. During the course of these events, the attention of the Japanese army, through Kawashima and the *tairiku rōnin* group, was on Babuujab (Babujab) and his troops.[9]

Babuujab was born in 1875 in Tümed Banner of Inner Mongolia. In 1911, when Outer Mongolia declared its independence, he joined the Bogdo Khan government and in 1913 was put in command of an assault on Inner Mongolia by the army of the Bogdo Khan government. In 1915, however, the tripartite Kiakhta Agreement between the Russian, Peking and Bogdo Khan governments established that Outer Mongolia would have autonomy under the suzerainty of the Republic of China. Disappointed with this agreement, which confirmed the separation of Outer and Inner Mongolia, Babuujab moved with his troops, who

originated from Inner Mongolia, to the Inner–Outer Mongolian border area and continued to carry on campaigning on his own initiative. After exclusion from the new regional order through the Kiakhta Agreement, Babuujab became a proxy for the Inner Mongols in their dissatisfaction. His presence was an irritation to the Chinese government – and even to the Bogdo Khan government – and eventually through the mediation of the Russian government, he was persuaded to disarm his troops and allow them to be settled in various places in Outer Mongolia. At this moment, however, the Japanese *tairiku rōnin* arrived on the scene and recruited Babuujab to work with them and Prince Su's group in their campaigns against Yuan.

Just as these activities were being stepped up, however, Yuan suddenly died. The Japanese government and army then decided to support the new president, Li Yuanhong, and immediately withdrew its support from all the anti-Yuan factions, instructing the Japanese forces to cease intervening in Chinese politics. Babuujab was left isolated but – by way of a demonstration of protest against the Japanese army, which had incited him to action and abandoned him midway through it – he suddenly began to lead his own troops toward Mukden. Following intercession by the Japanese army, he withdrew towards his base camp on the Inner–Outer Mongolian border. Then, in an attack by the army of Chang Tso-lin (Zhang Zuolin) in Linxi, Babuujab was defeated and killed and his forces were scattered. These are the actual circumstances of the 'second independence movement', which did not in any way constitute activities aimed at establishing 'the independence of Manchuria and Mongolia'; the Japanese army had simply used Babuujab as a tool against Yuan. As for Babuujab, with dreams of an independent 'Greater Mongolia' including Inner Mongolia, he had joined the Bogdo Khan government but, cut off entirely from his home base, he was vulnerable and needed allies to help him survive. Cooperation with the Japanese gave him a new opportunity and he succumbed to their advances.

How, then, did such events come to be called Mongolian 'independence movements', a mirror image of the facts? The term 'independence movement' first appeared in books composed by associates of Kawashima after the 1931 Mukden Incident.[10] From the point of view of Kawashima and his associates, the goal towards which they had been aiming for many years, namely 'Man-Mō independence' was achieved in another form with the establishment of 'Manchukuo'. Applying the term 'independence movement' to their Mongolian allies simply gave exaggerated publicity to their own activities.

After Babuujab's troops had been scattered, their remnants got into trouble in Kölün Buyir (Hulun Buyr). At precisely this time, the Bolshevik revolution took place in Russia and the resultant chaos affected Siberia. The Cossack G.M. Semenov, whose mother was a Buriyat Mongol, recruited a body of troops in Manchouli (Manjur, Manzhouli) with Babuujab's soldiers as their nucleus and, with the aid of a part of the Japanese army, advanced into Transbaikalia to engage in anti-Bolshevik activities. Meanwhile, in Transbaikalia, as a Buriyat Mongol initiative, there arose a 'nationalist' movement. Semenov gave it assistance and in the summer of 1919 a provisional government was set up in Dauria. It was to be the start of a pan-Mongol movement to unify all the Mongols. In actual fact, as participation was limited to a section of local Buriyats and Inner Mongols, mainly from Daghur and Eastern Inner Mongolia, its power base was weak. Despite the participation of the Japanese army officer Suzue Mantarō in this pan-Mongol movement as well as the presence of the Japanese military attaché Kuroki Chikanori as an adviser at Semenov's headquarters, and the support received from part of the Japanese army, the Japanese Army Central Command and Foreign Ministry placed no trust in Semenov or his troops, who repeatedly committed atrocities.

Finally, because the late Babuujab's troops, who had been incorporated into Semenov's forces, initiated a revolt against Semenov, the Dauria provisional government came to an unfortunate end. Furthermore, in Siberia, the political situation gradually shifted in favour of the Bolsheviks and Semenov was overthrown. Then R.F. Ungern von Sternberg, who had taken over command of Semenov's forces, invaded Outer Mongolia, but military intervention by the Soviet Red Army in 1921 led to the Mongolian People's Revolution. Thereafter, the Soviet Communist Party and Mongol nationalists, comprised of persons such as Rinchino who had at one time participated in the pan-Mongol movement in Buriyat, allied in the constructive activities of the early stages of the Mongolian revolution. From at least the early days of the revolution until 1928, the Comintern played a major role in political direction in Outer Mongolia.

MÉRSÉ'S CONCEPTS OF 'NATION' AND 'PEOPLE'

In modern times, how did the Mongols identify the world? What was the Mongols' position in the world? And how did they view Japan and the Japanese? How did the Mongols themselves describe their ethnic and state images? In

reality, aside from political propaganda and the like, works by Mongols giving an account of these things are extremely rare. In this context, the works of Mérsé, a Daghur (Daur) Mongol in the 1920s, are worthy of attention.[11] Mérsé himself, during the confusion following the Mukden Incident of 1931, was arrested and taken away to the Soviet Union, but the influence he had on the younger generation in Inner Mongolia was profound. For instance, Qafunggh-a, who was one of his disciples, became a high official in Manchukuo and, after the destruction of Japanese imperialism, played an important role in directing the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement.

Mérsé was born in 1894 to an eminent Daghur family in Kölün Buyir, a region in which Mongol 'nationalistic' movements were extremely strong. In 1911, the region responded promptly to the Mongol declaration of independence and was guaranteed regional autonomy until 1920 by the Russo–Chinese Agreement. Mérsé himself, as well as forming a political group with local youth as its nucleus, attended the pan-Mongol Assembly of the Buriyat Mongols held in 1918 in Verkhneudinsk. In 1922, immediately after the People's Revolution, he was invited to Outer Mongolia, and then – through his connections with the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party ('Mongghol-un arad-un qubisqal-un nam') and the Comintern – when the Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party ('Dotaghadu Mongghol-un arad-un qubisqal-un nam') was created in Kalgan (Zhangjiakou) in October 1925, he became its secretary-general.

I have already noted that an important issue when examining 'nationalism' in the Mongol context is that in Outer Mongolia, before the concept of 'the nation' had come into being, the concept of 'the people' with its emphasis on class distinction was imported from Soviet Russia, and until very recently, the word 'nationalism,' carrying special and negative nuances bound up with pan-Mongolism, was not used. However, by paying attention to Mérsé's earlier works (at least until the middle of the 1920s), which were written in Chinese for Han Chinese readers, we are able to understand something of how he viewed the political institutions set up in Outer Mongolia after the revolution. In his works, Mérsé refers to the Mongol People's Party (later Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, MPRP) with the Chinese term 'Menggu guomin [gemin]dang', i.e. the 'Mongolian National Revolutionary Party'.[12] In short, the concept of 'the people', carrying class distinctions, was represented by the Mongol word *arad* (from the Russian *narod*) and interpreted by Mérsé to mean 'the nation'. Naturally enough, the party which he founded was named in the Mongolian language

'Dotaghadu Mongghol-un arad-un qubisqal-un nam' and in Chinese 'Neimenggu guomin gemingdang' (i.e. 'Inner Mongolian National Revolutionary Party'). Moreover, in an appeal by that party dated in 1925, the term 'Republic of China' (Zhonghua minguo) was rendered 'Kitad arad ulus' in Mongol.[13]

These facts reflect the particular political condition of the Mongols at the time. In 1921, following military intervention by the Soviet Red Army, the 'Mongol People's Revolution' began and a 'People's Government' was established. At this time, however, ideas of socialism had scarcely penetrated into Mongolia and the people participating in political power were 'nationalists' rather than 'socialists'. In particular, the leader of the MPRP in the mid-1920s, Dambadorji, was very 'nationalistically' minded, hoping for unification with Inner Mongolia. Furthermore, among Comintern agents who gave political guidance to the People's Government, there were many Buriyat Mongols who, although they were 'revolutionaries', for the most part also harboured 'nationalistic' tendencies. Despite the realization of a 'People's Revolution' in Outer Mongolia, in effect what Mérsé felt was 'nationalism' in Ulaanbaatar.[14] Thus according to his interpretation of the Mongolian word *arad*, what had appeared on the scene in Outer Mongolia was not the ideology of 'the people' but 'nationalism'.

This perception was related to the Comintern and Soviet policy toward China and Mongolia at that time. The 'Revolution' had taken place in Mongolia in 1921 after Soviet intervention and in 1924 the MPR had been brought into being. However, the Comintern and Soviet Union, being uncertain whether the MPR could actually become a true socialist state, considered that it was still going through a transition period. The same year, 1924, marked the beginning of the collaboration in China between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party and it was in this atmosphere that Mérsé and his associates set up the 'Dotaghadu Mongghol-un arad-un qubisqal-un nam'. Most likely, it was with a view to enhancing nationalism in Outer Mongolia and borrowing on the strength of the MPRP that Mérsé conceived his plan for 'revolution' in Inner Mongolia. Once again the name of the party which he organized reflected the subtleties of the current political situation. If viewed by its Mongol name, 'Dotaghadu Mongghol-un arad-un qubisqal-un nam', it appears as a sister party of the Outer Mongolian MPRP, but its Chinese name of 'Neimenggu guomin gemingdang' has resonances with 'Zhongguo Guomindang' (Kuomintang). This ambiguity certainly reflected the special relationship between China and Mongolia at that time.[15]

Mérsé's activities did not, however, continue. In 1927, the Comintern's 'collaboration' between the Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Party broke down due to an anti-communist coup d'état by Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi). As a result, the members of the Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party also split into two groups, one group aligning itself with the Comintern and the other with the Kuomintang. The Comintern changed direction from its former political path of coexistence with 'nationalists' to a path of radical socialist revolution dubbed the 'Extreme Leftist Road'. From this time onwards, 'nationalism' or things 'nationalistic' in the MPR were regarded as definitely dangerous concepts and a rapid change to socialism on the Soviet model was enforced.

Mérsé, following a Comintern directive based on the 'Extreme Leftist Road', staged an armed insurrection in Kölün Buyir in June 1928. However, this insurrection was quickly suppressed by the Chinese northeastern army. Mérsé surrendered to Chang Hsüeh-liang (Zhang Xueliang) in September 1929. As for the 'Mongol Nationalism' that he preached, recognizing that realization of an independent 'nation-state' for all the Mongols was impossible, Mérsé shifted to the achievement of so-called cultural autonomy for the Mongol people within the 'Zhongguo' (China) framework. His guiding principle changed from Mongol 'nationalism' to 'ethno-nationalism' under China. Furthermore, he recognized that the 'revolution' in Outer Mongolia initiated by the Soviets, far from aiming to establish a 'nation,' had as its goal the dictatorship of 'the people'. Referring to the 'destiny of the Mongols', Mérsé said that a truly independent state could only gain equal status internationally when it had built a nation on the basis of culture and science and when it was in a position to provide for its own workers and armed forces. Since this was not the situation in which the Mongols found themselves, Inner Mongolia and Buriyat (and even the 'People's Republic' in Outer Mongolia) were not sufficiently developed to survive on their own. An 'independent nation' in the true sense could not be established there. If it were impossible to set up an independent nation, he concluded that the Mongols should not fumble for an 'alliance' with another different nation. Rather than being allied to a more culturally advanced nation like the Russians or the Japanese, which would lead to the Mongols being 'assimilated' or 'annihilated', it was more appropriate to ally with the closely related Han Chinese, an equally weak nation. Regarding the ambitions of the Japanese in Mongolia, Mérsé also warned in his writings that the 'pan-Asianism' preached by the Japanese also meant that they had Mongolia in their

sights for invasion. Tangible proofs of this intention which he presented were Babuujab's relations with the Japanese, and the relations between Semenov and the Japanese during the period of the Dauria government.[16]

With the sudden occurrence of the Mukden Incident in 1931, all news of Mérsé ceased. His friend, Owen Lattimore, wrote that he had 'a record of having collaborated, for a period, with Japanese policy at the time of the Russian and Mongolian Revolutions' while concern that 'Mérsé might bring some Mongols over to the Japanese side' caused a general subordinate to Chang Hsüeh-liang to have him secretly assassinated,[17] but this account is not accurate. Mérsé was in fact taken under guard from the Soviet consulate in Manchouli to the Soviet Union. Lattimore's supposition is not, however, totally incorrect as, while Mérsé throughout his life exerted himself to educate Mongol youth, many of them did collaborate with the Japanese.

INDEFINITE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE JAPANESE AND INNER MONGOLIA FROM THE 1930s

For the Japanese, the issue of how to maintain and expand Japanese imperialistic interests in Northeast China in the light of what was called the 'Man[churia]-Mo[ngolia] Problem' and the fact that from the first half of the second decade of the twentieth century, 'Man-Mō' actually indicated only southern Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia have been set out above. With the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the downfall of the Russian empire, the Japanese perception regarding the scope of the 'Man-Mō' regional concept changed to take on the meaning of all Manchuria plus eastern Inner Mongolia. During the 1920s, when the Kuomintang emphasized the national unification in China, Japanese imperialism discovered a response to both Chinese anti-imperialism the 'Man-Mō Problem' by establishing the puppet state of Manchukuo. Within Manchukuo, the Mongols were accorded the status as one of the five ethnic groups comprising the multi-ethnic state.

When Manchukuo was established in 1932, however, the officer corps of the Kwantung Army did not include an expert on the Mongol question, so there was still no concrete policy regarding the Mongol people. The Kwantung Army then turned to an employee of the South Manchurian Railway Company, the 'Mongol expert' Kikutake Jitsuzō, for a policy draft. In line with their apparently pro-Mongol stance, in the early days of Manchukuo the Japanese created the

Mongol autonomous region of Hsingan Province, prohibited excessive entry by Han Chinese immigrants, rectified the complex relations governing rights of possession in the Mongol lands, diffused a system of primary education throughout the Mongol population, and made provision for Mongol youths to enter institutions of higher learning in Manchukuo and Japan itself. The actual condition of Japanese rule was one of sinister control by military might but, since there had been no apparent gains during the rule of the previous Chang family regime, Japan's Mongol policy in the early period was welcome among certain Mongols.

The expansion of Japanese imperialism did not cease with the establishment of Manchukuo. In northern China military tension increased and in the western part of Inner Mongolia a movement initiated by the Mongol Prince Demchughdongrub (De Wang) and others, and directed toward the Nanking (Nanjing) government, demanded a high level of autonomy. Responding to this activity, the Kwantung Army was poised to raid northern China. In 1937, following the sudden outbreak of war between Japan and China and with the support of the Kwantung Army which had launched the attack, Demchughdongrub organized the Mongolian Allied Leagues' Autonomous Government.[18] Then in 1939, the two puppet local governments of Chanan (southern Chahar) and Jinbei (northern Shanxi), which Japan had set up in northern China, were amalgamated to create the Mongolian Allied Autonomous Government.[19]

Demchughdongrub himself, in cooperation with Japan, expected to realize the unification of Inner Mongolia and high-level autonomy, but his dream was not to be. Japan and Manchukuo would not authorize the integration of the Mongol districts in Manchukuo with the Mongolian Allied Autonomous Government. As for unification of the Mongolian Allied Autonomous Government and the Jinbei government, since the majority of the population were Han Chinese, it could not in any way be described as a 'Mongolian (Allied Autonomous) Government'. Contrary to Demchughdongrub's hopes, in reality his administration was merely a Japanese puppet regime and, with the outbreak of the Pacific War, Japanese control and economic exactions became increasingly severe. Japanese policy toward the Mongol districts at that time may be summarized as follows. Manchukuo was a puppet state set up by Japan but, as it was formally an independent state, the Japanese formulated a policy which treated Manchukuo as completely separate from China proper. Japan's policy regarding the Mongols in Manchukuo was understood as an ethnic policy of Manchukuo. As for the

existence of the Mongolian Allied Autonomous Government, it was regarded as part of Japanese policy toward China (naturally excluding Manchukuo). The MPR, for its part, was always caught up in Japan's strategy toward the Soviet Union. In short, among those who formulated Japanese political and military policy, a 'Mongol policy' encompassing the whole of the Mongol lands lacked any real meaning.

After the establishment of the Mongolian Allied Autonomous Government, there was much play in Japanese propaganda on Japan as protector of the Mongols, and Demchughdongrub was also widely lauded as the reincarnation of Genghis Khan. But the role actually played by Japan in the formation of a Mongol national identity was limited. Owen Lattimore recounts an interesting episode. In 1935, in Peking, he was present at an interview of 'some Mongols in Japanese service' by the correspondent of the *Times* of London. At first, 'we talked with them in Chinese and got exactly the standard answers you would expect in such a situation, namely that the Japanese were true friends of the Mongols and so on.' Some time later, however, Lattimore gave them to understand that he knew the Mongol language and was a friend of Mérsé, and according to Lattimore's recollection:

> then, the senior of these Mongols in Japanese uniform said to me: 'If you speak Mongol, and if you were a friend of Merse, then we speak to you not as a foreigner but as a fellow Mongol. You must know this: Do not look at our uniforms. When the day comes, we will act as Mongols and not as paid soldiers of the Japanese.' [20]

This utterance Lattimore referred to as 'a remarkable statement', but looked at in terms of conditions at that time, it was a sentiment that Mongols could be expected to hold.

Mérsé's disciple Qafunggh-a went to Japan in 1941 as a counsellor of the Manchukuo embassy in Tokyo. In his residence, he gathered Mongol students from Manchukuo and the Mongolian Allied Autonomous Government studying in Japan and preached 'Mongol nationalism' to them. Once, he said something like the following:

> Anyway, Japan and Germany are likely to be defeated. If that happens, the oppressed minority peoples of the world will win their freedom and liberation through the support of the Soviet Union and the world Com-

> munist movement. When the people of Inner Mongolia receive the support of the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic, unification of all the Mongols may be achieved.[21]

Immediately after the defeat of Japan in 1945, Qafunggh-a started up a political movement and, proceeding to Ulaanbaatar, appealed for the amalgamation of Outer and Inner Mongolia, but this was rejected by Choibalsan (Choyibalsang). Thereafter, the objective of his political movement shifted to autonomy for Inner Mongolia, but soon the agreement with the Chinese Communist Party spearheaded by Ulaghanhegüü (Ulanhu) broke down. As a result, in 1947, the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government was set up. Although this government met the long-cherished desires of the Mongols of Inner Mongolia for the unification of Inner Mongolia, this unification, following the directives of Chinese Communist Party policy, carried the connotation of being achieved within the 'China' framework.

CONCLUSION

Japanese attitudes towards the Mongols differed from region to region and from time to time. Until the late 1920s, Outer Mongolia was considered to be a Russian, later Soviet, sphere of influence. After the establishment of Manchukuo in 1932, however, Japan began to develop geopolitical interests in Outer Mongolia, although this ambition came to nothing. Even before this time, Japan had no direct influence on Mongol nationalism in Outer Mongolia. At most, it played an indirect role as a counter weight to China and the Soviet Union.

Japanese influence on Inner Mongolia was made possible by the fact that this region was under Japanese control for more than ten years. Of course, the Mongols of Inner Mongolia did not acquire a single defined existence under the Japanese occupation, although the Japanese presented themselves as cooperating in a 'revival of the Mongols'. However, Japan's presence influenced Mongol consciousness or nationalist feeling, both by publicizing their 'help' to the Mongols and by limiting Mongol nationalism. Praising Genghis Khan and the glorious past of the Mongol empire gave Mongols some kind of confidence in their Mongol identity, though the Japanese purpose lay in a different direction. On the other hand, limiting Mongol nationalism led the Mongols to resist Japan and this in turn strengthened their Mongol identity.

From the coming to power of the Kuomintang in China in 1928, the political movements of the Mongols in Inner Mongolia aimed primarily toward a high level of autonomy within the China framework.The independence movement led by Demchughdongrub between 1936 and 1945 had the idea of establishing a Mongol state and appeared at times to have Japanese backing, but in reality the Japanese did not intend to allow it to materialize. Hopes in Inner Mongolia that the end of the Second World War might mean another opportunity for Mongol nationalism came to nothing when it became clear that Outer Mongolia would uphold the Yalta Agreement. Thus, the concept of 'nationalism' in an Inner Mongolian context is complex: there was a form of 'ethno-nationalism' but also a short-lived 'nationalism'. This complex political environment makes it difficult to talk confidently of a genuine Mongol nationalism. Rather, there was a clear sense of Mongol ethnic identity which expressed itself in a variety of political aspirations, only some of which were truly nationalist in the sense of aspiring to a single Mongol state.

NOTES

1 Uchida Yahachi (transl. and ed.), *Yoshitsune Saikō-ki* [The rebirth story of Yoshitsune] (Tokyo: 1885); also see Honda Mitsugi, *Naze Yoshitsune ga Jingisu-kan ni narunoka* [Why did Yoshitsune become Genghis Khan?] (Sapporo: Hokkaido Kyoikusha, 1986), pp. 116–150.

2 Nakami Tatsuo, 'Gunsannorbu to Uchi-Mongoru no Meiun [Prince Gungsangnorbu and the fate of Inner Mongolia]', *Nairiku Ajia, Nishi Ajia no Shakai to Bunka* (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1983), pp. 411–435.

3 Baron Hayashi Gonsuke's communication with Prince Gungsangnorbu, 8 December 1916, Terauchi Masatake papers, National Diet Library, Tokyo.

4 Nakami Tatsuo, 'Chiiki Gainen no Seijisei [The political nature of the concept of regionality]', *Ajia kara Kangaeru (1): Kosaku suru Ajia* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1993), pp. 273–295.

5 Nakami Tatsuo, 'A Protest Against the Concept of the "Middle Kingdom": The Mongols and the 1911 Revolution', in Etō Shinkichi and Harold Z. Schiffrin (eds), *The 1911 Revolution in China: Interpretative Essays* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1984), pp. 129–149.

6 Nakami Tatsuo, 'Bogudo Hān Seiken no Taigai Kōshō Doryoku to Teikoku-shugi Rekkyō [The Bogdo Khan regime and the Great Powers]', *Ajia Afurika Gengo Bunka Kenkyū* 17 (1979), pp. 1–58.

7 Kokuryū-kai (Kuzū Yoshihisa) ed., *Tō-A Senkaku Shishi Kiden* [Biographical portraits of pioneer patriots in East Asia] (Tokyo: Kokuryū-kai, 1936); Aida Tsutomu, *Kawashima Naniwa-ō* [Kawashima Naniwa] (Tokyo: Bunsui-kaku, 1936).

8 Kurihara Ken, 'Daiichiji, Dainiji Man-Mō Dokuritsu Undō [The first and second independence movements of Manchuria and Mongolia]', *Kokusai Seiji: Nihon Gaik'ō-shi Kenkyū/ Taisho Jidai* (1958), pp. 52–65.

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10 Kokuryū-kai (Kuzū Yoshihisa) (ed.), *Tō-A Senkaku Shishi Kiden* [Biographical portraits of pioneer patriots in East Asia] (Tokyo: Kokuryū-kai, 1936), Vol. 2, pp. 318–348 and pp. 625–682; Aida Tsutomu, *Kawashima Naniwa-ō* [Kawashima Naniwa] (Tokyo: Bunsui-kaku, 1936), pp. 158–292.

11 Nakami Tatsuo, 'Nashonarizumu kara Esuno-Nashonarizumu he; Mongorujin Meruse ni totteno Kokka, Chiiki, Minzoku [From nationalism to ethno-nationalism; 'nation', 'region', 'ethnicity' as seen in Mérsé's works]', *Gendai Chūgoku no Kōzō Hendō, Vol. 7: Chūka Sekai* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2001), pp. 119–149.

12 Guo Daofu (= Mérsé), *Menggu Wenti* [The Mongol Question] (1923); *Xin Menggu* [New Mongolia] (1923).

13 Mong. C 306, inventory No.3428 in the St Petersburg State University Library (Uspensky Catalogue, item no. 952).

14 Guo Daofu (= Mérsé), *Xin Menggu*, p. 14.

15 Komatsu Hisao (ed.), *Chūō Yūrashia-shi* [A history of central Eurasia] (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 2000), pp. 354–359.

16 Guo Daofu (= Mérsé), *Menggu Wenti Jiyangyanlu* [Lecture on the Mongol Question] (Mukden: Donbei minzu shifan xuexiao, 1929), pp. 27–31.

17 Owen Lattimore, *China Memoirs, Chiang Kai-shek and the War Against Japan* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1990), pp. 27–28.

18 'Mongol-un chighulghan-yi qolban öbesüben jasaqu ordon' in Mongolian; 'Mōko renmei jichi seifu' in Japanese.

19 'Mongol-un qolban öbesüben jasaqu ordon' in Mongolian; 'Mōko rengō jichi seifu' in Japanese.

20 *Ibid*., p. 32.

21 Mōri Kazuko, *Shuen karano Chūgoku* [Ethno-nationalism in contemporary China] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1998), pp. 177–208.



Map 3: Northeast Asia, 1920



CHAPTER FIVE

The Japanese 'Civilization Critics' and the National Identity of Their Asian Neighbours, 1918–1932: The Case of Yoshino Sakuzō

DICK STEGEWERNS

THE NON-NATIONALIST CIVILIZATION DISCOURSE OF THE PREWAR IMPERIALIST INTERNATIONAL ORDER[1]

In the final year of the First World War Japan was suddenly confronted with the new slogan of 'self-determination of nationalities', introduced by Lenin in November 1917 but most influentially propagated by his ideological opposite Wilson a few months later. The new slogan presented Japan with a serious problem. Whereas before the war there had been no significant pressure upon the country, neither internal nor external, to recognize the distinct identity and corresponding rights of the ethnic nations within and on the border of the Japanese Empire, these same nations were all of a sudden granted an internationally acclaimed and thus very respectable vocabulary and infrastructure by which they could and certainly would voice their nationalist demands.

The principle of 'self-determination of nationalities' was presented by Wilson as one of the pillars on which a new and just world order, to be laid down at the Paris Peace Conference, would rest and accordingly it was an issue also very much in focus in the Japanese media of the immediate postwar days. In the Japanese language, which in contrast to the English language makes a sharp distinction between the nation in a political sense (*kokumin*) and in an ethnic sense (*minzoku*), the right of self-determination of nationalities – often simplified as the right of national self-determination – was without difficulty and ambiguity translated as minzoku jiketsuken. However, this term easily hid the fact that, although *minzoku* of course was not a completely new concept because the

word had existed in the Japanese language since the late nineteenth century, it was nonetheless a rather recent fabrication and had mainly been used by a handful of bureaucrats, journalists and academics.[2] Most Japanese when confronted with the outside world tended to divide it up by means of either *kuni* (country), *kokka* (state), *kokumin* (the political nation) or *jinshu* (race) rather than by *minzoku* (the ethnic nation). This practice was partly a reflection of the fact that, in the prewar imperialist world order as perceived by Japan, there had hardly been any need to consider the issue of nationalism in the sense of ethnic nationalism and, accordingly, the national identity of its Asian neighbours. The few Asian geographic units of which Japan was aware, within the framework of the overall national goal of expansion onto the Asian continent, were in general treated as nothing but theatres, empty stages that had to be manned by Japan before any of its competitors did. Within this internationally supported framework of imperialist expansion, the argument of 'civilization' (*bunmei*) had at least officially the task of supplying this crude national aim, which often coincided with a fair amount of bloodshed and oppression, with a laudable universal coating. Occupying and ruling African and Asian territory was presented as a 'white man's burden', which the European nations grudgingly but in obedience to their duty towards God and Civilization took upon themselves. Japan was one of the few exceptions to resist successfully the nineteenth century tide of Western imperialism and by 1911 it had even completely shaken off the yoke of the unequal treaty port system, but Japan's success was to a large extent a success of accommodation. In confronting the West it had not come up with an indigenous discourse and, as it seriously embarked on its own imperialist adventure at the end of the nineteenth century, it was hardly surprising that it adopted the convenient Western discourse of civilization. While the strategic argument of taking and fortifying Korea and parts of China, thus making them into the outer line of defence of Japan's heartland, was also brought to the fore without any reservation in the first days of Japanese imperialism, the argument of civilization came more and more to prevail outwardly: Japan as a civilized nation (*bunmeikoku*) had to contribute to the lofty goal of the progress of world civilization by bearing its part of the 'white man's burden' in the form of the enlightenment of uncivilized Korea and China.

Copying this apologetic Western debate at first glance seemed quite convenient, but there was a fundamental contradiction. When hierarchically dividing the world into groups of countries according to their level of civilization and

rendering certain privileges to the most civilized, it becomes very easy to argue that Japan, as the acclaimed sole 'civilized nation' in the East, has the duty to expand into Korea and China. But at the same time it becomes very difficult to explain why it should be the task of the 'mediocre Japan' to go in there and not that of the 'Western champions of civilization', especially at a time when the Japanese themselves were still very much aware of a hierarchical civilization gap between Japan and the West. Japan needed another argument to supplement the universal discourse of civilization in order to make expansion into Korea and China a particularistic Japanese privilege. This argument was of course easily found in the comparatively familiar concept of 'race' (*jinshu*). Civilizing the barbarians and thus uplifting the general level of world civilization was a shared 'civilized man's burden' but doing so on the East Asian stage was a 'yellow man's burden'.

Up to the end of the First World War Japan's expansion onto the Asian continent was usually defended by means of a blend of the two arguments of 'civilization' and 'race'. A very intricate and well-known blend was the *Tōzai bunmei-ron* (Theory of Eastern and Western civilization) as proposed by such different opinion leaders as Okakura Tenshin, Uchimura Kanzō, Ōkuma Shigenobu and Kayahara Kazan: the juxtaposed spiritual Eastern and materialist Western civilizations meeting each other on Japanese soil and there sublimating into one world civilization of an unprecedented high level. Although most Japanese intellectuals tended to be somewhat more down-to-earth and preferred a more balanced blend, since they could not perceive a separate Eastern civilization of any serious value and humbly rejected the idea of Japan as the summit of world civilization, there was hardly any blend that did not fulfil the task of providing Japan with a particular mission and special privileges on the East Asian continent.

Within both the civilization and the race discourses, Japan's Asian neighbours were generally looked down upon and their national identity was ignored. The Japanese treated these nations either as uncivilized entities, which were considered to be lacking both elements of the nation-state, that is a unified political nation (*kokumin*) and a centralized modern state (*kokka*), and thus did not even live up to the two most basic preconditions to be counted as a civilized nation (*bunmeikoku*). Or they treated them as nothing but immature and inferior members of the yellow race, who were never even asked if they shared the Japanese idea of an (East) Asian unity.[3]

The above-mentioned 'serious problem' confronting Japan in 1918 was that, as a result of external developments in the West, the imperialist 'civilization'

discourse of yore was all of a sudden substituted with a new discourse which, at least outwardly, was to rule international relations and which was to a large extent based on the concept of the ethnic nation. The fact that the bitter experience of 'the Great European War' had led to a new internationalist trend in which such familiar vocabulary as imperialism, militarism, colonialism and so on was stripped of its former lustre and, moreover, in many cases came to hold a negative connotation was something a Japanese could still cope with. That is, if he or she was satisfied with the scope in 1918 of Japan's formal and informal empire (which, profiting from the temporary absence of the Western powers from the East Asian scene during the First World War, had recently been considerably extended). However, the fact that the new discourse in international relations highlighted the cause of ethnic nationalism placed a ticking time bomb under the Japanese imperialist status quo. For even if Wilson had probably never considered the idea of applying the principle of self-determination of nationalities to ethnic nations outside Europe, the universal applicability of the principle heartened all sorts of non-Western nationalist anti-colonial or anti-imperialist movements which up to that time had been slighted or denounced. Made respectable by the new discourse, these movements gained strength and could no longer be easily ignored. If Japanese opinion leaders had not understood the implications of the messages coming from the West at the end of the war or had thought they could just wait and see which way the wind blew they were soon proved seriously mistaken; while negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference continued during the first half of 1919, Tokyo was successively shaken by the Korean March First Movement and the Chinese May Fourth Movement, uprisings which both had a distinctly nationalist and anti-Japanese character. It was clear that it was time for both the Japanese government and opinion leaders to come up with an answer to the sudden changes occurring in Japan's backyard as a result of the new world order and the new discourse which accompanied it.

THE POSTWAR ETHNIC NATIONALIST DISCOURSE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF FORMAL EMPIRE – THE JAPANESE COLONY OF KOREA

One of the *bunmei hihyōka* (civilization critics, as the Japanese opinion leaders tended to call themselves) who rose to the challenge was Yoshino Sakuzō (1878–1933). Yoshino was a professor of Political History at the Law Faculty of Tokyo

University, the most prestigious faculty of Japan's most prestigious university, and as such trained a considerable number of very influential political and social leaders. However, as the main writer of the most prominent general magazine of the day, the *Chūō Kōron* (The Central Review), his influence upon and popularity amongst the middle class reading public outranked those of all other opinion leaders. During the period 1918–1932 he wrote extensively on current affairs in the fields of social and political reform, the labour and proletarian party movements, and international relations. His views, primarily by means of the *Chūō Kōron* but also by means of an unending list of general magazines, specialized magazines and newspapers, were distributed nation-wide including the colonies. As a result of an optimistic outlook sustained by his idealism and Christianity, his interpretation of events sometimes was somewhat unusual. However, his conclusions and directions were usually in line with those of his generation and enabled him to develop into the personification of the Taishō period (1912–1926) and the undisputed figurehead of the so-called 'Taishō Democracy' (dates disputed, but somewhere between 1905 and 1932).[4]

Up till 1918 Yoshino, like most of his contemporaries, had hardly dwelled upon nationalism in the sense of ethnic nationalism (*minzokushugi*).[5] The closest he had reached was patriotism, of which he distinguished two forms; the first being *aikoku* (love the country) or *yūkoku aimin* (care for the country and love the people) which he considered sound and even essential for the progress of a nation and the second *kokusuishugi* (chauvinism), which he considered intolerant, extreme and detrimental to both national and international society. Yoshino promoted the former and ignored the latter and thus had seen no dilemma whatsoever in prescribing patriotism or national salvation (*kyūkoku*) for China and enhancing Japan's national interests in China at the same time.[6] Moreover, in a world which he tended to divide conveniently into four or five cooperating zones of 'Monroe-ism' there had been no question of a dilemma between internationalism and national interests. There seemed to be a peaceful balance amongst and within the various zones.[7]

However, when in 1917–1918 another type of nationalism, ethnic national self-determination (*minzoku jiketsushugi*), came to the fore through the uncoordinated efforts of Lenin and Wilson, Yoshino could no longer deny that if this form of nationalism were propagated by China and Korea it eventually could not but collide with Japan's national interests, which he equated with another, minimal sort of nationalism, namely the national right to live (*kokuminteki*

seizonken). For the first time Yoshino admitted that there was a dilemma between 'internationalism', in the form of the universal *right* to self-determination of nationalities, and 'nationalism', in the form of Japan's particularistic *need* for national subsistence through continental expansion. Although the goal of the Japanese nation was still the same, the international framework had changed. As a result the legitimate means to achieve the goal had become more restricted and were increasingly dependent on the benevolent cooperation of other nations. Like many contemporaries Yoshino chose not to resist but to adjust to the new 'international current':

> Once this principle [of ethnic nationalism] is accepted at the peace conference, even if its application is limited to a certain circumscribed area, its moral authority will know no limits and therefore it goes without saying that the postwar question of the disposal of ethnic nations will eventually be dealt with by means of the so-called principle of the self-determination of nationalities. And even if this question is not directly raised at the peace conference we should not be at ease and continue to oppress [other] ethnic nations, for this will imply that we are going against the world trend. … We should immediately reform our policy of colonial rule and be prepared for the postwar trend.[8]

In the case of Korean and Taiwanese nationalism with which, as Yoshino had predicted, Japan indeed was soon confronted (respectively in March 1919 and in January 1921), harmonization of ethnic national rights of others and Japan's own national needs was not such a difficult task. Although it was no longer politically correct to invade foreign territory and establish new colonies, this new rule did not seem to be of any consequence to the colonies which already existed. Accordingly there was hardly any outside pressure on Japan nor outside support to those colonized by Japan, except from the new but feeble Russian communist government, to bring about a substantial reform of the colonial status quo in East Asia.

Notwithstanding this lack of substantial outside pressure, already at an early stage Yoshino had of his own accord become aware of the need to adjust Japan's colonial policy, especially in the case of Japan's main colony, Korea. In his opinion colonialism was a noble undertaking and accordingly he thought the rule of Korea to be a matter which did not merely concern the development of national prosperity but also 'our honour as an Oriental developed country'.

This led him to support Japan's colonial policy of assimilation in theory, in the sense that it would contribute to the cultural enlightenment of the Koreans, yet he became more and more aware that in practice this laudable policy did not work in the case of 'ethnic nations that have a somewhat developed distinct civilization of their own', a category to which he considered Korea also belonged.[9] At a time when even Great Britain, a country to which Yoshino attributed 'superior colonial qualities', had evidently failed in its assimilation experiment in Ireland and was reforming its colonial policy, it was clear to him that Japan could not stay behind in 'our own Ireland'.[10] He was only further confirmed in his views when in the early spring of 1916 he visited the annexed colony for the first time, as part of a larger inspection tour of both Korea and Manchuria on the instigation of the Japanese government. His visit to Korea was not limited to the customary meetings with the colonial bureaucrats of the government-general but also included talks with anti-Japanese activists and leaders of the Ch'ŏndo-gyo, the highly syncretic and egalitarian popular religion. His overzealous discharge of his duty led him, probably much to the distress of his sponsor, to the following conclusion:

> The colonial capacities of us Japanese are extremely immature. … The few Japanese colonists that have succeeded in Manchuria and Korea depend on either excessive government protection or unlawful trade. … It seems as if the Japanese villages in Manchuria and Korea have been moved here in their entirety from Japan; neither on the level of business relations nor on the level of social relations do they have any connection with the natives [*domin*]. … The Japanese authorities have spent a large amount of money for the sake of the welfare of the natives and have constructed several splendid facilities, but most of these concentrate merely on superficial formality and lack all passion. … They oppress and scorn the natives and as long as they outwardly act as if they render benevolence but in reality force the natives to submit blindly and totally to their power, the natives will invariably, if not outwardly at least secretly, hold feelings of resentment. … There is almost no spiritual communication between the Japanese government institutions and the natives. … Moreover, ethnic nations simply do not like to be ruled by foreigners. … In sharp contrast, the American missionaries in Korea and Manchuria have, completely independent from their state authorities, self-sacrificingly worked in the interests of the natives and have become the object of their adoration, as stateless gods. … The Japanese only act

> egoistically and thus have of their own doing prepared the ground for the anti-Japanese movement. Instead we should foster pure spiritual harmony and cooperation.[11]

Considering that various observers since 1917 had forecast an oncoming storm of ethnic national self-determination this need became even more urgent. For example, in January 1919 Yoshino, yet again tackling a problem to which hardly anybody else paid serious attention, referred to the logical inconsistency that would arise between the status of the new mandatory territory of Micronesia and the status of Japan's established colonies. He foresaw a situation whereby Japan under a League of Nations mandate would formally be obliged to educate completely uncivilized natives, who did not yet have any hope of ever being able to decide their own political future, and to guide them to a level where they could implement national self-determination, while the comparatively civilized Korean nation had never been promised anything more than the dubious honour of complete assimilation into the Japanese empire. Yoshino urged his government to apply swift reforms that would give the Koreans hope for the future before the postwar trend of ethnic nationalism posed considerable problems.[12]

But his warning came too late. Only a few months later the colony was set ablaze by a large-scale popular insurrection, aimed at calling the attention of the world powers, then in conclave at the Paris Peace Conference, to the right of the Korean people to national independence. Although Yoshino, a proponent of gradual peaceful reform, as a matter of course denounced the violence of the Korean protesters, his reaction to the March First Movement was in general sympathetic. Still, even Yoshino did not take the Korean demands head on. He started out by stating that the Korean question was a 'humanitarian problem' which had to be seen through 'a mirror of sharp moral judgment'.[13] Based on this moral view of the self and the other, which he represented by the term *isshi dōjin* (impartial benevolence) from the 1910 imperial decree on the annexation and rule of Korea, he advocated drastic reforms of the policy of colonial rule, such as equal treatment in the fields of education, employment and income, freedom of press and speech and, to facilitate matters, civilian rule instead of military rule.[14] Accordingly, he prophesied, a 'new era' of civilian and civilized colonial rule would be ushered in and at last the long-term colonial objective of 'close collaboration between homeland and Korea (*naisen tomohataraki*)' would come within reach.[15]

Yoshino was aware that 'the inevitable result of a policy of impartial benevolence will be that we will have to accept some sort of autonomy (*jichi*)'.[16] He

thought that the Koreans, in cooperation with the Japanese residents, at least should have the right to supervise the rule of the Japanese authorities, but he did not seem to want to commit himself too strongly. Before the uprising he had approvingly cited Yamamoto Miono's recommendation that

> Our future goal should be to develop Korea to the level of a completely autonomous colony (*kanzen naru jichi-shokuminchi*) within 50 to 100 years. In the meantime we should give them autonomy and let them partake in Korean politics to the extent that they have culturally progressed.[17]

Now he merely stated that 'measure, extent and period of implementation are open to debate' and 'Korean demands such as autonomy, independence, an independent Korean parliament or Korean representatives in the Imperial Parliament are all long-term topics which have to be considered by a special research or investigation committee on the policy for ruling over Korea'.[18]

In line with his critique of the Japanese colonists and the colonial government of an earlier date, Yoshino thus was more than willing to interpret the March First Movement as proof of Japan's complete failure as a colonizing power and to propose reforms deemed necessary to improve the situation, but he ignored the central Korean demand for political sovereignty. A new era of civilian colonial rule was still colonial rule. The Korean problem was not so much a political question he handled in terms of Korean rights or even a practical problem centred on Korea's capacity to be autonomous. Most of all it was a moral question that called for Japanese self-reflection and which was to be the touchstone to test whether the Japanese nation was sufficiently capable, that is, civilized, to apply colonial rule and expand into the Asian continent.[19] Within the framework of such a discourse the complete national self-determination or independence of Korea and Taiwan could only be 'too radical' a proposition and promises of autonomy, in contrast to promises of full equality with the Japanese settlers, had to remain vague.[20]

However, there was an even more important reason for this than the need for a testing ground for Japanese colonial ability. In sharp contrast to Taiwan, Manchuria and other parts of China, where Yoshino by this time almost completely rejected aggressive expansion and only recognized economic and cultural means to further Japan's natural destiny to expand onto the continent, Korea had a special military status which allowed for somewhat cruder means. His special treatment of Korea is evident from the fact that, in a *Tōhō Jiron*

article in 1918, he continued to justify the Sino–Japanese and Russo–Japanese wars by means of a very simplified view of Korea and a misrepresentation of Chinese and Russian influence in the Korean peninsula during the period from 1876 to 1904 that was unworthy of an eminent scholar such as Yoshino. Moreover, he allowed a glance at his 'true colours' when he came to the topic of the eventual annexation of Korea in 1910:

> Our national defence is incomplete when all our defensive facilities are stationed within our national borders. … Although Belgium is a small country it fortunately is endowed with the capacity to be independent and it accordingly can preserve its neutrality interposed between England and Germany, but if it had been a country such as Korea, England would have competed with Germany and would have exerted itself to stretch its line of national defence to the Eastern part of Belgium. The position of Japan's national defence in the Orient is exactly the same as that of England in Europe.[21]

It is very revealing to see that he uses the concept of 'a line of national defence' (*kokubōsen*), which is situated outside the national border (*kokkyō*), since one cannot but associate it with the paired concepts of 'the line of interest' (*riekisen*) and 'the line of sovereignty' (*shukensen*) as introduced in a famous letter dating back to 1890 by Yamagata Aritomo, the arch-conservative *genrō* and autocratic founding father of the modern Japanese army who in all other aspects is best exemplified as the complete opposite of everything for which Yoshino stood.[22] Although Yamagata's view of the East Asian scene had further evolved since the Japanese victory in the Russo–Japanese war, in the sense that Japan's line of interest, which just like the line of sovereignty had to be defended at all costs, now stretched to include the whole of Manchuria and even to other considerable parts of mainland China, Yoshino did nevertheless acknowledge a similar line of national defence which comprised all of Korea. As later examples dating from after the outburst of the March First Movement also suggest, his support for Korean autonomy was indisputably subordinate to this strategic concept:

> Although we regret that our ruling policy was extremely biased towards Japan, this does not imply that we can let a policy of 'Korea for the Koreans' take its own course. Even fervent supporters of the Korean independence party probably will recognize that we demand that our interests be taken into consideration to a considerable extent.[23]

Even if the Koreans should be allowed to partake on an equal footing in the implementation of the rule of Korea, the general framework of the rule had to remain firmly in Japanese hands, and inevitably had to be 'colonial rule'. Thus there were overriding strategic reasons for Yoshino to hold on to Korea and since there was no international pressure to relinquish existing colonies, he did not need to take Korean independence into serious consideration.

From our present point of view it is of course very easy to criticize Yoshino for his hypocrisy: on the one hand heralding the cause of ethnic national self-determination while on the other hand rejecting Korean independence. In those days due to censorship it would probably have been impossible to raise a public call for Korean independence. Nonetheless, there was no need to propagate the illusion that, once given autonomy, the Koreans would spontaneously come to share the *Yamatodamashii* (Japanese spirit) and would even voluntarily choose to remain part of the Japanese empire.[24] Besides, it is evident that in the case of the colonies, Yoshino tried to marginalize the issue of political emancipation, a topic he stressed so much in the case of the motherland Japan, in favour of cultural and social emancipation.[25] Still, aside from this sort of patronizing, we should not forget that Yoshino was a lonesome forerunner as far as his view of the Korean ethnic nation was concerned. While most of his contemporaries turned their heads Yoshino could not refrain from drawing their attention time and again to abuses against Koreans in Japan and, even more exceptionally, in the colony itself. Moreover, he was able to look upon the Korean insurrection as a legitimate and respectable nationalist movement and publicly vented his strong doubts over the assimilation policy.[26] In my opinion he was the only Japanese who was able to come up with something as 'outrageous' as the proposal that:

> The Japanese in Korea, at least the Japanese teachers, should master the Korean language and should wear the Korean costume. … True assimilation cannot completely be a one-way process.[27]

In spite of Yoshino's evident limitations, he at least recognized the distinct identity of the Korean ethnic nation and tried very hard to see things from the Korean point of view and, as a result, he was willing to meet Korean rights and demands (and those of other colonized people) to a much greater extent than the vast majority of inhabitants of the colonizing countries of his day.

THE POSTWAR ETHNIC NATIONALIST DISCOURSE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF INFORMAL EMPIRE – THE JAPANESE SPHERE OF INFLUENCE IN NORTH CHINA

In the case of China, however, things were very different from Korea. Since China was not a colony, its nationalist movement could not be so lightly dismissed. Moreover, it was evident that as a result of the war the position of the United States in the world had become pre-eminent and that also in the Asian theatre it could no longer be ignored, as Yoshino had been inclined to do.[28] Japan was now on the defensive and was forced to do more than merely mimic the American vocabulary of the open door, equal opportunities and sovereignty of Chinese territory. Under such circumstances Yoshino's erstwhile call for a superior position for Japan in East Asia legitimized through 'Monroe-ism' was no longer timely. Finally, although definitely not an expert in the field of economics, Yoshino was one of the many Japanese who drew the lesson from the war that national power in the modern world was mainly determined by economic strength: Japan could no longer remain an agricultural state but had to become an industrial power.[29] From that time onwards we find Yoshino elaborating predominantly on Sino–Japanese economic cooperation:

> The Japanese used to be extremely careless, demanding their natural resources from all over the world, but this war has finally opened our eyes and has made us look to China even more. China abounds with all sorts of natural resources, which are merely waiting for someone to come over and develop. Almost all of the things Japan lacks can be produced in China, so Japan can become an independent economic unit when it can make use of China's natural resources. Moreover, we need China as a customer for our commercial and industrial goods. Therefore, no matter from which angle one looks at it, Japan's economic survival and development can only be attained by means of an alliance with China.[30]

Thus Yoshino also subscribed to the completely contradictory idea that Japan had to attain economic autarky by means of a Sino–Japanese economic alliance.

While this awareness induced many others to cling even more to the position Japan had achieved in Manchuria, Yoshino took a somewhat different stand:

> Our most important aim is to foster strong economic ties between Japan and China … and accordingly we must take the whole of China as the

> object of our China management … and not limit ourselves to merely one part such as Manchuria and Mongolia or Shantung.[31]

Judging by these statements, Yoshino seemed to be willing to consider giving up parts of Japan's position in Manchuria, that is those parts which were based on strategic motives, in order to gain an overall stronger economic position in China. This position was a far cry from his earlier stand, which had been marked by calls upon the Chinese to show some understanding for the inevitable 'political expansion' of Japan into China and for the fact that one could not expect to live peacefully in Manchuria, 'the buffer zone between an expanding Japan and a weakening China'. At the time he mainly characterized the 'political expansion' of Japan in China as an essential element in order to guarantee Japan's principal objective, that is 'economic and social expansion' in China, and optimistically remarked that Japan's political expansion might become unnecessary if only China would become stronger.[32] Now he distanced himself from this line of argument by characterizing it as the main factor in anti-Japanese feelings among the Chinese. Yoshino had been aware of this side-effect before but had merely treated it as a tiresome yet bearable burden. However, with his new emphasis on the overriding need for an economic alliance this attitude was no longer tenable:

> The Japanese are definitely not the only people proceeding on this same road [towards an economic alliance with China]. The Americans and the English are out there as well. Therefore it is not sufficient to just make an effort; we must be aware of the presence of strong competitors and make a more than usual effort. The precondition is to soothe Chinese feelings and foster emotional ties.[33]

To win the free economic competition in China – which Yoshino thought that Japan, in spite of its capital and industrial limitations, was capable of achieving because of its geographical advantage and the relatively large number of people occupying key positions in China who had studied in Japan – and to be able to 'bathe in the bliss of China's inexhaustible natural resources', Japan first had to win the free competition for China's sympathies.[34] In theory Yoshino was thus able to translate the Japanese need for a Sino–Japanese economic alliance into terms of Sino–Japanese friendship, yet it still remained to be seen if his rhetoric had any practical value, that is, to see to what extent he was willing to give in to China's claims to its right of national self-determination in order to obtain its friendship and cooperation. While in early 1917 he already confessed that the

way the Japanese had handled the Twenty-one Demands had been aggressive and counter-productive, within the framework of his new scheme it became time to give in on the content as well. This proved to be a long and difficult road for the former imperialist.[35]

Yoshino is well known for the fact that he was one of the very few Japanese who immediately supported the May Fourth Movement in China and even characterized it as having exactly the same objective as those representing 'the true Japan', namely ousting bureaucratic and militarist forces.[36] However, what he deliberately did not emphasize was that the direct incentive for the movement had been the decision at the Paris Peace Conference to confer the German rights in Shantung to Japan. Ironically, on the day of the insurrection Yoshino was in Osaka delivering a speech in which he mentioned that 'Japan's demands concerning Shantung are almost identical in nature to the British demands concerning Egypt and are perfectly just'.[37] His argument that there was a clear distinction between sovereignty (which had to be restored to the Chinese) and rights (which would pass into Japanese hands) was rather technical and definitely would not help to capture the hearts of the Chinese, for which after all he professed to be striving.[38] Although he admitted that the existing Sino–Japanese treaties had been forced upon China by unjust means, he was not ready simply to start with a clean slate.[39] His dilemma was that while he was aware that Japan had to adjust its China policy, directly to the demands of Chinese nationalism and indirectly to the general framework of internationalism, he wanted to do it as far as possible on Japanese terms. To use a comparison Yoshino often used to describe the relation between the proletariat and the intelligentsia, China was the patient who knew best where it hurt, but Japan was the doctor who knew best how the pain had to be cured. Moreover, in this case the doctor had considerable interests of his own and, although knowing that it was a breach of the professional code, demanded some 'inevitable' guarantees in the field of the future management of Manchuria and the Hanyeping Coal and Iron Company – China's only iron-manufacturing conglomerate, based in Shanghai, which was largely supported by Japanese loans and which supplied Japan's iron works with a major share of its pig iron and iron ore – before starting to operate.[40]

However, as the Kuomintang's Northern Expedition was more and more successful and he understood that the fate of Japan's rights and interests in China in the near future was clear, Yoshino no longer resisted. In April 1927 he took the final step in the process of compromising with internationalism by turning

his former 'demands' into 'a formal request' to the Southern faction led by the Kuomintang:

> Although we respect the full sovereignty of the Chinese authorities to deal with our former rights and interests as they please, we hope they will be lenient in so far as these have a direct influence on the daily life of the Japanese common people. [41]

In the sense that Yoshino's demands had become merely theoretical, his stance resembled that of the so-called 'weak-kneed' Shidehara policy of 'no intervention in China', which he indeed strongly supported. Accordingly he completely rejected the Tanaka policy of armed intervention, although he fully subscribed to the goals of the latter.[42] Yoshino had not changed his opinion on Japan's national needs but merely recognized that these could no longer prevail over China's rights. He considered attempts to secure Japan's needs by means of force both illegitimate and unrealistic. The national goal of expansion onto the 'Asian continent' was from now on not to be pursued by any other than peaceful economic means and thus Japan's lot would be in China's hands. Whereas most Japanese were horrified by this prospect, Yoshino thought it inevitable and, helped by his optimistic view of mankind, placed his trust in the good intentions of the new Nationalist Chinese government.[43]

Even in the wake of the Manchurian Incident and the creation of Manchukuo, Yoshino stood firm. As early as 1922, and again at the time of the Shantung expeditions of 1927–1928 and two weeks before the incident itself, Yoshino had rejected ideas of establishing a pro-Japanese puppet state in Manchuria as unrealistic and detrimental to Japan's future.[44] Now matters had come to a head he was as outspoken as ever: the army's action was 'aggressionist imperialism' and the recognition by the Japanese cabinet 'a breach of the Nine Power Treaty and an act of animosity towards the Chinese government'.[45] In several *Chūō Kōron* editorials of 1932 and 1933 there is a remarkable change in vocabulary. This change suggests that Yoshino converted (*tenkō*) like many others, but closer reading tells us differently. As late as December 1932, in spite of all sorts of restrictions on freedom of speech – he had to write within the framework of the *fait accompli* of the establishment of Manchukuo[46] – Yoshino was very critical and told the Japanese public more than the authorities wanted it to know. He emphasized that Manchuria was both in theory and in fact a part of China, pointed out that the Japanese argument of self-defence was contrary to the facts

and that the new state of Manchukuo depended completely on Japanese support and management, and was adamant that, even if there was to be another Far Eastern Monroe Doctrine, it was of no practical value if China were not participating.[47]

CONCLUSION

As far as the case of Korea was concerned Yoshino was definitely not typical of the group of opinion leaders of his day, in the sense that the extent to which he was willing to 'give in' to the Korean ethnic nationalist demands was unprecedented and unequalled by any of his colleagues in the period under discussion here. Still, the limits of his reaction show very well what the general attitude was towards the 'Korean question'. Yoshino's deviation was one of quantity, not of quality, and therefore I think Yoshino can manage to give us an insight into Japanese views of the Korean colony up till the end of the Second World War. In the case of the 'China question', however, there was clearly also a qualitative difference between two groups of opinion leaders, a difference which I think is to a large extent generational. That is why, in discussing Japanese attitudes towards Chinese ethnic nationalism during the interbellum (1918–1931), I think that one cannot treat Yoshino as a representative of 'the opinion leaders' but only as a representative of the Taishō generation of *bunmei hihyōka* (those born between 1870 and 1880). Under pressure of the new international framework after 1918 and, most directly and thus most conclusively, of a strong Chinese nationalist movement after 1927, this generation was willing to acknowledge – or at least resigned itself to acknowledging – that China's ethnic national rights were superior to Japan's national needs. During the 1920s, however, a younger and more radical generation of opinion leaders had gradually and in a natural way increased its influence and, at the end of the 1920s, when the 'China question' came to a head, they prevailed in the printed mass media. The above-mentioned characterization of 'radical' meant that, in contrast to the members of the preceding Taishō generation, they were more than willing to challenge the postwar world order in order to make way for Japan's essential and thus justified expansion. What this overriding aim of securing Japan's national needs meant for the rights China advocated on the basis of its ethnic national identity will be evident from the following quotation from an article written by Sugimori Kōjirō (1881–1968) in support of his country's actions in China at the time of the Manchurian Incident:

> There is no nation with a stronger personal will to survive than the Chinese. … Therefore the existence of the Chinese without a state and a national territory of their own is very well conceivable. One can imagine the Chinese becoming a second sort of Jews. … They will do anything just to survive. … The future of the ethnic nation-state is not eternal. … It will gradually and progressively dissolve. The advent of the world state, the human state, the supra-national state, the supra-racial state, the *Civitas Maxima* is both a materialistic inevitability and a spiritual necessity. Together with the advent of such an era the day of the Chinese will have arrived. Because in a sense it will mean that the Chinese, who have lost their national territory, will even enjoy the honour of being the forerunners of this world state.[48]

Although most members of this early Shōwa generation of opinion leaders did not go as far as Sugimori in presenting a picture of the Chinese people happily giving up their national rights, the passage above is but one example of a whole body of identical arguments which tended to set aside completely these same rights in favour of various imperative universal trends. And these trends (globalism, utilitarianism, functionalism, formation of regional economic blocs, and so on), in sharp contrast to the universal trend of ethnic national self-determination, were of course in one way or another considered to be perfectly in line with the creation of a Japanese zone of Monroe-ism in East Asia.

It is hardly necessary to mention what became of the rights of the ethnic nations of 'Greater East Asia' with which Japan was confronted in the 1940s, once one is aware that this confrontation was the unplanned result of Japan's early Shōwa generation's choice for Japan's national right to live at the expense of China's right to ethnic national self-determination. The precedent of the unfortunate China, the only Asian neighbour Japan recognized after Korea ceased to be a neighbour when it was annexed in 1910, seems to have preordained the reactions of Japan to the national identity of its other (and weaker and more abstract) 'Asian neighbours'. The grasp of Japan's national *needs*, that is, its 'national *right* to survival', proved suffocating: the national rights of the 'Asian neighbours' were only brought to the fore when these were considered functional (for example Thai claims to neighbouring territories in Southeast Asia) but in most cases national rights based on ethnic national identity were rendered harmless by transforming them into common 'Asian' rights based on race, once again perfectly in line with Japan's aim of creating a Japan-led exclusionist sphere of influence in East and Southeast Asia.

NOTES

1 In this chapter the terms 'the war', 'prewar', and 'postwar' are used in relation to the First World War.

2 As the literal translation of *kokumin*, 'state-nation', indicates, this term was predominantly related to the fact that in the modern era individuals more and more became fully-fledged members of a politically clearly defined and geographically clearly demarcated structure, namely the state. In this sense *kokumin* was a modern phenomenon and, accordingly, those people who – on account of the absence of a strong centralized state or for other reasons – were considered not sufficiently 'modern' or 'civilized', were usually not categorized as *kokumin* but as *domin* (natives) or some other derogatory denomination. Although the word *minzoku* (literally 'nation-family') was a more recent fabrication than *kokumin* it nevertheless referred to real or imagined ties which predated the framework of the modern state. It emphasized common ancestry, history, religion, language, experience, culture, spirit, and so on, and in all its inevitable vagueness was prone to trace the roots of the ethnic nation back to the beginning of time. Regardless of its arbitrary and unscientific criteria and its self-serving objectives, in the process of demarcating the own nation as a distinct ethnic nation other nations, which had not been considered fit to be honoured with the term *kokumin*, were also characterized as *minzoku* and thus for the first time obtained a distinct and neutral identity. This new identity was easily allotted to 'inferior nations' since at first it did not coincide with any rights being granted, but when rights were suddenly being granted on the basis of this ethnic identity it was too late to deny it. For the Japanese adoption of the concept 'ethnic nation' and their creation of an identity as a homogeneous ethnic entity, see Yasuda Hiroshi, 'Kindai Nihon ni okeru minzoku kannen no keisei', *Shisō to Gendai* 31 (1992), pp. 61–72; Yoon Keun-cha, *Minzoku gensō no satetsu – Nihonjin no jikozō* (Iwanami Shoten, 1994); Oguma Eiji, *Tanitsu minzoku shinwa no kigen* (Shinyōsha, 1995), Oguma Eiji, *[Nihonjin] no kyōkai* (Shinyōsha, 1998); Tessa Morris-Suzuki, *Re-Inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998).

3 There have been ample studies on the condescending way prewar Japanese looked upon their 'Asian' brothers – an adjective which was usually synonymous with only the 'Chinese' and seldom included the Japanese themselves. See Nomura Kōichi, *Kindai Nihon no Chūgoku ninshiki – Ajia e no kōseki* (Kenbun Shuppan, 1981); Yamamuro Shinichi, 'Ajia ninshiki no kijiku' and Furuya Tetsuo, 'Ajiashugi to sono shūhen', both in Furuya Tetsuo (ed.), *Kindai Nihon no Ajia ninshiki* (Kyōto Daigaku Jinbun Kagaku Kenkyūjo, 1994), pp. 3–102; Stefan Tanaka, *Japan's Orient – Rendering Pasts into History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

4 Yoshino's status as the symbol of the Taishō-period is once again confirmed by the fact that he is the only opinion leader of the day whose face adorns one of the stamps in the '20th Century Series' that were issued in 1999 and 2000.

5 Only at the beginning of 1918 did Yoshino for the first time use *minzokushugi* in the title of one of his many articles. 'Kōwa jōken no ichi-kihon to shite tonahera-ruru minzokushugi.' *Chūō Kōron*, 1918 (3): pp. 92–96. There is a rare article by Yoshino from October 1913 which from a political point of view analyses 'the present competition between ethnic nations', but it was a subject on which he was requested to write by the magazine *Shin-Nihon* rather than a subject he had chosen himself. Moreover, in the article he refuses to treat nationalism as an 'ism', a laudable goal to which one can rightfully aspire, and instead he rather distantly categorizes the different forms of expression of what he prefers to call 'the drive towards ethnic national unity' and analyses what chances these various forms have in accomplishing their goal. Yoshino Sakuzō, 'Seijijō yori mitaru konnichi no minzoku kyōsō', *Shin-Nihon*, 1913 (10): pp. 44–56. Although we disagree exactly on the point of how profound Yoshino's awareness of *minzokushugi* was before 1918, I am indebted to Kevin M. Doak for his insistence on distinguishing between nationalism and ethnic nationalism. See his recent articles 'Ethnic Nationalism and Romanticism in Early Twentieth-Century Japan', *Journal of Japanese Studies*, vol. 22, no. 1, 1996; 'What is a Nation and Who belongs? National Narrative and the Ethnic Imagination in Twentieth-Century Japan', *The American Historical Review*, 102:2, 1997; 'Culture, Ethnicity, and the State in Early Twentieth-Century Japan', in Sharon A. Minichiello (ed.), *Japan's Competing Modernities* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1998), pp. 181–205; 'Narrating China, Ordering East Asia: The Discourse on Nation and Ethnicity in Imperial Japan', in Kai-wing Chow, Kevin M. Doak and Poshek Fu (eds), *Constructing Nationhood in Modern East Asia* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press: 2001). The term 'ethnic nationalism' may arouse mixed feelings amongst advocates of the Queen's English, but it is indispensable for making a distinction between the Japanese *kokkashugi* or *kokuminshugi* on the one hand and *minzokushugi* on the other. In my opinion this distinction is essential in the historical debate on nationalism in other countries as well and therefore 'ethnic nationalism' should be considered for much wider use.

6 'Katō-kun no [Aikokushin]-ron'. *Shinjin*, 1905 (3): p. 55; 'Nihon bunmei no kenkyū'. *Kokka Gakkai Zasshi*, 1905 (7): pp. 130–131; 'Shinajin no keishikishugi'. *Shinjin*, 1906 (9), reprinted in *Yoshino Sakuzō Senshū* (henceforth abbreviated as *YSS*), vol.8 (Iwanami Shoten, 1995), pp. 182–183.

7 'Shin Nichi-Ro kyōyaku no shinka'. *Chūō Kōron*, 1916 (8): p. 76. 'Monroe-ism' may strike the Western reader as somewhat odd, but this literal translation of the Japanese *monrō-shugi* was a term which was widely used at the time of the First

World War and, once again, after the Manchurian Incident. Often used in the context of a 'Monroe Doctrine for (East) Asia', it referred to the idea that the predominant position of the United States on the American continent was supported by both the cooperation of its weaker American brothers and the recognition of world society. The point that the adherents to 'Monroe-ism' thus tried to make was that the Western powers, instead of interfering in Asian matters, should grant Japan, as the strongest nation of the Asian continent, the privilege to act in the same dominant way as the United States did in its own backyard.

8 'Kōwa jōken no ichi-kihon to shite tonaheraruru minzokushugi'. *Chūō Kōron*, 1918 (3): pp. 95–96.

9 'Sohō sensei cho [Jimu Ikkagen] wo yomu'. *Shinjin*, 1914.10, reprinted in *YSS*, vol.3: p. 107.

10 Airando mondai', *Shinjokai*, 1914.7, reprinted in *YSS*, vol.5: p. 42.

11 'Man-Sen shokuminteki keiei no hihan'. *Shinjin*, 1916 (6): pp. 57–61.

12 'Kōwa kaigi ni teigen subeki waga kuni no Nanyō shotō shobunan', *Chūō Kōron*, 1919 (1): pp. 145–146; 'Chōsen no tomo yori no tegami', *Chūō Kōron*, 1919 (1): p. 155; 'Chōsen tōchisaku'. *Chūō Kōron*, 1918 (10), reprinted in *YSS*, vol.9: pp. 50–51.

13 'Chōsen tōchi no kaikaku ni kansuru saishō gendo no yōkyū'. In *Reimei Kōenshū*, vol.6, 1919 (8): p. 5; 'Taigaiteki ryōshin no hakki'. *Chūō Kōron*, 1919 (4): p. 103.

14 'Kōkokuteki Chōsen no sonzai wo wasururu nakare', *Umi ka Oka ka*, 1919 (7): p. 10; 'Chōsen tōchi no kaikaku ni kansuru saishō gendo no yōkyū', *Reimei Kōenshū*, vol.6, 1919 (8): p. 41; 'Shokuminchi ni okeru kyōiku seido', *Chūō Kōron*, 1919 (6): p. 96; 'Chōsen tōchi no kokuminteki shihai', *Chūō Kōron*, 1919 (7): p. 88.

15 'Shinsōtoku oyobi shinseimusōkan wo mukau', *Chūō Kōron*, 1919 (9): p. 214; 'Chōsen ni okeru genron jiyū', *Chūō Kōron*, 1919 (6): p. 94.

16 'Chōsen bōdō zengosaku', *Chūō Kōron*, 1919 (4): p. 121.

17 'Chōsen tōchisaku', *Chūō Kōron*, 1918 (10), reprinted in *YSS*, vol.9: p. 50.

18 'Chōsen bōdō zengosaku', *Chūō Kōron*, 1919 (4): pp. 121–22; 'Chōsen tōchi no kaikaku ni kansuru saishō gendo no yōkyū', *Reimei Kōenshū*, vol.6, 1919 (8): p. 8.

19 'Chōsen tōchi no kaikaku ni kansuru saishō gendo no yōkyū', *Reimei Kōenshū*, vol.6, 1919.8: p. 42; 'Chōsen tōchi ni okeru [kōjō] to [seigi]' and 'Chōsenjin no jichi nōryoku', *Chūō Kōron*, 1919 (9): pp. 222–223.

20 'Kokusai mondai ni kansuru shitsugi ni kotau', *Shinjin*, 1920.6, p. 9.

21 'Waga kuni no Tōhō keiei ni kansuru san-daimondai', *Tōhō Jiron*, 1918 (1): pp. 42–43, 46–47.

22 Yamagata Aritomo, 'Gaikō seiryakuron'. Reprinted in *Nihon kindai shisō taikei 12: taigaikan* (Iwanami Shoten, 1988), pp. 81–86. It is also found in the collection of

Yamagata's written opinions compiled by Ōyama Azusa, *Yamagata Aritomo Ikensho* (Hara Shobō, 1966), pp. 196–201, but one has to be aware that this version mixes up the order of the pages of the original letter.

23 'Chōsen bōdō zengosaku', *Chūō Kōron*, 1919 (4): p. 122.

24 'Chōsen no bōdō ni tsuite', *Chūō Kōron*, 1920 (11): pp. 84–85; 'Chōsen mondai', *Chūō Kōron*, 1921 (1): p. 191.

25 A telling example in this context is that Yoshino in 1923 rejoiced over 'the fact' that 'the internal demands of the young Koreans are penetrating a level far deeper than political freedom' and that 'the Korean Labour Federation is in very close cooperation with Japanese labourers … they are joining hands on the high ground of the liberation of the proletariat … and thus the Korean popular movement is going beyond *the narrow-minded bounds of political independence*'. 'Chōsenjin no shakai undō ni tsuite', *Chūō Kōron*, 1923 (5): pp. 193, 198. For Yoshino's stand towards his Taiwanese compatriots, from whom he demanded that they become 'an independent cultural ethnic nation' but to whom he simultaneously refused to give political independence, see 'Shukuji', *Taiwan Seinen*, 1920 (7), reprinted in *YSS*, vol.9: p. 293.

26 'Kōkokuteki Chōsen no sonzai wo wasururu nakare', *Umi ka Oka ka*, 1919 (7): pp. 10–11; 'Chōsen mondai', *Chūō Kōron*, 1921 (1): p. 191; 'Tonghak oyobi Ch'ŏndo-gyo', Bunka Seikatsu, 1921 (7), reprinted in *YSS*, vol.9: p. 183; 'Taigai mondai ni taisuru watakushidomo no taido', *Fujin no Tomo*, 1921 (7): p. 35; 'Suwōn gyakusatsu jiken', *Chūō Kōron*, 1919 (7): pp. 88–89; 'Chōsen tōchi no kaikaku ni kansuru saishō gendo no yōkyū', *Reimei Kōenshū*, vol.6, 1919 (8), pp. 41–42; 'Chōsen no nōmin', *Bunka no Kiso*, 1925.9, reprinted in *YSS*, vol.9: p. 208.

27 'Senpuku Sengo no shōrei', *Chūō Kōron*, 1919 (6): p. 96.

28 'Iwayuru kyōdō sengen to Nichi-Bei mondai', *Chūō Kōron*, 1918 (1), pp. 107–108; 'Waga kuni no Tōhō keiei ni kansuru san-daimondai', *Tōhō Jiron*, 1918 (1), p. 49.

29 'Taisengo no sekaiteki kyōsō', *Chūō Kōron*, 1916 (3), p. 16; 'Nisshi shinzenron', *Tōhō Jiron*, 1916 (9), p. 24.

30 'Waga kuni no Tōhō keiei ni kansuru san-daimondai', *Tōhō Jiron*, 1918 (1), p. 53.

31 'Nichi-Bei kyōdō sengen to waga tai-Shi seisaku', *Tōhō Jiron*, 1917 (12), p. 41.

32 'Nisshi shinzenron', *Tōhō Jiron*, 1916 (9), pp. 14–18, 23; 'Nichi-Ro kyōyaku no seiritsu', *Shinjin*, 1916 (8), pp. 5–6.

33 'Nichi-Bei kyōdō sengen to waga tai-Shi seisaku', *Tōhō Jiron*, 1917 (12), p. 42.

34 'Waga kuni no Tōhō keiei ni kansuru san-daimondai', *Tōhō Jiron*, 1918 (1), pp. 58–60; 'Tai-Shi gaikō seisaku ni tsuite', *Yokohama Bōeki Shinpō*, 1918 (17 June), reprinted in *YSS*, vol.8, p. 339.

35 'Waga tai-Man-Mō seisaku to Teikaton jiken no kaiketsu', *Tōhō Jiron*, 1917 (3), pp. 27–28. For a detailed analysis of Yoshino's ideas on Sino–Japanese relations in

the imperialist prewar international order, see my 'Yoshino Sakuzō – The Isolated Figurehead of the Taishō Generation', in D. Stegewerns (ed.), *Nationalism and Internationalism in Imperial Japan; Autonomy, Asian Brotherhood, or World Citizenship?* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, forthcoming).

36 'Pekin daigaku gakusei sōjō jiken ni tsuite', *Shinjin*, 1919 (6): pp. 3–7; 'Shina ni okeru hai-Nichi jiken', *Chūō Kōron*, 1919 (7), p. 84.

37 'Shantung mondai', *Reimei Kōenshū*, vol.5, 1919 (7): pp. 27–29.

38 'Shantung mondai no kyakkanteki kōsatsu', *Kaikoku Kōron*, 1919 (6): p. 15.

39 'Shina kinji – Washinton kaigi ni okeru Shina no ch'i', *Chūō Kōron*, 1922 (3): p. 194; 'Shina jōyaku haiki tsūchō', *Chūō Kōron*, 1923 (3): p. 233.

40 'Tai-Shi kokusaku tōgi', *Kaizō*, 1924 (11): p. 32; 'Saikin no Ei-Shi kattō', *Chūō Kōron*, 1926 (10): pp. 97–100.

41 'Musan seitō ni kawarite Shina Nanpō seifu daihyōsha ni tsugu', *Chūō Kōron*, 1927 (4): p. 1.

42 'Shina kinji', *Chūō Kōron*, 1927 (5): p. 109; Tanaka naikaku no Man-Mō seisaku ni taisuru gigi', *Shakai Undō*, 1927.10, reprinted in *YSS*, vol.6: pp. 295–296. Shidehara Kijūrō (1871–1951), a former diplomat, was Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Minseitō-led cabinets of Katō Takaaki, Wakatsuki Reijirō and Hamaguchi Osachi (June 1924–April 1927 and July 1929–December 1931). Tanaka Giichi (1864–1929), a former army general turned party leader, was Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Seiyūkai cabinet headed by himself (April 1927 – July 1929). There is an ongoing debate on the question of whether or not the China policies of these two Ministers were intrinsically different but, somewhat in line with Yoshino's argument, I subscribe to the view that, notwithstanding the identical theoretical goals, the practical goals and effects were in a completely different category.

43 'Tai-Shi seisaku hihan', *Chūō Kōron*, 1928 (9): pp. 85–86; 'Shina shuppei ni tsuite', *Chūō Kōron*, 1927 (7): pp. 119–20; 'Tai-Shi shuppei', *Chūō Kōron*, 1928 (6): pp. 64–66.

44 'Shina no keisei', *Chūō Kōron*, 1928 (7): pp. 79–80; 'Man-Mō mondai ni kansuru hansei', *Chūō Kōron*, 1931 (10): p. 1.

45 'Man-Mō dokuritsu undō to Nihon', *Chūō Kōron*, 1931 (11): p. 1; 'Minzoku to kaikyū to sensō', *Chūō Kōron*, 1932 (1): p. 32; 'Manshūkoku shōnin no jiki', *Chūō Kōron*, 1932 (9): p. 1.

46 'Sōsenkyo to taigaikō-ron', *Fujin Saron*, 1932 (2): p. 49; Yoshino diary, 1932 (12 September), reprinted in *YSS*, vol.15.

47 'Ritton hōkokusho wo yonde', *Kaizō*, 1932 (11): pp. 228–231. 'Tōyō Monrō-shugi no kakuritsu', *Chūō Kōron*, 1932 (12): p. 1; 'Naigai ta'nan no shinnen', *Chūō Kōron*, 1933 (1): p. 1.

48 Sugimori Kōjirō, 'Shina bunkatsu no mondai', *Kaizō*, 1932 (11): pp. 75–76.

CHAPTER SIX

Assimilation Rejected: The Tong'a ilbo's Challenge to Japan's Colonial Policy in Korea

MARK E. CAPRIO

INTRODUCTION

The letter sent by the Japanese government-general in Korea to the *Tong'a ilbo* [East Asian Daily] on 25 September 1920 expressed a feeling of regret over the newspaper's behaviour. Less than six months earlier, revisions in the colonial administration's newspaper policies had allowed the newspaper, along with a small number of others, to begin publishing. Now, however, the Japanese authorities decided to impose the severest of penalties upon the newspaper: indefinite closure. The letter listed the reasons for this action and then explained that in granting Pak Yŏnghyo, the president of the periodical, permission to start a newspaper the government-general had hoped that the news it chose to print would 'contribute to the prosperity of the Japanese and Korean people, as well as to the development of culture'.[1] Regrettably, the letter commented, this aspiration had not been fulfilled.

In fact, the *Tong'a ilbo* had strongly promoted cultural development, but it had done so in a way that was hardly palatable to the Japanese. Rather than promoting the official Japanese line of cultural assimilation, the newspaper had argued for a strengthening of Korean culture. Its pages also offered commentary on deficiencies of the Japanese culture that its colonial masters strove to export to the Korean peninsula. Indeed, the editorial that pushed the government-general to close the newspaper for the better part of half a year was its critical discussion on the religious merits of the three Imperial treasures (the sword, the jewel, and the mirror). Needless to say, this tone of cultural instruction, one that worked

to forge a Korean identity against the invading Japanese assimilation policy, was not what the Japanese envisaged when they granted permission for the newspaper to commence publication.[2]

NEWSPAPERS AND JAPANESE COLONIAL POLICY

Newspapers in Korea did not begin to appear until the mid-1880s. The earliest publications made extensive use of Chinese characters, which limited their readership to educated Koreans. Not until the emergence of the *Tongnip Sinmun* [Independent Newspaper] in 1896 were the Korean people offered a newspaper written in *han'gul* script that the masses could understand. This newspaper, and a number of others that were to follow, addressed in their columns such themes as the promotion of Korean national identity, the reform of education, and the misdirected Japanese-Korean relationship. The newspapers criticized the arrogance which Japanese showed towards the Korean people while arguing that relations based on greater equality between the two peoples would better serve Japan's interests.

After the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910, most of the Korean-language newspapers were forced to close; they were replaced by the *Maeil sinbo* [Daily News], a private newspaper that offered strong support for the policies of the Japanese administration. The large number of Chinese characters used by this newspaper indicate that its target audience was to be the educated population of Korean society. Two themes recur repeatedly in the pages of the *Maeil sinbo* during the first decade of its existence: the merits of Korean–Japanese assimilation and the shortcomings of Korean society of the day. Its message was echoed in two sister newspapers, the English-language *Seoul Press* and the Japanese-language *Keijō Nippō* [Seoul Daily]. With the few Korean-language newspapers permitted to continue operations dying out soon after annexation, the government-general held a virtual monopoly on Korean-language publications until Governor General Saitō Makoto relaxed publication legislation in 1920.[3]

Under the new regulations, the government-general allowed three new Korean-language newspapers to commence publication, the *Chosŏn ilbo* [Korean Daily], the *Sidai ilbo* [Times Daily], and the *Tong'a ilbo*. The *Tong'a ilbo* was the most popular of the vernacular press on the Korean peninsula in the 1920s and also the most daring; articles intended for its pages were often 'erased' by the Japanese censors, with empty space and smudge marks left to indicate that material had

been removed. On a number of occasions the newspaper faced indefinite closure.[4] On the other hand, it had many Japanese connections. The president of the newspaper, Pak Yŏnghyo, had gone to Japan to learn the newspaper trade in the last years of the Chosŏn dynasty (1392–1910). The newspaper received funding from Kim Yŏngsu, a man who also had a number of influential supporters in Japan.[5] The Tong'a ilbo company was even forced to purchase its printing presses in Japan.

The policy change which allowed the emergence of the *Tong'a ilbo* was one of a series of reforms made in the early 1920s. These reforms were issued at the beginning of a period the government-general termed 'cultural rule' (*bunka seiji*), a change from the 'military rule' (*budan seiji*) that had characterized Japanese rule since Korea's annexation in late August 1910. It would be wrong to regard 'cultural rule' as more benevolent than its military predecessor, for both rules were based on a fundamental disrespect for Korean identity. Nonetheless, the new policy aimed at a more subtle process of subordination. The policy change reflected a feeling in Japan that the clumsy directness of Japanese policy in Korea in the 1910s had worked against Japan's long-term interests. The international embarrassment the Japanese felt from their poor handling of the Korean independence demonstrations of 1919 forced the government-general to employ more lenient controls over the Korean people to win back both international and Korean support. Prominent thinkers, such as Yoshino Sakuzō and Hara Kei, argued that the Japanese failure to win the trust of the Koreans was due to their failure to consider the Koreans as equals.[6] From this time, moreover, there appeared increased discussion, primarily in education journals, on providing Koreans with an education of equal value to that received by Japanese.

Government officials also believed that the reforms would enable them to control Korean society more effectively by giving them new sources of information on public opinion. By allowing the Korean people a voice, wrote Vice-Governor General Mizuno Rentarō, the Japanese authorities could 'discover the smoke before the heat turned to fire',[7] and could more thoroughly prepare for, and better still prevent, a potential second independence movement. Indeed, one of the most important successes of the reforms was the fact that they brought into the open the forces in Korean society which had been behind the independence movement of the 1910s, thus making them easier to control.[8] Initially, however, a shortage of Japanese personnel competent in Korean meant that the colonial authorities

could censor only a limited range of publications, and Koreans thus had a greater degree of freedom in the range of issues they could address.

Whereas the Japanese authorities saw this newly open public sphere as soothing resentment against colonial rule and offering opportunities for surveillance, Korean nationalists saw it as offering terrain in which they could resist Japanese policies. The *Tong'a ilbo* thus acted as one of the primary organs for the Korean cultural nationalist movement over the first half of the 1920s.[9] It was by far the most popular newspaper during this decade, as well as perhaps the most harassed of the Korean language newspapers. Its coverage of the activities of the wide variety of political groups then operating offers students of this period a rich understanding of the Korean response to their Japanese subjugators at this time. Its pages therefore offer some insight into the Korean interpretations of Japan's intentions for the peninsula. Japanese opinion regarding the administration of the Korean peninsula was never entirely consistent because they disagreed over whether to seek the full assimilation of Koreans as Japanese, to turn them into a kind of second-class Japanese or to regard them as close neighbours and allies who might be permitted to retain some of their own identity, either within a broader East Asian framework or as special partners in the Japanese imperial enterprise. For the *Tong'a ilbo*, as for most Koreans, such subtle distinctions in Japanese policy mattered little; the ending of Korean independence seemed to be nothing other than the first step in a policy of assimilation which aimed to bring about the destruction of Korean identity altogether. The Japanese occupation, however, forced Koreans to think in a variety of ways about exactly how they imagined the nature of 'Korean-ness'. Many of these imaginings found a reflection in the pages of the *Tong'a ilbo*.

The *Tong'a ilbo* challenged the Japanese administration's idea that the futures of the Korean and Japanese people were destined to become one, an idea for which the Japanese media had demonstrated support even before annexation. The great challenge for Korean nationalists was the sharp contrast between their country's history and that of Japan during the half century before the annexation. Whereas Japan had modernized and industrialized, turning itself into an emerging great power, Korea had not and it had paid a high price for this failure, becoming a prize in the contest between other powers. Japan's most powerful argument, by contrast, was its claim that it had come to Korea to lead the Korean people swiftly along the same kind of modernizing path, for the common benefit of the two peoples. The *Maeil sinbo* emphasized this idea within

a week of its conception in an article titled 'The significance of assimilation' (*Tonghwa ŭi chuui*). Here the newspaper stressed that if 'Japan is strong, then our country [Korea] is strong. If our country is weak, however, Japan is also weak'. The editorial continued by assuring its readers that 'if the older brother eats well then the younger brother of the same house will not starve'.[10] The scholar Yun Ch'iho wrote of the 'sad situation' that would transpire if the Japanese were to retreat from the peninsula, a move which, he said, would leave Korea to a fate similar to that of Turkey, Mexico, and China.[11] Others stressed Korean sovereignty while acknowledging Japan's fate to be tied to an East Asian regional alliance that included Korea. Yŏ Unhyŏng, a leader of the 1919 March First Independence Movement, proposed to Japanese Colonial Office Chief Kōga Renzō the idea of an independent Korea working in cooperation within an 'awakened East Asian policy of Japan, Korea, and China', as well as with other neighbouring states.[12]

The *Tong'a ilbo* responded to this argument both with simple assertions of Korea's cultural distinctiveness and with more subtle historical arguments. The newspaper recognized that Korea's own 'feudal' past had helped to bring about its current plight. Rather than accepting that Japan offered the best path to a modern future, however, the newspaper portrayed Japan as a catalyst – or perhaps at most as a midwife – for processes of change which could be developed from within Korean society. These changes, it implied, should lead naturally to Korean liberation, rather than to loss of identity in a broader Japanese polity.

The call for liberation appeared in a wide variety of forms, from outright promotion of Korean liberation to discussion of the liberation movements of other colonized peoples, to the liberation of the Korean women from their Korean male subjugators. The message was clear: political liberation would not be complete without a cultural liberation from Korea's 'feudal' past, but conversely the logical and inevitable consequence of cultural modernization was political liberation, not Japanization.

The *Tong'a ilbo* argued against a lingering belief of the nineteenth century that civilizations became great by demonstrating that they could colonize and assimilate peoples believed to be weak (or lacking) in civilization. The Japanese had been introduced to this belief even before the 1868 Meiji Restoration, and they had received numerous reminders of the idea following their push to join the ranks of the world powers from the second half of that century.[13] The Japanese characterization of Korea as a 'decaying land', and its inhabitants as 'sickly', the newspaper suggested, had served to create an image of its people as

weak and thus as candidates for subjugation.[14] The *Tong's ilbo* did not deny that there were shortcomings in traditional Korean society, but it argued these in no way disqualified the Koreans from the same rights to self-determination enjoyed by other colonized peoples.

It often reported the activities of Korea's independence patriots at home and abroad. It even urged the Korean people to organize a 'second independence movement'; the bold headline laden with Chinese characters was sure to have attracted the attention of any Japanese official thumbing through that day's edition, even if he had been totally ignorant of the Korean language.[15]

The pages of the *Tong'a ilbo* therefore frequently reported events in other colonized countries and left readers to draw their own conclusions. Ireland was a favorite topic, probably because of its active nationalist movement and its physical proximity to the colonial power. Both peoples, the *Tong'a ilbo* pointed out, had been subjugated by a people separated from them by a body of water. This subjugation, in both cases, was due to the country's betrayal by its own people. The fact that their subjugators, the English and the Japanese, had been close allies for two decades no doubt added to the Korean identification with the Irish people.

Encouraged by the 1922 success of Ireland's becoming a 'free state' within the British Commonwealth, the *Tong'a ilbo* retold the story of the country's annexation in its pages. The account, offered in English, concluded with a judgement that only barely concealed a message for the Japanese.

> The fatal blow [annexation] was dealt to Ireland. At the same time, an equally fatal curse was voluntarily invoked upon the British Empire. The crushing of a neighboring nation must have been gloated over by the then leaders of the English government. But they little knew what their joy would cost their country in subsequent centuries.[16]

The newspaper also made frequent mention of India and the Philippines, where active nationalist movements had begun to wrest concessions from their colonial rulers, but they drew still more courage from the American example. Throughout the period of Japanese rule, Koreans stalked American diplomats and statesmen around the globe with petitions in hand in an effort to enlist their help in returning Korean independence. The *Tong'a ilbo* augmented this effort by publishing English language articles on the eighteenth century American struggle for independence (a good number of these articles appearing in the

first week of July). Many of these articles incorporated the imagery that had captured the emotions of American freedom fighters 150 years earlier, including democracy, personal and national liberty, no 'taxation without representation' and national independence.

One of the best examples is seen in the 24 August 1920 issue that targeted the Congressional tour to Korea. The newspaper welcomed the American 'brothers' of the Korean people in bold (English) print followed by a lengthy article, also written in English, proclaiming the shared commitment of the two peoples to freedom and democracy. The United States, it wrote, had been from early on a 'refuge for the oppressed … . This is why America has been loved and respected by the troubled and the tyrannized'. The Korean people, the article continued, were prepared to 'make sacrifice for … the principle of *democracy*'. The newspaper concluded by expressing its hope that the tour members would 'carry our hopes' back with them to the United States for, although separated geographically, 'there can be nothing which can separate us in our love and common ideals'.[17]

Finally, the *Tong'a ilbo* likened the liberation of the subjugated Korean women to Korean national liberation. The metaphor was fitting in many ways. The emergence of the women from her 'inner quarters' (*anch'ae*) into Korean society after all coincided in time with the emergence of the 'hermit' Korean state into the global society. The 'new woman' (*sinyŏsŏng*) that emerged in the 1920s appears to be a combination of the Japanese *atarashii onna* (new woman) and *moga* (modern girl) in her emergence into society, her status as an educated individual, and her new look: her modern clothes, her modern cosmetics, and her modern hairstyle.[18]

The newspaper devoted a number of editorials to the education of this 'new woman'. Not only would her learning elevate her position in society, it would also serve to deliver Korean society from the fetters of its 'feudal' past. This argument considered the woman's role as educator of her children in the years prior to their starting formal education. A society could not advance with its women left ignorant, argued writers for the *Tong'a ilbo*, for she could only pass on to them that which she knows. While this argument shared similarity with that put forth by the *Maeil sinbo*, it differed in the newspaper calling for a Korean-based education to replace the Japanese-centred learning stressed in the government-general schools.[19]

In these arguments, therefore, the *Tong'a ilbo* neatly refuted arguments that Japan's subjugation of Korea was natural or permanent. Korea might have failed

to modernize when Japan did, but it had not given up its right to a national identity and to independence.

> Weak nations and backward people must be given equal opportunities for progress and liberty to work out their own destinies, they must be helped and not dominated; and then and only then, the world will witness a new age of peace and good will among nations.[20]

The newspaper willingly acknowledged the superiority of the Japanese in a number of fields including the sciences, politics, morals, and economics. However, it asserted that Korean advancement in these areas could be attained through their natural development as a people. When the Korean people came to attain the high level of culture enjoyed at present by the Japanese people, a 'genuine relationship will come to exist' between the two peoples and the 'fundamental purpose of the Japanese-Korean annexation will be realized'.[21] And the newspaper presented itself as proof that the impetus to modernize lay within Korean society and did not need to be imported from Japan.

Alongside this argument, however, the *Tong'a ilbo* also pinpointed what it saw as the regressive aspects of Japanese rule, especially in the sphere of education. An important part of the Japanese modernization discourse was the argument that the rapid acquisition of modern skills from Japan demanded the wholesale introduction of Japanese language. In one of its first editorials, the newspaper criticized this policy. Forcing Korean children to learn their subjects in the Japanese language, the *Tong'a ilbo* began, 'blocked national development'. The newspaper continued by arguing that education was most important for a people's modernization; the ages between five and twelve were the most pivotal for a child's development. Thus, education during this early stage in life should be conducted in the language that was most natural to the student.[22]

More sharply, however, the *Tong'a ilbo* also cast doubt on the formative power of Japanese education in Korea when it was not reinforced by the environment outside the school. The newspaper acknowledged that if the Korean children used the Japanese language in their education they would learn to use the language naturally. But it pointed out that fluency in Japanese was no guarantee of loyalty to Japan. History, the newspaper claimed, had demonstrated that the national interests and historical background of a people could negate the effects of education, and that this kind of policy in fact most often ended in failure. As an example of this failure the newspaper offered the case of the Britain's

eighteenth century failure to retain its American colonies.[23] To understand the fruitlessness of Japanese assimilation policies one had only to look to the children of Korea for proof. These children, it wrote, were aware of Japanese deception.

> They know of its dishonesty … . Furthermore, they know that their teachers are the enemy. They know that their grandfathers and fathers have had to endure cruel persecution at the hands of the Japanese. They have observed the Japanese police passing through their houses and committing brutal acts against their parents. Can such children ever be Japanized?[24]

Here, the newspaper ingeniously offered its readers consolation over the futility of Japan's efforts. At the same time it also seemed to be expressing to them the importance of maintaining awareness in the younger generation of the Japanese crimes to counter the Japanese-based education to which they were subject.

On the surface, the message presented by the *Tong'a ilbo* was not seditious. It was a message that the Koreans were willing to work with the Japanese as long as the relationship was founded upon positive terms. The newspaper's message was not necessarily palatable to all Japanese, but it was largely in agreement with the arguments of Japanese such as Hara and Yoshino who also argued for more equitable Japanese–Korean relations. Even if the newspaper sometimes could not bear to conceal its enthusiasm for Korean sovereignty, it managed to avoid irrevocably antagonizing the Japanese authorities by analysing the shortcomings of Japanese rule as if it could still agree with Japan's ultimate goals. The newspaper, however, no doubt felt closer to Yanaihara Tadao who proposed that Japan's cultivation of Korea as an independent state, the cultivation of a people who had grown to consider their identity in political terms, would be considered an honourable accomplishment for the Japanese people.[25] For Koreans to be recognized as a people with a separate ethnic identity (rather than simply a member of the Asian [yellow] race), though, they had to promote a distinct 'Korean' identity, a theme also emphasized by the newspaper.

KOREAN IDENTITY

Ironically, the Korean national identity which the *Tong'a ilbo* sought to construct or reflect was one which drew heavily on the Japanese model. Rather than imagining a society which might be different from that of Japan in its human

values, the newspaper imagined a society different from Japan in its cultural markers but very much like Japan in its discipline and uniformity.

The *Tong'a ilbo* addressed the issue of Korean disunity in its maiden issue where it declared its intention to do its part to create the 'great unified culture' that the Korean people needed for development. In June 1924 it sent out a plea for peninsular Koreans to create a unity in action to accompany the unity in purpose and spirit they held with their 'overseas [Korean] brethren'.[26] Towards the end of the decade, the newspaper again stressed this issue in declaring Korea's 'cultural immaturity' as being that which stood between the recently liberated countries of Egypt and Ireland and their own enslaved existence. Koreans, it concluded, must prepare for the 'new era that is drawing closer everyday' by development of their 'national unity and resources'.[27]

The newspaper described the unity that the Korean people must forge as that akin to the formation of a symphony orchestra among a group of talented musicians. Just as these musicians all possessed gifted individual talents in their own right, so too did the people of a nation. However, just as the lifting of the conductor's baton brought these individual talents into harmonious communion, so too must a nation skilfully blend the individual talents of its people to strengthen itself as a unified entity. Only then could a people attain 'autonomous self-management' (*chaju yŏng*), and thus become self-reliant (*charip*).[28]

The *Tong'a ilbo* also worked to promote a sense of 'Korean-ness' and identity among the Korean people. In this way the newspaper acted as a Korean nation-building 'textbook', a firewall built to hold back the onslaught of Japanese propaganda directed at assimilation. Aware of the abundant reference to Japanese heroes and models in the textbooks used to teach Korean children,[29] the newspaper responded by publicizing Korean icons, creating Korean heroes and identifying Korean culture to its readers. As one example, to commemorate the publishing of its 100th issue in July 1920, the *Tong'a ilbo* listed 100 things and people important to Korean culture. Later that year it offered an editorial on the beauty of Korean clothes; the newspaper followed this with a three-day seminar-in-print on ways in which the Korean people could disseminate their culture to the greater population.[30]

In addition to criticizing the education curriculum centred on the Japanese language, the newspaper took every opportunity to promote Korean as the language of the Korean people. In particular it emphasized the need to 'civilize' the language, that is, to record its grammar and lexicon in the form of grammar

books and dictionaries. In November 1926, the *Tong'a ilbo* urged Korean linguists to develop within the Korean people a 'love' (*aechŏng*) for the Korean language by encouraging linguistic research and by publishing more books in the Korean language, as well as by honouring the creator of the *han'gul* script, King Sejong.[31]

For the *Tong'a ilbo*, creating heroes was a means of showing what Koreans could achieve. The newspaper celebrated the accomplishments of the winners of the sports tournaments it sponsored; it showcased the court cases of Korean defendants at major trials of crimes against the Japanese colonial state, labelling those on trial the 'representatives of the Korean people'. Prison hunger strikers, as well, received publicity through the newspaper's coverage of their sacrifice.[32] On a more positive note, it heralded the accomplishments of Chŏn Kyunyang in 1924 when the scholar became the first Korean to be employed at an American university.[33]

The biggest hero to grace the pages of the *Tong'a ilbo* during the 1920s was An Ch'angnam, the first Korean aviation pilot. An's accomplishment was his success in a field that was just beginning to develop, one in which, the newspaper emphasized, only a limited number of people participated. He was 'a pioneer in the technology of the newest body of research in present-day science – that of aviation technology'. Thanks to his flights, it continued, the 'genius and talents of the Korean people are broadcast to the world'. Upon the pilot's return to his homeland, An was greeted by 'thousands of miles of cheering people of his native land'.[34] These 'mountains and waves' of people were in a state of frenzy as he entered the capital to receive a wreath of flowers to commemorate his heroic achievement.[35] Native Koreans reading of An's accomplishments as presented by the *Tong'a ilbo* could not help but feel a sense of national pride.[36]

The 1920s were an age of militant nationalism in both Europe and Asia, and the rhetoric of sharp ethnic boundaries, distinctive cultural markers, national heroism and disciplined national unity could be heard in Italy, Germany and Spain, as well as India, Siam, China and Korea. In the *Tong'a ilbo*, moreover, this nationalist rhetoric was accompanied by an appreciation that Korea's plight was shared by other colonized peoples and an acknowledgement that part of the problem for Korea lay within her own society.

CONCLUSION

The infraction committed by the *Tong'a ilbo* that led to its indefinite shutdown was listed under Article 21 of the colonial Newspaper Act: newspaper seizure or

suspension could be ordered by the Home Ministry if it believed the newspaper to be 'disrupting peace and stability'. The letter cited the newspaper's reference to Korean liberation through use of 'secret language' (*ŭn'ŏ*) to spread ideas of independence. In addition, evidence of the *Tong'a ilbo*'s violations was noted in the newspaper's repeated criticism of the government-general. Here, the letter specifically made mention of the newspaper's use of the 'bad English government' in India as a reference to Japanese rule in Korea.[37]

The government-general finally lifted its suspension of the newspaper's operations on 10 January 1921. However, it was not until 21 February, more than a month later, that the *Tong'a ilbo* was able to resume publication. This would not be the last time the newspaper faced indefinite closure; it would also have to endure seeing a great number of its articles erased and would have nearly 400 of its issues seized.[38] In 1939, Japanese wartime restrictions forced the closure of all of the Korean-language newspapers save for the *Maeil sinbo* that offered its last edition on 16 August 1945. The *Tong'a ilbo* reappeared following Japan's surrender and continues to publish to this day.

The Japanese presented to the Korean people ideas of affinity between their peoples: assimilation was a process that had begun in ancient times only to be interrupted by the long and corrupt Chosŏn Period. Japan's rise to a status of world power, along with its people's successful absorption of modernity, mandated its mission to resume the process of cultural amalgamation of its colonized peoples while absorbing their territory into the Japanese Empire. The *Tong'a ilbo* saw its mission as the refutation of this message, and the publicizing of another: Korean ethnic identity. The salvation of the Korean people lay not in their Japanization, but in their awakening to national liberation, in their forging an identification with their own cultural heritage, and in their recognizing their ability to participate in modernity. As in most other colonizer-colonized relationships, the colonized identified the content of their discourse primarily by that put forth by their colonizer. In this way the Japanese subjugator came to limit the content of the Korean response not only directly by their censoring mechanisms, but also indirectly by the editorial choices they made in the media organs. Rather than establishing a new agenda, the Korean media found itself colonized by the agenda set by the Japanese colonial administration in terms of its definition of civilization and the road a people should take to reach that goal.

AUTHOR'S NOTE

This chapter was presented in various forms at the third annual Asian Studies Conference Japan (June 1999) and at the University of Washington Korea Colloquia (March 2000). In addition to the helpful comments offered by the two editors of this volume, the quality of the chapter has also been enhanced by comments from Frank Baldwin, Erin Chung and Yungmi Lim.

NOTES

1 Kim Sangman (ed.), *Tong'a ilbosa* [The history of the *Tong'a ilbo*], Vol. 1 (Seoul: Tong'a ilbosa, 1975), pp. 151–152.

2 The Korean newspapers during the period of Japanese occupation are a source that has received relatively little attention. To date the few studies in English that have examined colonial-era newspapers have focused on Japanese policy. Michael E. Robinson's article on 'Colonial Publication Policy' offers readers an overview of publication policy in Korea during the years of Japanese control. He draws comparisons with similar policy in Taiwan at the time. Several histories of the *Tong'a ilbo* have been written. Choong Soon Kim's biography of Kim Sŏngsu, the entrepreneur who established the newspaper, contains a chapter on the early years of the newspaper. In Korean, the newspaper company published a three-volume company history. A number of studies have come out in Korean language journals that have relied heavily on the content of the *Tong'a ilbo*. Chŏng Saehyun uses the *Tong'a ilbo* to consider the new women's cultural movement of the 1920s. Sin Yŏngsuk examines the changes in marriage culture during Japanese rule through use of the newspaper's contents. This chapter will offer a broader consideration of the paper's role in Korean identity formation in the 1920s.

3 The *Kŏngnam ilbo* continued publication into 1915 when financial problems forced it to close. In addition there were up to 29 underground newspapers circulating on the peninsula during the first decade of Japanese rule. See Kim Sangman (ed.), *Tong'a ilbosa*, p. 66.

4 The government-general required the newspapers to turn in a copy of each edition as it was going on the street. If the publication police found anything in need of deletion the publisher was responsible for recalling all copies and making the change before redistributing the paper. Apart from erasure, the authorities could prohibit the sale and distribution of particular issues, confiscate copies of the newspaper, and order indefinite closure. See Kim Sangman (ed.), *Tong'a ilbosa*, pp. 124–126. See also Robinson, 'Colonial Publication Policy', for a description of the

penalties. Robinson writes that the censorship in Korea was only slightly more restrictive of Korean publishers than Japanese publishers (*ibid.*, p. 320). Robinson also offers the following statistics for newspaper circulation in 1929: *Chosŏn ilbo* 24,286*; Tong'a ilbo* 37,802; *Chungoe ilbo* 14,267; and *Maeil sinbo* 23,015. By 1939 the *Chosŏn ilbo* had become more popular than the *Tong'a ilbo* (95,939 to 55,977) (p. 326).

5 Kim Sangman (ed.), *Tong'a ilbosa*. Pak had been given the title of marquis following annexation. For information on Kim Sŏngsu's life see Carter Eckert, *Offspring of Empire: the Koch'ang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism, 1876–1945* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991), and Choong Soon Kim, *A Korean Nationalist Entrepreneur.* It is also reported that Yoshino Sakuzō was influential in the Korean group gaining a license to commence publication of the newspaper. See Kim Sangman (ed.), *Tong'a ilbosa*, pp. 69–70.

6 Calls for reforms were first made by retiring Governor General Hasegawa Yoshimichi months before the March First movement in 1919. Yoshino Sakuzō wrote extensively in the *Chūō kōron* and other magazines regarding his views on the Japanese mismanagement of Korea. See, for example, Yoshino Sakuzō, 'Chōsen mondai ni kan shi tōkyoku ni nozomu' [Concerning the Korean problem and aspirations for the authorities], *Chūō kōron* (February 1921), pp. 79–82. Hara Kei's views can be read in Hara Kei, 'Chōsen tōchi shiken' [A personal opinion on Korean administration], *Saitō Makoto kankei monjo* (Reel 104, Japanese National Diet Library, keisei shiryo shitsu), 1919.

7 Mizuno Rentarō, 'Chōsen ni okeru genron no jiyū: osan no seiji' [Freedom of speech in Korea: politics of the mountain] in Nishio Rintarō (ed.), *Mizuno Rentarō kaisōroku, kankei bunsho* [Memoirs and official papers of Mizuno Rentarō] (Tokyo: Yamagawa shuppansha, 1999), p. 52. Mizuno was referring to the surprise experienced by many Japanese to see Koreans marching for their independence at the time of the March First Movement. This argument was also made by others. Kim Sangman quotes a high police official as saying that allowing Korean newspapers provided the Japanese police with a 'defensive preparation strategy' to 'know the enemy'. Kim Sangman (ed.), *Tong'a ilbosa*, p. 75.

8 This point is made by Michael E. Robinson, *Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920–1925* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988).

9 Michael E. Robinson's work remains the best interpretation of this period. See *ibid*. See also Kenneth M. Wells, *New God, New Nation: Protestants and Self-Reconstruction Nationalism in Korea, 1896–1937* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1990).

10 *Maeil sinbo*, 30 August 1910. A few newspapers spoke out against Korean annexation for economic reasons, by mid-1910 it is rather difficult to find a Japanese news-

paper that did not support this development. One exception was the *Japan Chronicle*, an English-language newspaper run by foreign residents of Kobe. On 27 August 1910, the newspaper challenged Japan's claim that the Korean people had not made progress toward the development of a modern state while arguing that Japan itself was not fit to annex neighbouring territory.

11 Yun Ch'iho, *Yun Ch'iho diary* (Seoul: Kuksa p'yŏnch'an wiwŏnhoe, 1973–1986): 18 February 1920.

12 Yŏ Unhyŏng, 'Ilbon chŏngch'aek ŭi chuyo insadul kwa ŭi hoedam: ch'ŏksik kukchang Koga Kennozo wa ŭi hoedam' [Discussions with influential members of the Japanese government: a discussion with Colonial Office Chief Kōga Renzō], in *Yŏ Unhyŭng Chŏnjip*, vol. 1 (Seoul: Tosŏ ch'ulp'an, 1991).

13 German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's advice to members of the Iwakura Mission regarding the difficulty small nations face in trying to preserve their sovereignty comes to mind. See Kenneth B. Pyle, *The Making of Modern Japan* (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1996), p. 98. The idea of Korea being a dagger pointing at the throat of Japan was also a warning from the West of Japan's vulnerability if it did not establish control over the Korean peninsula.

14 Nitobe Inazō is responsible for the characterization of the Korean people as a land in decay. In 1906 he penned an article titled 'A Decaying Nation' based on his visit to the Korean peninsula, where he wrote that he felt 'as though there were a slowly working fatal poison in the atmosphere'. Nitobe Inazō, 'A Decaying Nation', in Yanaihara Tadao (ed.), *Nitobe Inazō zenshū*, vol. 12, (Tokyo: Kyōbunkan, 1983–1987), pp. 324–326. Fukuzawa Yukiichi described the Koreans as a people that were 'paralyzed in all four limbs in that they had no ability for civilization'. See Fukuzawa Yukichi, 'Chōsen no mondai', [The Korean problem], *Fukuzawa zenshū*, vol. 8, ed. Jiji shinbōsha (Tokyo: Kokumin tosho, 1926), pp. 591–592.

15 *Tong'a ilbo*, 17 August 1920.

16 'Ulster in Ireland', *Tong'a ilbo*, 16 September 1924. This article had more to do with the Irish anti-English struggle than it did with Ulster.

17 'Welcome to the American Congressional Party', *Tong'a ilbo*, 24 August 1920.

18 For an account of the Japanese *moga* and *atarashii onna* see Barbara H. Sato, 'The *Moga* Sensation: Perceptions of the *Madan Gāru* in Japanese Intellectual Circles during the 1920s', *Gender and History*, vol. 5, no. 3 (Autumn 1993), pp. 363–381. Kyeong-Hee Choi offers an analysis of the 'new [Korean] woman' in Kyeong-Hee Choi, 'Neither Colonial nor National: The Making of the "New Woman" in Pak Wansŏ's "Mother's Stake I", in Michael Robinson and Gi-wook Shin (eds), *Colonial Modernity in Korea* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).

19 The use of the value of women's education to Korean society appeared on numerous occasions. On the issue of allowing women a 'Korean education' see 'Chosŏn yŏja kyoyuk ŭi kyŏlchŏm' [The weak point of Korean women's education], *Tong'a ilbo*, 21 September 1929. The image of the uplifting of women and the uplifting of the nation is also seen in an October 1926 article describing the importance of the annual all-Korea women's tennis tournament sponsored by the newspaper. Here it listed the preservation of Korea's overall national health, the preparation for the women's most important duty – motherhood – and the promotion of male–female equality as the value in holding the tournament. *Tong'a ilbo*, 3 October 1926.

20 *Tong'a ilbo*, 5 December 1924.

21 'Chosŏn t'ongch'i munch'e e tae han nonŭi' [A discussion regarding the problem of Korean administration], *Tong'a ilbo*, 12 May 1923.

22 *Tong'a ilbo*, 12 April 1920.

23 *Tong'a ilbo*, 26 April 1923.

24 'Saitō ŭi chŏngch'aek' [Saitō's policies], *Tong'a ilbo*, 21 August 1924. This article was erased by the Japanese publication police. It can be found in *Ilcheha Tong'a ilbo apsu sasŏljip* [A collection of confiscated editorials of the *Tong'a ilbo*] (Seoul: Tong'a ilbosagan, 1974), p. 83.

25 Yanaihara Tadao, 'Chōsen tōchi no hōshin' [A plan for Korean administration], *Chūō kōron* (June 1926), p. 46.

26 *Tong'a ilbo*, 18 June 1924.

27 *Tong'a ilbo*, 1 January 1929.

28 *Tong'a ilbo*, 17 May 1920. This article was erased by the Japanese publication police and can be found in *Ilcheha Tong'a ilbo apsu sasŏljip*, pp. 18–19.

29 See Yi Sukcha's concentrated studies of Korean textbooks regarding the use of Japanese historical figures and social customs, and the dearth of similar Korean examples. Yi Sukcha, *Kyōkasho ni okareta Chōsen to Nihon* [Korea and Japan in textbooks] (Tokyo: Horupu shuppan, 1985).

30 *Tong'a ilbo*, 18 September 1920; 20–22 September 1920.

31 *Tong'a ilbo*, 9 November 1926.

32 See, for example, the coverage of the trial of 47 Koreans in the *Tong'a ilbo*'s 14 September 1920 issue. For hunger strikes, see news of Kim Chi and Pak Hŏnyŏng in the 30 January 1925 and 24 September 1927 editions of the newspaper.

33 *Tong'a ilbo*, 10 April 1924. Chŏn taught at Michigan State University.

34 The literal translation of the Korean is 'one thousand *ri* of *manse* voices lining the streets of his native land'.

35 *Tong'a ilbo*, 7 December 1922. The An saga continued up to the middle of the decade. He was reported to have been murdered in the aftermath of the Kanto earthquake of 1923 only to be discovered alive a few weeks later.

36 In contrast, the *Maeil sinbo* showed a picture of An being welcomed by Governor General Saito Makoto following the pilot's return to Korea.

37 Kim Sangman (ed.), *Tong'a ilbosa*, pp. 151–152.

38 Michael E. Robinson provides figures for the numbers of seizures of the four major newspapers including the *Tong'a ilbo* and the *Maeil sinbo*. The *Chosŏn ilbo* endured a slightly higher number of seizures than the *Tong'a ilbo*. Robinson, 'Colonial Publication Policy', p. 327.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Evil Empire? Competing Constructions of Japanese Imperialism in Manchuria, 1928–1937

RANA MITTER

In the four decades between 1905 and 1945, the Japanese imperial presence in Northeast China, or Manchuria, was an unavoidable and integral part of the region's identity. (The term 'Manchuria', by which the provinces of Liaoning, Heilungkiang (Heilongjiang), and Kirin (Jilin) were known in the West, Japan and to many Chinese before 1949, is itself controversial.)[1] Yet interpretations of that presence vary sharply. For historians in the People's Republic of China, the occupation was, quite simply, an imperialist invasion. This view tends to be shared by writers on the Japanese left, whereas writers on the right try to portray the period instead as one where Japan made a noble effort to modernize a backward region under a chaotic and corrupt government. The majority of Western writing has tended toward the former view in those relatively rare cases where it deals at all with the occupation of Manchuria as a question of social, rather than diplomatic, history.

This chapter puts forward a more complex picture of the significance of the Japanese presence in the Northeast. It argues that during the period of informal empire, in particular between 1928 and 1931, several coexisting strains of thought competed for the attention of the Han Chinese population of the region, particularly the urban and rural civilian elites (local magistrates, leaders of chambers of commerce and so on). Chinese nationalism, which in retrospect has been seen as the dominant strain of thought in the period, certainly grew during this period but was also highly contested. In contrast to it there existed a discourse that portrayed the Japanese as an integral part of the region who were bringing

modernity at a time when native Chinese governments appeared incapable of doing so, strengthened by agencies of Japanese 'social imperialism' within the region, including the Japanese-owned, Chinese-language press. The conflict between these conflicting discourses meant that two utterly contrasting images of the Japanese empire were created in the region, actively competing with each other for adherents. The full-scale occupation of Manchuria in 1931 was clearly a watershed for the Japanese imperial project in the region. Yet, as this chapter will argue, the implicit collaboration by many local Chinese elites with the Japanese *before* 1931 meant that a version of the pre-1931 collaborative discourse continued to function long after the occupation. However, after 1931, the rival nationalist discourse on Japanese imperialism was no longer permitted in the region. Therefore the anti-imperialist construction of the Japanese empire in Manchuria was forced to continue its development among an exiled nationalist diaspora community mainly located in Peking (Beijing) and Shanghai, and that construction became more and more prominent between 1931 and 1937 *outside* the Northeast.

There was, throughout the 1920s and until 1931, a profound ambivalence among the Northeastern Chinese about the significance and value of the Japanese imperial presence in their region. Although the competing discourses on this question were forced to separate in Manchuria itself after 1931, the wider ambivalence of the Chinese (not just the Northeasterners) toward the Japanese empire continued until the eve of war in 1937, and perhaps even afterward.

THE JAPANESE IN MANCHURIA

It may be useful here to outline briefly the history of the Japanese interest in Northeast China. In the Meiji period, Japan turned to imperialism as a means of achieving *fukoku kyōhei* ('rich country, strong army'). As part of that drive, the idea that Northeast China, or Manchuria, was the 'lifeline' that would ensure Japanese security in the region began to emerge among imperialist politicians such as Gotō Shimpei and Konoe Atsumaro, particularly as Russia already had a large informal empire in the area, supplemented by its formal colony on the tip of the Liaotung (Liaodong) peninsula. The neighbouring territory of Korea was also already under Japanese influence, and large-scale migration of Koreans into Manchuria became a highly significant phenomenon during this period. The status of Koreans was interpreted flexibly by the Japanese; sometimes, they were considered racial inferiors, at others, citizens of the Japanese empire with

the extraterritorial and other privileges that went along with that citizenship.[2] Thus many of the disputes between Chinese and Japanese interests in Manchuria during the next decades were in fact, on the ground, disputes between Chinese and Koreans. The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw Japanese agents being sent into the region to encourage local militias and powerbrokers to oppose the Russian presence, and eventually, war broke out between Japan and Russia in 1904. The fighting took place in Manchuria, and was eventually ended at the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, which transferred Russian control in South Manchuria, along with the Liaotung peninsula, to Japan. Gotō Shimpei then took charge of the establishment of the South Manchurian Railway (SMR), a major commercial and social agency in the region which not only controlled railways, but acted as an alternative administration to the local Chinese government, providing health care, education and employment to Chinese as well as Japanese in the zone under its control. The reach of this ostensibly commercial enterprise shows that, in Y. Tak Matsusaka's words, 'Territory rather than trade lay at the heart of Japanese aspirations in Manchuria'.[3] In addition, a Kwantung (Guandong) Army garrison was stationed in the region, which numbered around 10,000 men at the time of the Manchurian Incident of 1931; by the same year, the Japanese civilian community in Manchuria had grown to over 233,000 people, with the Korean population now reckoned at around 629,000.[4] The increasing strategic importance of Korea, which had been formally annexed by Japan in 1910, meant that the Kwantung Army also had the assistance of the substantial forces of the Japanese garrison army in Korea.

The Chinese regional leader, Chang Tso-lin (Zhang Zuolin), had a complex relationship with the Japanese. The latter sponsored and supported Chang through much of his period in power, but eventually became frustrated with his unpredictability. This frustration led maverick Kwantung Army officers to assassinate Chang in 1928. In the preceding years, however, Chinese nationalism had begun to emerge as a powerful ideological movement throughout the country, including in the Northeast. The elder Chang's death paved the way for Chang Hsüeh-liang (Zhang Xueliang), his son, to take power and formally bind the Northeast to the new Kuomintang (Guomindang) government in Nanking under Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi). Again, the objects of Chinese nationalist anger were often Koreans rather than Japanese; for instance, in the summer of 1931, a dispute over land rights between Chinese and Korean farmers in the district of Wan-pao-shan (Wanbaoshan) heightened tensions between the two sides. This

incident was just one of many that fuelled fear that the younger Chang would seek to end Japanese influence in Manchuria. The increasing development of Chinese-run railway lines in the region also provided a flashpoint, as the Japanese feared that the SMR's interests were being fatally damaged.[5]

Soon after the Wan-pao-shan incident, two relatively junior Japanese officers, Ishiwara Kanji and Itagaki Seishirō, launched an attack on 18 September 1931 which led to the Kwantung Army's complete occupation of Manchuria by February 1932. In March 1932, a supposedly independent state named 'Manchukuo' was established, in practice under the control of Japanese 'advisers'. Meanwhile, Chiang and Chang protested to the League of Nations but refused to launch a military attack to retake the region. Manchuria remained under Japanese control until 1945.[6]

THE PROMOTION OF CHINESE NATIONALISM IN THE NORTHEAST

Chinese nationalist discourse, both in the 1920s and in the contemporary People's Republic, portrays the Japanese presence in Manchuria along certain fixed lines: that it was an alien intrusion into the region which was rejected by the majority of the population, with the exception of a few, anomalous 'collaborators' (*hanjian*), and that its most important aims were the destruction of Chinese nationalism and the inculcation of a 'slave mentality,' along with economic exploitation of the region and a quest for regional security. Thus, Wang Bingzhong dismisses the argument that Japanese investment modernized the region: 'The Japanese industrial base in the Northeast was made secure by the period of Fengxi warlord rule, and not by the "efforts" of the Japanese imperialist invaders'.[7] Wang Chengli states that the Japanese managed to persuade local elites to collaborate with them only because 'they used certain treacherous elements from the Fengxi clique'.[8] (The Fengxi, or Fengtien, faction was the Northeastern Chinese militarist group led by Chang Tso-lin which controlled much of North China in the 1920s.)

Research on other regions in the Japanese empire suggests a more complex relationship between Japanese imperialism and the Chinese. For instance, in their work examining the 1947 'February 28th Incident' in Taiwan, Lai Tse-han, Ramon Myers and Wei Wou give an assessment of the 50 years of Japanese colonial rule on Taiwan, and note that while the Taiwanese certainly welcomed

victory for the Chinese at the end of the Sino–Japanese War in 1945, they also respected the 'efficiency and integrety [*sic*] of Japan's civil and military personnel in Taiwan', not least as a potential model for China.[9] The 1989 volume *The Japanese Informal Empire in China* also provides a nuanced set of arguments for complexity in understanding the relationship between China and Japan.[10] (The present volume, of course, also aims to contribute to this understanding.)

A closer examination of Manchuria during the period of Japan's informal empire also suggests a more complex situation. To begin with, under the rule (1916–1928) of the leader of the Fengxi faction, Chang Tso-lin, *all* ideology was considered potentially suspect by Chang, and nationalism certainly fell into this category. In particular, the Kuomintang's association with Soviet communism throughout the 1920s led to persecution by Chang, who was fiercely anti-communist. (I will continue to use the term 'Kuomintang' to differentiate the Nationalist movement of Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek from 'nationalism' as a wider ideological phenomenon.) Chang's son, Chang Hsüeh-liang, was a very different sort of politician, who had become a convinced nationalist (if a rather fickle supporter of the Kuomintang) as a result of his military academy training; he even sponsored a Kuomintang newspaper, the *Dongsansheng minbao* (Three Eastern Provinces People's Newspaper), in the 1920s, at a time when Nationalist activists such as the college teacher Ch'ien Kung-lai (Qian Gonglai) were being detained by the elder Chang.[11]

The turning point for nationalist ideology in the Northeast came in 1928, when members of the Kwantung Army garrison assassinated Chang Tso-lin with a bomb on his personal train, angry at his refusal to toe the line of his Japanese sponsors. They had miscalculated, as Chang Hsüeh-liang's attitude toward the Japanese turned out to be even less favourable than his father's. In late 1928, the younger Chang aligned himself with Chiang Kai-shek's government, now based in Nanking, although it was no secret that he remained wary of Chiang and the KMT. This wariness is reflected not only in diplomatic reports of the time (the American Minister in China, Nelson Johnson, stated in 1930 that Chang 'distrusted General Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang as at present constituted, because he did not believe in the latter's policy of making the Government a party monopoly'), but also the Japanese-sponsored Chinese press aimed at the urban elite, as will be seen below.[12] Nonetheless, Chang made an open commitment to ideological nationalism in a way that his father had never done. Nationalism, in the context of the Northeast, perhaps inevitably

took Japanese imperialism as the touchstone against which it had to define itself. Anti-imperialism already had a wide following in China by the late 1920s, but the anti-British form of it, so visible during the May 30th Incident, for instance, needed to be adapted to the particular circumstances of the Northeast.

In this redefinition of nationalism, Chang was aided by a coterie of dedicated political activists. These young men, around ten to twenty in number, formed a core group who were responsible for much of the transmission of nationalist ideology in the Northeast between 1928 and 1931. They shared several things in common: they tended to be from poor rural backgrounds but had been sponsored by local elites to study in the nearest big city (usually Mukden, now known as Shenyang), and had there been highly influenced by the new strains of thought that had come into China during the late Qing and early Republic. Yen Pao-hang (Yan Baohang), one of these reformers, had grown up in Hai-ch'eng (Haicheng) county in Fengtien (Fengtian: later Liaoning) province, then qualified at the Mukden Normal College before setting up a school for local poor children under the auspices of the YMCA. In 1925, the YMCA, of which he had become the local secretary, sponsored him to study in Edinburgh, where he registered for a diploma in Social Studies. Tu Chung-yuan (Du Zhongyuan), who would in the mid-1930s become one of the best-known political writers in China because of his association with the prominent editor Tsou T'ao-fen (Zou Taofen), grew up in Kirin province, but also moved to Mukden at an early age. Early on, he decided to study in Japan to develop the technical skills he needed to set up a porcelain factory, and during his studies, he returned to China to lead anti-Japanese demonstrations. Other prominent members of the group included Ch'e Hsiang-ch'en (Che Xiangchen), Ch'en Hsien-chou (Chen Xianzhou), and Wang Hua-i (Wang Huayi).[13]

This group was largely responsible for the shaping and directing of a hostile, nationalist image of the Japanese imperial presence in the Northeast which would gain greater potency after 1931. Having such a group available was useful to Chang, as its members were prepared to undertake anti-Japanese activities far more openly than Chang could afford to do himself.[14] Although Chang had formally allied with the Nationalists, he had to maintain at least reasonable relations with the Japanese, who still had a formidable presence in the region. This constraint did not apply to Yen, Tu, and their associates. The most prominent vehicle for their activities was the Liaoning Nationalist Foreign Affairs Association (*Liaoningsheng guomin waijiao xiehui*), set up in 1929, and

accompanied in the same year by the establishment of a Liaoning Anti-Narcotics Committee (*Liaoningsheng judu lianhehui*).

One of the most prominent tropes with which the Chinese nationalists were able to associate the Japanese was the illicit sale of narcotics. Opium had, of course, been sold widely in China for decades, with the British being instrumental in the widening of the trade in the early nineteenth century.[15] The Japanese, however, had a more prominent role in the sale of narcotics in the Northeast, and Yen Pao-hang and his associates used the Anti-Narcotics Committee as a means of highlighting this role, as on 9 May 1929, when they organized a major anti-drugs day in Mukden, publicly burning opium purchased from Japanese sources. A third and related organization set up by Yen was the Liaoning Provincial Society for the Encouragement of Nationalist Knowledge (*Liaoningsheng guomin changshi cujinhui*), which spread nationalist propaganda in institutions including schools, colleges and prisons. Yen also widely distributed translations of the 'Tanaka Memorial,' the alleged statement of policy by Japanese prime minister Tanaka Giichi which declared an intention to take over all of China; the memorial has since been shown to be a forgery, but it had a great deal of currency in Chinese nationalist circles at the time.[16]

Technology was one of the key areas in which the Japanese attempted to project an image of modernity that was in contrast with a supposedly backward Chinese technical level (as will be seen below). Within Chang's leadership group, technology became one of the areas where the Chinese leadership attempted to beat the Japanese at their own game. The work of Ch'en Hsien-chou was important in this context.

Like Tu Chung-yuan, Ch'en's story showed the ambivalent relationship which so many young Chinese nationalists had with the Japanese. Ch'en shared the desire to regenerate China, and the Northeast in particular, so as to end the Japanese hold over it, yet he also recognized that Japan was the most obvious source of the ideas which might bring about that transformation. Like Yen Pao-hang, Ch'en graduated from normal college in Huan-jen (Huanren), where he studied Japanese, and made repeated attempts to study in Japan. On his third try, he was admitted to the Sendai Industrial College, where he studied electrical engineering from 1919 to 1924, while also becoming involved in overseas Chinese nationalist groups. On return to the Northeast, his first attempts to find a job were thwarted by the manager of the Northeast Wireless Inspectorate, Chang Hsuan (Zhang Xuan), who was under Japanese influence and disapproved of

Ch'en's involvement in anti-Japanese demonstrations. However, he was taken on by the Fengtien (Mukden) City administration, which commissioned him to establish the city's first tram line; he completed the project within a year, and at a cost of less than two million yuan (*xiandayang*). It was reported that Chang Tso-lin said approvingly of his achievement: 'That foreign-educated Chinese student, he's got a bit of Chinese backbone!'[17] By 1927, Ch'en had also set up a tram line in Harbin. His influence grew after Chang Hsüeh-liang acceded to power in 1928, when Ch'en was requested by Kao Chi-i (Gao Jiyi), the head of the Northeast Communications Committee, to refurbish the area's wireless network. Chang Hsuan was dismissed, and Ch'en organized a substantial expansion of the region's transmitter network. From the one transmitter which had previously been set up (in the Imperial Palace in Mukden), over twelve were established in cities including Ch'ang-ch'un (Changchun), Ying-k'ou (Yingkou), Tsitsihar (Qiqihaer) and Harbin, with the help of German engineers.

Ch'en's activities were part of a wider effort on the part of the Chang Hsüeh-liang regime to set up technical and commercial operations that would rival those of the Japanese, and provide an indigenous Chinese alternative to the Japanese-supplied versions. These activities took place as part of a wider effort by Chang to reform the structures of the Northeast. He gave it to be understood that he was trying to reduce the size of the massive Northeastern army (although with little success), and to stabilize the troubled local currency, improve the educational institutions and reform local government. How successful, though, were the efforts of Yen and the other nationalists? Unfortunately for them, they were hampered in part by the disparity between the rhetoric of reform and the reality. Chang Hsüeh-liang, in a statement to the Congress of the Kuomintang in 1930, declared that the Northeast was at that point in a transitional crisis. When he tried to cut numbers in the army, he found that dismissed soldiers found other occupations: 'many of the ringleaders of the bandits are former officers, though it's frowned upon to say this'. Reforming the Northeast's finances was difficult when 'there are more than 70 types of paper currency issued in the Northeast, and on the all-important railway loans, 'we will not be able to meet the payments'.[18] In short, Chang's report spells out the reality for taxpayers in the Northeast of the early 1930s: grandiose promises, and high taxes to pay for them, but few results.

As will be seen below, this perception of the Northeast as an area in crisis was also reflected back to the civilian elites through the Japanese-controlled

Chinese-language press. Chang's attempts at reform were caught in a trap. His avowed aim was to attack vested interests in the region which he felt were keeping the Northeast from successfully modernizing. Among these groups were local militarists opposed to Chang's rule, and one of these militarists, Yang Yü-t'ing (Yang Yuting), fell victim to an assassination engineered by Chang in January 1929.[19] However, the most powerful group which felt threatened by Chang's reforms was the Japanese. Various of Chang's actions were a direct threat to their interests, in particular the building of a new port at Hu-lu-tao (Huludao) which was intended to compete directly with the port of Dairen (Dalian) located within the fully colonized Kwantung Leased Area. However, while threatening these groups, Chang had not yet managed to secure loyalty among any other widespread or powerful groups in society. The civilian elites, who were taxed to pay for the reforms, had not yet seen many benefits accrue to them as a result of Chang's changes. They also saw that despite his avowed intention not to wage the kind of constant civil wars which his father Chang Tso-lin had started, he had managed not only to provoke a minor war with the USSR in autumn 1929 but also to take part in the Northern Plains civil war in 1930. However, officers in the Kwantung Army could see that Chang's reforms might, in time, succeed and gain him popularity. Therefore, they had to launch their coup while it was still feasible for them to argue that they were 'rescuing' the Manchurian Chinese from the exploitative rule of the Chang family.

THE JAPANESE CONSTRUCTION OF EMPIRE IN MANCHURIA

The centrality of the imperial project in Manchuria to Japanese identity has come under increasingly detailed scrutiny in recent scholarship; a notable example is Louise Young's *Japan's Total Empire*, which has explored the complex place that Manchuria had in Japanese self-construction during the Taishō and early Shōwa eras.[20] During the informal phase of imperialism, the South Manchurian Railway (SMR) was the agency through which the Japanese attempted to provide a benign face for their imperialism, and, as Joshua Fogel has noted, it 'had an immense sense of responsibility, of mission'.[21] Much more than a railway, the SMR was practically an alternative administration in the Northeast, controlling education, health and employment in the Kwantung Leased Territory and the zones around the railway itself. Ramon Myers has noted that the SMR administration was known by Chinese locals for not taking 'squeeze' (bribes), and for

providing 'well-equipped hospitals' in cities such as Mukden, Ch'ang-ch'un, and Dairen.[22] In addition, it deliberately structured its employment policies so as to take on Chinese locals, rather than replacing them with newer technology which did not need as many workers. By means of these policies, the Japanese imperial presence could provide concrete examples of benefits to local Chinese which would support the argument presented in the Chinese-language press which they also sponsored.[23] During this period, many Japanese leftists came to Manchuria to work for the SMR, feeling a sense of mission could be exercised there which was impossible at home. Of course, one cannot accept without question the assumption of many of these would-be reformers that the Manchukuo project could be portrayed as a liberating, anti-colonial force.[24] Nonetheless, the activities of the SMR had some significant effect in influencing Chinese elites.

The SMR's agenda can be seen in one of the most prominent agencies of the Japanese presence in pre-1931 Northeast, the Japanese-owned, Chinese-language press, aimed in particular at the Chinese civilian urban elites of the region. The worldview of 'liberal imperialism' took a particular attitude toward the Chinese and the Japanese presence in Manchuria, with the spread of articles suggesting a respect for Chinese past tradition combined with a despair and contempt for contemporary Chinese reality. The Chinese elements that are portrayed positively in the journal *Dongbei wenhua* (Northeastern Culture) are all aspects of the distant past, such as archaeological sites. In contrast, the Japanese are shown associated with modernity and newness, as providers of health care centres, bacteriology laboratories and shopping malls. Modern China is depicted solely as a combination of endless warlord battles and currency depreciations. Also specific to the Northeast was the desire of the Japanese to portray themselves as 'natives': in other words, not as imperialist colonizers but rather as recent immigrants adding a contribution to the region. In a region such as the Northeast, whose ethnic Manchu population had largely been supplanted since the late eighteenth century by internal migration from other parts of China, the concept of native-rootedness was far less established than elsewhere. Therefore, it was perhaps not a hopeless cause for the Japanese to try to portray themselves as merely the latest arrivals in an immigrant society, particularly in view of their substantial numbers in the cities. The privileges which they arrogated to themselves, such as extraterritoriality, led to difficulties in their creation of a narrative of Manchuria in which they situated themselves as 'natives'. Yet, as

Mariko Asano Tamanoi has argued, it is no longer sufficient simply to regard the Japanese presence in the region as one which saw static 'racial' identities interact with one another: as she notes, 'the relationship of identity to racial classification is not only spatially variable but also temporarily fluid'.[25] The changing interpretation of the Korean presence in Manchuria, as Barbara Brooks shows, is an example of that fluidity.

THE JAPANESE-CONTROLLED CHINESE PRESS IN MANCHURIA

The Japanese-controlled, Chinese-language press was used to create a space where Japanese empire was constructed as a 'native' part of the Northeastern region and, as part of that, to set the stage for the separation of 'Manchukuo'. Below, materials dating from the eve of the occupation of Manchuria are examined to show the agenda which was being set by this section of the press just before the great crisis.

The most important instrument of Japanese press influence in the region was the newspaper *Shengjing shibao* (Shengjing Times), the most popular Chinese-language newspaper in the region. In 1926, the pro-Kuomintang newspaper in the Northeast, the *Dongsansheng Minbao*, despite being the second most popular in the region, had only 8,000 readers, as compared to 30,000 for the top-placed *Shengjing shibao*.[26] The *Shengjing shibao* was Japanese-owned but its writers and distribution staff were mostly Chinese. Our understanding of why Chinese readers might choose such a paper is increased on examining it closely: *Shengjing shibao* was by no means a crude propaganda organ for the Japanese presence in the region but instead offered analysis that resonated with its readers' desire for stability while undermining Chang Hsüeh-liang's government and its association with continuing militarism. Naturally, readership of a newspaper does not equal agreement with its views, but it seems unlikely that the two were completely unconnected, particularly when, as in the Northeast, there was a choice of periodical.

The journal *Dongbei wenhua* (Northeastern culture) also illustrates the aims of Japanese social imperialism in the Northeast. It was the journal of the Sino–Japanese Cultural Association (Zhong-Ri wenhua xiehui), which was described in an editorial in the issue of 15 September 1930 in this way: 'This Cultural Association is an agency of cultural cooperation between the people of China and Japan. It was set up in 1921 to strive for the advancement of the goals of

culture in the Northeast and international coexistence. We have received the praise of personages both at home and abroad'.[27]

What, then, is the definition of 'Northeastern culture' which the journal seeks to put forward? The term 'culture' (*bunka*), originally a classical Chinese compound, had emerged with its meaning reconfigured as part of the Meiji reforms, and like much of the reformist language of that era, had been re-imported into China as *wenhua* by thinkers such as Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (Liang Qichao) concerned with the project of 'national salvation' for China.[28] For it to be used here showed an attempt to associate the journal with a form of progressive Chinese thought which might appeal to the sorts of groups (middle-class urban elites in particular) who had been disappointed by the failure of the 1911 Revolution to bring about real change, as well as portraying the Japanese as part of the progressive project.

In *Dongbei wenhua*, medical provision became part of the journal's progressive discourse. Modern medicine has frequently been at the forefront of the imperial project worldwide, allowing imperial powers to use the power of healing to support their rhetoric of a 'civilizing mission', often in a highly paternalistic way.[29] Medicine was, however, also one of the areas in which nationalistic Chinese had great admiration for the Japanese: famously, the writer Lu Hsün's (Lu Xun) first career choice was to go to Japan to study medicine. This is ironic, inasmuch as more traditional medicine remained more popular among many non-elite Chinese; the elite who espoused nationalism were also those most convinced by the transformative powers of Western medical technology. Nonetheless, there is also evidence that Western medicine provided by the Japanese did also have non-elite popularity. Sophia Lee has shown that, except in the immediate aftermath of particular acts of Japanese aggression against China, popular usage of the Dōjinkai hospitals set up by a Japanese philanthropic organization in China ran into tens of thousands during the 1920s and 1930s.[30]

Channels such as *Dongbei wenhua*, however, provided a way for the Japanese to propagate their own image of what they were doing for the Chinese inhabitants of the region. In an article on 'The SMR Hygiene Research Institute' on 1 August 1930, the author started by stating that this was the first of a series of articles about 'all sorts of enterprises undertaken by the SMR, so as to give evidence of the research done by people of this country'. This last phrase, a translation of *guoren* in Chinese (read *kokujin* in Japanese), has the implication of 'compatriots' as well as 'natives', and by using this word, the author was seeking to situate the

Japanese as part of a new 'Manchurian' identity. The introduction to the article talks about the health problems (such as plague and cholera) which had afflicted Manchuria, discusses the funding problems that the SMR had had which prevented them establishing the Research Institute until 1925, and then describes the building in Dairen, which is 'made of stone and is extremely attractive'. The bulk of the piece then discusses the various diseases which the institute works on, addressing its work on 'bacteriology, disease control, chemistry, hygiene, [and] seromanufacture'.[31]

Consumer culture was another area where *Dongbei wenhua* attempted to emphasize Japanese modernity in Manchuria, as in an article from 15 September 1930:

> In the centre of the city of Dairen … there is a three-storied iron-girdered, concrete large modern shopping area. This is Dairen's shopping complex, occupying 12,000 square metres … with more than 200 stores. … But the [businesses] are very different from an American complex. Recently [in the US], small underfunded stores have been oppressed by the economically powerful capitalist department store-style of management. … [However, in Dairen], using the combined strength of the controlling body, they planned that the small retailers' trade should be secure and prosperous … [and] each stockholder manages a store.[32]

Here it was not just Chinese backwardness but rapacious American capitalism from which the authors claim the Japanese imperial project distinguished itself. In general, the use of the Chinese-language, Japanese-sponsored press was part of the wider discourse of 'benevolent imperialism' which the Japanese nurtured in the Northeast after 1905.

THE UNDERMINING OF KUOMINTANG LEGITIMACY

The political agenda of *Shengjing shibao* and *Dongbei wenhua* was heavily tied to stimulating resentment against the Kuomintang leaders, meaning Chang Hsüeh-liang regionally, and Chiang Kai-shek nationally. One powerful way to do this was to break down the political legitimacy that the Nationalist leaders needed to consolidate their rule, and the most resonant accusation at the periodicals' disposal was that Chang and Chiang were merely a variation on the type of militarist leader who had ruled various parts of China over the decade and a

half before 1930. Most important, the significance of nationalist ideology as the differentiating factor between Chang Hsüeh-liang and his father, or Chiang and other would-be leaders, was denied or downplayed. Instead, the concerns of the alienated civilian elites were played up to the hilt. In an editorial in *Dongbei wenhua* on 1 November 1930, the author stated:

> When Chiang [Kai-shek] and Yen [Hsi-shan: Yan Xishan] split, each of them wished to win over Chang of Fengtien as their ally, to use him to gain publicity for their unworthy cause. But Chang turned them down, using the phrase, 'I do not wish to take part in a civil war … .' However, those in the know were aware early on that Chang was watching their flank like a tiger, and was not really unwilling to take part in a civil war. He 'nourished his spirit and stayed alert', desiring [to gain] the profits of someone who 'snatches the fish from the centre of the pond'.[33]

Another editorial, entitled 'the psychology of the key figures in this civil war', played on the fears of the civilian elites who had been disenfranchised and forced into unsuccessful wars by militarist rulers in the previous decade and a half. Chiang Kai-shek is dismissed as a warlord who constantly made alliances, only to break them in favour of new ones. 'When someone says that Chiang and Chang can collaborate from start to finish', asked one editorial, 'who can believe it?'[34]

Throughout, the effect was to paint the Chinese administration both in the Northeast and outside it as untrustworthy. The same effect is visible in editorials from *Shengjing shibao* during this period. One editorial entitled 'Can we hope for peace in the current situation?' analyses a lull in the 1930 civil war, when Chiang Kai-shek was under threat from the alliance of Yen Hsi-shan and Feng Yü-hsiang (Feng Yuxiang), and both sides hoped to draw in Chang Hsüeh-liang: the editorialist concluded, 'It is a long night, and a slow process, and we do not know when there will be the light of peace'.[35] The desire for peace is a recurring one, and editorials would use it to criticize the governing powers, as in the editorial 'The masses hope for peace':

> Only China has had a situation where there was a revolution to get rid of the people's distress, yet because of the revolution, the people's distress was deepened further. In seventeen years, we still have to say that the revolution is not yet completed. … The strength of the military is all-powerful, and they pay no attention to the terrible fate of the masses. … What people absolutely hope for is peace. But peace does not have a long-

> lasting nature. What is called peace is always temporary. … So what the masses hope for is a more developed peace. … Using the masses as its premise, it will give no pretexts to reactionaries. The government that the masses will trust is definitely not that of useless politicoes. … Recently, we hear, Chiang Kai-shek has become aware of this. On the battlefield, he has suggested to the KMT and the government that they should decide to hold a Fourth Congress, to resolve to establish a full or provisional constitution, and to convocate a National People's Conference. … But even if he does make peace, then it is still just a plan for a temporary cessation of hostilities, and the people's suffering will still be endless.[36]

The contrast between war-torn Chinese government and efficient, modern Japanese administration was clear enough here, and even Ch'en Hsien-chou's tramways and Chang Hsüeh-liang's sponsorship of the port at Hu-lu-tao were not necessarily enough to combat it. The two rival discourses, the Chinese nationalist one which regarded Japanese imperialism as a purely alien and invasive force, and the Japanese-sponsored one which portrayed Japanese imperialism as wholly beneficial to the Northeast, coexisted at the same time in the same region. Local elites could then choose between them as they saw fit in the 1920s.

It is also worth noting that the association of nationalism with another increasingly important player in the region, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), may have done its cause some harm. As Chong-sik Lee and Anthony Coogan have shown, it was not until after 1933 that the CCP began to find a foothold in the Northeast, and even then, it was a rather precarious one. Before that time, the CCP was associated with factionalism, and, more significantly for most inhabitants of the Northeast, violence and bandit-like behaviour: in the late 1920s, Chong-sik Lee notes, 'the so-called guerrilla activities directed by the Manchurian Committee [of the CCP] turned most of the population against the Communist party and drove a deep wedge between the Koreans and the Chinese'.[37] The knowledge that the Japanese were unambiguously anti-communist may have weighed in the minds of local elites deciding which side to support.

1931: THE DISCOURSES SPLIT

Chang Hsüeh-liang's three years in charge of the Northeast marked a turning point in the history not just of China but also of the Japanese empire. With the invasion and occupation of Manchuria on 18 September 1931 by the Kwantung

Army, Japan's informal empire in China took on a whole new formal dimension. Although the puppet state of 'Manchukuo' which was set up in 1932 was nominally independent, it was clear to all sides that the Japanese had the whip hand within it. And yet, examination of the reaction of local elites after the occupation shows that there was a great deal of readiness to cooperate with the new rulers.

In part, this readiness was due to the clear reluctance of the Chinese leaders, Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Hsüeh-liang, to launch a military occupation to retake the Northeast from the Japanese. This reality must have encouraged many local elites to weigh up their options and decide that it would be safer and easier to cooperate with the Japanese. But the Japanese social agencies such as the SMR and publications such as *Shengjing shibao* and *Dongbei wenhua* had also done a great deal to spread the idea among the urban civilian elites that Japanese rule would perhaps be more efficient and better-ordered than the often chaotic rule of the Changs, however well-intentioned Chang Hsüeh-liang's words might be.

However, 1931 marked a point where the two different discourses of the Japanese presence which had coexisted up to that point in the Northeast were forced onto separate paths; while the construction of Japanese imperialism as being beneficial to the region remained permissible, the nationalist, anti-imperialist version could now only exist openly in exile. Within Manchukuo, there were still a large number of elites at both the county and the local level who continued to make cooperation with the Japanese the keystone of their efforts to maintain their position. Thus Yü Ch'ung-han (Yu Chonghan), the former foreign minister under Chang Tso-lin, was brought out of retirement in 1931 to head a committee of local notables assigned to serve on a provisional government for the now supposedly 'independent' Manchuria. In an interview, he expressed high hopes for the new Japanese-dominated government of the Northeast, hoping that it would institute reforms which he felt Chang had failed to put in place: the government should 'smash the old warlord politics' and 'improve government using the will of the people as a basis'.[38] In fact, reports from local magistrates in the immediate aftermath of the crisis mostly speak about the restoration of local order, rather than reporting any wide resistance to the occupation. One example from many is in Liao-yuan (Liaoyuan), where a committee of Chinese local elites set up to restore public order reported on 5 October 1931 that as a result of their measures, 'The Japanese army and police have not yet advanced

into the county town even one step … and people's minds are at peace'.[39] In short, it appeared that the discourse of the Japanese as social imperialists who brought order with them was able to survive among many sectors of the population even after the 1931 invasion, because of the fear of an often ill-defined but potent mix of banditry, communism and warlordism against which the Japanese presence might be a guard. Where the Japanese used violence, of course, they were less able to maintain the positive image of themselves.

The Japanese occupation put an end to competing structures of authority in the Northeast. This meant that the nationalist discourse could no longer be heard in public there. Realizing the danger to themselves, Yen Pao-hang, Tu Chung-yuan and their associates quickly left the Northeast and reassembled in Peking, where they established an organization named the Northeast National Salvation Society (NNSS: *Dongbei minzhong kang-Ri jiuguohui*). The NNSS was largely responsible for creating a new nationalist discourse which spread through large sections of Chinese society *outside* Manchuria, particularly the elite, between 1931 and the outbreak of the Sino–Japanese War in 1937.[40] They had little success in propagating that nationalism inside occupied Manchuria, although they sent undercover agents into the region to try. Nor were the CCP any more successful in this endeavour; although their experience of creating a United Anti-Japanese Front was valuable in developing their later tactics of guerrilla warfare, they did not create mass resistance in the region itself, and CCP activists sent to the Northeast after the Japanese surrender in 1945 found the area distinctly under-politicized, from their point of view.[41]

The single most important Northeastern figure who helped to transform the image of Japan in nationalist discourse in China outside Manchuria was Tu Chung-yuan. As early as 1930, Tu had become involved with *Shenghuo zhoukan* (Life Weekly), Republican China's most successful popular periodical edited by the leftist journalist Tsou T'ao-fen, which at its height had a circulation of over 150,000.[42] After leaving the Northeast in 1931, Tu supplied stirring editorials for *Shenghuo zhoukan* which attacked the policy of nonresistance to the Japanese in Manchuria to which Chiang and Chang adhered. However, the NNSS was forced to dissolve in the summer of 1933, after Chiang signed the T'angku (Tanggu) Truce with the Japanese, which gave de facto recognition to the Japanese conquest of Manchukuo. Tsou T'ao-fen fled China, fearing that Chiang's secret police might try to assassinate him for his continued advocacy of anti-Japanese sentiment. In 1934, Tu Chung-yuan stepped into the breach, editing a new

periodical entitled *Xinsheng* (New Life) which swiftly emulated the high circulation of its predecessors.

Xinsheng exemplified the nationalist, anti-Japanese image of the post-1931 period. Before 1931, 'imperialism' in general had been the target of the nationalists, with the British playing as important a role as the Japanese in many cases.[43] Now it was the Japanese who became the most important targets, in large part because the Northeastern activists had created a propaganda image of resistance which focused attention on the Northeast. Tu's language about the Japanese was not gentle. Typical was the argument of one editorial from late 1934 entitled: 'How can there be goodwill between China and Japan?' Tu argued:

> There has recently been a call for 'Sino–Japanese goodwill' from mouthpieces for Japanese imperialism on several recent occasions. What does 'Sino–Japanese goodwill' mean? We can categorically state in one sentence: It is a plan by Japanese imperialists to destroy the Chinese masses' morale for resistance to Japan.[44]

As illustrations, Tu cited the invasion of Manchuria, the attack on Shanghai, and the occupation of Jehol (Rehe) to show how Japanese protestations of 'goodwill' were hardly convincing:

> The rapacious style of Japanese imperialist 'Sino–Japanese goodwill' is no different from hitting someone with your fist, kicking him, even taking his wife, snatching his property, and still … shamelessly saying to the person who has suffered this shame, 'We're good old intimate friends, like elder and younger brothers. Let's forget everything in the past and get back on good terms!'[45]

In conclusion, Tu asked: 'This man who's been beaten and kicked, and had his wife and property seized, if he could recognize clearly who was his friend and who his enemy, would he still be keen and willing to be friends with such violent villains?'[46] Tu's feelings are perhaps best summed up in a scabrous verse with which he began another editorial on the history of Japanese expansionism in the Northeast, in which he described the three things he feared most: 'I fear dogs, I fear bandits and I fear the little Japanese devils' (*pa gou, pa fei, pa [Riben] xiaogui*).[47]

The high circulation of the periodicals containing Tu's writings suggest that the image of the Japanese which he popularized penetrated widely, particularly

in urban circles. Yet even though Tu's work sold in such large quantities, reading between the lines, one can detect a more uneasy underlying current in the writer's mind. It appears that even as late as 1935, Tu was still concerned that the Chinese at all levels of society were refusing to recognize what he regarded as the irredeemably hostile nature of the Japanese threat. Although they read his pieces avidly, the Chinese urban audience whom Tu addressed also seemed prepared to give the Japanese the benefit of the doubt when faced with agencies of social imperialism. At the elite level, Sophia Lee has shown, Chinese students continued to take Japanese Boxer Scholarships, and at the non-elite level, Chinese workers used Japanese-funded Dōjinkai hospitals all the way up to 1937 and the outbreak of war.[48] Tu paid grudging tribute in another piece to the Japanese ability to take on board certain aspects of Chinese culture to make themselves appear sympathetic to the Chinese: 'These invaders now are really clever, in particular Japanese imperialism. They can take [ideas such as] 'respect for Confucius' and the 'Royal Way', and and other such ancient relics, and pander to the general masses in China who are backward-thinking'.[49] These words echo the strategy used by *Dongbei wenhua*, which followed exactly this line of portraying ancient Chinese culture as worthy of respect but modern Chinese politics as destructive, with the Japanese being reconfigured as an integral part of the newly developing sense of what it meant to be 'Chinese'.

CONCLUSION

The Japanese, like other imperialists in China and elsewhere, were never placed in simple opposition to the people whom they had colonized. Although resistance to the Japanese presence in the Northeast was an important and prominent part of the native Chinese reaction, it coexisted with accommodation and collaboration as well. The fluid way in which the Korean presence was understood by all parties in the region also shows the difficulty of establishing static categories to characterize the roles played by participants in the events of the early decades of the twentieth century. Certainly, Manchurian Chinese reactions to the Japanese were by no means monolithic. Those differing reactions were significant in defining how 'Chineseness' was understood by adherents of the two competing constructions of the Japanese empire (aggressive invader or benevolent modernizer) in Manchuria. The potency of *both* of these ultimately incompatible constructions after 1931 shows how influential they became. On the one hand, the

full-scale occupation of Manchuria set off a powerful resistance movement *outside* the Northeast whose effects are still visible in contemporary Chinese nationalism. On the other, the impression that had been created of the 'mission' of Japanese 'social imperialism' went some way to explain widespread collaboration by local elites in Manchukuo. The dominance of the former narrative in the postcolonial years since 1945 should not blind us to the power of the latter narrative in the 1920s and 1930s.

AUTHOR'S NOTE

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NOTES

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4 Figures on Japanese from Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998), p. 33; on Koreans, from Brooks, 'Peopling the Japanese Empire', p. 29.

5 See Matsusaka, *Making of Japanese Manchuria*, pp. 363–377.

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13 For biographical information on these activists, see Wang Lianjie (ed.), *Dongbei jiuwang qi jie* [Seven Northeastern national salvation heroes] (Shenyang: Baishan Chubanshe, 1992).

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CHAPTER EIGHT

The Japanese Threat and Stalin's Policies towards Outer Mongolia (1932–1939)

TSEDENDAMBYN BATBAYAR

In the first half of the twentieth century, the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) had a special place in world affairs as the Soviet Union's only satellite state. Following the Russian Revolution of 1917, the borders of Russia in Europe had receded, and the newly independent states in the Baltic region and Eastern Europe were for the most part suspicious of Soviet Russia and hostile towards its political intentions. Outer Mongolia, on the other hand, had escaped Chinese hegemony during the chaotic decade following the Chinese Revolution of 1911, and the Mongolian People's Republic, founded in 1924, depended for its survival not only on its own resources but also on the diplomatic backing of the Soviet Union. The international status of the MPR, however, was highly ambiguous. Few other countries recognized it as independent, and according to the Soviet–Chinese agreement of May 1924 the Soviet government recognized Outer Mongolia as an integral part of the Republic of China and promised to respect China's sovereignty there. The Soviets withdrew their troops from the MPR in January 1925, but it was clear that in practice the Soviet government as well as Comintern would tolerate no Chinese interference in Outer Mongolian affairs. By the end of the 1920s, the Soviets had successfully ousted the Chinese presence, including a sizeable trade, from Outer Mongolia and felt almost no threat from weak China. The MPR in turn became the Soviet Union's only reliable international ally. The intrusion of Japan into Manchuria in 1931, however, was the catalyst for a change in relations between Mongolia and the Soviet Union. Fearing that Japan's military and political strategies might



Map 4: The Mongolian borderlands

succeed in detaching Outer Mongolia from the Soviet sphere, Josef Stalin tightened Soviet control over the MPR, extending the Great Terror beyond the borders of the Soviet Union into Mongolia and seeking a thorough transformation of Mongolian society according to Soviet models.

Soviet–Japanese relations, officially established in 1925, were plagued from the start by a legacy of distrust left by the earlier Japanese intervention into Siberia. This distrust, however, turned into tense rivalry and deep suspicion following Japan's 1932 conquest of northern Manchuria, a region in which the Soviets considered that they had inherited the Tsarist Russian sphere of influence. The Japanese-inspired Manchukuo puppet regime had a border with Soviet Union about four thousand kilometres long in the east and north, and a border with the Mongolian People's Republic about 740 kilometres long in the west. During the eighteen months while the Kwantung Army extended its influence into northern and western Manchuria and Jehol province (March 1933), the Soviet Union took a position of 'strict neutrality'. This position was dictated not by any Soviet approval of Japanese actions, but rather by the Soviet Union's external isolation and internal situation, manifested in its relative military weakness in the Far East. While preparing to strengthen its economic and military position in the Far East under the second Five Year Plan starting in 1932, the Soviet Union sought to appease Japan by offering a non-aggression pact in December 1931. When the Japanese rejected this proposal after a delay of nearly a year, the Soviet side withdrew, selling their last asset in Manchuria, the Chinese Eastern Railway. The negotiations between the Soviet and Manchukuo representatives were frequently interrupted and not until March 1935 was the purchase agreement signed.

Just before the conclusion of this agreement, the focal point of Soviet–Japanese tension moved to the Manchukuo–MPR and Manchukuo–Soviet border. From January 1935, border clashes became frequent along the Manchukuo–MPR frontier. The three rounds of conferences, held in the railway station of Manchouli (Manjur) on the Soviet–Manchurian border, examined Manchukuo–Mongolia border issues, but they were broken off as a result of the Soviet–Mongolian mutual assistance protocol of 1936 and the 1936 Anti-Comintern Pact between Japan and Nazi Germany. In June 1937 Soviet and Japanese–Manchukuo troops came to the brink of war over islands in the Amur River, and in July 1938 the two sides engaged in bloody conflict at Khasan lake (Changkufeng). Finally, Soviet and Mongolian forces fought a full-scale war with the

armies of Japan and Manchukuo at Khalkhin-Gol (Nomonhan) from May 1939. The clash put Soviet and Japanese strategic units in conflict and involved modern warfare including the use of air power and tanks. In diplomatic terms, Khalkhin-Gol became a part of power play between three parties, the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany and Japan. By the end of August, the Soviet Union entered into a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany. Japan was not only defeated militarily by its arch enemy the Soviet Union but also humiliated diplomatically by its most trusted ally, Germany.

The Soviet–Japanese confrontation of the 1930s very significantly influenced Soviet policy toward the Mongolian People's Republic. For Stalin, who was concerned about the vulnerability of the Soviet Far Eastern and Baikal regions to Japanese attack, Mongolia became a very important geo-strategic buffer. He was also alarmed by the political implications of the Mongolian uprising of 1932. From the middle of 1932 the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union replaced the Comintern (Communist International) Secretariat as 'sole instructor' for the Mongolian leadership, and Stalin became personally involved in Mongolian affairs. Stalin attached great importance to the domestic stability and defence-preparedness of the MPR throughout the entire 1930s. He was the initiator of the Soviet–Mongolian mutual assistance protocol concluded in March 1936 and he sent Red Army troops to Mongolia in June 1936 for the first time. The outbreak of the Sino–Japanese war in July 1937 gave Stalin an excellent opportunity to send a large contingent of Soviet troops to Mongolia for the second time and to carry out a mass terror in Mongolia against those who were allegedly labelled as members of the 'Japanese spy network'. It was Stalin who set up a repressive regime of Kh. Choibalsan which mercilessly executed thousands of civilians and army men, and destroyed the Lamaist establishment.

Available documents suggest that Stalin suspected the worst of the Japanese military, especially the Kwantung Army in Manchuria. He saw Japanese border raids on the MPR as the prelude to a major attack on the Trans-Siberian Railway which would take Japanese forces through MPR territory. Aware of the geo-strategic importance of the MPR as an extension of Soviet Far East defence, Stalin decided to encircle the Japanese army in the Khalkhin-Gol region and to destroy them on territory claimed by the MPR. With military tensions rising in Europe, this strategy helped to ensure that the Soviet Union would not, for the moment, have to fight a war on two fronts, as well as enabling him to bring the MPR under firm Soviet control.

JAPAN IN MANCHURIA AND THE MONGOLIAN UPRISING

The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in September 1931, which soon brought Japanese troops of the Kwantung Army to the borders of the Mongolian People's Republic, aroused great alarm in Moscow. As early as 24 September 1931, L.M. Karakhan, Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, wrote to A.Ya. Okhtin, Soviet Polpred (ambassador) in Ulaanbaatar:

> Since the Japanese invaded Manchuria and are advancing along the Taonan road they could stage a probe of the Mongolian border in Barga. White guards could become active again and the arrival of ataman Semenov in Manchuria proves that perspective. It is important to attach importance [*sic*] to the eastern borders of the MPR and to organize liaison work and getting information from there.[1]

A Comintern delegation which visited Ulaanbaatar in 1932 warned the Mongolian leadership about the extreme threat emanating from Japan. As early as 1929, a Comintern representative was frank enough to declare:

> The territory of Mongolia is of great international significance. Although its population is no more than 800,000, its territory is bigger than Britain, Germany and France combined. Our main purpose is to maintain our dominant influence in that vast territory in order not to let Mongolia slip into the sphere of imperialists and enemies of the world revolution. That purpose is much more important than building socialism in a country of 800,000 cattle breeders.[2]

Comintern policy, however, had brought the country to the brink of civil war in the first half of 1932. The Comintern had advised the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP, also known as MAKhN) to undertake brutal attacks against nobles and high-ranking religious leaders with confiscation of their property, the mass collectivization of herders and the implementation of a Soviet trade monopoly. Discontent developed into a large-scale uprising including several thousand armed rebels and spreading across one fourth of the country. In response, the Soviet Politburo, the highest decision-making organ in the pre-war Soviet Union, quickly put in place a structure for imposing its influence in Mongolia. On 16 March 1932, it created a permanent 'Commission for Mongolia' which at first included Kliment Voroshilov, Soviet Commissar for Defence, as its chairman, and Lev Karakhan, Pavel Postyshev and Shalva Eliava as members.

The Commission was responsible for taking decisions on all important matters concerning the MPR. Meanwhile, Stalin and two other Comintern leaders sent an urgent letter to the MPRP leadership in May 1932 and recommended that they brutally suppress the rebellion as soon as possible. The Ulaanbaatar government then called in the regular army and during June and July it brutally suppressed the armed rebellion in western Mongolia.[3]

The armed uprising of 1932 proved that the Comintern had failed to implement its communist experiment in Mongolia. On Stalin's personal insistence, the Soviet Politburo sent Shalva Eliava,[4] who was also a deputy commissar for external trade, to Mongolia late in May 1932 with the task of assessing the actual situation and reporting back to the Politburo. On 10 June the Politburo instructed Eliava to make a wholesale change in the Mongolian leadership removing so-called 'leftists', asking them to admit that mistakes were made in internal policy and declaring an amnesty for those armed rebels who voluntarily surrendered their weapons.[5] Accordingly, in July 1932, the MPRP denounced its previous policy as a 'leftist deviation' and accepted socio-economic gradualism under the so-called 'New Turn' policy. In the same month, 46-year-old Anandyn Amar was appointed chairman of the State Baga Hural, the standing legislature, and 37-year-old Peljidiin Genden became prime minister in the Ulaanbaatar government. During 1933 and 1934 a rectification campaign conducted within the party saw 3,600 members expelled, while another 13,000 left the party voluntarily. The MPRP, which had a membership of about 40,000 in mid-1932, was reduced to almost half that size.[6] Eliava sent his report for the Politburo directly to Stalin on 29 August 1932. His 20-page report, which presented a highly critical assessment of the whole Soviet policy since 1921, was circulated to all members of Politburo. In his estimation, the armed uprising had been supported by the population of four major provinces (Arhangay, Hövsgöl, Övörhangay, and Dzavhan), which together accounted for 325,000 people, or 45 per cent of the population. The main slogan of the rebels had been 'Let's protect our religion' and this slogan had united lamas, herders and many MPRP members. Brutal attacks on monasteries and discrimination against lamas along with a severe shortage of basic goods had turned people against the local governments and state trade firms. Eliava described the economic situation of the country as extremely bad, pointing out the highly unbalanced state budget (the deficit for 1932 was 12 million tögrög), the ineffective work of Soviet and Mongolian state trade organizations, the very poor roads and transportation, and the huge shortage of basic goods (only half of real demand in 1932).[7]

Mainly on the basis of Eliava's recommendations, the Politburo issued an important resolution 'On Mongolia' on 1 November 1932. This 20-page document touched upon every practical aspect of the Mongolian economy, including the livestock sector, industry and transportation. Most of the document dealt with the restoration of domestic trade and the improvement of the working of Soviet trade organizations in Mongolia.[8] The Politburo attached great importance to improving Soviet–Mongolian trade relations. It recommended increasing the 1932 import of Soviet goods by providing an additional four million roubles in the form of commercial loans to Mongolia. The Soviet trade organization Sovmongtuvtorg was requested to stockpile enough Soviet goods in Mongolia itself to meet a minimum of nine months of Mongolian domestic demand.

In October 1933, the Politburo decided to send the Eliava delegation to Mongolia again. The delegation had two main tasks. First, it was to inspect how Soviet and Mongolian organizations were implementing the decisions of the Politburo concerning Mongolia, especially in such spheres as the import of Soviet goods, the establishment of reserves of essential goods, the improvement of roads and transportation, the use of river routes, the importance of the livestock economy, and the use of Mongolian national personnel in all branches of administrative and economic work. Second, it was to investigate the overall political situation in Mongolia including public opinion and public attitudes towards the government, the situation inside the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP, also known as MAKhN), the viewpoints of the Mongolian ruling elite and the influence of the 'New Turn' policy on relations between classes and various social groups.[9]

This closer Soviet scrutiny of MPR affairs had not yet translated into tight political control. When in May 1933 Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs Lev Karakhan wrote to the Soviet Polpred in Tokyo, Constantin Yurenev – stating that '[t]he Japanese must be made to understand that the Chinese Eastern Railway and questions tied to Manchuria, i.e., problems beyond the borders of our territory, are one thing; their claims concerning questions within the borders of the Soviet Union are another'[10] – he appears to have included Mongolia in the second category, rather than the first. Even in 1934, the same Karakhan, now retired from the post of Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, expressed a similar view. He was sent to Mongolia in July 1934 to get first-hand information on the situation there. In his speech in Ulaanbaatar, he praised the establishment of the MPR Red Army as a guarantee of security of Mongolian borders and stressed that this army was mastering the newest military weapons.[11]

By the middle of 1933, however, the Soviet Union had become increasingly fearful that Japan might be winning political support within the MPR. In mid-1933, Mongolia's Interior Police, under the direct guidance of Soviet instructors, accused the secretary of the MPRP, J. Lkhumbe, who had recently visited Dornod province (which bordered with Japanese-controlled Barga), of leading an alleged Japanese spy network in the three eastern provinces of Töv (Central), Hentiy and Dornod. On the basis of this accusation, altogether 317 innocent people were arrested and tortured during 1933–1934. Fifty-three of them were sentenced to death, 136 were sent to prison and 126 were sent into exile to Kolyma in the Soviet Union. Buriyats, who numbered no fewer than 215 out of the total 317, were the main victims.[12] Stalin's suspicion of the Buriyat emigré community in the eastern provinces of Mongolia, which numbered some 15,800 people, stemmed both from the fact that they had fled the 1917 October revolution and from the fact that many of them had relatives living in the Barga region of Manchuria which Japan had occupied in 1932.

In early October 1934, a Comintern delegation took part in Ninth Congress of the MPRP, with the task of examining how active Japanese were in Mongolia and how trustworthy the MPR leadership was. In their report of 29 October, they warned the Soviet and Comintern authorities that Japanese were indeed very active in Mongolia and cited the Lkhumbe case as evidence. Their main interest, however, focused on Genden, Mongolia's prime minister. Uncertain of his reliability, they advised bringing Genden under Soviet firm control. He was to be retained as leader for the time being but the delegation recommended that the Soviet Union seek out a figure of more reliable loyalty who could replace Genden if the need arose.[13]

The Ninth Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, held from 28 September to 5 October 1934, was the first after the 'New Turn' policy adopted in June–July 1932. The Congress restored to some degree the leadership role of the MPRP, which had been severely damaged by its direct intervention in government affairs between 1929 and 1932. In the same month, Prime Minister Genden was invited to Moscow where he and his delegation met both Stalin and Vyacheslav M. Molotov between 21 October and 2 December 1934. The highlight of the visit was a secret 'Gentlemen's Agreement' concluded on 27 November 1934. This agreement stipulated that 'there will be rendered mutual support by all methods to halt in advance the threat of military encroachments; moreover mutual support and aid will be rendered should there be an attack on

either the Mongolian People's Republic or the USSR from a third party'.[14] There was no doubt who was meant as a third party.

THE KHALKHIN-SÜME INCIDENT AND THE MANCHOULI CONFERENCE

On 23 March 1935 the Soviet Union reached an agreement with Japan on the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway, a constant source of tension between two countries since March 1932 when Manchukuo was created. The sale was a logical consequence of the Soviet policy of appeasing Japan through concessions. The aim of this policy, under the management of Commissar of Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov, was to deepen divisions within the ruling caste in Japan, by winning over the moderates and isolating the militarists through timely concessions, thereby lessening the likelihood of war.[15]

Already in January 1935, however, the tension had intensified along the Manchukuo–MPR border when a serious border clash occurred near the lake Buyr Nuur (Buyir Nuur). The Manchukuo government issued a statement on 8 January 1935, alleging that more than ten Outer Mongolian soldiers had entered Manchukuo territory and occupied Khalkhin-süme. Manchukuo troops then moved forward on the 24th to engage the Mongolian forces. In response, the Mongolian prime minister Genden issued a statement on 26 January that at about 1 p.m. on 24 January Mongolian border patrols had confronted about seventeen Manchukuo soldiers about two kilometres inside MPR territory. Genden reported that shots had been exchanged and affirmed that Khalkhin-süme had been part of MPR territory since 1921.

In fact, it was easy for a conflict of this kind to develop. As the Japanese historian Hata Ikuhiko has written, the borders ran through dense forests, mountains and deserts. In many sectors, moreover, there was uncertainty as to the detailed wording of the various treaties concluded between Tsarist Russia and the Qing (Manchu) dynasty. The Japanese General Staff and the Kwantung Army naturally interpreted boundaries to favour their own interests. Thus, in words of Hata, the seeds of dispute could be found in all directions.[16]

The Khalkhin-süme incident immediately drew the interest of Moscow. The subsequent exchange of letters between Manchukuo and the MPR authorities suggest that Moscow closely monitored these developments from the very beginning. The commander of the northern border garrison of Manchukuo,

within whose territory the disputed region fell, sent a letter on 1 February 1935 suggesting border negotiations between the two parties. A reply signed by the military commander of the MPR eastern border region suggested that the meeting be held at Ulan Ude (Verkhneudinsk) in Soviet territory, with the participation of a Soviet representative as observer.[17]

After a preliminary exchange of letters, the MPR delegation headed by G. Sambuu, Second Deputy War Minister, came to Manchouli railway station on the Manchukuo border on 30 May 1935. The Mongolian delegation, consisting of eight persons, also included G. Damba, commander of the second cavalry corps based in Bayantumen (now Choibalsan), and D. Dogsom, a senior official of the MPR government. The Manchukuo delegation, consisting of twelve persons, included North Hsingan provincial governor Ling Sheng as head of delegation, the northern border garrison commander Major-General Urjin, Manchukuo Foreign Office representative Shōichi Kanki, Manchukuo Military Office representative Lieutenant-Colonel Saitō Isamu and others.

One week before the MPR delegation arrival, a confidential telegram was sent from Kozlovskii, Far Eastern Department chief of the Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to Smirnov, Soviet consular chief based at Manchouli station. Kozlovskii wrote that Moscow attached great importance to the coming negotiations between the MPR and Manchukuo delegations:

> Japanese provocations in this border region have a definite goal of probing their Mongolian neighbours, and if possible, penetrating over the border and establishing some kind of contacts with those circles of the MPR whom they can rely on or in all instance to establish relations with the MPR government.[18]

Kozlovskii asked Smirnov to set up reliable communication facilities on the spot in order to be informed constantly not only of the pace of negotiations but also of any questions which might be raised during the process.

The first Manchouli conference started on 3 June 1935. The first preliminary meeting, at which the MPR delegation presented a seven point draft agenda, revealed that both parties had expected very different things of the conference. While the MPR delegation insisted that only the Khalkhin-süme incident be placed on the agenda, the Manchukuo delegation demanded the inclusion of the issue of establishing bilateral relations between the MPR and Manchukuo.[19] Finally, on 24 June 1935, the two delegations started to discuss the Khalkhin-süme

incident and exchanged written statements on the ownership of the territory. The Manchukuo side presented a statement, demanding that the MPR acknowledge responsibility for the incident and agree to pay compensation. In response, the MPR delegation presented its statement demanding a similar concession from Manchukuo. Each side based its claims on 'historical rights' to the place where the Khalkhin-süme (monastery of Khalkha) had been erected and both sides presented historical evidence to back these rights, including maps from the Manchu dynasty period. At issue in particular was whether Lake Buyr and the Khalkhin River constituted the traditional border between Khalkha and Barga in the steppes of the Buyr Nuur and Kölün Nuur (Dalai Nuur) region.

While the negotiations were still in progress, a further incident occurred in the Hailastyn-Gol area, between Nomonhan and the Khalkhin River, when a Kwantung Army surveying party, including military topographer Inukai, was captured by the MPR border forces. On 4 July 1935, Kanki visited Sambuu and handed a three-point ultimatum issued on behalf of Foreign Office of Manchukuo, demanding that the MPR government acknowledge responsibility for the incident, prosecute the guilty persons and accept a Manchukuo special representative office in the MPR in order to establish a permanent regime for regulating such border incidents if they continued to occur. A representative of the Kwantung Army met Sambuu on the same day and presented the same demands.[20]

This ultimatum brought an immediate response from the Soviet government through its Polpred in Tokyo, Konstantin K. Yurenev, who informed the Japanese government that the Soviets had 'close, friendly relations with the MPR' and had 'an interest in the inviolability of Mongolian territory', adding that they were 'greatly concerned about the provocative behavior of the Japanese–Manchukuo forces'. In reply, Foreign Minister Hirota Koki argued that the problem was one between Outer Mongolia and Manchukuo and, therefore, was the responsibility of neither Japan nor the Soviet Union. Hirota refused to accept the Soviet claim that it could assist the MPR in the issue.[21] The archive documents suggest that Japanese ultimatum made Moscow nervous and a Red Army unit with tanks and planes was sent in July 1935 to Mongolia.

On 13 July 1935, Sambuu met Kanki and handed him a letter signed by MPR Prime Minister Genden, containing his response to the Manchukuo ultimatum of 4 July. The letter expressed a willingness to set up a mixed commission to investigate and settle all border incidents, including the 23 June incident on the Hailastyn-Gol. However, Genden categorically rejected a Manchukuo permanent

representative office inside the MPR on the grounds that 'this unfounded demand is a direct violation of the sovereignty and independence of the MPR'.

The MPR delegation, in its report of 7 July to its government, wrote that Kanki and others had probably created the Hailastyn-Gol incident deliberately in order to force the Mongolians to discuss the establishment of official contacts between the two sides. They suggested, therefore, that it would be better to return to Ulaanbaatar after informing the Manchukuo delegation delicately that they needed to consult their own government.[22]

From this time until the closure of the first conference, the main dispute was over the number of permanent representatives, their respective authority and their location. Kanki proposed on 5 August that Manchukuo should send three representatives to the MPR, to be based in Ulaanbaatar, Bayantumen and Tamsagbulag, while the MPR would post its representatives to Changchun, Hailar and Manchouli. Sambuu replied on 13 August, repeating the MPR position that there should be only one permanent representative from each side with a limited authority to regulate border disputes. Before the departure of the MPR delegation on 26 August 1935, both sides agreed to resume the negotiations in the first half of September on the issue of setting up a mixed border commission.[23]

The Manchouli conference resumed in early October, and the two sides exchanged written proposals on 4 October 1935. The nine-point proposal of Manchukuo requested that three representatives from each side be posted in the principal towns of each country, including the capital cities. The six-point proposal of the MPR called for an exchange of just one representative from each side exclusively for settlement of border disputes and recommended that they be located in Tamsagbulag and Manchouli. The deadlock ensued from the very beginning because each side stubbornly defended its own position and refused to make concessions.

The Manchukuo delegation, especially Kanki, started to show impatience and threatened to break off the conference if the MPR delegation did not accept the Manchukuo offer. Kanki insisted on sending Manchukuo representatives to Ulaanbaatar as well as to two other places of the MPR on the grounds that this arrangement would facilitate settlement of those border incidents which could not be settled on the spot. On 9 October, when Kanki cancelled the meeting, Sambuu and other Mongolians visited Kanki in his apartment. Kanki again threatened to break off the conference if the MPR delegation continued to maintain its position.[24]

On 21 October 1935, Sambuu handed Kanki an MPR draft of an agreement for settling border disputes in the future. The MPR border representative would be posted in Manchouli and the Manchukuo representative in Tamsagbulag. With the cooperation of provincial authorities where he was posted, each representative would settle those disputes which occurred along his portion of border. Disputes which could not be settled by these two representatives on the spot would be handed over to a mixed border commission consisting of these two representatives. This proposal was not acceptable for Manchukuo, which wanted to open Ulaanbaatar for its representative at any rate. Because of this disagreement in principle, the second Manchouli conference ended abortively on 25 November 1935.

THE SOVIET–MONGOLIA PROTOCOL OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE

In the second half of 1935, while continuing to watch developments on the Manchukuo–MPR borders, the Soviet authorities also paid increasing attention to two other aspects of Japanese foreign policy. First, they were concerned by Japan's policy towards China as embodied in what were to become known as Hirota's 'three principles'. The third of these principles, namely Sino–Japanese military cooperation to combat the Bolshevik menace in East Asia, particularly from Outer Mongolia, alarmed the Soviets. Second, the growing closeness of Japan and Germany raised the spectre of a war on two fronts. Towards the end of 1935, a Soviet army intelligence officer deciphered the secret negotiations being held in Berlin between Oshima Hiroshi, the Japanese military attaché, and Joachim von Ribbentrop, the Nazi Party diplomatic expert. The Soviet side also depicted German–Japanese links as being one reason for the continued Japanese action on the Soviet Far Eastern borders.[25]

On 14 October 1935, two weeks after the start of the second Manchouli conference, Genden, the Mongolian prime minister, sent a letter addressed to Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov. This long letter, consisting of four parts, can be seen as the unofficial report by Genden to Stalin on what had been done since their last meeting in November 1934 in Moscow. The letter covered the issues of the Lamaist establishment, national culture and education, economic life, the external situation and the army.

All available documents suggest that the Soviet leadership's attitude toward Genden, who was prime minister and minister of foreign affairs from June 1932,

had changed dramatically by mid-1935. Some aspects of Genden's domestic policy, including his tolerant attitude toward the Lamaist church, his 'let's get rich' policy toward herders, and the placing of government authority over party authority, increasingly irritated the Soviet Polpred in Ulaanbaatar. In the face of mounting tensions along the MPR–Manchukuo border, the Soviets regarded Genden's handling of defence and army issues, especially his reluctance to increase army and defence spending, as a 'dangerous tendency'. Soviet Polpred Tairov raised with Moscow the issue of removing Genden from the Premier's post several times in 1935.

Stalin, however, was also greatly concerned about the continuing strength of Lamaism in the MPR. In the mid-1930s, some 800 monasteries existed with some 85,677 lamas, 11.7 per cent of the whole population. In his meeting with Genden and others on 15 November 1934, Stalin insistently raised the issue of Lamaist power: he feared that the lamas would not loyally defend the MPR against its enemies and therefore urged Genden to intensify the anti-religious campaign and eventually destroy organized religion in Mongolia. In a letter of 14 October 1935, Genden responded that dealing with Lamaism was a matter of the highest priority, and he described in detail what was being done in order to weaken its power. Genden reported to Stalin that most monasteries were taxed heavily, high ranking lamas were attacked fiercely, poor lamas were encouraged to become laymen, and so on. However, Genden was against the destruction of the Lamaist establishment by force; instead he advocated legal and economic measures which would eventually weaken the power of the church.

In his letter, Genden placed the second priority on defence issues. He reported that Japan was keen to establish political relations with the MPR and he warned that if it did not succeed in this Japan would create an incident which would give it an excuse to start a war against the MPR. Genden wrote the MPR was doing everything possible to avoid war with Japan, but that if it were drawn into war, he expected the USSR to seize the moment and deal a lesson to Japanese imperialism. He reported what was being done to strengthen the army and to increase defence spending. He argued, however, against a simple increase in the size of the army. Instead he recommended using the funds available to improve its weaponry.[26] Concerned with the aggressive behaviour of the Manchukuo delegation at the second Manchouli conference, the Soviet leadership invited a large delegation from the MPR, headed by Genden and including War Minister G. Demid and GVO[27] chief Ts. Namsrai. Genden and the others arrived in the

Soviet Union on 11 December 1935, and stayed for about one month until 9 January 1936. A week after their arrival, as if to test Soviet resolve, Japanese–Manchukuo forces burnt down an MPR frontier post at Bulan-Ders. The fighting on the Manchukuo–MPR border resumed in January 1936 and soon resulted in large-scale clashes toward the end of March 1936.

Stalin met Genden and other Mongolian leaders on 30 December 1935 and 7 January 1936. These meetings were a marked contrast to those of November 1934. A year earlier, Stalin had talked as a 'big brother' toward younger one, but this time Stalin was aggressive and very rude towards Genden. During his first meeting, Stalin accused Genden of not allocating enough for defence spending and of not doing anything against Lamaism. Stalin attacked Genden for spending only a quarter of the state budget on the army when, according to Stalin, he should spend at least a half of budget on defence. Stalin even warned Genden that if Genden thought that the USSR was cheating Mongolia and looking for its own gain then he could break with the Soviet Union and see what kind of treatment he received from Japan. On the second issue, Stalin maintained that the MPR government and institutionalized Lamaism could not coexist in Mongolia. One of them would prevail over the other. Stalin told the Mongolian leaders to choose either Lamaism or the national interest, and he advised the fiercest struggle against the lamas by imposing heavy taxes and by other methods.[28]

During his second meeting, Stalin quizzed Genden, Demid and others about the MPR leadership response to the increasing 'Japanese–Manchukuo provocations'. As negotiations revealed, the MPR leadership was not unanimous in assessing the Japanese threat or understanding how to defend the MPR. Premier Genden attached more importance to increasing the MPR's own defence capabilities and asked Stalin both to make available military-purpose loans and to send weapons and more Soviet army instructors. War Minister Demid on the other hand, was more in favour of concluding a mutual assistance protocol and bringing Red Army troops into the territory of the MPR. Stalin himself strongly favoured the idea of a mutual assistance protocol and sending Soviet troops to Mongolia. In fact he had raised the issue in his discussions with Genden one year earlier. This time (January 1936) Stalin strongly urged Genden to agree to have such a protocol and to ask for all forms of Soviet assistance, including Red Army troops. According to Stalin it was better to send Soviet troops now rather than to wait for a war. He offered to send two mechanized units with 3,000 soldiers to Mongolia and to station them near Tamsag in the east and Khaalgan in the south.[29]

When the MPR delegation returned to Ulaanbaatar, a joint meeting of the Presidium of the Baga Hural (standing legislature) and the government leaders was held on 25 January 1936. The meeting approved the report from Genden and Demid on their visit to Moscow and issued a Resolution requesting that Red Army troops, including two motorized units and one fighter squadron, immediately be admitted into the MPR. An official letter requesting the troops, signed by both Amar, then the Chairman of Baga Hural, and Genden, as prime minister, was sent to Kalinin and Molotov.[30]

On 12 March 1936, Amar and Genden, together with Soviet Polpred Tairov, signed the Soviet–MPR Protocol of Mutual Assistance at Ulaanbaatar. This protocol provided, in its first article, that 'in the case of the threat of an attack by a third country' the two governments 'should immediately confer regarding the situation and adopt all measures that may be necessary for the protection and safety of their territories'. The second article provided that the two governments were 'obliged in the case of a military attack against either party, to help one another with all means, including military assistance'.[31]

During 11–20 March, the MPRP Central Committee convened a meeting at which Kh. Choibalsan, who was First Deputy Premier at the time, sharply criticized Genden for his failure 'to increase defence might' and for his resistance to 'friendship with the USSR'. As was expected, the Baga Hural was convened shortly and dismissed Genden from his position as premier.[32] At the same time, it appointed Amar as prime minister and D. Dogsom, coincidentally one of the negotiators at the Manchouli conference, as chairman of the Baga Hural. However, Stalin's true protégé was Choibalsan, who was expected gradually to replace the 'stubborn' Genden as the top MPR leader.

Meanwhile, Japanese–Manchukuo troops continued their raids on the MPR frontier posts located in the disputed area. Four raids were registered for January, and a major one involving about 500 Manchukuo soldiers was reported on 12 February 1936. Amid the major reshuffle in the MPR leadership, Stalin decided to make his own firm voice heard that the USSR would defend MPR territory as its own. In his interview with Scripps-Howard on 1 March 1936, immediately after the putsch by young officers in Tokyo on 26 February 1936, Stalin bluntly stated that if Japan attacked Outer Mongolia the Soviet Government 'will have to assist the Mongolian People's Republic as they did in 1921'.[33]

Moscow decided to publish the full text of the protocol on 8 April 1936 in *Izvestiya* after a major border incident involving tanks and aircraft had taken

place in late March and early April in the vicinity of Tamsagbulag. Earlier, in late March, the Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs, B. Stomonyakov, summoned Ambassador Ōta Tamekichi to explain that the protocol had been signed. The same Stomonyakov wrote to K. Yurenev, Polpred in Tokyo, on 28 March that 'The Ulaanbaatar Protocol is a new link in a chain of resolute actions with which we are checking Japanese aggression against the MPR. Now Japan is certainly in no doubt that taking over Mongolia would lead to war with the Soviet Union'.[34]

The Soviet leadership was not confident that the Protocol and verbal statements would have an impact in 'war-like military circles' of Japan. In June 1936, motorized units of the Trans-Baikal military district entered the territory of the MPR and were stationed around Öndörhaan (Undurhaan) under the command of L. Vainer, chief Soviet military adviser to the MPR government. Moreover, the Soviet leadership doubled its military loan, enabling the MPR government to double its military spending for 1936. The number of Soviet military advisers sent to the MPR was increased from about 81 in 1935 to about 205 in 1936. Stalin also requested the new leadership of the MPR to increase its army to at least 17,000 men, a 30 per cent increase over the 1935 level.[35]

In short, after 1932, the Soviet leadership, especially Stalin, became increasingly preoccupied with the prospect of a Japanese attack on the Soviet Far East and the Mongolian People's Republic. After making major concessions on the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Soviet position was hardened on the issue of the MPR's territorial integrity. Stalin's view of Mongolia's geo-strategic importance was eventually formed during the period 1932–1936.

THE THIRD MANCHOULI CONFERENCE AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MPR

By autumn 1936 tensions on Manchukuo–MPR border had eased somewhat in comparison with the previous year. The third Manchouli conference opened on 15 October 1936 and closed on 20 December, and altogether about 20 meetings were convened. For the third conference both the MPR and Manchukuo sent new delegations. The Manchukuo delegation this time was headed by General Urjin, who replaced the former North Hsingan provincial governor Ling Sheng,[36] and its members included the current North Hsingan provincial governor Erkhembat (Erdenebat), Manchukuo Foreign Office Bureau chief Yano, and

Military Office representative Saito. The MPR delegation was headed by the First Deputy of the MPR Army, Commander L. Darizav, who actually arrived at the end of November to replace G. Sambuu,[37] and its members included the commissar of the Eastern military corps G. Lut-Ochir and the MPR attorney-general M. Yadamsuren.

At the third conference the MPR delegation handed to the Manchukuo delegation an MPR draft of an agreement to set up two mixed commissions. One commission was to investigate and regulate border incidents, while the other was to undertake a re-demarcation of the existing border between the MPR and Manchukuo. Nonetheless, despite more than two months of meetings both sides were deadlocked over the MPR draft. Finally, on 20 December 1936, the Manchukuo delegation suggested suspending discussions for the coming winter holidays.

The failure of the third Manchouli conference can be explained largely by the sharp deterioration of Soviet–Japanese relations after 25 November 1936, when the Anti-Comintern Pact between Japan and Germany was made public. Ever since the end of 1935, when Soviet intelligence intercepted the secret telegrams between Japanese General Staff and Oshima Hiroshi in Berlin, Moscow had closely monitored the pace of negotiations between Berlin and Tokyo.

On 16 November 1936 Soviet Polpred K. Yurenev queried Arita Hachirō about rumours concerning a Japanese–German agreement. On 28 November, three days after the announcement of the Anti-Comintern Pact, Litvinov, in his speech to the Eighth Soviet Congress, charged that the pact was an anti-Soviet move by fascist countries. He went on to charge that by virtue of this agreement Japan had lost its independence in the conduct of its foreign policy and that, although Japan desired to have friendly relations with the Soviet Union and wished to resolve certain pending issues, it would henceforth have to clear such agreements with Germany.

It has been argued that one of the main purposes of the Anti-Comintern Pact was to moderate Soviet activities in China and Outer Mongolia. In fact, however, it had an opposite effect on the MPR. The country not only remained closed to Japanese and Manchukuo representatives, but Soviet control was rendered complete with the installation of the repressive regime of Choibalsan, a protégé of Stalin. This process started in February 1936 and was completed by March 1939. In February 1936, a Mongolian secret police force, called the Ministry of the Interior, was created as a copy of the Soviet NKVD, with none other than

Choibalsan as its head. Between 1936 and 1939, Choibalsan became the Minister of War, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and finally, prime minister in March 1939. This rapid rise to power made him the undisputed leader of Mongolia and earned him the sobriquet 'Mongolia's Stalin'. Choibalsan was responsible, at Stalin's personal insistence, for a new campaign against Lamaism during 1937–1938 in which most of the 800 monasteries were ruined, and 16,000–17,000 high-ranking lamas were killed. In May 1937, Choibalsan reported to Nikolai I. Yezhov, Soviet Commissar for Internal Affairs:

> With the direct assistance of Soviet adviser Chopyak whom you sent to us and with the support of Soviet Polpred Tairov, I would urge the MPRP Central Committee and Government to adopt all necessary political and economic measures in order to decrease the number of lamas and to diminish their influence with the masses. … We implemented Comrade Stalin's advice by staging open court meetings five times, accusing high-ranking lamas of treason against the motherland, of spying and plotting to revolt.[38]

In late June 1937, while this campaign was under way, clashes broke out between Soviet and Manchukuo forces over control of two small islands in the Amur River on the northern section of Soviet–Manchukuo border. The Kwantung Army would have launched full-scale hostilities if the Japanese General Staff had not countermanded its decision to retake the islets. This order gave time for diplomatic negotiations in Moscow between Litvinov and Shigemitsu Mamoru to reach a compromise providing for the mutual withdrawal of troops. The incident showed clearly that Japanese and Soviet forces were poised on the brink of all-out conflict in the Far East.

Full-scale war broke out between Japan and China in July 1937. The KMT government of China immediately requested aid from the Soviet Union, and the Soviet leadership met to discuss the issue with the participation of Deputy Commissar B. Stomonyakov on 29 July 1937. Two days later Litvinov informed the Soviet Polpred in Nanking, Aleksandr Bobomolov, that the Politburo had decided against a bilateral pact of mutual assistance with China because such a pact would mean an immediate declaration of war on Japan. However, it had agreed to provide arms and to send military advisers on the firm proviso that the KMT first conclude a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union.[39] A non-aggression treaty between Moscow and Nanking was concluded on 21 August

1937. This agreement was a much heavier diplomatic blow to Japan than the Soviet–MPR Protocol of Mutual Assistance of March 1936.

By mid-August 1937 the MPR had become a major element in Soviet assistance to China. It is no coincidence that, on 13 August 1937, the Soviet leadership decided to send a large contingent of Red Army troops to the MPR even though there was no immediate threat from Japan. They produced a forged Japanese plan for an invasion of the MPR in order to convince the Mongolian leadership of the necessity of stationing Soviet troops there. Soviet Deputy Defence Minister Smirnov arrived with others on 24 August to monitor the arrival of the Soviet 17th Army with total strength of 30,000, to be stationed along the MPR's southeastern and southern borders.[40]

On 29 August 1937, Stalin sent an urgent telegram to Deputy Defence Minister Smirnov to explain to commanders of Red Army units why the Soviet government had sent them to Mongolia. Stalin emphasized that the Soviet–Mongolian mutual assistance pact and the presence of Soviet troops in Mongolia would guarantee the Soviet Union against a Japanese advance on Baikal through the MPR, against Japanese capture of the railway near Ulan Ude (Verkhneudinsk) and against an attack from the rear on the Soviet Far Eastern army. He argued that the stationing of Soviet troops in Mongolia did not mean occupation of the MPR but rather its protection from Japanese attack. Without Soviet troops in place, the Japanese would attack the weak Mongolian army and advance into the Baikal region. The defence of MPR borders was thus identical to the defence of the Soviet Far East and Baikal regions. He added that if Chinese troops were to turn up in the MPR then the Soviet army should disarm them in order not to give the Japanese any pretext to intervene.[41]

The Red Army entrance into the MPR was carefully planned and synchronized with the start of the mass terror launched by Choibalsan starting in September 1937. The terror continued up to the outbreak of full-scale war at Khalkhin-Gol. On 24 August 1937, Deputy Commissar of Internal Affairs M. Frinovskii joined Smirnov, with instructions to crack down on an alleged 'big plot of Japanese collaborators endangering the MPR'. Frinovskii brought from Moscow a list of 115 of the most important 'people's enemies' who were hidden in the MPR and waiting for a Japanese signal to revolt. They included MPR party and government leaders, army commanders and representatives of industry and trade. The mass arrests started on the night of 10 September. About 80 per cent of the army high command and almost the entire political leadership elected

by the Ninth Congress of the MPRP in 1934 became victims of the Great Terror in Mongolia.

The September terror was directed mostly against former Prime Minister Genden and War Minister Demid. Genden and others were arrested in Moscow in August 1937 and Genden was sentenced to death in November of the same year. Demid was invited to Moscow but he was poisoned en route at the Taiga railway station on 18 August 1937. Genden and others falsely confessed after torture that both Genden and Demid had been Japanese agents since 1932 and had created a broad espionage network which planned to break with the USSR and set up a Japanese puppet regime. From 1937 to 1939, altogether 56,000 innocent people (about 8 per cent of the MPR population at that time) were arrested all over the country as alleged participants in the 'Genden–Demid spy network'. On 2 October 1937, Choibalsan set up a special commission with extraordinary powers, which executed 20,039 people and jailed another 5,700.[42] The last major victim was Prime Minister Amar who was replaced by none other than Choibalsan. Amar was arrested in March 1939 by the Soviet 17th Army special department stationed at Ulaanbaatar and was sent to Moscow via Chita. After more than two years of interrogation and torture he was sentenced to death on 10 July 1941.

Plots, counterplots, trials and executions in Mongolia all too clearly echoed and mirrored the Great Terror of Stalin in the USSR. The English historian Charles Bawden rightfully concluded that 'the most likely explanation will be that in and after 1936 effective power in Mongolia was in the hands of the NKVD, and so ultimately of Stalin, for some years. … Mongolia's purges were being directed from outside the country, and were dictated by the course of events in, and the interests of, the USSR'.[43]

THE BATTLE OF KHALKHIN-GOL AND SOVIET DIPLOMACY TOWARD JAPAN

On 19 May 1939, Soviet Premier and Foreign Commissar Molotov summoned Japanese Ambassador Tōgō Shigenori and lodged a protest. He said:

> Recently, on May 11 and 12 as well as subsequently, the border of the Mongolian People's Republic was violated several times by Japanese-Manchurian units, which attacked Mongolian units in the region of Nomon-han-Burd-Obo, and also in the area of Dongur-Obo. There are

> killed and wounded among the troops of the Mongolian People's Republic. Japanese-Manchurian aircraft participated also in this thrust into the MPR. I must warn that there is a limit to patience, and I ask the Ambassador to convey to the Japanese government that there must be no repetition of such acts. … We will not tolerate this. One cannot tax the patience of the Mongolian government and believe that this will pass unpunished. My statement is in complete conformity with the provisions of the Pact of Mutual Assistance concluded between the USSR and the MPR.[44]

In this statement, Molotov, who had replaced Litvinov as Foreign Commissar in early May 1939, clearly reflected the mood of the Soviet leadership. Just ten months earlier a bloody conflict had broken out at Lake Khasan (Changkufeng) near Vladivostok. The Japanese seized two hilltops, and Stalin ordered his forces to bomb and wipe out the Japanese troops. After the three-day Soviet offensive, a cease-fire was arranged between Litvinov and Shigemitsu in Moscow. The success of the Soviet troops encouraged Stalin to believe that his armies would be able to teach Tokyo another lesson if an opportunity emerged.[45]

The Soviet leadership had also another reason to be harsh with the Japanese. The Munich conference of September 1938 and the seizure of Czechoslovakia by Nazi Germany in March 1939 convinced Stalin that all previous Soviet efforts to build 'collective security' in Europe were now falling apart and that it was time to reverse Soviet diplomacy completely. He now sought to negotiate with Berlin in order to postpone the coming war with Nazi Germany. Litvinov, who was known abroad as pro-British, was removed for this reason and replaced by Molotov as Foreign Minister. Stalin, aware of ongoing negotiations between Nazi Germany and Japan, was eager to seize a moment to teach Japan his own lesson.

Meanwhile, the border dispute at Khalkhin-Gol escalated. In mid-May the MPR cavalry division, together with a special unit from the 57th Special Corps of the Red Army stationed in the MPR, rushed from Tamsagbulag to Khalkhin-Gol and moved to the eastern bank of the river.[46] The Japanese tried an offensive on 28 May to push the MPR–Soviet troops from the east bank. However, the cavalry regiment of Azuma Yaozū was destroyed, and Yamagata Takemitsu's detachment was driven back. The MPR–Soviet forces claimed the loss of 130 soldiers, and estimated the Japanese losses at about 280.[47]

Moscow reacted immediately. What was the Soviet thinking on the Japanese assault in the Khalkhin-Gol region? As Soviet diplomat and historian L. N. Kutakov wrote later:

> The Japanese military calculated that the conquest of the MPR, which did not have a large army, would bring Japanese forces close to the Soviet border below Chita and put them within easy striking distance of the Trans-Siberian Railway, the Soviet Union's most vital artery of communication; at the same time it would enhance Japanese prestige and expedite the conclusion of a military alliance with Germany and Italy. … They were not worried by the possibility that the USSR might actively side with the MPR, confident that the Japanese army could successfully cope with the Soviet forces in the Trans-Baikal region.[48]

On 31 May, speaking at the Supreme Soviet, Molotov declared that the Soviet Union, in compliance with the Protocol of Mutual Assistance, would defend the borders of the Mongolian People's Republic as resolutely as if they were her own.

> It is time to understand that the Japanese allegations that the government of the Mongolian People's Republic is guilty of aggression against Japan are ridiculous and absurd. It is time to understand likewise that there is a limit to patience. It would be better, therefore, to discontinue in time the continuously repeating provocative violations of the border of the USSR and the MPR by Japanese-Manchurian military units.[49]

Divisional Commander Georgii Zhukov, who was chosen by Stalin as the right military person to teach Japan a military lesson, flew from Moscow via Chita to Tamsagbulag by 5 June 1939. As commander of the 57th Special Soviet Corps, Zhukov ordered all its units stationed in Ulaanbaatar and other areas to proceed to the Khalkhin-Gol region. Zhukov reported to Moscow that his strategy was to hold a position on the right bank of Khalkhin-Gol and to prepare gradually for a decisive counter-attack to drive the Japanese out of the disputed territory. The MPR prime minister Choibalsan came to Khalkhin-Gol on 21 June to meet Mongolian cavalry troops.[50]

Meanwhile, the Kwantung Army staff made plans to destroy the Soviet forces at one stroke. By the end of June, it had concentrated some 15,000 men including thirteen infantry battalions, 120 anti-tank guns, around 70 tanks, 400 vehicles and 180 planes at Khalkhin-Gol.[51] In early July, the main battle was fought at Bayantsagaan at the Mongolian side of the Khalkhin River. The main Japanese infantry force crossed the river on the night of 2 July and next day was attacked by about 200 Soviet tanks. Zhukov later remembered that it was his decision to send the tanks to attack the Japanese without infantry support. The Soviet tank

regiment lost more than half of its tanks. However, in Zhukov's opinion, this move forced the Japanese to pull back across the river.[52] On 30 June, the eve of the Japanese crossing of the Khalkhin River, Molotov cabled Surits, the Soviet Polpred in Paris, explaining the significance of the fighting on the Far Eastern frontier:

> The provocative activities of the Japanese and Manchurians in Mongolia are, according to our information, an attempt to display Japan's military power that was carried out at the insistence of Germany and Italy. The aim of these actions by Japan was to hinder the conclusion of an Anglo–Franco–Soviet agreement, to scare away England and France from this agreement. The evident failure that has befallen the Japanese in this enterprise cannot but have a significance contrary to the aims of the Germans and Italians.[53]

By the order of Soviet Defence Commissar Voroshilov on 19 July, the 57th Special Corps was reorganized into the 1st Army Group under the command of Divisional (after 31 July, Corps) Commander Georgii Zhukov. Zhukov's strategy was now to prepare a Soviet general offensive in order to encircle the Japanese forces on the Manchukuo side of the Khalkhin River and destroy them within the boundary officially claimed by the MPR side. At his request, a massive Soviet force including 57,000 men, 498 tanks, 385 armoured cars, 542 artillery pieces, and 515 fighter planes was concentrated in the area by mid August. In this way, he achieved the superiority in tanks and armoured cars he needed to encircle the Japanese.

On the Japanese side, the Kwantung Army judged that the fighting at Nomonhan (Khalkhin-Gol) had already passed the peak of its intensity and would now settle down into a struggle of endurance. About this time the Army General Staff intelligence division and the Kwantung Army intelligence section obtained information to the effect that the Soviet–Mongolian forces would go over to the offensive around the middle of August. But they seriously underestimated the scale of the Soviet's planned offensive. The General Staff intelligence division judged that 'if it were simply a question of thwarting an enemy offensive, present strength would suffice', and the operations division concurred.[54]

Much to the credit of Zhukov, the Soviet general offensive started on 20 August was successful. The encirclement of Japanese forces was completed on 24 August and the last Japanese resistance was defeated by 31 August. The Japanese suffered

heavy losses, with between 18,000 and 20,000 dead and wounded. The Red Army claimed its losses as 9000–10,000, the Mongolian army as 1,130.[55] The Kwantung Army asked for more troops to strike back at the Soviet forces but the Tokyo government, shaken by Germany's non-aggression pact with the USSR, intervened to halt further operations by Imperial edict, and dismissed the entire high command of the Kwantung Army. The day before the Nazi–Soviet pact was signed (23 August 1939) Deputy Foreign Commissar Semen Lozovskii met Tōgō Shigenori, the Japanese ambassador, and expressed his wish for the normalization of relations. If Japan had a concrete proposal in mind, then the USSR was willing to study it. On 4 September Tōgō finally received a telegram from Tokyo instructing him to 'Break the ice and start negotiations to achieve an overall adjustment of diplomatic relations. Parallel with this, try to settle the Nomonhan (Khalkhin-Gol) incident quickly.' After talks between Tōgō and Molotov from 9 to 15 September the two sides came to terms on an armistice.[56]

It took another nineteen months until an overall adjustment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Japan was achieved in April 1941, when the USSR and Japan signed a neutrality treaty. In the meantime, a number of meetings, including one in Chita from 7 December to 25 December, and another in Harbin from 7 January to 30 January 1940, were held on the re-demarcation of the frontier between the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchukuo. Finally, in June 1940, Molotov and Tōgō signed in Moscow a breakthrough agreement on the delineation of the disputed MPR–Manchukuo frontier.[57] When the re-demarcation task was completed by October 1941, the MPR side had secured the controversial main boundary line east of the Khalkhin River while the Manchukuo side gained face-saving but minor adjustments of the border in the Khandgai district southwest of Nomonhan.

CONCLUSION

In the 1930s, Japan became Mongolia's neighbour through its client state Manchukuo. Suddenly, Japan was knocking at Mongolia's door, using both pan-Mongol propaganda and military pressure. The Soviet Union, the MPR's only ally, perceived these attempts by Japan as a direct threat to the Soviet Far East and Siberia, and it promptly concluded a mutual assistance protocol with Mongolia that allowed Soviet troops to be stationed on Mongolian soil. Negotiations between Manchukuo and Mongolia to resolve peacefully several border disputes

ended in failure, largely due to Japanese and Soviet unwillingness to see these disputes settled.

Japan's aggressive posture in the 1930s was used as a pretext by the Soviet NKVD and the Mongolian Ministry of Interior to conduct mass purges among civil servants, army officers and the Buddhist clergy. Concerned with Soviet Far East's vulnerability, the Soviet Union was determined to protect the borders of the MPR as if they were its own. Tensions with Japan reached the breaking point in 1939 when a four-month-long battle broke out along the Khalkhin-Gol (Nomonhan), a river on Mongolia's eastern border, in which Japan was soundly defeated.

In August 1945, in the waning months of the Second World War, Mongolia declared war on Japan, and joined Soviet forces in their attack on Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. This state of war between Mongolia and Japan was technically not ended until February 1972, when the two countries agreed to establish diplomatic relations. A new active period in bilateral relations came at the end of the 1980s when Japan began playing its present leading role in assisting Mongolia in its transition towards democracy and a market economy.

AUTHOR'S NOTE

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NOTES

1 *Mongol–Zovloltiin Khariltsaa* [Mongol–Soviet relations: 1921–1940], vol. 1 (Ulaanbaatar: State Publishing House, 1976), p. 308.

2 *Komintern ba Mongol* [Comintern and Mongolia: archive documents] (Ulaanbaatar, 1996), p. 284.

3 There is some inconclusive evidence that Soviet troops took part in suppressing the rebellion in Mongolia. Soviet airforce Marshal V.A Sudets, who was an instructor for the Mongolian army at that time, recalled later that the Soviet airforce was used in some attacks against monasteries.

4 Shalva Eliava (1883–1937) was a member of the CPSU from 1904, candidate member of Central Committee from 1927. Between 1923 and 1931 he worked as the chairman of the Georgian government and later in the Caucasian Socialist Republic government. Eliava was transferred to Moscow in 1931 as deputy commissar of the People's Commissariat for External Trade. At that point he became a member of the Politburo Commission of Mongolia and was actively involved in Mongolian affairs until his arrest in 1937.

5 Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD), fond 89, perechen' 63, dok. 1,2. This title is a collection of microfilmed documents prepared in the series 'Archives of the Soviet Communist Party and State; Catalogue of Finding Aids and Documents, First Edition', published jointly by the State Archival Service of Russia (Rosarkhiv) and the Hoover Institution on War, Peace, and Revolution. It is distributed by Chadwick-Healey.

6 *MAKhN-iin tuukhen zamnal* [Historic path of the MPRP] (Ulaanbaatar: Mana Publisher, 1995), pp. 64–67.

7 TsKhSD, fond 89, perechen' 63, dok. 3.

8 TsKhSD, fond 89, perechen' 63, dok. 6.

9 TsKhSD, fond 89, perechen' 63, dok. 9.

10 Dokumenty Vneshnei Politiki SSSR, t. 16, dok. 152.

11 *Izvestiya*, 21 July 1934.

12 Ts. Batbayar, *Modern Mongolia: a Concise History* (Ulaanbaatar: Publisher for Science, Technology and Information Corporation, 1996), pp. 49–50.

13 Comintern and Mongolia, Archive Documents, Ulaanbaatar, 1996, pp. 410–415.

14 Mongol–Soviet relations, vol. 1, Ulaanbaatar, 1976, p. 362.

15 Jonathan Haslam, *The Soviet Union and the Threat from the East, 1933–1941* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1992), pp. 38–43.

16 Hata Ikuhiko, 'Japanese–Soviet Confrontation, 1935–1939', in J.W. Morley (ed.), *Deterrent Diplomacy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 133.

17 Manchouli Conference materials, archive of the Mongolian Army, Ulaanbaatar.

18 Manchouli Conference materials, archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ulaanbaatar.

19 Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ulaanbaatar.

20 *Ibid*.

21 Dokumenty Vneshnei Politiki SSSR, t. 18, dok. 308 and 311.

22 Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ulaanbaatar.

23 *Ibid*.

24 According to Mongolian Army Archive documents, at mid October, 1935 (6 or 16 October) Kanki met the MPR delegates Dogsom and Damba and made threatening statements such as 'if you don't accept our proposal, we will not consider you as an independent country and we will use force and reach your capital. Everything will depend on the outcome of this conference.' A threat of this kind was plausible, because in mid 1930s the Kwantung Army had about 60,000 troops, whereas the MPR army had only about 12,000.

25 Brian Bridges, 'Mongolia in Soviet–Japanese Relations, 1933–36', *International Studies*, vol. 2, 1982, pp. 22–23.

26 TsKhSD, fond 89, perechen' 63, dok. 16.

27 GVO is the Russian abbreviation of the State Internal Defence. It was set up in 1924 to fight against the enemies of the revolution, and was also in charge of frontier defence. The GVO was reorganized into the Ministry of Interior in 1936 as a copy of the Soviet NKVD.

28 TsKhSD, fond 89, perechen' 63, dok. 17.

29 TsKhSD, fond 89, perechen' 63, dok. 18.

30 TsKhSD, fond 89, perechen' 63, dok. 20.

31 Dokumenty Vneshnei Politiki SSSR, t. 19, dok. 65.

32 The Politburo of the CPSU decided at its meeting of 19 March 1936 to instruct Ulaanbaatar to explain the removal of Genden from his post as prime minister as being for 'health reasons' and not to publicize Genden's 'wrong viewpoints on Soviet–Mongolian relations', in order not to give the Japanese media any grounds for celebration. The Politburo also decided to leave Genden as a member of the MPRP Central Committee and to recommend him for the post of the MPR Polpred in Moscow. However, when Genden came to Moscow he refused to take the post. The Politburo then decided to send him and his family to Crimea for medical treatment. Genden stayed there until August 1937, when he was called to Moscow and executed as one of leaders of the 'Japanese spy network'.

33 *Izvestiya*, 5 March 1936.

34 Dokumenty Vneshnei Politiki SSSR, t. 19, dok. 106.

35 See the Mongolian language summary of the dissertation of D. Gombosuren, 'History of Mongolian Armed Forces: 1925–1955' (Ulaanbaatar, 1994).

36 Ling Sheng and his son were reportedly shot by Manchukuo authorities in April 1936 after allegations that they were plotting to join the MPR. The MPRP newspaper *Unen* reported this news on 10 April 1936.

37 Both G. Sambuu and L. Darizav were arrested in September 1937 as members of 'Genden-Demid spy organization' and were accused of using the Manchouli con-

ference as a channel to contact Japanese Army intelligence. According to Mongolian Archive documents, the Manchouli conference resumed briefly in the last days of May 1937 and it met again during August–September 1937.

38 L. Bat-Ochir, *Choibalsan* (Ulaanbaatar, 1996), pp. 116, 129–130.

39 DVP SSSR, t. 20, dok. 274.

40 Batbayar, *Modern Mongolia*, p. 54. By the directive of the Soviet Commissar of Defence on 4 September 1937, all Soviet troops stationed in the MPR were reorganized into the 57th Special Corps which was placed under command of Division Commander I. Konev. It included about 30,000 men, 265 tanks and more than 100 planes.

41 TsKhSD, Fond 89, perechen' 63, dok. 27.

42 Batbayar, *Modern Mongolia*, p. 52.

43 C. R. Bawden, *The Modern History of Mongolia* (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 331.

44 Cited by L.N. Kutakov, *Japanese Foreign Policy on the Eve of the Pacific War* (Tallahassee, Florida: The Diplomatic Press, 1972), pp. 148–149.

45 The Soviet Government took the same firm stand on fisheries negotiations in late 1938 and early 1939, refusing a new convention. It informed Tokyo of its intention to withdraw forty fishing grounds from Japanese exploitation for strategic reasons.

46 Before the Khalkhin-Gol conflict, the Mongolian army consisted of 17,500 regular army and about 6,000 border troops. The regular army consisted of six cavalry divisions each with 1,750 soldiers. The Mongolian 6th cavalry division and Soviet detachment of Bykov (about 1,200 soldiers) participated the battle for Khalkhin-Gol in late May. The Japanese force included Colonel Yamagata's detachment of about 1,000 men and Azuma's cavalry regiment.

47 For an exhaustive account of the May battles, see Alvin Coox, *Nomonhan: Japan against Russia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), vol. 1, pp. 200–250.

48 Kutakov, *Japanese Foreign Policy*, p. 146.

49 Cited by Kutakov, *Japanese Foreign Policy*, p. 149.

50 According to Mongolian military historian Gombosuren, about half of Mongolia's army command was purged by Choibalsan and his Soviet advisers during 1937–1938; 645 commanders were purged in 1938 and another 391 in the first half of 1939. Even after the outbreak of the Khalkhin-Gol battle, purges continued which included Luvsandonoi, deputy commander of the Mongolian army.

51 For the Japanese attack in July and conflict between Tokyo and the Kwantung Army concerning the escalation of the battle, see Hata, 'Japanese–Soviet Confrontation, 1935–1939', pp. 163–167.

52 Soviet data indicate that at that time Soviet forces consisted of 12,541 men, 139 heavy machine guns, 86 light guns, 23 anti-tank guns, 186 tanks and 266 armoured cars. They had less infantry than the Japanese but they had two and a half times more tanks. This factor played a decisive role in the battle at Bayantsagaan.

53 *God Krizisa: 1938–1939* [The Year of Crisis], vol. 2, Moscow, 1990, dok. 452.

54 Hata, 'Japanese–Soviet Confrontation, 1935–1939', p. 169.

55 In September 1939, reflecting on the death of 20,000 Japanese soldiers at the hands of Zhukov's troops, Stalin bluntly remarked: 'That is the only language these Asiatics understand. After all, I am an Asiatic too, so I ought to know.' Cited by Haslam, *The Soviet Union and the Threat from the East*, p. 164.

56 Hosoya Chihiro, 'The Japanese–Soviet Neutrality Pact', in J.W. Morley (ed.), *The Fateful Choice: Japan's Advance into Southeast Asia, 1939–1941* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), p. 18.

57 By the terms of a follow-up agreement on 18 July 1940, details of delimitation were left to a Manchukuo–MPR border commission operating on the scene. Actual surveying on the spot began in early September after six meetings were held in Chita, between 3 and 24 August, involving technicians from both sides.

CHAPTER NINE

The Problem of Identity and the Japanese Engagement in North China

MARJORIE DRYBURGH

The political and cultural upheavals that beset China after the late nineteenth century called into question all assumptions on what it meant to be Chinese. Issues ranging from the cultural nature of 'Chineseness' to the national political framework, and from China's place in the world to the position of regions within the nation, were opened to discussion and debate. The provinces of the north – Hopeh (Hebei), Shantung (Shandong) and Shansi (Shanxi) – were particularly affected by this process. The north had suffered grave social and political disruption in the civil wars of the 1920s; and, with the establishment of the new central government in Nanking (Nanjing) in 1927, the economic and political centre of gravity shifted southwards. The people of these provinces were therefore required simultaneously to come to terms with a 'new China' and to reassess their own position within it. This reassessment was given particular urgency by external pressures: the process of questioning was taking place, not only in an environment of serious internal conflict but in the context of external intervention in the region by Japan. With the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931–1933, North China found itself in the front line of the emerging conflict, and was forced again to consider the relationship of region to nation and the bonds of obligation between them.

When the Japanese increased their direct engagement in North China in 1933, they brought with them the experience of earlier interventions in Siberia and Manchukuo. One of the strongest lessons they drew from this experience was the need for a political strategy, that is, a programme to engage the broad support,

Map 5: North China

not only of compliant officials, but also of the local population in general. In 1931, the Kwantung army used military force to seize the three Manchurian provinces and only later created a political order that was intended to win local support, in the form of the state of Manchukuo. Similarly, the occupation of Jehol (Rehe) province in 1933 and its incorporation into Manchukuo was purely a matter of military force. By 1935, however, military force was temporarily side-

lined, and the Japanese military developed a rather more subtle programme of arguing that they were better able than the Chinese central authorities to offer protection to the interests and identities of North China. The initial platform for this was the T'ang-ku (Tanggu) Truce of 31 May 1933, which turned the eastern part of Hopeh (excluding Peking [Beijing] and Tientsin [Tianjin]) into a demilitarized zone. The Japanese armies further exploited the terms of the truce agreement to impose political conditions excluding central military and administrative organizations, as well as individual officials, from North China. The north, therefore, was more easily open to Japanese influence, and more vulnerable to Japanese pressure, than the rest of China.[1]

By the 1930s, Japanese encroachment in the north was perceived by Chinese nationalists as the greatest challenge yet seen to China's unity, independence and sense of nationhood. In this context, the manipulation of popular Chinese activism was used to add weight and an appearance of legitimacy to Japanese military initiatives, and to allow Japanese actors in North China to claim that they were not merely pursuing their own national or bureaucratic interests in the region, but that they were also seeking to establish a framework that was more accommodating to northern Chinese interests and identities than the existing order led by Nanking. Although practical factors undoubtedly influenced Japanese engagement in North China – with Japanese military superiority deterring decisive action by the Chinese centre, and Japanese actors building their case for intervention on the Japanese interests at stake – advocates of this engagement focused rather on Chinese participation, arguing that it was driven by north Chinese actors, informed by north Chinese interests and given meaning by service to north Chinese destiny.

The first substantial manifestation of this shift in emphasis from Japanese ambitions to north Chinese aspirations came with the 'North China Autonomy Movement' of autumn 1935. The autonomy movement grew out of earlier Japanese military efforts to cultivate support among the retired and serving officials of North China. Political pressure on the Chinese regional and central authorities, backed by the threat of military action, continued throughout this period. More significantly, the movement saw the emergence of open agitation in favour of autonomy or self-government (*zizhi*) by ostensibly independent popular Chinese organizations. The movement first emerged in a farmers' rising in Xianghe (Wage-Giles: Hsiang-ho) county, east of Peking, in late October, in which county officials were deposed after local people demanded self-government for the

county; pro-autonomy activism then spread across rural and urban Hopeh and culminated in the establishment on 25 November 1935 of a Japanese-sponsored 'puppet' organization, the East Hopeh Anti-Communist Autonomous Council (*Jidong fanggong zizhi weiyuanhui*), chaired by Yin Rugeng.[2] The outcome of the movement was therefore the creation of a new zone of Japanese influence south of the Great Wall, protected by Japanese military strength but justified by appeal to constructions of Chinese interest and identity.

Given the proven impotence of the Chinese authorities in the past in the face of military action, why this shift in tactics? First, Hopeh in 1935 was better defended than Manchuria in 1931, and the capacity to resist renewed Japanese military advances was therefore also greater. Second, the appearance of Chinese popular support deflected attention from Japanese military ambitions to the far less problematic matter of Chinese disunity and instability: it offered an immediate response to Chinese central government protests, to international concern and to unease elsewhere within the Japanese authorities at independent action by the Japanese armies on the Asian mainland.[3] Finally, Hopeh was not Manchuria. Despite the continuing prominence of 'retaking lost territory' in Manchuria in anti-Japanese rhetoric in China, the symbolic importance of the four Manchurian provinces paled beside that of the territories south of the Great Wall which included the former capital of Peking. While Japanese intervention in Manchuria was justified by emphasis on the difference between Manchuria and China south of the Great Wall, intervention in Hopeh and the other northern provinces could not be treated in the same way. The Japanese military enterprise called into question Chinese senses of belonging and of community that could not be ignored, and the question of identity was therefore crucial to the management and presentation of 'autonomy'.

Official Japanese and Chinese narratives of the autonomy movement predictably differed in their explanations of the movement's origins and development, orthodox Chinese sources attributing the movement to Japanese intervention in North China, and Japanese sources treating pro-autonomy agitation as the product of Chinese domestic politics. Yet a comparison of the accounts produced by Japanese and Chinese actors and sympathetic observers suggests a more complex relationship between Chinese and Japanese intentions and ambitions in the north. In these explanations, assumptions of the material interests at stake, and the relationship of the movement to shifting identities in the North China region were interleaved. Japanese scrutiny of China as a whole, by scholars,

journalists and officials, was nothing new: China as Other was central to the reconsideration of Japanese identities that took place after the late nineteenth century. The autonomy movement drew on another strand in this discourse: among the meditations on the state and destiny of China were those of Japanese seeking not only to define Japan in relation to a decaying China but also to construct and invoke a China adapted to the needs of a rising Japan.[4]

On the surface, the rhetoric of autonomy drew on a vocabulary and repertoire of arguments common to both Chinese and Japanese advocates of autonomy: that all China was suffering under unjust and inept rule by the Nanking government; that the economic and political disadvantages afflicting the north as a region must be addressed; and that self-government offered the best chance of restoring dignity and prosperity to the region and assuring the north's place in a wider national regeneration. Paradoxically, therefore, the appeal of this apparently subversive and separatist initiative was largely dependent on the argument that this was not a violation of Chinese identities but a step towards their fuller realization. It is only on probing the perceived origins of those ills, the proposed solutions to them, and the meanings attached to 'autonomy' itself that the remaining, significant differences come back into focus: the relationships between the autonomous order and the central authorities, between region and nation, and between Chinese and Japanese actors and observers were problematic as soon as they were elaborated.

The construction of 'autonomy' or 'self-government' (*zizhi*) was central to this process, and the concept of autonomy served as a site in which Japanese and Chinese representations of the movement could co-exist, while not actually meeting or interacting. On the Japanese side, it is clear enough that 'autonomy' for North China inevitably involved the separation of the region – though this might be temporary – from the control of the Nanking government, and the ostensibly independent management of regional political and financial affairs. This separation was presented as essential to the future prosperity of the region. It also implied an almost tutelary relationship with Japan that, in the climate of increasingly vocal Chinese nationalism, awoke fears of further Japanese expansion south of the Great Wall. To understand why the concept of autonomy could have appeal on the Chinese side, despite these associations, it is necessary to appreciate that in orthodox Kuomintang (KMT, Guomindang) thought, 'self-government' was recognized as the phase of political development following the period of KMT tutelage which was necessary to transform China from a politic-

ally backward society into a modern constitutional state. Under self-government, responsibility for aspects of local affairs was to be devolved to elected bodies cooperating with the bureaucracy. To be granted the right to self-government, the people of a county or city had to prove themselves through political education managed by the KMT, and self-government was thus a mark of collective growth and achievement, and a sign that a political community was recognized as capable of managing its own affairs. As conceived by Sun Yat-sen, local self-government implied no cession of sovereignty by the centre but rather a harnessing through popular mobilization of local energies to national purposes; as implemented by the Nanking government, self-government was subject to overt bureaucratic control. Yet in neither case was 'self-government' marked by the separatist intentions that characterized Japanese-sponsored autonomy activism.[5]

The first sign of an open shift in Japanese military approaches to North China came in September 1935, in a statement made by Tada Hayao (Tada Shun), commander of the Japanese North China Garrison Army (NCGA, Kahoku chūton gun) based in Tientsin.[6] The Tada statement purported to offer a blueprint for future Japanese action in China, sparking off wider discussions of autonomy and the predicament of North China, touching on themes that resurfaced repeatedly in these discussions and clearly influencing some – though not all – of the other strands in the autonomy debate.

Much of the Tada statement followed an entirely predictable path. Tada reasserted Japan's role in maintaining peace in East Asia and in liberating the oppressed nations (*minzoku*) of the region from Western imperialism. While he argued that these aims should inform Japan's policy and actions on the Asian mainland, he nonetheless affirmed that Japanese policy should primarily serve Japan's own development. He went on to declare that success or failure in dealing with China was the definitive test of Japan's efforts in pursuing this policy, and noted that Japan's immediate focus of concern should, for entirely practical reasons, be the North China region. So far, so conventional. Yet as Tada developed his arguments, we see the opening up of a territory in which issues other than Japanese economic and strategic advantage might be included within the scope of Japanese approaches to the region.

First, Tada acknowledged that Japanese pursuit of its own interests could not take place in a vacuum: an understanding of China, an accurate 'diagnosis of China's sickness' was essential to the search for a suitable remedy; and he therefore discussed at some length the state of China as a whole and the north

as a region. Tada's principal focus here was on political matters; and he shifted the focus of attention from China as 'nation' (*minzoku*) to 'the Chinese people' (*Shina minshū*). Tada argued that many of the evils from which China then suffered were attributable to those who held political or economic power; that for 6,000 years the Chinese people had been the objects of 'extortion' by the government and by the financially powerful. It was for this reason above all that China remained poor, backward and disordered: the powerful had no interest in development that did not directly enrich them; and the powerless were distrustful of any attempt at government intervention into their lives. China's problems were therefore the product, not of some intrinsically Chinese weakness but of the corrupt and rapacious practices of a powerful minority.[7]

Therefore, he argued, Japanese anger should not be directed indiscriminately against China as a nation, but against China's unworthy rulers. Despite talk of modernization and development, the government of the 1930s was, to Tada, in no way superior to its predecessors. The practices of the past, he declared, had been continued enthusiastically by Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT after 1927. He repeated some of the common charges against the Nanking government, of duplicity, ingratitude and a confrontational approach to foreign policy, complaining that 'they do not consider that they owe their very survival to Japan', and noting that the greatest victims of their incompetence and irrationality were their own people:

> [the authorities in Nanking] feed off their people to sate themselves; not only are they the common enemy of the [Japanese] empire and the Chinese people, but it would not be an exaggeration to say that they are the enemy of humanity itself. …[8]

Tada thus reframed the primary conflict in North China, not as a national struggle between China and Japan but as a conflict between the perpetrators of bad government and the champions (Chinese and Japanese) of a better order.

Tada was equally dismissive of those seen as Japan's traditional allies in China, the 'professional pro-Japanese elements', asserting that their actual service to Japanese interests was minimal, and arguing that 'it is the height of folly to rely on these … people to further our plans for Sino–Japanese friendship and co-operation'. Effective Sino–Japanese cooperation therefore depended on finding alternative partners. It is notable that Tada did not suggest an alternative political grouping with whom Japan might cooperate. Instead, he returned repeatedly

to the plight of the mass of Chinese people under the Nanking government and to Japan's responsibility for their salvation:

> … if we are to save the Chinese people, we must drive out these warlords. Moreover, if today we do not save them, then these 400 million pitiful people will suffer unthinkable hardships … [and] Japan, which has a close relationship to China, will also be greatly affected.[9]

Thus the Chinese people themselves, rather than a faction within the leadership, were conceived as both partners and beneficiaries of the new approach proposed by Tada. The association of this new approach with 'the people' was important to Tada's presentation of Japan's mission. First, he used 'the people' not as an actually existing constituency with declared interests, grievances and intentions but as a legitimating device. By claiming to act in the largely unspecified interests of the undefined people, and to liberate them from exploitation by the Nanking government (an exploitation that was vehemently condemned, but only vaguely described), Tada dissociated Japanese efforts from individual or sectional interests, declaring them instead to be a response to collective Chinese aspirations. Secondly, the focus on 'the people' allowed Tada to present the Japanese mission in China as a struggle against injustice perpetrated by a minority and to distance himself from the far more provocative question of a *national* Sino–Japanese conflict; and this distancing was reinforced as he developed other dimensions of his argument.

The national question emerged again as Tada emphasized the importance of finding a way forward in China that was not merely profitable to Japan but also equitable. He acknowledged the disruptive effect on relations both of a Japanese sense of superiority over the Chinese and of further violations of a Chinese sense of collective dignity. Similarly, while he at no time suggested that Japan should renounce its leading role on the mainland, he was also critical of those who favoured creating a 'second Korea' in Manchuria or North China: he argued that the desire for independence and self-determination was universal, citing the example of European colonies, and pointed to the difficulties of managing multi-ethnic states, for example in Central and Eastern Europe. Yet he argued that to equate independence with isolation was to impose unnecessary burdens on economically underdeveloped states such as China. He therefore proposed a union of 'independent yet indivisible' states, initially encompassing Japan, Manchukuo and North China, as a means of ensuring that Chinese

sensibilities and rights of self-determination were respected, and Japanese objectives met, without undue friction or drain on Japanese resources.[10]

Finally, Tada's vision of Sino–Japanese cooperation offered a new status for the North China region within all China. North China was, he proposed, a region in which Japanese objectives could easily be met and an ideal starting point for a new mode of Sino–Japanese cooperation that could, once successful, be extended to all China; separation under an autonomous order was a purely transitional measure. While asserting a special relationship between Japan and the north, he did not deny the 'Chineseness' of northerners, nor did he argue that the destiny of the north was distinct from that of China south of the Yellow River. Instead he proposed that North China, now a marginalized and disadvantaged region, be offered a central place in an initiative that was to liberate and regenerate all China, and demonstrate to the people of all China the benefits of cooperation with Japan while promoting peace and prosperity in East Asia as a whole.

Chinese advocates of autonomy echoed some – though not all – of Tada's arguments in their own vision of the autonomous order: both the founding declaration of the East Hopeh Anti-Communist Autonomous Council, made on 25 November at the culmination of the first stage of the autonomy movement, and pamphlets produced by the protesters of Xianghe county, returned to themes raised earlier by Tada.[11] Superficially, Tada and Chinese advocates of autonomy pointed to the same broad conclusions: that something was gravely wrong in China; that the roots of these problems lay in the existing structures of political and economic power, and not in 'the Chinese' as a larger group; and that the resulting inequalities therefore were wholly remediable and could be eradicated by radical action. The implication was that Chinese could engage in pro-autonomy activism on Chinese terms, not simply as adjuncts to the Japanese. At the simplest level, the autonomous community was a community of intent in that its boundaries were drawn between those who declared themselves willing to work for better government and greater prosperity for China and those who were not. This was a significant point of contact for the various groups involved. However, it left the specifics vague; and as soon as one probes for these specifics, elements of difference begin to emerge.

The theme of official depravity was a case in point. Tada's criticism of KMT rule was enthusiastically taken up by Yin Rugeng. In explaining why the East Hopeh Council offered a better way forward for region and nation, Yin focused

on the 'six great crimes' of party and government. These were: that favouritism and competition for political advantage had plunged China into decades of disastrous civil war; that KMT obsession with borrowed Western concepts, from capitalism to Marxism, had destroyed the economic balance that had previously existed in China and brought about social collapse; that the KMT had turned its back on China's cultural foundations, displacing Confucian values to make way for Sun Yat-sen's 'heretical' Three People's Principles; that the KMT shirked its responsibilities towards agricultural production; that the KMT had abandoned good faith and amity in its relations with other powers; and that the KMT was extravagant and careless of popular welfare. This misrule by Nanking had exposed China to domestic disorder, international hostility and attack from within by the communists.[12] Yin's move for autonomy in North China therefore appeared as an enterprise that was in many respects very close to that outlined by Tada.

The Xianghe protesters too were critical of the Nanking government. They declared that Nanking had indeed neglected the civic and political capacities and aspirations of its people. Despite the eight years of political tutelage, Nanking had failed to educate the people for the next stage of local self-government. The protesters asserted, 'Dai has been too busy reading the sutras to make time to hold examinations and send officials to the counties to train the people, so we are unable to fulfil our duties as citizens'.[13] This coldness towards the countryside, the protesters suggested, was rooted in fears of rural radicalism and in a mistaken assumption that any episode of rural unrest was evidence of communist sympathies rather than of legitimate grievance. This confrontational approach to rural hardship, they argued, only increased opposition to the centre and sympathy for the communists. The Xianghe protesters were more willing than Tada or Yin to identify specific factors that contributed to their complaints: they commented on the absence of rural credit organizations and on the social disruption caused by poverty, which turned people towards banditry and communism. They cited fears of centrally imposed changes to the land tenure system that would, they claimed, effectively end private ownership of the land and subject farmers to unprecedented official control.[14]

Yet the Xianghe pamphleteers did not consider the contract between rulers and ruled to have been comprehensively violated. Where they pointed towards a gulf between government and people that gravely affected North China, they attributed this alienation, not to moral deficiency on the part of the authorities

but to a lapse of understanding. Xianghe's problems were presented as a consequence of poor communication and failures of vision rather than either an irremediable rift between north and centre or an intrinsic unfitness of the Nanking government. Thus, while for Tada and Yin the autonomous community certainly excluded the KMT, the Xianghe activists directed their protests towards the KMT plenum soon to be held in Nanking and their declared aim was not the removal of the Nanking government, nor the detachment of Xianghe from its sphere of influence, but its reform and the observance by officials and people of the extent of their responsibilities and the proper limits of their powers.[15]

Both Chinese accounts presented a community defined by shared values; and this too emphasizes the gulf between Chinese visions of autonomy. For Yin Rugeng, the project of autonomy did not exclude on the basis of political or economic status, education or place of birth, but drew in all those who shared Yin's disgust with the Nanking government and his regard for the traditional values of moral governance. Yin appealed to values which he identified as traditionally Chinese. He quoted Confucius on social justice and cited Confucian principles such as loyalty, filiality and good faith as 'the spirit on which Chinese civilization founded the state' (*zhonghua liguo zhi jingshen*).[16] Therefore, the re-dedication of the rulers to benevolent rule, a return to the values embodied in the Confucian canon, frugality and proper attention to farming, the restoration of the balance between the poor and the rich, and a more measured approach to foreign affairs were China's last hope of escaping destruction. The Xianghe protesters, on the other hand, affirmed their adherence to values identified as belonging to the KMT under Sun Yat-sen.[17]

On the substance of the autonomous order, Chinese advocates of autonomy again differed. Yin Rugeng appeared to share Tada's instrumentalist approach to autonomy. He emphasized that he had repeatedly appealed to the central government to reform itself; now, despairing, he could only advocate separation from Nanking. He did not develop the discussion of 'autonomy' itself beyond this, thus equating autonomy with separation rather than with any specific form of self-government. The Xianghe protesters, on the other hand, were prepared to articulate at least the outlines of an autonomous order. The way forward depended on a full assumption by the central government of its economic and political responsibilities to the region, on the confirmation of a proper balance of power between officials and private citizens, and on the adoption of new, more inclusive strategies for the management of locals affairs that offered greater

power and greater responsibility to the people of the county. To redress economic inequities, the protesters demanded that popular banking organizations (*minsheng qianhang*) be established across China; and they proposed that the resources of all the economically active, from workers to merchants, be used to underwrite public construction projects from irrigation to mining and manufacturing. Self-reliance was central to the active engagement of the people in economic life; and they were dismissive of approaches that sought to relieve poverty without empowering the poor: 'Relief is limited, and charity has boundaries; … people who eat only from charity can never have enough to eat; people who rely only on loans, can never borrow enough'.[18] Leaving aside the practicality of such an enterprise, it seems clear that what the protesters were arguing for here was a national movement for economic regeneration which drew in citizens from all levels of existing hierarchies in the private sector.

On political concerns, the Xianghe protesters argued for greater popular engagement in political life. Here again, unlike Yin Rugeng, they invoked the Three People's Principles as the basis of their proposals. The government was to assume a facilitative role here, cooperating with the people to secure popular welfare; preparing the people for self-government and the full exercise of their powers; supporting the poor and the weak who experienced greater difficulty in assuming their full role as citizens; and recognizing the whole Chinese nation as a state-wide community (*guozu*) incorporating equally familial, village, county, provincial and urban communities.[19] There were to be strict limits on the power of officials, particularly where private economic activity was concerned, lest the unequal balance of political power compound economic inequalities. The Xianghe protesters were not seeking separation from Nanking, but a fuller realization of the principles espoused by the central government, and of their own identities as active citizens (*guomin*) of China as defined by their assumption of the four powers of suffrage, recall, initiative and referendum proposed by Sun Yat-sen.[20]

This understanding of self-government is reflected also in the county gazetteer published in 1936.[21] Here, regional self-government implied neither detachment nor separatism. Instead, it was linked by the gazetteer's authors with a more orderly local society, in which closer engagement by the organs of self-government in local affairs – from the compilation of population registers to mediation in popular disputes – allowed their efficient and equitable management. This was absolutely central to the destiny of the county. The authors declared:

> In the twenty years between the establishment of the Republic and today, truly not a day has passed in which we have not striven to achieve self-government. That said, in the past decade or so, we have implemented only the name and not the substance; there is no point in being reticent about this. Since north and south were unified and political tutelage began, politics has gradually been normalized and we have begun to prepare for self-government. …[22]

Therefore, self-government was seen as an indicator of collective political maturity and a county's emergence from tutelary government into a newly framed partnership between centre and locality, and a relocation of the region within the nation.

The divergences between Chinese visions of autonomy were less marked in other areas. Tada had argued that Japan's natural allies in North China were not the officials, but the oppressed people of China, and the Chinese writers too portrayed autonomy as an enterprise that would engage the broad mass of the community, and not just a specific elite group. 'The people' were not generally depicted as highly politically conscious, but they were portrayed as worthy partners (under suitable leadership) in the salvation of China and the establishment of peace and prosperity; as vulnerable and distressed but not as uncivilized, irrational or disorderly. This was reflected in the Xianghe pamphlets: as the 'Rationale and Methods' declared,

> [I]f we do not arise of our own accord, then … we will have betrayed our status as citizens. … On [October 20], one person from each household (ideally, more than one) will rise early and … will be led by the village chief or another representative … to the county town to present a petition in fulfilling our duties as citizens [*guomin*], facilitating the fight against Communism and self-salvation; we must discuss all matters peacefully with the county chief and absolutely must not act violently. …[23]

Yin Rugeng, too, presented his vision of the new autonomous order as one in which the people's interests were close to the heart of the government, as distinct from his portrayal of inequitable and ruthlessly extractive KMT rule. He stated that his declaration of autonomy was a response to popular sentiment and to the calls of the 'four million people of the [east Hopeh] War Zone'.[24] Thus, although the autonomous community remained hierarchical, and proper social leadership within the region would be neither abandoned nor subverted,

collective interests were to be valued above sectional interests, and 'the people' were to be drawn into the project of autonomy, and dignified by their participation.

For Tada and the Chinese writers alike, the autonomous community was not an essentially regional order. The limits of the autonomous community did not depend on conditions or characteristics explicitly identified in the texts examined here as distinctively or intrinsically northern. Tada had described North China as the region offering the greatest chance of initial success to the project of autonomy; yet he had not suggested that this was due to special northern characteristics which rendered permanent separation from the rest of China inevitable. If Yin Rugeng's immediate constituency was a North China regional one, his intended audience was national. Yin, who was a native of Zhejiang and not of North China, did not suggest that the north had suffered more than the rest of China under KMT rule; he did not propose a distinct northern destiny as justification for separation from the centre, nor did he suggest that this was to be a lasting separation. Yin argued for the establishment of a federal system of government, which implies a substantial revision of the relationship between province and nation, but his concern, in the final sentence of the declaration, was for the future of the whole nation, and not for one region within it.[25]

The vision of the Xianghe protesters too remained resolutely national in scope. Where they perceived divisions within China, these were drawn along lines of political and economic advantage and disadvantage; and their protests were framed as an attempt to reduce or remove those divisions, and not to draw battle lines across them. Thus the Nanking government and the KMT remained the ultimate audience for their protests; the demands made by the Xianghe protesters were legitimized by appeal to the principles of Sun Yat-sen thought, and the political order that the protesters aspired to build in Xianghe centred on a county assembly firmly tied into a national hierarchy of representative organizations.[26] Despite varying degrees of dissatisfaction with KMT rule, the Chinese actors still affirmed the value attached to a united China. Consequently, neither political circumstances nor northern identities appeared to demand that a separate northern destiny be pursued. Just as the problem with China was perceived as having national impact, so the framework of its resolution was conceived on a national scale, and although this resolution was to be launched on a regional stage, this was only a prelude to its nation-wide extension.

The relationship between China and Japan in the context of northern autonomy presented greater problems. Tada Hayao had spoken in general terms of liberating the north from Nanking, and of establishing economic cooperation

between North China, Japan and Manchukuo. He had presented the relationship between Chinese and Japanese as essentially tutelary: the 'paradise of co-prosperity in North China' was to be created *for* the Chinese people *by* the Japanese; and, while Tada was critical of proposals that Manchukuo and North China be incorporated into the formal empire, at no time did he suggest that Japan take anything other than a leading and authoritative role in the salvation of China. Chinese advocates of autonomy took different approaches. Yin Rugeng, despite his close personal links with Japan, and despite the important role played by the Japanese authorities in the establishment and management of the East Hopeh Council, did not refer to cooperation with Japan as an essential part of his enterprise. He mentioned Japan only as one of China's slighted international partners, asserting that,

> The ill-informed believe that the conflict with Japan was caused by the overbearing attitude of our powerful neighbour, but if you look at the truth of the matter, Party members brought this on their own heads, as they divided into pro-Japanese and anti-Japanese factions, and pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet factions. …[27]

And although he referred in passing to values shared by East Asian powers, and to the quest for peace in East Asia, he did not talk of a special relationship between China and Japan, of a special role for Japan in China's future or of the material benefits that, for example, economic cooperation between North China and Japan might offer. Although the Xianghe incident occurred some time after the Tada statement in a Japanese zone of influence, and attracted considerable interest from the Japanese authorities, the declarations of the Xianghe protesters made no reference to the possibility of Japanese involvement in the future of Xianghe or of the north. Therefore the project of autonomy was located and articulated within the context of specifically Chinese concerns: the aspirations towards Asian co-existence and co-prosperity that emerged in sections of the Tada statement were generally absent from these Chinese discussions of the meaning of autonomy. The autonomous community was essentially China-centred, and it was presented in Japanese and Chinese advocacy of autonomy as a framework within which Chinese conceptions of complementary national and regional identities and destinies could be explored and enacted.

The autonomy movement in North China was in many ways a brief interlude in Japan's political engagement on the mainland. Japan's encouragement

of local autonomy movements came to an end with the outbreak of full-scale war in China in July 1937, after which Japanese plans revolved around the creation of 'puppet' governments across China. Yet if the programme for Hopeh foreshadowed the more extensive accommodation with nationalist interests in Southeast Asia in the early 1940s, its implementation in the political climate of North China in the 1930s was problematic. Recent events in Manchuria had fuelled Chinese fears that any Japanese engagement in Chinese affairs posed a substantial threat to Chinese freedoms to manage internal political affairs and to negotiate and act upon Chinese identities as defined by Chinese. As proposals for cooperation between the Japanese and local Chinese proponents of autonomy might be condemned variously as cynical and self-interested collaboration, or as a naïve invitation to malevolent external intervention, Chinese autonomy advocates' claims to legitimate engagement in the debate on the practicalities of autonomy as an expression of northern identities were founded on the assertion that they took part *as Chinese*, and not under the influence of the predatory Japanese armies.

The rhetoric of autonomy did nothing to promote the acceptance of autonomy as a coherent political order operating on transparent common principles within clear political boundaries. On the one hand, the Xianghe protesters demanded self-government for their county; on the other, the Japanese military forces toyed with ideas of creating a broader separatist North China state encompassing not only Hopeh, Shansi and Shantung but also the Inner Mongolian provinces of Chahar (Chaha'er) and Suiyuan. The advocates of autonomy might have been united by disaffection with the current order and by their choice of 'autonomy' as a description for the new order they aspired to, but there is little evidence of a shared understanding of the definition and implications of 'autonomy' in practice.

Despite the lively Japanese interest in the question of autonomy for North China, the rhetoric and representation of the early autonomy movement was essentially China-centred. Whereas Japanese forces had created a platform for Manchukuo by emphasizing its differences from China, Chinese and Japanese accounts alike sought to explain the autonomy movement by defining and locating the north within a changing China. That is not to say that advocates of autonomy were blind to the divisive potential that the movement was perceived to have; indeed, the emphasis on Chinese problems and needs in the rhetoric of autonomy suggests that they were keenly aware of the need to deal with this

question, and that, if nothing else, the need to show respect for Chinese sensibilities was an important factor shaping the representations of autonomy. The emphasis on China seems to have been consciously adopted in some cases – notably in the pronouncements of Tada and Yin Rugeng – as a mask to the ambitions driving the autonomy movement that allowed advocates of a 'separated' autonomous North China to present such an order as a first step towards the regeneration of a re-centred China, rather than as a peripheral, breakaway enterprise.

If the partial success of the autonomy movement (in the establishment of the East Hopeh Council) indicates the vulnerability of North China to Japanese pressure, the presentation of the autonomy movement suggests that a northern sense of community with all China was still taken as a given, and this shaped the rhetoric of autonomy in a number of important ways. First, the regional dimension of the movement was played down. Although the political design behind Japanese military involvement in the North China autonomy movement was to further 'Japanese' interests by exploiting the alienation of North China and the erosion of community with other groups with China, Tada and Yin declined to express open approval of this goal. The plight of North China – on which much of the discussion of autonomy did focus – was seen as symptomatic of a sickness affecting all China. There were no allusions to the north as a region in which special circumstances – such as geographical distance from the centre, relative economic or political power or local culture – in any way implied a distinctive northern destiny or identity, or an inevitable or desirable separation from the rest of China. Thus the rhetoric of autonomy did not generally demand that the north Chinese choose between Chinese and northern identities and allegiance; and indeed it offered to North China an enhanced role in national salvation by presenting North China as the testing ground for a new and revitalized China.

Second, Japanese involvement was not heavily emphasized, and the movement was generally presented by actors and sympathetic observers as a Chinese enterprise. Even Japanese writers sought to distance Japanese actors from the autonomy project: where the relationship between Japan and North China was discussed, it was depicted as rooted in a community of interest, and rarely as the product of a special bond based on shared culture or origin. Moreover, where the creation of a sense of community between China and Japan was represented as an objective of the autonomy movement, this intention was

attributed to Chinese actors rather than to Japanese, and it rarely appeared in discussions of the movement until after December 1935, when Japan became an established part of the autonomous landscape of the north.

Finally, the concept of 'autonomy' itself, while widely applied as a description of the movement's goals, was subject to varying definitions. The rhetoric of autonomy offered not a common coherent project but a repertoire of concepts on which Japanese and Chinese actors could draw to justify their actions; and it is very clear that Chinese and Japanese attached different meanings to this shared vocabulary. For Japanese writers, 'autonomy' was equated in the short term with regional financial and political independence, and was apparently used as shorthand for the wider economic aims of the movement. Autonomy implied a distinct separation of the North China region from Chinese central authority; and regional self-government provided a framework within which the broader interests of the North China region could be pursued. Some Chinese advocates of autonomy shared this view, but for others, 'autonomy' still meant regional self-government according to principles still officially espoused by the KMT. In both cases, self-government was a mechanism rather than an end in itself: for Japanese writers, it was a means to free North China from Nanking's grasp and secure its political and economic development; to Chinese actors, it was a means to affirm the Chinese identities of the northerners. Here, the autonomy movement appears to have owed its appeal to its refusal openly to contest northern claims to belonging and its assertion that it offered instead an alternative understanding of the region and its people's place within the Chinese nation.

AUTHOR'S NOTE

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NOTES

1 I have explored the significance of the North China region and the role of its officials in relations with Japan in *North China and Japanese Expansion, 1933–1937: Regional Power and the National Interest* (Richmond: Curzon, 2000).

2 Chinese organizations based in Tientsin advocating autonomy for North China are listed in Himeno Tokuichi, *Hokushi no seijō* [Political conditions in North China] (Tokyo: Nisshi mondai kenkyūkai, 1936), pp. 43–46. Yin Rugeng had close personal links with Japan: educated partly at Waseda University, he had married a Japanese woman and worked in Japan as a representative of the Nanking government in 1927. *RMDCD* (Beijing, 1989), p. 577

3 Gaimushō officials were quick to dismiss Chinese official protests at Japanese military involvement. Telegrams Ding Shaoji to Chinese Foreign Ministry, 8.11.1935, 19.11.1935, 26.11.1935, 27.11.1935, 24.12.1935; *ZRWJ*4, pp. 34–39; Chinese Foreign Ministry to Ding Shaoji, 22.11.1935; *ZRWJ*5, pp. 470–471.

4 See for example, Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie (eds), *Japan's Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); Joshua A. Fogel, *The Literature of Travel in the Japanese Discovery of China*, 1868–1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996); Stefan Tanaka, *Japan's Orient* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

5 On the development of the concept of self-government and its implementation, see Philip Kuhn's 'Local self-government under the Republic: problems of control, autonomy and mobilization' in Frederic Wakeman and Carolyn Grant (eds), *Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), especially pp. 270–273, 281–283.

6 Reprinted in Himeno, *Hokushi no seijō*, pp. 86–104; a Chinese translation appeared shortly afterwards in the national journal *Guowen zhoubao*. Nanking had received intelligence reports in summer 1935 on Japanese ambitions in North China during the summer; telegram Jiang Zuobin to Foreign Ministry, 18.6.1935; *ZRWJ*5, pp. 347–348. Senior Chinese officials suspected that the statement was not an independent initiative on Tada's part but that it had been approved by the military authorities in Tokyo; telegram He Yingqin to Chiang Kai-shek, 14.6.1935, *ZYSL6.2*, pp. 74–75.

7 The same hostility towards the ruling authorities and dissociation of the broad mass of the people from them was seen in discussions of Korea's problems in the years before the 1910 annexation; see Peter Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), especially pp. 407–413.

8 Himeno, *Hokushi no seijō*, p. 89.

9 *Ibid*., p. 89.

10 *Ibid*., p. 93. Further research on Tada would be required to establish his precise thinking here, but it is possible that he wished to avoid the kind of criticisms – discussed above by Stegewerns – earlier levelled at Manchukuo in influential journals.

11 Yin Rugeng, 'Tuoli zhongyang zizhi' [Separation from the centre and self-government], *ZRWJ4*, pp. 420–422. The Xianghe pamphlets are: 'Xianghe renmin zijiu zijue xuanyan' [Xianghe people's declaration on self-salvation and self-determination], 'Xianmin zijiu zijue liyou ji banfa' [Rationale and methods for self-salvation and self-determination by people of the county], 'Xianmin zizhi zijiu zhuandan' [Leaflet on self-government and self-salvation for people of the county], all in *ZRWJ4*, pp. 159–163. Other surviving writings on the autonomy movement include Himeno Tokuichi's *Hokushi no seijō*; Kurihara Kōsaburō's *Hokushi no shinsō o kataru* [Discussing the truth about North China] (Tokyo: 1936); Watanabe Tsuyoshi's *Hokushi ni gyōshō o tsuku: In Rōkō to Kitō jichi; waga tairiku seisaku no hōkō* [Sounding the morning bell in North China: Yin Rugeng and autonomy in east Hopeh; our continental policy] (Tokyo: Yūkan Teikoku shinbunsha, 1935); Weng Jiuma's *Hokushi ni okeru jichi undō monogatari* [Tale of the North China autonomy movement] (Tianjin: Yong bao, 1935). Himeno, chairman of the Sino–Japanese Research Society (Nisshi mondai kenkyūkai), had published a number of works on politics and travel in Manchuria and North China in the 1930s (see also Fogel, *Literature of Travel*, p. 176); Kurihara (b.1880) was a Minseitō Diet member with interests in foreign policy matters; Watanabe (b.1898) was manager of the *Teikoku shinbun* and principal director of the East Asian Humanities Research Institute (Tōa jinbun kenkyūjo); Weng Jiuma wrote also on political matters in the Japanese-owned, Tientsin-based journal *Kita Shina* [North China].

12 'Tuoli zhongyang zizhi', *ZRWJ4*, pp. 420–422.

13 'Liyou ji banfa', *ZRWJ4*, p. 160. Dai Jitao was chairman of the Examination Yuan, one of the five councils or Yuan that governed Republican China, responsible for the modernized examinations used to recruit civil servants under the Republic.

14 They described the changes in land tenure practice as the policy pioneered in Shansi by Yan Xishan which was then the subject of considerable debate across China. 'Xuanyan', *ZRWJ4*, pp. 159–160.

15 'Liyou ji banfa' *ZRWJ4*, p. 161; 'Zhuandan', *ZRWJ4*, p. 162.

16 'Tuoli zhongyang zizhi', *ZRWJ4*, p. 421.

17 'Liyou ji banfa', *ZRWJ4*, p. 160; 'Zhuandan', *ZRWJ4*, p. 161.

18 'Xuanyan', *ZRWJ4*, p. 159; 'Liyou ji banfa', *ZRWJ4*, p. 160.

19 'Liyou ji banfa', *ZRWJ4*, p. 160.

20 'Liyou ji banfa', *ZRWJ4*, p. 160; summary translation of Sun on the four powers in William de Bary and Richard Lufrano (eds), *Sources of Chinese Tradition*, 2nd edition, vol. 2 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), pp. 323–324.

21 Wang Bao'an, Wu Wendiao et al. (comp.), *Xianghe xian zhi* (Xianghe county gazetteer), October 1936 (reproduced Taipei: Chengwen, 1967). The gazetteer was

therefore published after the absorption of Xianghe into the jurisdiction of the East Hopeh Council but written before. Wang, a native of Liaoning, had served as county chief in Xianghe in 1931–1934; Wu, born in Henan, was appointed in 1936.

22 Wang Bao'an, Wu Wendiao et al. (comp.), *Xianghe xian zhi*, pp. 231–233; 144.

23 'Liyou ji banfa', *ZRWJ4*, p. 161. The use of '*guomin*' (rather than '*gongmin*') throughout Xianghe pamphlets conflates – as Liang Qichao had done – national belonging with civic rights and duties. On Liang and other Chinese commentators on citizenship, see Peter Zarrow, 'Introduction: Citizenship in China and the West' in Joshua A. Fogel and Peter Zarrow (eds), *Imagining the People: Chinese Intellectuals and the Concept of Citizenship, 1890–1920* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), pp. 17–21.

24 'Tuoli zhongyang zizhi', *ZRWJ4*, p. 423.

25 *Ibid*., p. 423. Federalism was associated – in the rhetoric of those advocating a unitary centralized Chinese state – with unfettered regionalism and with disregard for centralized national authority and the value traditionally ascribed to Chinese unity. See Jean Chesneaux, 'The Federalist Movement in China, 1920–3', in Jack Gray (ed.), *Modern China's Search for a Political Form* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 96–137 on the debates surrounding federalism in the 1920s and Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995) pp. 177–205, for an alternative perspective.

26 'Liyou ji banfa', *ZRWJ4*, pp. 160–161.

27 'Tuoli zhongyang zizhi', *ZRWJ4*, p. 422.



Map 6: Indochina and Thailand

CHAPTER TEN

Vietnamese Nationalist Revolutionaries and the Japanese Occupation: The Case of the Dai Viet Parties (1936–1946)

FRANÇOIS GUILLEMOT

During their occupation of Southeast Asia, the Japanese sponsored the creation of five 'independent' states in former European colonies. Burma and the Philippines each received formal independence in 1943, and the former French possessions in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos were given the same status in early 1945. Preparations for a similar Indonesian independence were interrupted at the last moment by the end of the Second World War. Because of these actions, the Japanese have often been regarded as either sympathetic to Southeast Asian nationalism or at least forced by circumstances to deal with nationalist leaders. A closer examination of Japanese policies in Vietnam, however, reveals that there was an important lack of co-operation between Japanese authorities and local Vietnamese nationalists, even for those groups which appeared to have the most to gain from the Japanese occupation.

Part of the problem is that most histories of Vietnamese nationalism in the twentieth century are dominated by the rise of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) under Ho Chi Minh's leadership. Following the Japanese surrender in August 1945, the Viet Minh, the nationalist front led by the ICP, took control of most of the provincial cities in central and northern Vietnam before making its way south. Determined to keep power at all costs, the ICP consolidated its internal control in the north by banning or eliminating opposing nationalist parties and by creating an effective police force.[1] On 2 September 1945, Ho Chi Minh officially declared the birth of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV).

What is lost in this version of the past, however, is that the ICP was never alone in the Vietnamese political landscape, neither in the early 1940s nor after 1945. Moreover, Japan, not just France and the Soviet Union, had long attracted many Vietnamese anticolonialists. After conquering Vietnam in the late nineteenth century, the French suppressed a series of revolts by patriotic traditionalist scholars. As elsewhere in Asia, many Vietnamese were inspired by Japan's victory in the Russo–Japanese war in 1905. The famous Vietnamese nationalist, Phan Boi Chau, formed the *Dong Du* ('Learn from the East') movement at the turn of the century in order to send young Vietnamese to Japan to study military science and Western modernization via a successful Meiji broker. In the 1920s, the French briefly tolerated the constitutionalist movement which aimed at the gradual evolution of self-government based on the model of British India; but the French offered the constitutionalists no encouragement and the nationalist movement soon moved towards a revolutionary strategy or, for some, confirmed it. Rebellions in 1930, however, were brutally crushed and many nationalist and communist leaders were confined under appalling conditions to the prison island of Poulo Condore. Indeed, the first breaks between Vietnamese communist and non-communist nationalists occurred on Poulo Condore. The Vietnamese Nationalist Party (Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang, VNQDD) had rebelled at Yen Bay in 1930 before the communists did so in Nghe An and Ha Tinh about a year later. Only in 1936, when a more liberal-minded Popular Front government came to power in France, did a new opportunity emerge for more open political activity. Political prisoners were freed and restrictions on political activity were relaxed.[2] Amongst the political groups which emerged at the time were a series of parties which, at least in their admiration for Japan and its example, were among the heirs of Phan Boi Chau and the VNQDD. And like the communists, Dai Viet parties sensed in 1945 'that their moment in history had arrived'.[3]

Non-communist and anticolonialist, these parties were in many ways the most logical partners for Japanese interests in Indochina. And yet, in spite of the ICP's wartime propaganda, they received little assistance from the Japanese. Understanding why that was the case can cast new light on the failure of non-communist nationalist parties to come to power in Vietnam in August 1945 as opposed to their communist competitors. Ironically, concrete Japanese aid to these non-communist anticolonialist parties would only really show itself after the Japanese defeat in August. And by then, it was far too late. A Franco-Japanese entente in Indochina until March 1945 placed them in a strange position in

Southeast Asia and diminished greatly the impact of Japanese notions of national identity among non-communist Vietnamese nationalists.

IN SEARCH OF A NEW NATIONAL IDENTITY: THE DAI VIET IDEA

Dai Viet nationalism was of another kind. Its leaders aspired to the creation of a 'Greater Vietnam' (Dai Viet), either Republican or Monarchist, but modern and non-communist. The origins of the Dai Viet parties are to be found in the relaxed political climate of the Popular Front (1936–1939). In Hanoi, the Indochinese university (Université Indochinoise) was the breeding ground for revolutionaries.[4] Most of the youths involved in clandestine activities were cultivated students and moved by a desire for independence. Of particular interest for these non-communist nationalists was the need to return to the past in order to find the themes of national emancipation that could work in the present. Young revolutionaries created parties or small clandestine groups that adopted different names, some of them including the term 'Dai Viet'.

Given that the movements of several of these parties were clandestine, it is not always easy to verify their founding dates. We know that four of these parties were created between 1936 and 1938. Former revolutionaries of the VNQDD, freed from Poulo Condore in 1936, were no strangers to this political agitation. The most famous of them, the Greater Vietnamese Nationalist Party (Dai Viet Quoc Dan Dang or DVQDD), better known as Dai Viet from the 1950s, was created by a revolutionary student named Truong Tu Anh. He came from the province of Phu Yen and had been arrested several times by the French Sûreté for his anticolonialist activism. This party came into the open in early 1939, complete with a political statement.[5] The second, called the Greater Vietnamese National-Socialist Party (Dai Viet Quoc Xa or DVQX) was formed in 1936 but would not be active until after the Japanese coup on 9 March 1945. The third, the Greater Vietnamese Humanism Party (Dai Viet Duy Dan or DVDD), was created in 1937 by a young and brilliant intellectual named Ly Dong A, who had participated in the Lang Son affair in 1940 before taking refuge in China (see below). Lastly, the Greater Vietnamese Authentic People's Party (Dai Viet Dan Chinh or DVDC) was created in 1938 under the stimulus of the famous northern intellectual, Nguyen Tuong Tam, better known by his *nom de plume,* Nhat Linh.[6]

At that time, each of these parties brought with them rather vague political programmes. However, the goal uniting all of them was the desire for independence from the French. The majority of these parties (DVQDD, DVDD and DVDC) conceived this national independence in terms of simultaneous social emancipation via necessary political reforms; but they also had a common vision of a powerful Dai Viet state of days gone by, symbolized by the two great imperial dynasties that had consolidated and reinforced a sense of national identity: the Ly and the Tran. The semi-authoritarian regime that they backed was a third way between communism and capitalism.[7]

GLORIOUS HISTORICAL MARKERS IN AN 'INDOCHINESE' GEOGRAPHICAL AREA: ROOTS AND 'RACE'[8]

From a geographical point of view, the space making up the Vietnamese nation in the minds of young revolutionary students remained rather unclear. The borders of this nation, which had always been on the move in the past, were not fixed in local minds at the beginning of the twentieth century. Indochina, a reference learned in Indochinese classrooms, comprised five regions (*pays*) grouped into a Union (Tonkin, Annam, Cochin China, Laos and Cambodia). Debates on the appellation of the country took place in the press at the time, giving rise to heated discussion. As Christopher Goscha has indicated in his work *Vietnam or Indochina?*, the die had not yet been cast.[9] The preferences of young intellectuals for 'An Nam', 'Dai Nam', 'Viet Nam', 'Dai Viet' or 'Dong Duong' (Indochina) could belie opinions unique to their different geographical origins. Whereas the youth of Hanoi preferred the name 'Dai Viet', those in the central part preferred 'An Nam' or 'Dai Nam' (an appellation that evoked the Nguyen dynasty whose capital had been in Hue). In the South, 'Viet Nam' was a lively success.[10] These appellations were also chosen in terms of the geographical extension they represented.

In the minds of young nationalists, the choice of the name of the country was much more historical than geographical. A look at the different names used in the past allows us to understand better the thinking of these activists. Vietnam, before it was called as such, had known a dozen internal names. The two larger dynasties and consolidators of the future Vietnamese state, the Ly and the Tran (1010–1400), used the name 'Dai Viet' for almost four centuries, as did the later Le (1428–1527). The advent of the Nguyen, after the Tay Son interlude (1778–

1802), did not definitively solve the problems linked to the name of this geo-cultural space. It was rather the name 'Viet Nam' that was adopted, following the Chinese refusal to accept the first choice of 'Nam Viet'.[11]

The attraction of 'Dai Viet' for young nationalists is understandable. It was the symbol of a glorious and warlike past, one of independence and of the formation of the nation-state. The more recent terms, 'Viet Nam' or 'Dai Nam', were linked to the dynasty of the Nguyen, and were for many nationalists symbolic of decadence and of the decline of the Empire.[12] In the eyes of the northern students, their choice was 'geographically' natural. The cradle of Vietnamese civilization was in the Red River Delta; the South had been acquired only gradually over the centuries. The geographical North (Tonkin), the historical Dai Viet, symbolized therefore the source of Vietnamese civilization. Nationalist activists believed that a return to the origins was essential in constructing the geographical and political identity of their future nation.

As the cradle of the Viet, the North was also the source of the ethnicity, of a certain 'authenticity' for these nationalists.[13] During their long movement towards the South, the Viet swallowed the Cham kingdom, as well as several different ethnic groups living in the highlands in western Vietnam. This progression was also one of assimilation and *métissage*. How was this assimilation experienced by the activists from the North? What was the real impact of these new ideologies based on a vital space, of the 'struggle of the races', being vigorously applied in Hitlerian Germany but also defended ideologically in China (in the form of the Three Principles of Sun Yat-sen) or energetically in modern Japan?[14] We cannot say at this point, but the reference to Sun Yat-sen appears as an explanation.[15] The right of the 'people's existence' or vitalism, as defined in the DVQDD's doctrine,[16] may have been inspired by Sun Yat-sen's ideas. It was also motivated by several spatial and cultural factors: the geographical narrowness and the density of the population of the delta of the Red River are not alien to the mental construction of these new ideologies. The idea of hygiene during the colonial regime favoured increased population, transforming the idea of vital space into a serious topic of discussion. As a result, the neo-Darwinist explanation of a world in constant struggle for survival found a favourable response among revolutionary nationalists in Tonkin.[17]

Yet the appellation 'Dai Viet', adopted by young revolutionary nationalists in the North, did not really make clear to which geographical space it was representing and how far it extended. We can perhaps find part of the answer

in the ceremony which swore in new DVQDD members before a map of Dai Viet comprising all of Indochina and a part of the rest of Southeast Asia.[18] At first glance, this was no doubt for practical reasons (perhaps the only map available?). But it is possible that the choice was also strategic: did not the future Dai Viet have to be *more* than the Dai Nam and Viet Nam of former times?

The emergence of different nationalist parties was in response to these precise, geo-spatial and cultural factors. Politically, because of the recent failures of anti-colonialists in invoking the 'nationalist' names of Viet Nam, Indochina or even An Nam, other nationalists may have been wary of using these terms. In this complex context the 'Dai Viet idea' became a new and increasingly powerful concept for these young nationalists.

If one lists the different Dai Viet parties which emerged, between 1936 and 1943 in Vietnam, one can notice two things. On the one hand, four of these parties appeared in the North.[19] On the other hand, these parties were born in a special historical context, appearing only a few short years before the Japanese occupation of Indochina. Indeed, Vietnamese nationalists of all political stripes were closely following Japan's expansion towards northern Indochina, especially after the outbreak of the Sino–Japanese war in 1937.

SECOND WORLD WAR: CAUGHT BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND THE JAPANESE

The Japanese expansion into northern Indochina in 1940 had the potential to catapult non-communist nationalist parties into the revolutionary limelight. In addition, while the Japanese threat ended the Popular Front period and led to increased political repression inside Vietnam, it also brought other nationalist groups, located outside Indochina since the Dong Du days of the late 1920s, into the picture. This was particularly the case during the 'Lang Son affair', in September 1940, when the Japanese threatened to invade northern Indochina via southern China.[20] Japanese troops stationed across from Lang Son were accompanied by four or five thousand Vietnamese soldiers of the National Restoration Army (Kien Quoc Quan) led by Tran Trung Lap who was affiliated to Prince Cuong De's revolutionary party (Phuc Quoc).[21] As a part of the Dong Du movement, Cuong De had travelled to Japan at the turn of the century and had stayed there, waiting for a favourable moment. In 1940, that moment seemed to have come. The possibility of Japanese support for the Vietnamese anti-colonialist movement seemed greater than ever.

Non-communist nationalists would be disappointed, however, when the Japanese decided to occupy French Indochina but without overthrowing the French themselves. Unsurprisingly, the Lang Son uprising was a failure. The French Sûreté remained in place and Cuong De never returned to lead a non-communist, anticolonialist 'Dai Viet nation'. Once again, pitiless repression forced the Restoration Army to take refuge in China, beyond the reach of the police services of Indochina. Within the colony, things were as bad. Unlike Indonesia or Burma, the war years were disastrous for parties operating clandestinely, both Nhat Linh's DVDC and Truong Tu Anh's DVQDD. In 1941, well known members of the DVDC (Hoang Dao, Khai Hung and Nguyen Gia Tri) were arrested by the French Sûreté and leader of the DVQDD, Truong Tu Anh, was interned twice for anticolonialist activities, in 1942 and 1944.

This first failed insurrectionary experiment and continued French police suppression, delivered in the wake of the Japanese offensive, undoubtedly moderated the confidence placed in Japan by a major part of the Vietnamese revolutionaries. The Japanese decision to allow the French to continue running the Indochinese colony after 1940 effectively weakened non-communist nationalists like the Dai Viet by preventing them from developing their organizations in the open, from gaining nationalist support from the masses and by condemning them to a dangerous position where they could be, ironically, associated with the Japanese at the end of the war by the ICP waiting to rush in from the outside. That end came in mid-1945 and these non-communists parties were badly prepared to turn events their way.

The Japanese occupation provided the nationalists with some room to manoeuvre, however limited by the French Sûreté it may have been. At the outset of 1944, the Dai Viet National Alliance (Dai Viet Quoc Gia Lien Minh) came to life in Vietnam.[22] This development was important, for all of the other revolutionary alliances fighting for independence before had been established in southern China, outside Indochina: the Viet Minh in 1941 and the Dong Minh Hoi in 1942. This new Dai Viet Alliance grouped the four Dai Viet parties (DVQDD, DVDC, DVQX and DVDD), as well as a dissident pro-Japanese branch of the VNQDD, called the 'New VNQDD' (Tan VNQDD) led by well-known veteran revolutionaries such as Nguyen The Nhiep, Nguyen Ngoc Son, Nhuong Tong and Ngo Thuc Dich. According to Quang Huy, at first the Alliance comprised eight revolutionary parties. In addition to the four aforementioned Dai Viet parties, it included the VNQDD, DMH, Viet Nam Dan Chu and Thanh

Nien Ai Quoc parties.[23] A recent well-informed document suggests that the Alliance consisted of four Dai Viet parties and the New VNQDD.[24] The principal goal of the Alliance was to re-establish complete independence and to promote democratic reforms in a new Dai Viet Republic, focused on the people's welfare. In early 1945, the Dai Viet Alliance was personified by Nguyen Xuan Tieu (Nguyen Ly Cao Kha in reality). He was the leader of the Greater Vietnamese National-Socialist Party (DVQX), a kind of political, pro-Japanese police which had defected to the Japanese forces during the coup of 9 March.

THE ALLIANCE OF THE DAI VIET PARTIES IN THE EMPIRE OF VIETNAM, MARCH–AUGUST 1945

All of these parties, however, remained hobbled by the Franco-Japanese entente in Indochina. Only with the Japanese overthrow of the French on 9 March 1945 did a new opportunity present itself. The strategic reasons that led the Japanese to the *coup de force* in March are well known. In an increasingly uncomfortable position, which marked the beginning of its political and military decline in Southeast Asia, Japan needed a safe base to fall back on. To ensure its strategic defence and to counter French Gaullist resistance in Indochina, the question of Indochina became urgent to settle at the end of January 1945. Fearful of French resistance and American strategic designs, the Japanese wanted total military control of Indochina. On 9 March, Operation 'Meigo' was launched throughout Indochina. By the end of the month, almost all of the region was under Japanese control. With the French colonial administration now gone, the Japanese allowed Emperor Bao Dai to proclaim Vietnamese independence on 11 March. The political vacuum created by the Japanese coup and the declaration of independence greatly favoured the activities of nationalist-revolutionaries like the Dai Viet parties.[25]

We know that the Japanese coup had a strong impact on the Vietnamese population. To the detriment of the colonial authorities, it allowed the more radical forces to emerge on the political scene.[26] And yet, for these nationalists, the moment for taking power never truly emerged, even after the Japanese had overthrown the French entirely. If the Japanese intensified their efforts to encourage independence activities and promoted ideas of 'Greater Asia', they did not allow local nationalists to take control in Vietnam. During the six months from March to August 1945, while the Japanese gave direct protection, they did

not provide any kind of transfer of power to sympathetic nationalist forces (Thanh Nien Ai Quoc Doan, Viet Nam Phuc Quoc Dong Minh Hoi)[27] or those regrouped in the Dai Viet Alliance. In a way, they facilitated the ICP's coming to power.

Kiyoko K. Nitz has well shown the diversity of Japanese policy towards Indochina.[28] Groups of different Japanese interests mingled and their support for revolutionary nationalists was a function of their own interests. It is known that Vietnamese personalities benefited from Japanese logistical aid and certainly from their direct protection. But if the names have been identified,[29] the role they played in Vietnamese organizations is less clear and remains to be studied in greater detail. The organization, the 'Black Dragon' (Kokuryūkai), is one example. Created by Uchida Ryōhei in 1901, it spread throughout a large part of East Asia as Japanese military conquests widened.[30] The Black Dragon society was set up as well in Vietnam under the name 'Hac Long', the Vietnamese translation of Black Dragon. In the South it was run by Nguyen Huu Thi[31] and in the North under the cover of 'Japanese-Vietnamese cultural exchanges'.[32] The role of this extreme rightist organization is poorly known, but it seems that its development was short-circuited by the political aims of the military (maintenance of the status quo and a refusal to favour independence-minded groups), unlike the policies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (support for 'the liberation of Asian peoples').[33]

THE TRAN TRONG KIM GOVERNMENT: FIRST STEP TO A DAI VIET REVOLUTION?

The 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere' (Dai Tōa Kyōei Ken), the well-known Japanese plan to liberate all of Asia from Western imperialism, gave hope to those who were keen on freeing themselves from Western rule. But in Vietnam, this grandiose policy remained contradictory. The problem was that if Japanese propaganda calling for 'Asia for the Asians' appealed to the Vietnamese, the Japanese vision of Vietnam as a 'backward nation' mitigated Vietnamese enthusiasm for working with the Japanese. This factor is important when one considers the ambiguous position of the Tran Trong Kim government in April 1945 in its relations with the Japanese.

The Tran Trong Kim government has often been presented as a pro-Dai Viet government.[34] This confusion is due, in our view, to two things. First, the

political scene in northern Vietnam was dominated by the actions of the Dai Viet parties, grouped within the Dai Viet Alliance. For example, the Alliance organized the majority of the public demonstrations during this short period, namely the anniversary of the Trung Sisters, the National Festival of the Hung Kings, the Commemoration of the Revolt of Yen Bay, as well as more directly political demonstrations in August 1945.[35] Second, it was easy at the time to label the Tran Trong Kim government pro-Japanese. Use of 'Dai Viet' led to a misleading association of Vietnam with 'Dai Nippon' (Greater Japan). To our knowledge, no member of the Tran Trong Kim government belonged to the Dai Viet parties, even if a personality like Tran Trong Kim was certainly appreciated by these parties.[36]

The relations between the Tran Trong Kim government and the Japanese authorities have been well treated by Masaya Shiraishi.[37] The different plans leading up to the Operation 'Meigo' and the serious divergence of views between the Japanese Army and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs resulted in a half-baked solution favouring the military view over that of the civilians, and thus the maintenance of the status quo instead of national independence. The Japanese excluded therefore their main protégé, Cuong De, and his possible prime minister, Ngo Dinh Diem. David Marr presents the most likely understanding of the Japanese choice: 'General Tsuchihashi deliberately excluded both Cuong De and Diem when he rejected key portions of the coup and postcoup plans developed by Colonel Hayashi in late 1944'.[38] Or, as Ralph Smith remarks: 'Once again the Japanese need for stability and continuity, which had been given so much emphasis by the army, prevailed over the more idealistic notions of those who wanted to encourage Vietnamese nationalism'.[39] The tandem, Bao Dai-Tran Trong Kim was considered to be the easiest one to manipulate.[40] Tran Trong Kim recognized that he was not qualified to form any such government and that he had no political organization behind him.[41] Following the refusal of Diem, and a second invitation to Tran Trong Kim to form a new government, the latter accepted. He could only surround himself with patriotic intellectuals who were absolutely not pro-Japanese, with the possible exception of Tran Van Chuong.[42]

Was this government favourably inclined towards the Dai Viet's political perspective? One should recall the two primary goals of the Cabinet: to combat the famine that had killed almost two million people in the North between 1944 and 1945 and to begin the territorial reunification and modernization of Vietnam.[43] On that note, the Dai Viet parties were all favourably disposed towards and gave

measured support to the Tran Trong Kim cabinet.[44] For these nationalists, the revolutionary process, underway since the late 1930s for the Dai Viet parties, was en route.

Thus, the DVQDD organized its own *maquis* in Kep (Bac Giang province), Lac Trieu (Hai Duong province) and then at Chapa and the DVDD did the same in Nga My (Ninh Binh province). The DVQX remained mainly in Hanoi and Haiphong to prepare for the eventuality of a takeover by nationalist forces. The DVDC, through the *Ngay Nay* newspaper, remained the intellectual avant-garde of this nebula. They were now only waiting for the favourable moment. Their aim remained a Vietnamese *social* and *national* revolution, of which the Tran Trong Kim government was but one phase.

The Dai Viet Alliance also tried to play a role in the formation of a new, independent Vietnamese government under the Japanese. Immediately after the coup, the Dai Viet Alliance created a committee for the constitution of a new government. The parties of 'national and social tendency', together with the DVQGLM, met in Hanoi on 11 and 12 March. After these meetings, they formed the 'Dai Viet Quoc Gia Cach Mang' also called the 'Viet Nam Quoc Dan Hoi', operating at 23 rue Quanh Thanh in Hanoi.[45] It offered its services to the Japanese authorities but did not receive the least attention from them.

The only Dai Viet force that committed itself politically to the Japanese was the DVQX, which played a role as an indigenous paramilitary force.[46] Nhat Linh, leader and founder of DVDC and who was rather pro-Japanese at the outset,[47] crossed over to the pro-Chinese camp in mid-1945. The DVQDD and the DVDD had not shown any allegiance to Japan and its imperialist politics. On the contrary, from 1939 to mid-1945, the DVQDD had its own *maquis* and trained partisans in its own military schools. As far as we can tell, its instructors were of two types: non-commissioned officers of the colonial infantry trained by the French and Vietnamese military graduates of the Whampoa Political-Military Academy in Canton.[48] In order to obtain arms, the clandestine military schools of the DVQDD turned to stealing from the colonial infantry's depots or called on the services of *tho phi* ('pirate') suppliers, Chinese pirates who controlled a part of the arms traffic between northern Vietnam and southern China.[49] In fact, all of them thought they would be able to lead a Dai Viet revolution at the opportune moment.

But, things did not turn out according to their hopes. The Alliance did not gain official Japanese backing, nor any chance to work in the new cabinet led by

Tran Trong Kim until August 1945.[50] These disappointed hopes and the acceleration of history in July-August 1945 led to a definitive break within the Alliance and finally to its outlawing after the insurrection of August 1945.[51] To our knowledge, the Dai Viet parties, from their creation to 1945, benefited little from their contact with the Japanese, in contrast to the Cao Dai or Hoa Hao forces in the South.[52] This marginalization of the Dai Viet parties under the Japanese would put them in an even more difficult position when the Japanese surrendered in August and the ICP began to take power.

THE FAILURE OF NON-COMMUNISTS TO TAKE POWER AFTER THE JAPANESE SURRENDER

As we have shown, the organization of the Dai Viet parties and the tenor of their calls for independence and the unification of the country increased markedly after the Japanese coup. The Dai Viet Alliance that had been mobilized in order to influence the formation of a new government gradually lost hope of having an impact on events. Ironically, only after the defeat of the Japanese in Vietnam did non-communist nationalists receive some sort of tangible support from the Japanese.

The Dai Viet Alliance finally attempted a takeover in early August 1945. However, under pressure, Nguyen Xuan Chu, then president of the 'Directing Committee of Northern Policy' – established by the Hue Court to deal with the confused situation – refused to resign and to turn his power over to the Dai Viet parties.[53] Chu's legalistic position did not prevent Nguyen Xuan Tieu, the leader of the Alliance, from attempting an armed takeover on 16 August. Following rumours that French escapees, rearmed, were going to retake the town, the Alliance baulked.[54] This hesitation was fatal. In the following days, between 17 and 25 August, local Viet Minh cells took power in the country. In this desperate situation, internal divisions among the Dai Viet parties only made matters worse. On 17 August, during a reunion of these nationalists, two groups emerged. The first, led by Nguyen Xuan Tieu (DVQX) and Le Khang (VNQDD), called for an immediate *coup d'état* in response to the advances of the Viet Minh. The second, under the direction of Truong Tu Anh and Pham Khai Hoan (DVQDD), refused to take power by force and run the risk of a civil war.[55] Because of the nationalist disunity, the Dai Viet August revolution was a complete failure.

During the race for power and during the revolutionary process, the Dai Viet parties were too divided and not as well organized as the Viet Minh cadres,

who were specialists in agit-prop. The August Revolution came as a surprise for many nationalists. Caught off guard and divided, they let opportunities pass them by. An attentive reading of the newspaper *Binh Minh* or of the *Hai Phong Nhat Bao*, the Dai Viet Alliance information organ, indicates rather clearly that the pro-Japanese option was maintained until the capitulation, placing the nationalist forces in an uncomfortable position in relation to the arriving Allied forces.[56] The Viet Minh, perfectly aware of this weakness, stepped up this caricature of the nationalists in its propaganda. During the August events, the *Binh Minh* was not yet hostile to the Viet Minh, which had been able to seize this unique opportunity to stage a 'successful taking of power' in favour of the revolutionaries.[57] Until the end of August, most revolutionaries of all camps and of all parties seemed to believe in the possibility of joint participation in the affairs of the new state. They would lose out again.

A second nationalist alliance had taken form in southern China in May 1945. It also brought together Dai Viet parties (DVQDD and DVDC) and the Overseas Section branch of the VNQDD, exiled in China since the repression of 1930.[58] This alliance, the 'Nationalist Parties Front' (Mat Tran Quoc Dan Dang or QDD), backed by the Chinese Kuomintang (Guomindang), developed a programme of intervention in Vietnam in order to take power after the Viet Minh victory. Thus, even though the Dai Viet Alliance had fallen apart, the new Quoc Dan Dang Front had from September entered into direct armed conflict inside Vietnam with the newly formed Democratic Republic of Vietnam. In northern and central Vietnam, this nationalist front defended its positions in the countryside until its forces were almost completely wiped out at the end of 1946.[59]

In effect, the coming to power of the DRV on 2 September 1945 was the death knell for the Dai Viet parties who, when outlawed by the new regime and the object of police repression by the Viet Minh, had to return to clandestine operations. They were gradually eliminated and, like most of the revolutionary nationalists in the North and the Centre, took refuge again in China.[60]

In the South, the events had taken another turn, much more complex, for both the Viet Minh and the nationalists allied in yet another newly formed 'National United Front' (Mat Tran Quoc Gia Thong Nhat; later called Mat Tran Quoc Gia Lien Hiep).[61] The anti-French forces regrouped in the South held numerous non-communist nationalist partisans such as Huynh Van Tri (Muoi Tri), Nguyen Hoa Hiep, and numerous 'Independent Troops' (Bo Doi Rieng) inside and outside the Viet Minh.

TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE: DEFEATED JAPANESE SUPPORT OF THE QDD FRONT

Paradoxically, Japanese aid to the anti-French forces (QDD and Viet Minh) would only come after their very defeat. As is well known, the Allied armies (the Chinese in the north of Indochina and the British in the south) were given the task of accepting the surrender of around 100,000 men making up the Japanese troops in Vietnam.[62] But in spite of this surrender, more than 5,000 deserters or dissidents remained in Vietnam for military as well as personal reasons.[63] In other words, only after the August Revolution did Japanese unofficially 'intervene' on behalf of the nationalists. They helped the QDD in running military training schools, in particular the famous infantry school at Yen Bay (Truong Luc Quan Yen Bai Tran Quoc Tuan)[64] and did not hesitate to furnish arms to the Dai Viet fighters.[65] At the Yen Bay camp, two training manuals of the Japanese infantry were translated by a young nationalist named Long.[66]

Furuta Motoo and Oka Kazuaki have tried to explain the principal reasons that led Japanese to remain in Indochina. First, Japan had been devastated and occupied by the Americans, so that many Japanese had grave misgivings about returning to the mother country. Second, the former members of the Japanese police forces (*kenpeitai*), in fear of being made prisoners and of being brought to justice as war criminals by the Allied Forces, took refuge in Vietnamese society. Third, many young Japanese officers and warrant officers were still committed to the Pan-Asian ideal, and voluntarily took part in the resistance within the Viet Minh or Dai Viet forces, faithful to the watchword of 'Liberation of Asia'.[67] Thus, many soldiers, including the most nationalist, left the ranks of the imperial army to pursue the fight. Approximately 400 Japanese joined the Viet Minh, primarily as military instructors or commanding officers.

Fewer Japanese soldiers joined the different Vietnamese forces in the South.[68] This difference is easily explained. North of the sixteenth parallel, Japanese activities were only loosely checked by the Chinese, whereas in the South French forces, aided by the British, were able to return in September 1945 and immediately took steps to bring Japanese forces under their command.[69] In this way, the deserters in the North were able to 'work' much more easily for over a year until the outbreak of full-scale war in northern Vietnam in December 1946.[70]

These Japanese deserter-centurions, experts in military science, were obviously sought after by the radical political organizations, such as the DVQDD and above all the Viet Minh.[71] Skilfully, the Viet Minh was able to make use of these

Japanese to train its troops.[72] For its part, the DVQDD also recruited Japanese. Thus, the head of the DVQDD, Truong Tu Anh, ordered agents in the North to recruit Japanese officers and warrant officers who were troubled by their defeat.[73] He gave them Vietnamese names and gathered them in four places in Hanoi where they were taught the doctrines of the party on the 'people's existence'.[74]

However, the QDD nationalist forces found themselves in a more difficult situation, even if they benefited from the protection of certain Japanese soldiers. For one, most of these Japanese deserters had joined the DRV, thinking it to be the only legal government available.[75] Isolated politically, the QDD nationalists therefore had an even harder time gaining what was rapidly diminishing Japanese aid. Moreover, the Viet Minh also used these deserters against the QDD groups. From 1946, the French knew that this group of Japanese deserters, called 'La légion étrangère du Viet-nam' (The Foreign Legion of Vietnam), would opt for two kinds of action in case of a French landing: some 'isolated' individuals would organize and lead Viet Minh combat groups whereas 'formed units' of Japanese would serve as storm troopers for the DRV government.[76] Between August 1945 and the end of 1946, Japanese allied with the nationalists were killed or arrested during confrontations with the Viet Minh.[77] In the South, Dai Viet troops in the region of Ba Queo were integrated into the Binh Xuyen forces (in the twenty fifth Binh Xuyen Regiment, also called 25AB Regiment). Japanese were also killed during confrontations with the French Expeditionary Corps.[78]

JAPANESE FRIENDS OF DAI VIET RESISTANCE

Two remarkable cases of Japanese aid to Vietnamese revolutionary nationalists are worth mentioning: that of Komatsu Kiyoshi and Watanabe Hitomi, alias '*Anh* Be'.[79] Without going into the details of their activities within the ranks of the nationalists, one should nonetheless note that their aid to the Vietnamese was as emotional as it was concrete, notably in the furnishing of arms. Anh Be served in the Dai Viet southern resistance of the 'An Dien Troops' (Bo Doi An Dien) led by Bui Huu Phiet. Because of his ardent support, he was later remembered 'as a grand Japanese who asked to take part in the resistance'.[80] Komatsu, for his part, helped protect and install the nationalists in the South.[81] However, Komatsu's dream of uniting all the resistance forces within the same government remained a utopia, as the Viet Minh's increasing hold on power showed each day.[82]

Were their cases isolated? It is hard to say for the moment.[83] However, the sources allow us to affirm that young Japanese deserters were numerous and a certain number of them decided to remain definitively in Vietnam instead of returning to their devastated country. In a way, they followed the example of the young actor Yasui Shoji in *The Harp of Burma* (*Biruma no Tategoto,* 1956), the beautiful film realized by Kon Ichikawa.[84]

In his memoirs, Nguyen Tuong Bach, younger brother of Nhat Linh, recalls officer Hung, the head instructor of the QDD forces training camp of Chapa, at a farewell meal after the folding of the nationalists:

> The Japanese officers were also very enthusiastic, drinking much. Because they were exiled, their lives hung only by a thread, knowing that the Allied Forces would most probably arrest them, and bring them to justice. … In the middle of the banquet, an officer – named Hung – the head instructor, rose and executed a figure with his sabre, and then started a Japanese farewell song ('Sayonara') to the beat of his alcohol bowl. We did not understand his song but its tragic voice, similar to a lamentation so particular to the Japanese language, made us tremble with emotion. Only the unfortunate ones, those that were leaving, could feel this song. Three other Japanese accompanied it with tears in their eyes. Deep in my soul, I ardently wished them to return to their native land within their families and live simply, to forget the past errors.[85]

In his recent memoirs, Pham Van Lieu, an old Dai Viet militant who served in the QDD forces, emphasises the role of Japanese officers in the Military School of Chapa. This school, created on 1 January 1946, was entirely commanded by Japanese deserters who had joined the Dai Viet resistance. Lieu mentions that six of these 'new Vietnamese' helped the nationalists to train around 300 Dai Viet students, giving them lessons in Japanese military techniques that were translated into Vietnamese. He recalled that each of these Japanese officers adopted a *nom de guerre* from the Tran dynasty, which had led Vietnamese resistance to the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century. Thus, the Dai Viet Troops (Dai Viet Bo Doi) were directed by Japanese instructors Tran Anh Hung (Captain and Head-Officer), Tran Thanh Dan, Tran Trung Dung (Bo Doi A), Tran Anh Quoc (Bo Doi B), Tran Trung Than (Bo Doi C), and Tran Trong Nang (Bo Doi C2).[86]

CONCLUSION

As we have seen, the Dai Viet political organizations, armed with a new conception of nationalism, benefited from the Japanese presence in Indochina. However, like Cuong De, Ngo Dinh Diem and Nguyen Xuan Chu, who have been presented as benefiting from Japanese support, they were nonetheless excluded from the Tran Trong Kim Cabinet and military support during the revolutionary period of 1945. The desertions described above seem to have been in a minority, still not widely known and especially about the cases of desertions inside the nationalist forces.

The role played by the Japanese was paradoxical and occurred in two stages. While Japanese authorities still had the possibility of playing their pro-nationalist cards in Vietnam before August 1945, they chose to maintain the status quo to the detriment of the Dai Viet groups that had been organized to receive power from them. Then, following the capitulation, Japanese deserters or dissidents naturally leaned towards helping the newly formed Vietnamese government, the DRV, instead of helping the nationalist opposition.

From Nanking (Nanjing) and Hongkong, this opposition was reorganized in 1947 and the Greater Vietnamese Nationalist Party (DVQDD) went underground in order to organize its support for Bao Dai. This party, the only one to maintain the name 'Dai Viet', would reconstitute its forces and play a key role in Vietnamese politics in the following decade. The party took over the administration of the North, thanks to Governor Nguyen Huu Tri, directed the police and trained some of the future officers of the National Army, who were instructed in Nha Trang, under the direction of Nguyen Ton Hoan. It carried out an almost impossible fight against communism, in the form of Viet Minh, using the regional forces placed under its direction (Bao Chinh Doan), and at the same time fought against the French by maintaining a constant pressure on the various Baodaist governments and on the emperor himself. Ironically, the Dai Viet found itself yet again in a difficult position. Strongly opposed to communism and to the DRV in particular, the Dai Viet had no other choice but to work with the French who, like the Japanese, were still unwilling to grant full independence to even a non-communist Vietnam.

NOTES

1 F. Guillemot, 'Viêt-nam 1945–1946: L'élimination de l'opposition nationaliste et anticolonialiste au Nord au cœur de la fracture vietnamienne', at International

Conference, 'Vietnam since 1945: States, Margins and Constructions of the Past', Paris, 11–12 January 2001.

2 The coming to power of the Popular Front in France allowed greater political liberalization in Indochina. Many VNQDD and ICP prisoners in Poulo Condore were liberated. Political groups, such as the Trotskyists, were authorized to vote in local elections in Cochin China, while the freedom of the press was better respected.

3 D.G. Marr, *Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, 1920–1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), p. 415.

4 In particular the faculties of medicine and law, the Buoi and Albert Sarraut lycées. See Nguyen Xuan Chu, *Hoi Ky Nguyen Xuan Chu* [Memoirs of Nguyen Xuan Chu] (Houston: Van Hoa, 1996), pp. 35 and 107–108; Le Van Sieu, *Van Hoc Su Thoi Khang Phap, 1858–1945* [History of literature during the anti-French resistance, 1858–1945] (Saigon: Tri Dang, 1974, reprinted in the USA, 1991), p. 370; Nguyen Thanh, *Mat Tran Viet Minh* [The Viet Minh Front] (Hanoi: Nxb Su That, 1991), p. 40; Nguyen Tuong Bach, *Viet Nam Mot The Ky Qua* [Vietnam, the passing of the century] (California: Nxb Thach Ngu, 1998), pp. 91–101. Interview with Nguyen Ton Hoan (5 December 1998).

5 *Ban Tuyen Ngon cua Dai Viet Quoc Dan Dang* [Declaration of the Dai Viet Quoc Dan Dang], in Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre (SHAT), 10H 607. On the founding date, 1936 or 1938, see Nguyen Can Canh, 'Thanh nien va cac phong trao chong Phap thoi can dai (1900–1945)' [Youth and anti-French movements during the modern period], *Dong Viet,* no. 2, Fasc. II (September 1994), p. 498; interviews with Nguyen Ton Hoan (5 December 1998), Nguyen Van Canh (11 December 1998) and letter to the author from Nguyen Van Canh dated 24 February 1999.

6 See F. Guillemot, *Réflexions sur l'existence du mouvement nationaliste vietnamien: le cas du Dai Viêt, 1940–1955* (Paris: EPHE, mémoire de DEA, 1998), pp. 97–98. Some sources place the founding date of several small parties, such as the DVDD, at a later date, around 1940–1941. See also R.B. Smith, 'The Japanese Period in Indochina and the Coup of 9 March 1945', *Journal of Southeast Asia Studies*, vol. 9 no. 2 (1978), p. 274.

7 See Guillemot, *Réflexions,* pp. 98–100. The party about which we have the most documentation (archives and monographs) is the DVQDD. The majority of the documentation on the DVDD relates to the works of its founder, republished first in Saigon in the 1960s, and later in the United States, after 1975. The DVDD Doctrine is still appreciated as a source of reflection today (see for example: Pham Khac Ham, *Triet Ly Ly Dong A* [The Philosophy of Ly Dong A], 1998). On the DVDC of Nhat Linh, some archival documents of 1941 inform us of the goals of the party. However, the documentation concerning the DVQX remains extremely sparse, other than a few tidbits in nationalist press of the 1940s.

8 We use the expression 'race' as it was employed by the French press and Vietnamese nationalists before 1945. See for example: *Phan Boi Chau Toan Tap, Tap 2* (Hue: Nxb Thuan Hoa, 1990), p. 347 and P.-É. Cadilhac, 'Une enquête sur l'Union Indochinoise', *L'Illustration,* no. 5071 (11 May 1940).

9 C.E. Goscha, *Vietnam or Indochina? Contesting Concepts of Space in Vietnamese Nationalism, 1887–1954* (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, NIAS Reports, no. 28, 1995), p. 7, n. 2; for examples, see the references cited by Goscha, p. 67, n. 168 and n. 169.

10 See Vu Ngu Chieu, *The Other Side of the 1945 Vietnamese Revolution: The Empire of Vietnam (3–8/1945). A New Interpretation* (Houston: Van Hoa, Bilingual Series, 1996), pp. 35, 88.

11 Minh Mang, however, would later take up the term 'Dai Viet' for a short time before 'Dai Nam' became the official name of this very contested dynasty. For details, see P. Langlet, *L'ancienne historiographie d'État au Vietnam, T. I* (Paris: EFEO, 1990), p. 74; Goscha, *Vietnam or Indochina?*, pp. 13–16; Guillemot, *Réflexions,* pp. 100–101. Also see Hoang Co Thuy, *Viet Su Khao Luan, Tap 9* [A research essay on Vietnamese history, Book 9], (Antony: Hoi Van Hoa Hai Ngoai, 1992), p. 1963, in which the author points out that the national appellation, 'Dai Viet', used from the times of the Emperor Ly Thanh Ton (1054) until the end of the Tay Son, had been in use for about 750 years.

12 Ta Chi Dai Truong, *Nhung Bai Van Su* [Historical and literary works] (Garden Grove: Van Hoc, 1999), p. 53.

13 The names of the parties 'Dai Viet Dan Chinh' or 'Dai Viet Duy Dan' refer to the ideas of 'authenticity' and 'unicity' of Dai Viet.

14 However, our idea here is not to mix up Hitlerian ideology with Sun Yat-sen's but rather to suggest that there were a number of pamphlets and writings that channelled a wide range of diverse ideas into Vietnam. It is not clear whether L. Gumplowicz's concept of the 'struggle of races' (*Rassenkampf*) was well known in Indochina. However, some basic ideas of German national-socialism were known by a few activists of the DVDC associated with Nhat Linh. Most of these documents arrived in Indochina in French translation. They influenced, in part, the political programmes and actions of the Dai Viet parties. The other influences came from the admiration of Imperial Japan via the stories of the old Dong Du partisans and the Sun Yat-sen doctrine of 'People's livelihood'.

15 On this subject, see *Le Triple Démisme de Suen Wen,* translated, annotated and appraised by P.M. D'Elia (Shanghai: Bureau Sinologique de Zi-Ka-Wei, 1930); Ton Trung Son [Sun Yat-sen], *Tam Dan Chu Nghia* [The doctrine of the three principles] (Saigon: Nha in Levanthe, 1965), translated by Ngo Tam Ly; M.-C.

Bergère, *Sun Yat Sen* (Paris: Fayard, 1994), pp. 400–450 (Ch. X: 'Le Triple Démisme de Sun Yat Sen'); Ton Trung Son, *Chu Nghia Tam Dan* [The doctrine of the three principles] (Hanoi: Vien Thong Tin Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi, 1995), translated by Nguyen Nhu Diem and Nguyen Tu Tri. See also: M.B. Jansen, *The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970). On Japan, see K. Nishida, 'L'essence nationale du Japon' (Kokutai), in *Cent ans de pensée au Japon,* vol. 2 (Arles: Picquier, 1996), pp. 81–114, translated and presented by P. Lavelle.

16 See *Tuyen Ngon DVQDD* ('Phan thu hai: Dan Toc Sinh Ton Chu Nghia') [Declaration of the DVQDD (Second part: The doctrine of people's existence)] ([USA], 1985), an almost identical copy of *Ban tuyen ngon cua DVQDD,* SHAT, 10H 607, translated in 10H 4199, 'Proclamation du Parti Nationaliste Dai Viêt' (2 May 1948); Hung Nguyen, *Dan Toc Sinh Ton Chu Nghia* [The doctrine of people's existence] (Cosa Mesa: Tu Sach Nguoi Dan, 1989); Viet Son, 'Quan Diem Dan Toc Sinh Ton Trong Coi Moi' [The outlook of the people's existence)], *Dai Viet,* no. 4 (Union City, 1993), pp. 11–12; SHAT, 10H 607, Sehan, BR no. 2643, April–May 1950 ('Troisième leçon: Doctrine de la survivance').

17 See Hue-Tam Ho Tai, *Radicalism and the Origins of the Vietnamese Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 2–3, 20–22.

18 SHAT, 10H 607, Sesag, no. 1453 (18 Jan. 1948), BR a/s *Principes d'organisation du Parti DVQDD (traduction);* Bui Diem (with D. Chanoff), *In the Jaws of History* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 22.

19 A fifth, the Greater Vietnamese Restoration Association (Dai Viet Phuc Hung Hoi), was created in central Vietnam and was more of an exception given its short life. This small party, created by Ngo Dinh Diem in 1942, was nonetheless very active and rapidly suppressed from June 1944. See Hoang Co Thuy, *Viet Su Khao Luan,* p. 1963; Chinh Dao, *Viet Nam Nien Bieu 1939–1975* [A chronicle of Vietnam] (*Tap A: 1939–1946*) (Houston: Van Hoa, 1996), pp. 181, 185 and 186; Lu Giang, *Nhung Bi An Lich Su Dang Sau Cuoc Chien Viet Nam, quyen 1* [The notable historical secrets of the Vietnam War, Book 1] (Garden Grove: Lu Giang, 1999), pp. 91–98.

20 For details, see R. Bauchar, *Rafales sur l'Indochine* (Paris: Fournier & Cie, 1946), pp. 41–49.

21 See Gaudel, *L'Indochine Française face au Japon,* pp. 48–49; Bauchar, *Rafales sur l'Indochine,* pp. 60–69; Cuong De, *Cuoc Doi Cach Mang Cuong De* [The revolutionary life of Cuong De] (Saigon: Tran Liet, 1957), pp. 134–136; Pham Van Son, *Viet Nam Tranh Dau Su* [History of Vietnamese struggle] (Paris: Idase, 1987), pp. 177–180; M. Shiraishi, 'Betonamu Fukkoku Domeikai to 1940 nen fukkokugun hoki ni tsuite' [On the League for the National Restoration of Vietnam and the 1940 revolt by the Restoration Army], *Ajia keizai* [Asian economies] 23, no. 4 (1982), cited by

M. Shiraishi, 'The Background to the Formation of the Tran Trong Kim Cabinet in April 1945: Japanese Plans for Governing Vietnam', in *Indochina in the 1940s and 1950s* (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, Translation Series II, 1992), p. 114, n. 6; K. Tachikawa, 'Independence Movement in Vietnam and Japan during WWII', *NIDS Security Reports* (National Institute for Defense Studies), no. 2 (March 2001), pp. 93–115 (especially pp. 96–101).

22 See Hoang Van Dao, *Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang* [The Vietnam Nationalist Party] (Saigon: 1970 second edition), pp. 227–229; Smith, 'The Japanese Period in Indochina', p. 274; Nguyen Tuong Bach, *Viet Nam Mot The Ky Qua*, p. 144. According to Quang Huy, in a series of hagiographic articles published in Saigon concerning the studied period, the Dai Viet Alliance would have been created as early as 1943 by revolutionary scholar Le Phuc Thien, originating from the province of Thanh Hoa. He would have had many contacts with the Japanese. A reading of this document suggests the argument that the Japanese could have suggested the Alliance is largely plausible; see Quang Huy, 'Si Khi Ai Chau' [The scholar-gentry of Ai Chau], *Sai Gon Moi,* nos 82–92 (25 October–5 November, 1968). I am grateful to Professor Nguyen The Anh for providing me with a complete copy of this document. According to other sources, the DVQGLM was created after the Japanese coup; we think it was just reorganized at this time. See, for example: Le Gian, *Nhung Ngay Song Gio* [Stormy days, memoirs] (Hanoi: Nxb Thanh Nien, 1985), p. 122; Pham Van Son, *Viet Nam Tranh Dau Su,* p. 181; Duong Trung Quoc, *Viet Nam Nhung Su Kien Lich Su 1858–1945, tap IV: 1936–1945* [The historical events of Vietnam, 1858–1945, Book IV] (Hanoi: Nxb Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi, 1989), p. 228.

23 Quang Huy, 'Si Khi Ai Chau', p. 14.

24 See Quang Minh, *Cach Mang Viet Nam Thoi Can Kim, Dai Viet Quoc Dan Dang 1938–1995* [The contemporary Vietnamese revolution: The Dai Viet Quoc Dan Dang, 1938–1995] (Westminster: Nxb Van Nghe, 2000), pp. 110–111.

25 For a complete explanation of the course of the Japanese takeover, see Smith, 'The Japanese Period in Indochina', pp. 268–301.

26 M. Ducoroy, *Ma trahison en Indochine* (Paris: Les Éditions Internationales, 1949), p. 201; Nguyen Vy, *Tuan, Chang Trai Nuoc Viet, tap 2* [Tuan, the young Vietnamese, Book 2] ([USA], Dai Nam, undated), p. 513. In Hanoi, on the evening of 11 March, 30,000 people demonstrated in support of the 'Greater Nationalist-Revolutionary Vietnam' (Dai Viet Quoc Gia Cach Mang) under the aegis of the DVQGLM, see *Dong Phat,* no. 5962 (12 March 1945), p. 1. In the South, a big demonstration occurred on 18 March to herald the newly won independence and 'to thank Japan'. See Doan Them, *Hai Muoi Nam Qua. Viet Tung Ngay, 1945–1964* [Twenty years gone by: a daily record 1945–1964] (Los Alamitos: Xuan Thu, n.d.), p. 5.

27 See for example the plans for a takeover prepared by nationalists in the South in order to bring the 'Dai Nam Quoc' to power. CAOM, HCI 57, CSTFEO, BCR, no. 755/1000/B3 (18 Feb. 1947): 'Les partis révolutionnaires annamites et l'occupant japonais, fin 1940–septembre 1945' (doc. C10).

28 K.K. Nitz, 'Independence without Nationalists? The Japanese and Vietnamese Nationalism during the Japanese Period, 1940–45', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, vol. 15, no. 1 (1984), pp. 108–133.

29 M. Shiraishi, 'La présence japonaise en Indochine', in P. Isoart (ed.), *L'Indochine Française 1940–1945* (Paris, PUF, 1982), pp. 219–227 (§ II 'Les contacts japonais avec les nationalistes vietnamiens') and 'The Background to the Formation of the Tran Trong Kim Cabinet', pp. 115–118.

30 On the origins of the Black Dragon, see Sang Il Han, 'Uchida Ryohei and the Japanese Continental Expansionism, 1874–1916' (Claremont Graduate School, Ph.D. dissertation, 1974). See also Jansen, *The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen*; R. Seth, *Espions du Soleil levant* (Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1961), pp. 67–68; R. Deacon, *Kempei Tai: The Japanese Secret Service Then and Now* (Tokyo: C.E. Tuttle Company, 1991), Ch. 5: 'Colonel Akashi and the Black Dragon Society'; SHAT, 10H600, BRCI, no. 7804/1000 (30 Dec. 1946), 'Les services spéciaux japonais et le problème japonais en Indochine', pp. 189–190.

31 SHAT, 10H 4201, Sesag, no. 4583 (29 July 1948), BR a/s 'Activités de Nguyên Huu Thi'; see also Sesag, BR no. 4438 (15 July 1948). We have been unable to identify with certitude whether he was also the Minister of Public Works in the new government of Tran Trong Kim; it seems not.

32 SHAT, 10H 643, 'Étude sur le parti Dai Viêt', p. 4; A. Patti, *Why Vietnam? Prelude to America's Albatross* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 301–306 (§ 'Japanese Clandestine Apparatus'). For a detailed account of relations between the Vietnamese nationalists and the Japanese before 9 March, see Nitz, 'Independence without Nationalists?', pp. 114–119.

33 Naturally, the Japanese role in Vietnam was more complex. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not systematically support the 'liberation of Asian peoples' and, on the contrary, agents of the Black Dragon were consistently in favour of support for ethnic national liberation from its inception. Uchida's organization had also many supporters in the Japanese Imperial Army. For further details about Japanese action at different levels (civilian level, Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Imperial Army), see Tachikawa, 'Independence Movement in Vietnam', pp. 101–114.

34 See for example: J. Chesneaux, *Contribution à l'histoire de la nation vietnamienne* (Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1955), p. 233; Patti, *Why Vietnam?*, p. 478 as well as G. Boudarel, '1945: sous le drapeau rouge', in *Hanoi 1936–1996. Du drapeau rouge au billet vert* (Paris: Éditions Autrement, Mémoires no. 48, 1997), p. 85.

35 See David G. Marr, *Vietnam 1945, The Quest for Power* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), p. 357.

36 Tran Trong Kim's nephew, Bui Diem, who was a Dai Viet member, however, reports that he was designated by Truong Tu Anh, the leader of the DVQDD, to be a discreet link between the party and his uncle. See Bui Diem, *In the Jaws of History*, pp. 25–26, 30–33.

37 Shiraishi, 'La présence japonaise en Indochine' and 'The Background to the Formation of the Tran Trong Kim Cabinet'.

38 Marr, *Vietnam 1945*, p. 116, n. 175.

39 Smith, 'The Japanese Period in Indochina', p. 286.

40 Shiraishi, 'The Background to the Formation of the Tran Trong Kim Cabinet', p. 130.

41 Tran Trong Kim, *Mot Con Gio Bui* [Dust storm] (Saigon: 1969), pp. 49–50.

42 And even then, the case of Tran Van Chuong remains complex, as Boudarel has noted in '1945: sous le drapeau rouge', p. 102.

43 On the famine, see Marr, *Vietnam 1945*, pp. 96–107, 207–210; and recent works of Nguyen The Anh, 'Japanese Food Policies and the 1945 Great Famine in Indochina', in P. H. Kratoska (ed.), *Food Supplies and the Japanese Occupation in Southeast Asia* (New York: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 208–226; M. Furuta and Van Tao, *Nan doi nam 1945 o Viet Nam: Nhung chung tich lich su* [The 1945 famine of Vietnam: Historical records and evidence] (Hanoi: Vien Su Hoc Viet Nam, 1995). On Tran Trong Kim's reforms see Vu Ngu Chieu, *The Other Side of the 1945 Vietnamese Revolution*, pp. 29–54. Territorial reunification remained an issue, because the Japanese retained control of Cochin China when they conceded independence to the rest of Vietnam in early 1945.

44 See for example: *Hai Phong Nhat Bao,* no. 52 (14 May 1945), pp. 1–2 (interview with Tran Trong Kim). *Hai Phong Nhat Bao* [The Hai Phong Daily] was the information service of the DVQGLM in Haiphong.

45 See *Dong Phat,* no. 6018 (13 May 1945), p. 1; Quang Huy, 'Si Khi Ai Chau', p. 31; Huynh Kim Khanh, *Vietnamese Communism, 1925–1945* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), p. 297; Duong Trung Quoc, *Viet Nam Nhung Su Kien Lich Su,* pp. 228–229.

46 See the 'solemn call' of the DVQX of Thai Binh in *Hai Phong Nhat Bao,* no. 115 (9 August 1945), p. 2.

47 See the political programme of the DVDC: Centre des Archives d'Outre-Mer (CAOM), RST/NF 06495, Note no. 19720, Hanoi (16 September 1941): 'Activité révolutionnaire au Tonkin'.

48 Trieu Ton, 'Chien khu va quan truong' [War zone and military school], *Dai Viet,* no. 4 [Union City, 1993], p. 19; Trieu Ton, 'Chien khu va quan truong', *Dai Viet,* no. 6 [Union City, 1993], p. 41; Hoang Ton Van, 'Viet Nam Mau Lua' [Vietnam in the firestorm], *Dai Viet,* no. 9 [Houston, 1994], p. 63. Pham Cao Hung, alias Pham Thiet Hung (*anh* Giang), was a Dai Viet military leader who was sent to the South to build a resistance base after 9 March 1945. He was a colonel in the Chinese Kuomintang (Guomindang) army, had graduated from the nineteenth class of Whampoa in 1943 had participated in the 'Anti-Japanese Front of Truong Sa'. SHAT, 10H 4199, [rapport] no. 434/Z, QDD no. 26, Saigon (23 June 1948), pp. 1–2; [rapport] no. 631/Z, QDD no. 42, Saigon (10 September 1948), pp. 2–3 and Tran Kim Truc, *Toi Giet Nguyen Binh. Hoi Ky Cua Tham Muu Truong Trung Doan 25 Binh Xuyen* [I killed Nguyen Binh. Memoires of the chief of staff of the 25th Binh Xuyen regiment] (Saigon: Dong Nai, 1972), p. 66.

49 Trieu Ton, 'Chien khu va quan truong', *Dai Viet,* no. 6, pp. 41–42.

50 On the Tran Trong Kim cabinet, see Shiraishi, 'La présence japonaise en Indochine', pp. 233–238; Shiraishi, 'The Background to the Formation of the Tran Trong Kim Cabinet', pp. 113–141 ; Hoang Co Thuy, *Viet Su Khao Luan,* pp. 1946–1977; Marr, *Vietnam 1945,* pp. 113–151; Vu Ngu Chieu, *The Other Side of the 1945 Vietnamese Revolution*.

51 On the outlawing of the DVQDD and DVQX parties, the principal actors within the Dai Viet Alliance, see the Viet Minh press of 1945, such as: *Dan Chu,* no. 12 (7 Sept. 1945), p. 1; *Doc Lap,* no. 14 (14 Sept. 1945), p. 1; C.E. Goscha, *Tradition militante et rénovation culturelle au Viêt-nam: Réflexions sur le VNQDD, le Tu Luc Van Doan et la rupture d'un courant non-communiste (1927–1946)* (Paris: Université Paris VII, mémoire de DEA, 1994), p. 70 and n. 177. The latter document by Goscha focuses on the nationalist failure of 1946.

52 For details about the Japanese Army and its relations with the Cao Dai sect in the South, see Tachikawa, 'Independence Movement in Vietnam', pp. 108–112.

53 See Hoang Van Dao, *Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang*, pp. 241–242; Hoang Co Thuy, *Viet Su Khao Luan,* p. 1986; Lu Giang, *Nhung Bi An Lich Su,* pp. 205–206. In his memoirs, *Hoi Ky Nguyen Xuan Chu,* 'revised' by Chinh Dao and Nguyen Xuan Phac, it is strange that Nguyen Xuan Chu does not speak of his interview with Nguyen Xuan Tieu, leader of the DVQX, see pp. 279–284.

54 Hoang Van Dao, *Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang*, p. 244; Marr, *Vietnam 1945*, p. 375; Lu Giang, *Nhung Bi An Lich Su,* pp. 206–207. Basing himself on Hoang Van Dao's book, published in Saigon in 1965, Marr proposes the date of 14 August, at 2:00 P.M. The same book, updated in 1970, gives the date of 17 August, in the afternoon, and mentions notable differences in comparison with the first edition. Our current

research shows that the date of 16 August at the end of the afternoon is the most probable. See Hoang Co Thuy, *Viet Su Khao Luan*, p. 1986; Quang Minh, *Cach Mang Viet Nam*, pp. 112–113 ; Le Hong Lan, *Nhung ngay khoi nghia o Ha Noi* [Insurrectional Days in Hanoi] (Hanoi: Nxb Thanh Nien, 1975), p. 60; Nguyen Van Khoan (ed.), *Tong Khoi Nghia Thang 8-1945 tai Ha Noi. Viet Minh Hoang Dieu* [The general insurrection of August 1945 in Hanoi, The Viet Minh Hoang Dieu] (Ho Chi Minh City: Nxb Thanh Pho Ho Chi Minh, 2001), p. 199.

55 Hoang Van Dao, *Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang*, pp. 249–250; Lu Giang, *Nhung Bi An Lich Su,* pp. 206–208.

56 See in particular the *Hai Phong Nhat Bao* editorials of Nguyen Trieu Luat, a well-known intellectual affiliated with the VNQDD.

57 See for example *Binh Minh,* no. 128 (Monday, 20 August 1945), no. 129 (Tuesday, 21 August 1945) and no. 131 (Thursday, 23 August 1945).

58 Hoang Van Dao, *Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang*, pp. 218–219; Nguyen Tuong Bach, *Viet Nam Mot The Ky Qua,* pp. 155–156. The three parties, Overseas-VNQDD, DVDC and DVDD realized in China, on 12 January 1945, an initial political alliance in order to counter the Viet Minh and the ineffectiveness of the DMH. This alliance had one ideology, a unique command, flag and hymn. See Nguyen Tuong Bach, *Viet Nam Mot The Ky Qua*, pp. 143–144 and appendix pp. 295–299.

59 On the conflict opposing the nationalist front QDD and the communist Viet Minh Front in the North, see Hoang Van Dao, *Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang;* Nguyen Tuong Bach, *Viet Nam Nhung Ngay Lich Su* [Vietnam, The days of history] (Montreal: Tu Sach Nghien Cuu Su Dia, 1981), pp. 88–111; Hoang Tuong, *Viet Nam Dau Tranh 1930–1954* [Vietnam in struggle 1930–1945] (Westminster: Van Khoa Publishing House, 1987), pp. 89–101; Guillemot, 'Viêt-nam 1945–1946: l'élimination'.

60 Under the direction of Truong Tu Anh, the QDD planned a *coup d'état* in July 1946. However, the DRV's police discovered their plan and launched a severe crackdown on orders from Vo Nguyen Giap. Truong Tu Anh and Ly Dong A were kidnapped by the Viet Minh security forces by December 1946. Their disappearances weakened the Dai Viet parties, which had to reorganize themselves greatly in order to survive.

61 See SHAT, 10H 4201, Sûreté Fédérale en Cochinchine, Subdivision 1, no. 9380S, Saigon (23 July 1947), Brochure intitulée 'Les Fronts historiques', traduction de l'ouvrage de Viet Dau [Tran Van An], *Nhung Mat Tran Lich Su (1934–1947)* [The historical fronts, 1934–1947] (Saigon: Tu Dan, 1947).

62 SHAT, 10H 600, BRCI, no. 7804/1000: 'Les services spéciaux japonais', pp. 136–138; SHAT, 4Q 43, (d. 6): Présidence du Conseil, EM de la défense nationale, 2e Section, no. 958/DN/2, Paris (27 February 1947), Note de renseignements: 'Les Japonais en Indochine', p. 1. I am grateful to C. Goscha for sharing these documents with me.

63 Some were in close contact with the Vietnamese and were slowly 'Vietnamized'. The Vietminh called them 'New Vietnamese' (*nguoi Viet Nam moi*). See M. Furuta and K. Oka, 'Tu binh linh quan doi Thien hoang den chien si Viet Minh – vai net ve nhung nguoi Nhat tham gia Viet Minh' [From a soldier in the Imperial Army to an officer in the Viet Minh. Some points about the Japanese who participated in the Viet Minh], in Van Tao (ed.), *Cach Mang Thang Tam, mot so van de lich su* [The August Revolution: Some historical problems] (Hanoi: Nxb Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi, 1995), p. 320; SHAT, 10H 600, BRCI, no. 7804/1000: 'Les services spéciaux japonais', p. 181, télégramme 1. On the numbers of Japanese and their reasons for deserting, see SHAT, 10H 600, CSTFEO, EM/2B, no. 3787/2, Saigon (9 August 1946): 'Rapport sur la collusion nippo-Viêt Minh', p. 5; 10H 4363, CSFFEO, EM/MCAJ, no. 4272/SDJ, Saigon (17 August 1946), fiche de renseignements no. 22, p. 4; 10H 4363, CSFFEO, EM/MCAJ, no. 4592/SDJ, Saigon (24 September 1946), fiche de rens. no. 37; 4Q 43, (d. 6): 'Les Japonais en Indochine'. Particularly on this subject, see C.E. Goscha, 'Belated Allies: The Technical Contributions of Japanese Deserters to the Viet Minh (1945–1950)', in M. Young and R. Buzzanco (eds), *Blackwell Companion to the Vietnam War,* forthcoming.

64 Also known by the name 'Dai Viet Luc Quan Tran Quoc Tuan Quan Truong' [Tran Quoc Tuan military infantry school of the Dai Viet]. During the Viet Minh's attack on this base in 1946, several Japanese instructors were killed. SHAT, 10H 643, 'Étude sur le parti Dai Viêt', p. 13; Hoang Ton Van, 'Viet Nam Mau Lua', pp. 66–67. See also Bui Diem, *In the Jaws of History*, p. 41; Hoang Tuong, *Viet Nam Dau Tranh,* pp. 94–95.

65 See for example the supplying of arms to the An Dien troops in the South, led by the DVQDD. Tran Kim Truc, *Toi Giet Nguyen Binh.* pp. 68–74; Tran Van Quoi, 'Bo Doi An Dien Thu Duc trong nam dau khang chien chong Phap' [An Dien troops of Thu Duc during the first year of the anti-French resistance], in *Mua Thu Roi, Ngay Ham Ba, Tap 2: Doc Lap Hay La Chet* [Autumn is here already, the 23rd, Book 2: Independence or death] (Hanoi: Nxb Chinh Tri Quoc Gia, 1996), p. 205.

66 These two manuals were entitled in Vietnamese: *Tac Chien Yeu Vu Lenh* [Directives for essential combat operations] and *Bo Binh Thao Dien* [Ground manoeuvres], Hoang Ton van, 'Viet Nam Mau Lua', p. 67.

67 Furuta and Oka, 'Tu binh linh quan doi', pp. 314–323. For more details about the Japanese in the Viet Minh forces, see C. Goscha, 'Le contexte asiatique de la guerre franco-vietnamienne: réseaux, relations et économie' (Paris: EPHE, Ph.D. thesis, November 2000), vol. 1, pp. 368–402.

68 SHAT, 4Q 43, (d. 6): 'Les Japonais en Indochine', p. 1; 10H 4363, CSFFEO, EM/MCAJ, no. 4592/SDJ, Saigon (24 September 1946), Fiche de renseignements no. 37 ('Déserteurs Japonais dans les bandes rebelles'). It is likely that some of these

Japanese deserters, though originally in the South, decided to go to the North in order to take advantage of a greater liberty of action.

69 SHAT, 4Q 43, (d. 6): 'Les Japonais en Indochine', p. 1; SHAT, 10H 4304, CSFFEO, EM/2B, no. 1534 [?]/2, Saigon (21 Feb. 1946): 'Note sur les Japonais au Tonkin'.

70 SHAT, 10H 4363, CSFFEO, EM/MCAJ, no. 4272/SDJ, Saigon (17 August 1946), Fiche de renseignements no. 22, p. 1. Other deserters remained in Viet Minh ranks until 1950, such as Captain Mina Yoshima, who took the name Hoang Dinh Quang. SHAT, 10H 607, CFTVN et ZOT, EM/2B, no. 2884/ZOT/2 (16 April 1950).

71 Furuta and Oka, 'Tu binh linh quan doi', p. 318.

72 SHAT, 4Q 43, (d. 6): 'Les Japonais en Indochine', pp. 2–6; 10H 600, CSTFEO, EM/2B, no. 3787/2, Saigon (9 August 1946): 'Rapport sur la collusion nippo-Viêt Minh', pp. 5–6.

73 If a command had been given, we have not been able to find a written copy of it. The clandestine operations of the DVQDD suggest that written documents were extremely rare.

74 See Quang Minh, *Cach Mang Viet Nam*, pp. 123–124.

75 SHAT, 10H 600, BRCI, no. 7804/1000: 'Les services spéciaux japonais', p. 157. See also Furuta & Oka, 'Tu binh linh quan doi', p. 318.

76 SHAT, 10H 642, (d. Notes d'informations: 'Évolution de la situation politique en Indochine 1947–48–49'), FTEO, 2B, partie 'III. Les Japonais', s.d. [1946].

77 SHAT, 10H 2959, Cdt des TFIN, EM/2B/BRN, no. 2628/1200, 7 December1946 (Listes nominatives des Japonais). For example, Captain Kitazi, a partisan of the VNQDD, was arrested at Dong Trieu. In another case, a group of a dozen Japanese, also members of the VNQDD, were arrested at Vinh Yen during their return to Hanoi.

78 SHAT, 10H 98 (dossier 2), BRQ (8–9 February 1946); BR (10–11 April 1946). Also see Tran Van Quoi, 'Bo doi An Dien'.

79 Vinh Sinh, 'Komatsu Kiyoshi and French Indochina', *Moussons* 3 (2001), pp. 78–79; Tran Kim Truc, *Toi Giet Nguyen Binh;* Quang Minh, *Cach Mang Viet Nam,* p. 66.

80 Tran Kim Truc, *Toi Giet Nguyen Binh.* pp. 68–69. On the An Dien Troops and *maquis* of Dai Viet, see Quang Minh, *Cach Mang Viet Nam*, pp. 65–68, 74–77.

81 Vinh Sinh, 'Komatsu Kiyoshi and French Indochina', p. 78. On Komatsu, also see SHAT, 10H 600, BRCI, no. 7804/1000: 'Les services spéciaux japonais', pp. 160–161.

82 SHAT, 10H 600, BRCI, no. 7804/1000: 'Les services spéciaux japonais', p. 164.

83 We also know that eight Japanese instructors were fighting with the Dai Viet forces in Chapa, see Quang Minh, *Cach Mang Viet Nam*, p. 124; *Ngay Nay*, no. 580, p. B5.

84 A nice example of the psychological immersion in one of the countries 'liberated' by Japan.

85 See Nguyen Tuong Bach, *Viet Nam Mot The Ky Qua,* p. 281.

86 Unfortunately, Pham Van Lieu did not recall the Japanese names of these officers. See Pham Van Lieu, 'Truong Luc Quan Tran Quoc Tuan: Truong Vo Bi cua Quoc Dan Dang' (The Tran Quoc Tuan Infantry School: The Military School of the QDD), Ngay Nay, no. 480 (15 May 2002), pp. B5-B6; Pham Van Lieu, *Tra ta song nui, hoi ky 1* [Give us back the country, memoirs 1] (Houston: Van Hoa, 2002), ch. 3.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Accord and Discord: Japanese Cultural Policy and Philippine National Identity during the Japanese Occupation (1942–1945)

RICARDO T. JOSE

Japan's search for a political format to underpin its military expansion in Asia relied on two elements. Japan exploited its status as the first Asian country which had achieved rapid modernization to present itself as a natural model, and as the natural leader, for other Asians who wanted to modernize their own countries. And the Japanese played on various kinds of national identity to win political enthusiasm for their cause. They presented themselves as the champions of local nationalism against the imperialism of individual Western colonial powers and of China, while also casting themselves as leaders in a Pan-Asian anti-Western movement encompassing the whole region. When Japan occupied the Philippines in 1941–1942, however, these strategies turned out to be of very limited use. America's own standing as a modern power and the high degree of autonomy it had given to the Philippines meant that Japan's claims to be a modernizer and a liberator rang hollow, and the Japanese interaction with Filipinos was marked by clumsy propaganda on the Japanese side and cynical collaboration by Filipinos.

Japan's interests in the Philippines were mainly strategic. The archipelago had some mineral resources that were important to the war effort, but only a few plantation crops were considered important. The Philippines' near northern neighbour, Taiwan, which had been a Japanese colony for slightly longer than the Americans had ruled the Philippines, produced most of the tropical crops that the Japanese needed. Rather, the Philippines was attacked in 1941 because it lay on the route to Indonesia's oil fields and because it was a base for American



Map 7: Southeast Asia, 1943

power in Asia. This meant that Japan's main interest in the archipelago was to keep order, rather than to mobilize the Filipino people. Even for this aim, however, Japan needed to do more than simply controlling the political and economic administration of the Philippines during the war years. Since the Philippines had spent so much time under Western colonizers, the Japanese planners believed that Filipinos had lost their Asian identity, and the Japanese felt it necessary to reinvigorate the Philippines as an Asian country in line with the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. They thus prepared cultural and educational plans to remould the Filipinos' way of thinking, plans both to introduce Japanese culture and ways of life and to develop and strengthen native Filipino culture. Western culture – mainly American culture – was to be reduced if not eradicated. To some extent these plans fell in with what Filipinos had already been doing before the war, that is, working to develop a stronger national culture and identity. On the other hand, the economic and political policies of the Japanese occupation and the behaviour of Japanese soldiers nullified much of what the Japanese tried to do. Apart from resenting brutal treatment meted out by the occupying Japanese, most Filipinos believed the Americans would return and that the Japanese would soon be defeated; consequently, few Filipinos took the Japanese plans seriously. The plans partly succeeded, however, where Japanese aims coincided with Filipino interests.

BACKGROUND

The Philippines into which Japanese troops marched in 1942 was in many ways the most Westernized country in Asia. Three hundred and fifty years of Spanish rule had left nearly ninety per cent of the population as Catholics, as well as giving rise to a nationalist revolution which would probably have ended colonial rule in 1898 if the Americans had not decided to take over the territory.

The Americans established a nationwide public education system, making English the official language and teaching it in all schools. The Americans of course promoted American values and ways of life, and these values and ways were reinforced by a liberal economic system in which free trade gave American firms and American culture full access to the Philippine market. Filipinos, at least in the cities and among the elite, became thoroughly familiar with American goods and American popular culture. Catholicism remained the dominant religion but in many other respects Filipinos came to bear a strong, though perhaps

superficial, resemblance to Americans.[1] Although the Americans had brutally suppressed the Filipino nationalist movement between 1898 and 1900, they very quickly began to hand administrative power to Filipinos, first at local, then at regional and finally at national levels. From 1935, the Philippines was a Commonwealth, with full internal self-government and its own president. American influence may have been strong, but the real autonomy of the Filipinos in the Commonwealth vastly exceeded that of the citizens of Manchukuo; the United States had, moreover, promised full independence after a decade.

Under these circumstances, the Filipino construction of a national identity before the Second World War was somewhat problematic. Unlike most Asian countries, the Philippines could not point to a glorious pre-colonial history; when the Spanish arrived the Philippine archipelago was the home of a large number of relatively small autonomous agricultural and hunting communities, who had no large cities and left no great monuments or other cultural records. It was much harder, moreover, for Filipinos to catalogue a list of grievances against the relatively benevolent Americans than it was for the Vietnamese to complain about the French or the Indonesians about the Dutch. A radical critique of American economic domination would have been possible, but such a critique was of no interest to the prosperous regional elites who dominated Commonwealth politics. Especially during the Commonwealth period, Filipinos acquired a set of national symbols: a national language based on Tagalog, impressive public buildings including the Legislative Building and Manila City Hall and a sense of historical depth based on the nationalist struggle against the Spanish. Filipino writers and artists explored native themes, repudiated American influences and searched for an identity, Fernando Amorsolo painted impressionistic rural scenes, and the Philippine Writers' League tried to emphasize Filipino or Malayan ideas. But still, a clear sense of national identity seemed to be much more elusive for the Filipinos than for most of their neighbours. However much Filipinos might celebrate the simple traditional values of village and community, they could not pretend that these values would help the Philippines modernize.

Under these circumstances, ideas of a Pan-Asian identity could in fact find some support in the Philippines. If an Asian culture was the basis for Japan's modernization, then it could be argued that the means for modernizing also lay within traditional Filipino culture. During the revolution against Spanish rule in 1896, some Filipino leaders, including President Emilio Aguinaldo, had looked towards Japan for assistance. Hardly any help came at that time, but there

remained some feeling amongst Filipinos that Japan, as a brother Asian country, was a natural ally. A few politicians and writers, such as Pio Duran and Vicente Sotto, believing in Pan-Asianism, supported closer relations between the Philippines and Japan during the American regime, while some anti-American mass-based movements continued to expect aid from Japan for achieving independence. Japan for its part sought at least to encourage this sense of fraternity. During the Commonwealth period, the Japanese government launched a cultural campaign to make Filipinos more aware of Japan, a campaign which included circulating magazines and books about Japan, inviting Filipinos to visit Japan, sponsoring a radio programme and publishing a newspaper in Manila. Student and professor exchanges were also started.[2] Although some Filipinos welcomed the cultural exchange (such as the popular writer Francisco B. Icasiano), others – government officials, journalists and army officers – saw Japan as a potential menace, and thus looked on these cultural developments with suspicion. Not all Filipinos feared Japan, but very few saw Japan's looming power as offering much advantage to their future. As the war clouds gathered, some writers and artists became more openly nationalistic, publishing works on being Filipino, on loyalty to country, on the flag and other national symbols. Others highlighted the positive aspects of the partnership between the United States and the Philippines. As the Sino–Japanese War raged from 1937, the Japanophiles – those who respected Japan – argued that Japan had no unfriendly intentions towards the Philippines and would maintain peaceful relations. The Japanophobes, on the other hand, pointed to Japanese atrocities in China and warned that similar events might take place in the Philippines if no preparations were made for defence.

The outbreak of war on 8 December 1941 caught most Filipinos by surprise, even as mobilization of defence forces was going on. News of the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor reached Manila before dawn and on the same day the Japanese invaded islands to the north of Luzon. By early morning, the cities of Baguio and Davao had been bombed. Major Japanese landings in Luzon began on 22 December, and Manila was subjected to almost daily Japanese bombings. On Christmas Eve, General Douglas MacArthur, the commander of the Philippine–American military forces, evacuated Manila to fight a defensive campaign in the Bataan Peninsula. He later withdrew to Australia, and Bataan fell on 9 April 1942. Organized resistance ended a month later.

The swiftness of the Japanese advance came as a shock to most Filipinos. As the Japanese forces took over town after town, most people hid in their houses

or fled to the mountains. A minority, out of curiosity or because they were pre-war Japanophiles, supported the Japanese, came into the streets to watch as the imperial army arrived. Anti-Japanese sentiment was strong, because of rumours of rape and atrocities that had spread in advance. Stories of the Rape of Nanking and indiscriminate bombing in China had circulated widely before the attack.[3] Many young Filipinos rallied to the flag, seeing the Japanese invasion as an act of indiscriminate aggression. Filipinos would fight the Japanese in the same way that Filipinos had fought against the Spaniards and the Americans. Besides, American rule had been rather lenient and most Filipinos were friendly to the Americans, who had promised independence in 1946. In Indonesia, the Japanese could be seen as liberators from Dutch colonialism, but with independence already on the agenda in the Philippines, the Japanese, it seemed to most Filipinos, were only destabilizing the country and disrupting the passage to independence. The Japanese propaganda line 'Asia for the Asiatics' was seen as an empty phrase as Japanese sentries slapped or inhumanly punished minor infractions of their rules. Also important was the fact that the Americans fought hard to defend the Philippines, and did so alongside Filipino soldiers. In other parts of Southeast Asia, the rapid and often chaotic collapse of the colonial powers in the face of Japanese force seemed to signal the weakness of the West and its lack of real commitment to the region. American and Filipino forces, by contrast, were defeated in a hard-fought struggle which left much of their prestige intact.

JAPANESE CULTURAL POLICY

Japanese government and military planners realized that their occupation policy for the Philippines would face several problems and differences from the rest of Southeast Asia. In their view, prolonged exposure to Western civilization had alienated the Philippines from the true Asian spirit, and the fact that the Filipinos had fought on the side of the United States against Japan provided a basic hurdle to winning Filipino loyalty. In addition, due to the educational policy of the Americans, Filipinos were highly literate, although that literacy was heavily Occidental in character. This situation contrasted with that in other Southeast Asian countries, and even with the literacy level of Japanese occupation troops.[4]

To address these difficulties and try to win Filipino cooperation and sympathies, the Japanese developed an ambitious cultural policy which focused on turning the Filipinos away from American and Western 'materialistic ways',

building on native traditions and presenting Japan as the leader of Asia. Furthermore, vocational training and love of labour would be instilled. The United States and Britain were to be portrayed as cunning devils bent on world domination, so as to turn away Filipino loyalties from these countries. Priorities in the military administration in the Philippines were to restore public order, to hasten the acquisition of vital resources necessary to fight the war, and to ensure the economic self-sufficiency of the Japanese occupation forces. But the cultural policy sought to bring the Filipino heart, mind and spirit into the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Most Japanese officials in the Philippines believed that the Filipinos had to be given a new spiritual foundation, around which a solid culture could be based. On this base, politics, economy and industry could be built up. Lieutenant-General Homma Masaharu, the first commander in chief of Japanese forces in the Philippines, publicly announced this principle.[5]

To build up the Filipino spirit according to the Japanese designs, the Filipino had to be remoulded. In February 1942, the military administration outlined the basic principles of education in the Philippines.[6] Education was to be 'renovated' in order to:

(1) make the Filipinos understand the position of the Philippines as a member of the Co-prosperity Sphere, know the 'true meaning' of the establishment of a New Order in the Sphere and realize the part which the Philippines should play in it. Proper understanding of these things would promote friendly relations between Japan and the Philippines 'to the fullest extent'.

(2) cut dependence on the Western nations, particularly the United States and Great Britain, and instead foster a New Filipino culture based on 'self-consciousness of the people as Orientals'. This also meant that Western culture and values, particularly liberalism and individualism, were to be discouraged.

(3) raise the morals of the people, de-emphasizing materialism.

(4) spread the Japanese language in the Philippines and eventually terminate the use of English.

(5) give importance to basic education and promote vocational education.

(6) inspire the people with the spirit to love labour.

While these principles were promulgated specifically for schools, they echoed the basic principles for the cultural campaign. Through schools, the minds of the Filipinos could be reshaped in accordance with Japan's goals as a matter of

long-term policy. The same lines would be developed for the media: in order to cut the Filipinos off from Western and American influences, as well as in order to implement their plans to remould the Filipinos, all forms of media had to be controlled. This meant censorship of the press, radio, movies, theatres and even mail. Radios had to be registered and reconditioned, which meant that the short-wave receivers were altered so that only programmes emanating from Radio Tokyo or other Axis stations could be received. Later, even typewriters and mimeograph machines had to be registered, with their typestyles and distinctive features submitted to the Japanese authorities. News and propaganda broadcasts from the United States and its allies were a weapon of war and therefore had to be suppressed. Listening to Allied radio stations was made a crime.

EXECUTING POLICY

Assigned to carry out the cultural programme was a special Japanese military unit called the Sendenbu (Propaganda Corps). The unit was led by Lieutenant-Colonel Katsuya Tomoshige, and comprised just over 300 officers, enlisted men and civilians. The civilians were professional artists, writers, photographers, broadcasters, musicians and priests or missionaries.[7] The initial batch of the unit landed with the first waves of the Japanese invasion forces and immediately began distributing propaganda leaflets. Upon reaching Manila, they secured all newspapers and printing presses as well as radio stations. Most were shut down, but some were allowed to continue after censorship and control measures were put in place. Other members went to the provinces to urge Filipinos to cooperate with the Japanese and resume their normal activities. Still other members went to Bataan and other battlefronts to persuade, by means of leaflets and loud-speakers, the Filipino soldiers to surrender.

Because of the negative connotation of the word 'propaganda', the unit's name was changed to Hōdōbu (Department of Information) in mid-1942. To supplement it, in mid-1943 the Bureau of Information and Public Security was created in the Philippine Executive Commission, a body staffed by Filipinos but supervised by Japanese. The Hōdōbu had within it a religious section composed of Japanese Christian priests and ministers. The Japanese tried to convince the Catholic Church in the Philippines to cooperate with the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, citing a Japan–Vatican diplomatic agreement. Meeting with ranking Philippine church officials, the Religious Section urged priests to

preach Japan's aims in the war, but most priests baulked at the idea. Archbishop of Manila Michael O'Doherty – an Irishman and hence neutral – resisted the Japanese advances and as a result the Japanese placed more emphasis on Bishop Cesar Ma. Guerrero, a Filipino. This strategy coincided with the 'Asia for the Asiatics' programme which Japan had made one of its central slogans in its drive to the south. The Religious Section also focused on early Philippine-Japanese relations, particularly the story of Takayama Ukon, a high-ranking Japanese Christian lord who had fled from Japan because of the persecution of Christians in the early seventeenth century and settled in the Philippines.[8]

While appealing to the Church on one hand, the Japanese Military Administration worked to curtail it on the other. The Bureau of Religious Affairs was created as an agency under the Executive Commission to supervise the religious orders, which were now required to secure permits for special collections, meetings and religious parades. The church was further ordered to report the amount of money it received as donations, and their financial status. In addition, all priests, ministers and other religious officials were required to secure a permit from the government before they could solemnize weddings. The Church did not escape the supervision and control of the Japanese.

An important part of the cultural policy was reopening the schools, following the basic principles announced by the Japanese. Before the schools could be reopened, curricula had to be examined and syllabi reviewed, and all textbooks were censored by members of the Sendenhan (Propaganda Section). To be removed from the pre-war textbooks was anything which was perceived as anti-Japanese (such as accounts of Japan's expansion in China), anti-war, tending to alienate Japan from her allies (Germany and Italy), pro-American or pro-British, supportive of American and British democratic and liberal ideas, opposing the fundamental principles of education or simply exposing improper conduct of the Japanese in the Philippines. In many cases the offending pages were simply torn out; in others, paper strips were pasted to cover the dangerous passages. The social sciences and literature were to be de-emphasized, while vocational education and service to the country were to be highlighted. This policy was meant to correct what the Japanese saw as a flaw of the American educational system, which encouraged the arts and white collar workers instead of science and manual labour.[9]

Public elementary schools were the first to open, with some 700 schools around the country being authorized to reopen in June 1942. Public high schools resumed

classes in the second semester of school year 1942–1943. Selected private schools were opened later after having been screened and checked. Vocational schools were also re-opened in 1942 and given much encouragement, in line with the new educational policies. Colleges and higher institutions of learning were opened later, but only selectively. The University of the Philippines was allowed to open relatively late, and even then only the technical courses, such as medicine, engineering and agriculture, were allowed to resume classes. Some schools, however, never opened during the Japanese regime since their buildings and campuses had been taken over by the Japanese military.[10]

After the textbooks were examined, all books in bookstores were checked for dangerous or offending ideas. All publications had to be censored and approved: this included newspapers, magazines, books and pamphlets. Movies, stage shows, radio programmes and even letters sent through the post office were also censored. Most radio stations were closed: in Manila, only the pre-war station KZRH was allowed to reopen, along with a few local stations, such as in Davao. The pre-war TVT [*Tribune–La Vanguardia–Taliba*] newspaper chain was reopened in Manila, with local newspapers later allowed to open in Legaspi, Cebu, Iloilo, Davao and Leyte. The pre-war Tagalog weekly, *Liwayway* [Dawn], was also allowed to circulate. All other pre-war periodicals were closed and their offices sealed. All Manila publications were later centralized under direct Japanese management, under the Manila Shinbunsha [Manila Newspaper Company].[11]

In line with building up loyalty to Japan, all schools were expected to teach about the New Order, and the Japanese language was made compulsory. Since many Filipino teachers had no idea about how to teach these new subjects, special courses were given to teachers to clarify the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and the cultural ideals of the New Order. Other special classes were offered in Japanese so that Filipinos would be prepared to teach the language; some of the teachers were men and women who were sent specially for this purpose from Japan. Despite these courses, however, many teachers found it difficult to teach the new subjects. The social sciences and history – when they were offered – were particularly ticklish to handle, since teachers did not know just how far they should go. As a result, some teachers skimmed lightly over what they perceived to be sensitive topics, lest they get into trouble with the Japanese Military Administration.[12]

Other special schools were opened in line with the New Order. The New Philippines Cultural Institute was established in Tagaytay: selected Filipino

young men studied rigorously under a Japanese teacher who hoped to instill the Japanese character and spirit into them. The Government Employees Training Institute was created to rejuvenate and reorient government personnel into the ideals of Greater East Asia. A boys' camp was held in Balara at which ten Filipino boys lived and studied with ten Japanese boys under controlled conditions, again to expose the Filipino boys to the Japanese spirit. The Japanese sent selected young men to Japan as government-sponsored students, to study at Japanese schools and be exposed to Japanese life at first hand. There were academies for the constabulary, to reorient them into Japanese methods of discipline and to motivate them to operate in the new environment. And the United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) veterans were made to undergo 'rejuvenation' courses to cleanse them of their anti-Japanese ideas.[13]

Instead of some of the pre-war, American-oriented periodicals, the Japanese began a few magazines of their own. *Shin Seiki* [New Era] was a glossy pictorial similar to *Life* magazine; *Philippine Review* was meant to be an intellectual monthly; and *Pillars* aimed at the Filipino youth. Through these magazines, and through newspapers and photo exhibits, propaganda appeared – either subtle or direct – extolling the virtues and power of Japan, urging the restoration of normalcy, calling for the development of a stronger native Asian culture, and attacking the Americans and the British. Japanese victory after victory, greater and greater collaboration of Filipinos with Japan and a rosy, peaceful life under the Japanese became standard news.

Realizing that Filipinos were avid moviegoers, the Japanese tried to use film to the maximum. They produced two full-length movies which highlighted their propaganda line. The first was a documentary production called *Victory Song of the Orient*, which glamorized the Japanese victory in Bataan and Corregidor, showing how these battles promised a new beginning for the Philippines. The second was a production which tapped both Japanese and Filipino experts: Japanese director Abe Yutaka was teamed with Filipino director Gerry de Leon to film *The Dawn of Freedom*, again focusing on the battles of Bataan and Corregidor. The movie – which starred top Filipino actors and actresses, and which used some of the more advanced cinematic techniques at that time – showed the tragedy of Filipinos siding with the Americans who, it turns out, betrayed them. In the end, the leading actor – Fernando Poe, Sr. – recognizes his folly and joins the Japanese. While the fighting is going on, the younger brother of one of the Filipino officers is run down by a retreating American

vehicle. A Japanese soldier nurses him back to health and strength and helps him to get back on his two feet – a classic portrayal of how the Japanese wanted the Filipinos to view Japan.

In addition to these two movies, a few movies which had been nearing completion at the start of the war were allowed to be shown, in addition to several Japanese movies starring popular Japanese movie stars, and showing suitable themes – valour in war, hard work in the home front and Japanese life (which included some romance for the more sentimental). Newsreels showing the latest Japanese victories were added to each movie showing. As in the publication business, a control agency – the Eiga Haikyūsha, or Movie Distribution Company – was established to check on and supervise all movies shown. There were never enough movies for the various theatres around the country, however, and the Japanese had to allow the showing of pre-war American movies which had been in the hands of the theatres when the war broke out.[14]

Even postage stamps were used as an instrument of propaganda, following the three basic lines. Initially, pre-war postage stamps were used, with the objectionable elements ('Commonwealth of the Philippines' and 'United States') blacked out. Dates and phrases were overprinted to commemorate the fall of Bataan and Corregidor, the anniversary of the outbreak of the war, the first anniversary of the Philippine Executive Commission and other key events of the Japanese occupation. Beginning in 1943, stamps printed in Japan were issued, featuring Philippine scenes, highlighting Japan's might and close Philippine–Japan ties.[15]

The Japanese tried to foster more active participation in their cultural programme by holding contests for poems, short stories, novels, slogans and musical compositions. The themes for these contests focused on the New Order, Philippine–Japan relations and other topics aiming to develop more Filipino awareness of the changed conditions. The winners were given much publicity and the winning pieces published or publicly presented.

In line with the 'build-up Japan' propaganda line, Philippine clocks were set to Japan time (one hour ahead of Philippines time), and Japanese holidays became Philippine holidays. Japanese Foundation Day, the Emperor's Birthday, Japanese Army and Navy Days were all declared official holidays with required participation in the various ceremonies organized for those days. There were celebrations for horses (Horse Day) and a harvest festival, in which Japanese Shinto rituals were practised. [16]

Japanese was declared an official language in the Philippines, together with Tagalog, and the Japanese language became a mandatory subject in schools. Names of roads, bridges and plazas were changed to Japanese names. Dewey Boulevard, for example, became Heiwa [Peace] Boulevard and Taft Avenue became Daitōa [Greater East Asia] Avenue. Lectures on Japanese culture were given over the radio, and Japanese marches were played over and over in parades, on the radio and in concerts. In all programmes, the Japanese national anthem was played, and participants and audiences had to bow towards Tokyo and observe one minute of silent prayer for the victory of Japan and for the Japanese war dead. [17]

To instill discipline as well as develop more alert bodies, a practice known as 'Rajio Taisō' was introduced. Rajio Taisō involved schoolchildren and government officials assembling in front of their buildings at a designated time in the morning to perform physical exercises as directed by the radio announcer. This practice was meant to make Filipinos obey orders from an unseen authority, thus making them more obedient citizens of Greater East Asia. [18]

The Japanese realized that 'Japanizing' the Filipinos would not be possible without also developing indigenous Filipino culture. But since this might lead to anti-Japanese sentiment, the Japanese attempted to control the Filipinization element. They banned the national anthem and forbade the public exhibition of the Philippine flag. In lieu of the national anthem, the Japanese sponsored a contest for suitable lyrics for a new march, and then commissioned young composer Felipe Padilla de Leon to write the music. Entitled 'Awit sa Paglikha ng Bagong Pilipinas,' [Song for the creation of the new Philippines] the lyrics, together with the rousing melody, prodded the country to rise up and meet the challenges of the New Order. In the field of literature, the use of Tagalog was encouraged by the Japanese. Contests were sponsored for the best literary works in Tagalog, with the best short stories of 1943 being compiled and published in book form.[19]

All in all, Japan's efforts to transform Filipino culture were encumbered by two short-comings. First the programmes were heavy-handed and intrusive. Filipino society was relatively well educated and politically aware, and most Filipinos had no reason to want to become more familiar with Japanese culture. Crude cultural propaganda aroused contempt and cynicism, rather than admiration for Japan. The Japanese programme also left open many possibilities for quiet resistance. Filipinos came to delight in deceiving the Japanese and in surreptitiously making fun of them.

The fact that few Japanese properly understood Tagalog or other local languages made this kind of deception all the easier. When asked to bow towards the direction of Tokyo and the Imperial Palace, and to say a prayer for the Japanese war dead, some bowed properly, but instead prayed that the Japanese would drop dead. Instead of 'reigning' in the Pacific, the Japanese fleet was made to 'resign' by simply adding the letter 's' to 'reign' in a *Tribune* article.[20] Dōmei, the Japanese news bureau, was made into an acronym which stood for 'Department Of Most Erroneous Information'. Instead of saying 'Ohayo' ('good morning' in Japanese), smart Filipinos bowed low and said 'O, Hayop!' (Beast!). And instead of greeting Prime Minster Tōjō Hideki with 'Banzai' on his visit to Manila, Filipinos lustily cheered 'Bangkay!' (corpse).[21] The popular comedy duo, Pugo and Tugo, satirized the Japanese with jokes, such as mimicking the Japanese soldier's penchant for wearing several wristwatches. The Japanese retaliated by interrogating them, and making them change their names (Tugo sounded too much like Tōgō, a distinguished Japanese naval hero) to Puging and Tuging. But still they made audiences laugh at the Japanese.[22] Hidden messages were inserted into plays, and secret warnings were devised; when the so-called 'Mystery Singer' (an actor with the stage name Cecil Lloyd) appeared on stage singing 'Bakit Hindi Ka Pa Dumarating' [Why have you not yet returned?] it was a signal that Japanese spies were in the audience. The song 'Bakit Hindi Ka Pa Dumarating' itself also referred implicitly to General MacArthur's promise to return to the Philippines.[23]

Perhaps just as important, the contradictions between Japanese propaganda and actual conditions were too visible: the Filipinos felt the slap of a Japanese sentry or experienced the looting by Japanese soldiers of private property, pens and watches more than they did the 'brotherhood' of Filipinos and Japanese. And the humiliation of bowing before sentries – and being slapped if one did it improperly – bit deeper into the Filipino psyche than all the propaganda could reach. Although there were Japanese who sincerely wanted to befriend Filipinos, acts of discrimination undid all the positive work the Hōdōbu tried to achieve. Tales of rape, torture, looting and executions by Japanese soldiers created an atmosphere of fear in the occupied Philippines. The forced regimentation and censorship imposed by the Japanese military administration clashed with the ideas taught by the Americans and fought for in the revolution against Spain. And since actions spoke louder than words, most Filipinos either chose not to cooperate or cooperated half-heartedly. The Japanese cultural campaign thus had very limited success.

Almost all Filipinos, moreover, saw the Japanese occupation as temporary: they believed that it was just a matter of time until the Americans would return; a little sacrifice now, most Filipinos felt, and things would return to the way they were before the war. This was one major reason why most Filipinos remained fence sitters – or joined the guerrilla resistance: Japan could not convince the Filipino that the United States would not come back. And since the occupation was perceived as temporary, its impositions were also seen as temporary.

The policy of promoting indigenous elements in Filipino culture, on the other hand, did strike an immediate chord with pre-war Filipino efforts to shape a distinctive national identity. This area of common interest between Japan and some Filipinos became more important after Philippine 'independence' in 1943.

CHANGES UNDER JAPANESE-SPONSORED INDEPENDENCE

In order to consolidate Filipino allegiance, the Japanese authorities offered 'the honour of independence' to the Philippines if the Filipinos began to understand the true reasons for Japan's going to war, and if Filipinos collaborated more wholeheartedly with the New Order.[24] This 'independence' scheme was fast tracked, and the Second Philippine Republic was inaugurated in October 1943, under President Jose P. Laurel. The new state, of course, was not truly independent: Japanese troops remained in the Philippines, and Laurel was in no position to act against Japanese interests. The archipelago's natural and human resources thus remained at the disposal of the occupation forces and many features of Japanese control from before 1943 – the ban on listening to foreign radio broadcasts and the compulsory morning Rajio Taisō remained in force. Nonetheless, Laurel tried to develop and strengthen Filipino culture and character and wanted particularly to make the schools more effective. He established the National Education Board to study curriculum changes and develop a more suitable educational programme for the country. The board advocated stressing the Filipino identity through the national language and history; it also recommended the teaching of Asian history and culture (not just Japan's). Other educational changes were made, in accordance with Laurel's vision. Laurel saw school as supplementing the family and church as a builder of morals and character; he aimed to make at least elementary education free. It was decided that only Filipinos could teach Filipino history. To improve teacher quality, qualifying exams were introduced. To be able to direct the educational thrust

more thoroughly, the government was given more powers to supervise all schools, including private ones.[25]

The Laurel government further tried to disseminate a more Filipino propaganda line, using all forms of media. Posters and leaflets calling for the support of the republic were issued. New periodicals were issued, such as *Filipina*, a monthly women's magazine which was both practical and intellectual. On the anniversary of the republic, a new newspaper was born, *The Republic*. Both periodicals tried to portray a more Filipino perspective than the *Tribune* and other publications, which still were censored by the Japanese. The Manila Shinbunsha was replaced by Philippine Publications, and radio station KZRH changed its call sign to PIAM, to further accentuate the new character of the republic. The regular newsreels shown in theatres were named *New Philippines News* and one movie, *Tatlong Maria* ['The three Marias'], was completed and released in late 1944. (The movie focused on the value and importance of traditional values, hard work and rural life as opposed to the greed, corruption and superficiality of city life).[26]

New stamps were printed for the republic, showing the nationalistic orientation taken by Laurel. One stamp – specially issued to commemorate the 1943 independence – showed a Filipina in traditional costume, with the Philippine flag and the Rizal Monument in the background. Broken chains on the side of the stamp symbolized liberation. A series of stamps with national heroes was also issued.[27]

The flag was highlighted in publications, posters and leaflets. The Philippine national anthem was translated into Tagalog and became 'Diwa ng Bayan' [Spirit of the nation], replacing the Japanese national anthem and 'Awit sa Paglikha ng Bagong Pilipinas.' Musical contests to highlight Philippine life and culture were sponsored, resulting in some rousing marches being composed. However, lyrics calling for the defence of the country were carefully omitted: even the section in the national anthem attesting to the glory of dying to protect the country against invaders was replaced by a less militant phrase.[28]

Even cigarette boxes were used to disseminate the propaganda line of the republic: one box bore the slogan 'A Free Philippines in United Asia', while another had 'Freedom Implies Responsibility'. Significantly, the brand of the cigarettes was 'Independencia', and the box proclaimed that the cigarettes were made from Virginia tobacco grown in the Philippines![29]

Laurel allowed the pre-war Code Committee (which had been created during the pre-war Commonwealth government) to continue its work on framing a

national moral and civic code for Filipinos. Laurel had been a member of the pre-war committee and was keenly aware of the need to strengthen Filipino morals, and thus encouraged the committee to finish its work. A draft code was finished in 1944 but, with the deterioration of conditions in Manila, was not made public.[30]

Laurel's desire to strengthen the country extended to religion. He felt that the church should be Filipinized – and wrote to the Pope to explain his ideas, arguing that Filipinos could understand the religion better if Filipinos ran the parishes and religious schools. He met religious leaders to explain his views, but time was too short for anything concrete to be developed. The government tried to keep the churches under some degree of control, however, as the Japanese Military Administration had sought to do: Laurel retained the Bureau of Religious Affairs and the restrictions previously imposed by it. [31]

Aside from government administration of all schools and to some extent, the church, Laurel also felt that public information also required some degree of control. To this end, he created the Board of Information, which replaced the Bureau of Information and Public Security of the Executive Commission. This measure was intended to prevent inaccurate and careless reportage not in keeping with the ideals of the Republic. [32]

Following the government's pro-Filipino line, two organizations were formed: the Kabataang Pangarap ni Rizal [The youth whom Rizal dreamed of] and Revtrufilnism (the exact meaning is not known, but the word probably stood for 'Revive true Filipinism'). Both were civic organizations which aimed at developing a greater nationalistic consciousness. Revtrufilnism sponsored an oratorical contest in early 1944 with the theme, 'I am a Filipino'.[33]

In retrospect we can see in Laurel's wartime cultural nationalism both a subtle patriotic resistance to Japanese imperialism and a calculated strategy to preserve the nationalist credentials of the Filipino elite. Because of their association with the Spanish, the Americans and, briefly, the Japanese, the established families that made up the Filipino elite were vulnerable to being portrayed as the enemies of the Filipino people. During the war, in fact, this portrayal was increasingly promoted by some of the guerrilla forces fighting the Japanese. Those forces which had come under communist influence saw the removal of the Japanese and the Americans as only steps in the liberation of the Filipino people: full liberation would require a social revolution. Against this portrayal, Laurel's relatively innocuous and inclusive nationalism was an important weapon.

Japan's efforts to bring about a change in the nature of Filipino identity were perhaps doomed to failure by the brevity of the Japanese occupation and by the looming prospect of an American return, especially after the battle of Midway in June 1942, less then half a year after Japan's victory in the Philippines. They were also hamstrung, however, by the fact that Japan's usual strategies – equating Japan with modernization and with liberation from imperialism – had little appeal in the Philippines. Japan could not offer the Philippines more than it had already received from its American colonialists. Japanese attempts to inculcate Japanese values, therefore, were met with cynicism and resistance. The only area of Japanese policy which struck a chord with Filipinos was the attempt to foster a Filipino identity which would be Asian but distinct from Japan. This programme both helped the Laurel government demonstrate its nationalist credentials in the face of the reality of Japanese hegemony and promoted a gentle inclusive nationalism which had no place for social revolution.

NOTES

1 The best discussions of Filipino culture and identity are Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *The Fateful Years* (Quezon City: R.P. Garcia, 1965), Vol. II, Chapter 11; Marcelino A. Foronda, Jr., *Cultural Life in the Philippines During the Japanese Occupation* (Manila: Philippine National Historical Society, 1975), pp. 1–7; and Motoe Terami-Wada, 'The Cultural Front in the Philippines, 1942–1945: Japanese Propaganda and Filipino Resistance in Mass Media' (M.A. thesis, University of the Philippines, 1984), Chapter 2. Basic works which deal with the Japanese occupation of the Philippines include Agoncillo's *Fateful Years*; Theodore Friend, *Between Two Empires: The Ordeal of the Philippines, 1929–1946* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965); A.V.H. Hartendorp, *The Japanese Occupation of the Philippines* (Manila: Bookmark, 1967); Ikehata Setsuho and Ricardo Trota Jose (eds), *The Philippines under Japan: Occupation Policy and Reaction* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1999); and David Joel Steinberg, *Philippine Collaboration in World War II* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967). For comparisons of the Philippine experience during the Japanese occupation and that of other Southeast Asian countries, see Grant K. Goodman (ed.), *Japanese Cultural Policies in Southeast Asia during World War 2* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991) and Theodore Friend, *The Blue-Eyed Enemy: Japan Against the West in Java and Luzon, 1942–1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). Although much has been written on the cultural side of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, this chapter attempts to place the experience in greater perspective through the use of newer sources, other primary sources and interviews.

2 On Japan's cultural policies before the war, see Grant K. Goodman, 'A Sense of Kinship: Japan's Cultural Offensive in the Philippines during the 1930s', *Crossroads*, 1, no. 2 (June 1983), pp. 31–44; Lydia N. Yu-Jose, 'Philippine–Japan Relations: The Revolutionary Years and a Century Hence,' in Aileen San Pablo-Baviera and Lydia N. Yu-Jose, *Philippine External Relations: A Centennial Vista* (Manila: Foreign Service Institute, 1998), pp. 301–303.

3 A perception has developed in recent years that the Rape of Nanking was unknown and unreported at the time, but several publications of the time recorded those events for the public. See, for instance, H.J. Timperley (ed.), *What War Means: The Japanese Terror in China: A Documentary Record* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1938).

4 For Japanese policies, see Terami-Wada, 'Cultural Front in the Philippines', especially chapters 3–9.

5 Homma Masaharu, *Address to the Filipino People* (Manila: n.p., 1942), p. 3.

6 Order No. 2, 11 February 1942, published in *Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration*, Volume 1, p. 13.

7 On the Hōdōbu, see Terami-Wada, 'Cultural Front in the Philippines', ch. 4. Official reports of the Hōdōbu are published as Watari Shūdan Hōdōbu (ed.), *Dai Jūyon Gun Gun Sendenhan Senden Kōsaku Shiryōshū* [Compilation of historical materials of propaganda operations of the 14th Army Propaganda Section] (Tokyo: Ryūkei Shosha, 1996).

8 Recent studies of the Religious Section are Ernesto A. De Pedro, 'The Catholic Unit of the Imperial Japanese Army' (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Santo Tomas, 1996) and Terada Takefumi, 'The Religious Propaganda Program for Christian Churches', in Ikehata and Jose (eds), *The Philippines Under Japan*, pp. 215–246. Official reports and files of the Religious Section were published as Ono Toyoaki and Terada Takefumi (eds), *Hito Shukyōhan kankei Shiryōshū* [Compilation of historical materials on the Religious Section in the Philippines] (Tokyo: Ryūkei Shosha, 1999). There was no section in Manila in charge of relations with the Muslims of the Philippines' southern islands.

9 On educational developments, see Agoncillo, *Fateful Years*, ch. 10; Dalmacio Martin, *A Century of Education in the Philippines* (Manila: Philippine Historical Association, 1980), pp. 248–311.

10 Instruction No. 2, 18 February 1942, *Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration*, Vol. I, p. 14; Claro M. Recto, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Education, Health and Public Welfare, ms., in Mauro P. Garcia papers, Sophia University, Tokyo, Japan. An edited version of Recto's report appears in *Historical Bulletin*, vol. 11 no. 4 (December 1967), pp. 409–451.

11 Details of the press under the Japanese can be found in Terami-Wada, 'The Cultural Front in the Philippines', ch. 7; Mainichi Shinbunsha, *Tōzai Namboku* [The four directions] (Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbunsha, n.d.), pp. 98–110 and Ricardo Trota Jose, 'The *Tribune* During the Japanese Occupation,' *Philippine Studies*, 1st Quarter, 1990, pp. 45–64 and 'The *Tribune* as a Tool of Japanese Propaganda, 1942–1945' *Philippine Studies*, 2nd Quarter, 1990, pp. 135–150. This section and the following are also based on the author's interviews with various employees of these periodicals, particularly Armando C. Malay and Vicente Barranco; and through a personal reading of most of the periodicals of that era, particularly the daily English newspaper, *Tribune*. Orders relating to radio and the press are in the *Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration*, Vol. I, pp. 11, 14, 19–20. More details on the various aspects of art and culture during the period are in Gina V. Barte (ed.), *Panahon ng Hapon: Digmaan sa Sining, Sining sa Digmaan* [The Japanese period: War in the arts, the arts in war] (Manila: Cultural Center of the Philippines, 1992).

12 Recto, Annual Report, 15–16; *Tribune*, 1 September, 18 November 1942; Martin, *Century of Education*, pp. 299–300.

13 These schools were not under the Department of Education. Manuel E. Buenafe, *Wartime Philippines* (Manila: Philippine Education Foundation, 1950), pp. 167–169. The *Official Gazette* and *Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration* contain speeches at graduation ceremonies of these various schools.

14 This section is based on movie advertisements in the *Tribune*, as well as video copies of *Victory Song of the Orient* and *The Dawn of Freedom* (original films are in the U.S. National Archives); and interviews with Armando C. Malay, Daniel H. Dizon and Antonio Gosalvez, who saw some of the movies during the Japanese occupation.

15 On postage stamps, the definitive work is Eugene A. Garrett, *A Postal History of the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines 1942–1945* (Chicago: privately printed, 1992).

16 Executive Order No. 6, *Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration*, Vol. I, p. 80; Executive Order No. 20, *Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration*, Vol. II, pp. 16–17.

17 Executive Order No. 41, *Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration,* Vol. IV, pp. 32–33. Various programmes and invitations in the University of the Philippines' Japanese Occupation Papers.

18 *Tribune*, 4 September 1942 and succeeding issues; interview with Armando C. Malay and Isagani Medina. See also Rajio Taisō exercise folders (one was for Group I exercises; a second was for Group II and III exercises).

19 *Tribune*, 8 December 1942; Kin-Ichi Ishikawa (ed.), *Ang 25 Pinakamabuting Maikling Kathang Pilipino ng 1943* [The 25 best Filipino short stories for 1943] (Manila: Philippine Publications, 1944); Agoncillo, *Fateful Years*, pp. 623–635.

20 *Tribune*, 27 May 1943; interviews with Armando Malay and Isagani Medina.

21 Interviews with Isagani Medina, Armando Malay; Marcial Lichauco, *Dear Mother Putnam* (n.p.: privately printed, 1949), pp. 63–65.

22 For theatrical showings and news, see *Backstage*, a periodical devoted to stage and theater, 1943–1944. Daisy Hontiveros-Avellana, 'Philippine Drama: A Social Protest' in Antonio Manuud (ed.), *Brown Heritage* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1967), pp. 668–688; Terami-Wada, 'Cultural Front,' pp. 328–334.

23 Interviews with Antonio Gosalvez and Lamberto Avellana.

24 Japanese Military Administration Communiqué on Independence, *Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration*, Vol. IX, pp. xxii–xxv; *Tribune*, 22 January 1942; 29 January 1943.

25 Executive Order No. 5, *Official Gazette,* 14–31 October 1943, p. 10 and Executive Order No. 10 for educational changes, *Official Gazette* November 1943, pp. 109–110; Proclamation No. 7 for the national language, *Official Gazette* December 1943, p. 190.

26 Samples of posters and leaflets are in the University of the Philippines' Japanese Occupation Papers and in the Philippine National Library. *Tribune* announcements marked the change to PIAM and Philippine Publications. Notes on 'Tatlong Maria' are from a typescript translation of the script.

27 Garrett, *Postal History*, pp. 265–279.

28 Executive Order No. 4, *Official Gazette*, 14–31 October 1943, p. 9. 'Diwa ng Bayan' music sheet and musical programmes in author's collection. Before the war, the national anthem was sung in English.

29 Samples of cigarette boxes in author's collection.

30 The civic code under Laurel's administration was published after the war. Civic Code Committee, Filipino Civic Code (Manila: Philippine Historical Association, 1958).

31 Executive Order No. 24, *Official Gazette*, December 1943, p. 200. Report of interview with Laurel, 25 October 1943, in *Historical Bulletin*, pp. 217–223; Laurel to Hon. Guglielmo Piani, 10 January 1944, Jose P. Laurel Memorial Library.

32 Executive Order No. 29, *Official Gazette*, January 1944, pp. 349–351.

33 Ordinance No. 18, 1 May 1944; Executive Order No. 54, 3 May 1944; Proclamation No. 18, 7 June 1944; Revtrufilnism, Inc., *I am a Filipino Movement*, Oratorical Contest programme, 13 February 1944.

CHAPTER TWELVE

Japanization in Indonesia Re-Examined: The Problem of Self-Sufficiency in Clothing

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During the Second World War, the Japanese Army and Navy occupied the Netherlands Indies (Indonesia). They divided the occupied territory into three parts, with the 25th Army in charge of the administration of Sumatra, the 16th Army ruling Java and the Navy controlling most of the remainder. Some Westerners who observed the Japanese military administration in Indonesia were quick to identify what they called a process of 'Japanization' under Japanese rule. This rather vague concept could be applied to a wide range of actions, including the teaching of the Japanese language, songs, dances, and choreographed fitness exercises, reforms in local administration, education, and agriculture, and the introduction of social, political, economic, military, and semi-military organizations, all apparently modelled after those in Japan.

In March 1944, Hayashi Kyūjirō, the political adviser to the occupation government in Java, wrote to the Tokyo authorities, asserting that independence should be granted to Java in the future and, during the preparatory period, the local people, particularly the youth, should be educated in such a way that they would be made into the 'second Japanese race in the Southern Regions, imbued with the Japanese spirit'.[1] How the Japanese implemented their 'Japanization' policies is relatively well documented, particularly with regard to Java where approximately 50 per cent of the population of occupied Southeast Asia was concentrated.[2] A systematic analysis of the reasons for the 'Japanization' effort, however, is yet to be conducted, though observers often allude to Japanese culture

and ideology in explaining it, as if seeking to transmit their culture were somehow a natural inclination of the Japanese.

Natural or not, 'Japanization' was in fact contrary to the Japanese official guidelines for the occupation. On 20 November 1941, only two and a half weeks prior to the invasion, the Japanese government and the Imperial Headquarters convened a liaison conference and adopted 'Guidelines for the Implementation of Military Administration in the Southern Regions'.[3] Rather than prescribing a 'Japanization' policy, the first of these ten guidelines stated that the occupation forces should make maximum use of existing local customs and institutions, which were to be interfered with as little as possible. In consequence, after occupying Java the Japanese assembled top Indonesian intellectuals and formed a Committee to Investigate Old Customs and Institutions.[4] The role of this committee was to inform the occupation authorities about social, economic and cultural conditions in Java and thus to help the effective formulation of occupation policies which would pay due respect to existing customs and institutions.

In the course of time, however, the Japanese decided to embark on extensive social and economic reforms. That foreign overlords could adopt a principle of minimizing interference and yet end up transforming the local communities profoundly had been amply demonstrated by the Dutch colonial history in Indonesia. The Japanese occupation also affected Indonesian society in drastic ways. But what made the Japanese implement the 'Japanization' policies? How did those policies affect the local people?

Alongside the influence of culture and ideology, some observers have argued that the urgency of mobilizing Indonesia's human and natural resources for the war effort played a major role in shaping 'Japanization' policies. A close examination of the Japanese military policy will, however, reveal that, although culture and resource mobilization were important determinant factors, a vast area in the military administration is not amenable to those explanations. That was because, behind the façade of Japanization, certain economic imperatives were at work that were more compelling than culture and ideology, and broader than the exploitation of specific resources.

The logic behind the occupation policies was multilayered, and so were the effects of the occupation on Indonesian people. At the level of high politics, the occupation was a fortuitous opportunity for Indonesian nationalists. For the first time the nationalists were allowed to spread their political messages to the people and to make preparations for independence, with the official slogan of

Merdeka atau Mati (Freedom or Death). The occupation apparently inflamed Indonesian nationalist sentiments, rather than 'Japanese spirit'. At the grassroots level, however, recent studies have cast serious doubts about the extent to which the nationalist messages spread. The so-called 'small people' were often completely oblivious to the nationalist cause, although the occupation affected their lives drastically. This chapter probes beyond the façade, into the multilayered logical structure of the Japanese occupation policies, and examines the policies' effects on the people of Indonesia. As a concrete example, it focuses on the problem of the supply of clothing and its relations with a wide range of political, social and economic reforms.

In the pre-war years, Southeast Asia, with one hundred and fifty million people, had relied heavily on imports for the supply of clothing materials. When the Japanese military occupied the region, this importation stopped. The occupation authorities, who were responsible for creating this sudden predicament, had to take some measures. Historians of this period have tended to examine events within each administrative unit such as Java but the occupied territories throughout Southeast Asia confronted many common problems. We can, therefore, observe similarities in the military administration of different military units. For a fuller understanding of the Japanese military administration, we need to examine the economic situation in a broader regional and historical context.

Historically, the First World War was a turning point for the Japanese economy and its economic relations with Southeast Asia. While European empires were waging ruinous assaults upon one another, Japan achieved an industrial takeoff, and its export of commodities to Southeast Asia increased dramatically. Japan's rapidly expanding industries, however, remained dependent on the Western empires for the supply of raw materials. By the 1930s, Japan became the world's largest exporter of cotton goods but the raw cotton for this industry had to come almost entirely from overseas.[5] Overcoming this kind of dependency, which affected Japan in a whole range of commodities including oil, became Japan's new diplomatic target and eventually drove her into the series of expansionist wars in the 1930s and 1940s.

Japan's ambition to create an economically self-sufficient sphere was captured in the slogan 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere'. This term was apparently used for the first time on 1 August 1940, the day the Japanese government published the key document called 'Kihon Kokusaku Yōkō' [Foundation of the

national policy]. This document itself did not contain the term but, in the press conference on the same day, Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke explained that Japan's diplomatic target was to construct a 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere', which would include the Netherlands Indies, French Indochina and other areas in the Southern Seas. This shift in Japan's foreign policy was a reaction to the German occupation of the Netherlands and France and the threat of an embargo by the United States against Japan.

The problematic nature of this new concept can be illustrated with criticisms and comments presented at that time. Rōyama Masamichi, a former professor at Tokyo University and a member of Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro's brain trust, Shōwa Kenkyūkai, responded immediately. He pointed out that the term 'Co-Prosperity Sphere' was not used in the 'Foundation of the National Policy', and complained that the concept was too vague; it was not at all clear what it was meant to be and how it could be achieved. The national policies in Germany, Britain and the United States were supported by much research, he argued, whereas lately in Japan there was a marked tendency among politicians to use empty slogans without careful examination. He called this tendency not only confusing but also dangerous.[6]

Matsushita Masahisa of Rikkyō University gave a more blunt criticism. On 7 October 1940, in one of the series of confidential symposia that the Navy organized, he argued that the concept of a 'Co-Prosperity Sphere' was deceptive because Japan would exploit resources from the other areas of the sphere but she had nothing to reciprocate with. When Latin American countries lost European markets, the United States was able to function as the market for their products, whereas Japan was incapable of functioning as the sole market for the Southern Regions. It would be more honest, he suggested, to use the term *Lebensraum* (living space). The so-called 'Co-Prosperity Sphere' was, he asserted, destined to become a 'Co-Poverty Sphere', and the Japanese people must be aware of that.[7]

It was not only critics who were aware of the deceptive nature of the concept. Some policy makers were also frank about it. Finance Minister Kaga Okinori explained in the Imperial Conference on 5 November 1941 as follows:

> The Southern Regions to be occupied have been importing considerably large amounts of various commodities. When we occupy the areas, importation of those items will stop. If the local economies were to be maintained effectively, we should be supplying those commodities. However, we do not have the necessary capabilities. For a considerably

> long period we cannot afford to pay attention to the economic wellbeing of the local people. We cannot but adopt so-called exploitative policies. In order to obtain natural resources and labour, we will issue military notes and other currencies but maintaining their values will be difficult.
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> We adopt the principle of self-sustenance of our expeditionary forces, and exportation of commodities from Japan to the occupied land must be kept at the absolute minimum. … We must push on forward ignoring for the time being the economic confusion in the occupied land caused by the fall in the value of the currencies and so on.
>
> Local inhabitants are, however, culturally primitive and their lands are rich in natural resources. Maintaining their lifestyles would, therefore, be relatively easy in comparison with some other areas such as China.[8]

The military venture was certain to create serious economic stress in the occupied territories. Japan nevertheless plunged into war under a deceptive banner, in order to secure strategic resources, without any clear vision for their proclaimed 'Co-Prosperity Sphere'. Kaga explained that the Japanese policy was to ignore economic problems in the occupied lands. There was, however, a limit to what they could ignore because 'to win the hearts of the people' was also one of the official aims of the military administration. Between winning the hearts of the people and ignoring their economic well-being lay a great contradiction. The occupation authorities had to grapple with it. Many of the 'Japanization' policies were, as we shall see presently, means with which to deal with this contradiction.

Kaga's prediction that maintaining the local people's 'primitive' lifestyles would be relatively easy proved wrong. The military administration quickly discovered that even the most basic matters such as guaranteeing access to food and clothing for the local population were formidable challenges. In pre-war years Southeast Asia as a whole was more or less self-sufficient in food. As for clothing, pre-colonial Southeast Asia had its own textile industries but they were almost completely wiped out during the colonial era due to importation of mass-produced goods from the industrialized countries. In the case of the Netherlands Indies, those goods came mostly from Great Britain and the Netherlands until the First World War, and thereafter from Japan. During the Great Depression, as the European powers lost their capacity to export textiles, Japan came to establish a near monopoly in the market.[9] The Netherlands Indies authorities took defensive measures, imposing restrictions on textile imports from Japan and beginning promotion of the local weaving industry.

The Japanese occupation authorities also tried to foster a textile industry in Indonesia. In this sense we can see continuity between the Dutch policy and the Japanese one. Few historians have ever paid attention to the aspect of continuity in economic administration from the Dutch era to the Japanese era. If we do, however, we can see varying degrees of continuity even in many of the 'Japanization' policies. That was in part because construction of a war economy began in Indonesia in 1939, as soon as the European war broke out with the Nazi invasion of Poland. The war economy lasted until the end of the war of independence in 1949. Examining continuity and change in the Indonesian economy in the 'three eras' within these ten years is a worthwhile project that is yet to be conducted.

A notable effort of industrialization in Indonesia began a few years before the outbreak of the European war. It was part of the Dutch attempts to protect the Indies from the effects of the Great Depression and the influx of commodities from Japan. From the mid-1930s the Netherlands Indies accelerated importation of power looms and by 1940 they built 82 weaving mills, 78 of them in Java. In addition, there were approximately 500,000 old-fashioned handlooms in operation in the villages.[10] Together these looms produced various clothing materials including seven million sarongs per year, which was about ten per cent of the local consumption. This weaving industry in Indonesia, however, depended on imported yarns. Indonesia's indigenous population did grow some cotton and in 1940 exported to Japan some 1,548 tonnes (349 tonnes from Java and 1,192 tonnes from the Outer Islands). This amount was statistically negligible, and so was Indonesia's spinning industry. When the European war broke out in September 1939, and particularly after the Netherlands was occupied by the Nazis in May 1940, the Netherlands Indies authorities further accelerated industrialization of the Indies. In 1941 they allocated a budget of 50 million guilders to the spinning industry and started building modern mills at Pasuruan and Bojonegoro.[11] Before those mills were completed, however, the Japanese had invaded.

The textile industry in Japan, on the other hand, had grown huge in comparison but it too depended on imported raw cotton. Soon after the establishment of Manchukuo, Japan formed the Japanese Association for Cotton Cultivation with a view to increasing cotton production in Korea and Manchukuo. These areas, however, came nowhere near meeting the Japanese demand. When the Sino–Japanese war broke out in July 1937, Japan created puppet governments in the northern part of China and began advocating a 'New Order in East Asia'.

This 'New Order' included an eight-year plan to increase cotton production in North China by 600,000 tonnes per annum, and to import half of it to Japan. After the Germans occupied France and the collaborationist government was formed at Vichy, Japan applied pressure on French Indochina and Thailand, requesting them to grow 200,000 tonnes of cotton for Japan in each area.[12]

After launching the invasion of Southeast Asia, the Japanese government requested that the Japanese Association for Cotton Cultivation make a plan for occupied Southeast Asia. The Association hastily made a five-year plan (Table 1), which the government officially adopted on 4 April 1942.

The target was to achieve an annual production of 230,000 tonnes of raw cotton by the fifth year using 1.3 million hectares of land. This production target, even if it were fully achieved, was far below the level of self-sufficiency. Meanwhile, the plan in China was fraught with problems and not progressing as Japan had hoped for. Furthermore, the Japanese came to realize that shortages of clothing materials in Southeast Asia were more serious than they had imagined. As soon as the Japanese occupied Indonesia, the local people lodged many complaints and petitions with the occupation authorities about the difficulty of obtaining clothing materials. The Dutch had made emergency stockpiles of clothing materials including garments, cloth, yarn, dyes, and threads, which the Japanese took over. Those stockpiles, however, amounted to no more than two to three months' supply.[13] The occupation authorities had

Table 1: Japan's initial five-year plan for cotton cultivation in Southeast Asia (1,000 ha)

	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947
Philippines	30	60	120	240	500
Java, Sumatra	10	20	40	80	140
Sulawesi, LS, NG, SB	15	30	60	120	338
Burma	50	83	133	200	338
Total	105	195	353	640	1,316

Source: 'Nanpō Keizai Taisaku (Kaiteiban)' [Economic policies with regard to the Southern Regions (revised edition)], in Ishikawa Junkichi (ed.), *Kokka Sōdōin Shi Shiryō Hen 8* [History of the national mobilization, sources, 8] (Tokyo: Kokka Sōdōin Shi Kankōkai, 1979), p. 62. LS, NG, SB signify Lesser Sunda (Nusa Tenggara), New Guinea, and Southern Borneo respectively.

Table 2: The Army's initial five-year plan (1,000 ha)

	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947
Sumatra	14	25	70	110	140
Java	30	50	90	150	180
Burma	354	545	613	680	816
North Borneo	0.25	1.5	5	7.5	10
Total	398.25	621.5	778	947.5	1,146

Source: Several tables in 'Sen'i Sakumotsu Chiiki Betsu Nenjibetsu Seisan Mokuhyō' [Annual production targets for fibre-producing crops according to the regions] (Gunsei Shiryō, no. 107).

to handle the limited resources very carefully, immediately introducing various regulations such as production control, price freezing, prevention of hoarding, and coupon and rationing systems.[14] As time passed, increasingly tight control over a range of economic matters proved necessary, and the Japanese embarked on a scheme of social and economic restructuring, or 'Japanization', under the banner of 'Construction of New Java'.

After adopting the initial five-year plan, the Japanese government entrusted the Army and the Navy with the formulation of more detailed cotton production plans for their respective jurisdictions. Since the initial plan was obviously insufficient, the Army and the Navy prepared much more ambitious plans later in the same year (Tables 2 and 3).[15] Since Southeast Asia had insufficient cotton processing facilities, the Japanese government made a four-year plan to reduce the textile industry in Japan and shift 1,120,000 spindles (out of the 12 million spindles in Japan) and 38,000 looms there.[16] The Army's production target of cotton cloth for local consumption in Java, Sumatra and Burma in 1944 was 65 million square yards, which was 0.77 square yards per person. This target was far from sufficient. Before the war, the average annual consumption of cloth per person had been 11.97 square yards in the Netherlands Indies and 22.43 square yards in Japan.[17]

As soon as the Japanese launched their aggression, importation of cotton products from Japan plummeted and ground to a complete halt in the course of 1943.[18] Shortages of clothing in the occupied areas became increasingly obvious. One Japanese official, Fukuda Shōzō, inspected Java in mid-1943 and

Table 3: The Navy's initial five-year plan (ha)

	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947
South Sulawesi	9,625	26,950	57,750	92,400	130,500
North Sulawesi	19,390	41,550	66,480	82,730	94,000
Bali	5,090	11,140	22,250	35,640	50,900
Lombok	4,090	10,220	20,450	32,720	40,900
Sumbawa	530	1,330	2,650	4,240	5,300
Flores	1,800	4,500	9,000	14,400	18,800
Total	40,525	95,690	178,580	262,130	339,600

Source: Several tables in 'Shō Sunda Mensaku Shonendo Seiseki Gaikyō' [Overview of the cotton production results in the first year in the Lesser Sunda] (Nishijima Collection, NV19).

reported that many children could not go to school because their pants were in tatters; lack of clothing was also frustrating the Japanese attempt to increase rice production in Java since many farmers could not work in the fields because their sarongs were torn.[19] The Japanese in Java gradually strengthened their cotton production plan, using more land than they had planned in 1942.

The Indonesian members of the Committee to Investigate Old Customs and Institutions initially considered that the most important social issue facing Java at that time was unemployment, followed by education, overpopulation, industrial development, and health and hygiene. They therefore discussed these issues in this order. In June and July 1943 when they discussed industrial development, some Indonesian members responded positively to the idea of fostering cotton and textile industries in Java. Trying to achieve self-sufficiency in clothing using homegrown cotton and manual machines in a way similar to that which Mahatma Gandhi had been advocating in British India sounded rather attractive. If Japan was going to shift textile factories to Indonesia, that would be even better. In August and September, during three sessions, they discussed the issue of clothing. During these sessions, the members were made to realize the urgency and the scale of the problem, and reached a general consensus that clothing was the number one issue Javanese society was facing. The stenographic record of the first session is missing but the record of the

subsequent sessions shows that a Japanese member explained in the first session how closely cotton production was related to food production. If clothing materials were to be produced locally, cotton and some other fibre-yielding crops had to take up substantial land areas, which would jeopardize Java's self-sufficiency in food. Cotton could be grown either in irrigated fields or on non-irrigated fields, but planting on non-irrigated fields could be done only in the rainy season because germination required plenty of water. Moreover, productivity in irrigated fields could be up to ten times higher, but wet rice was the most important food crop. The military administration faced a difficult question of how to grow cotton and other fibre-yielding crops without causing a reduction in food production.[20]

In the third session on clothing held on 25 September 1943, a Japanese member of the committee, Arimura, explained some of the measures the Japanese authorities were planning to take.[21] One was to plant cotton as a secondary crop after harvesting rice. In Java, rice was mostly grown over the rainy season, sowing taking place in November and harvesting being carried out in April and May. Cotton, in contrast, did not require much water for growing except for germination, and excessive rainfalls in the flowering time would damage it. Cotton should, therefore, be planted just before the end of the rainy season. If planted in March, it would flower and fruit in September and October. This pattern of cultivation would be made possible by introducing a quick-maturing strain of rice, called Hōrai, from Taiwan. The local varieties of rice took 170 days to mature on average while Hōrai rice matured in 110 days. If Hōrai rice were planted in November, the land would become available for cotton by March. The seven residencies in the eastern half of Java did not receive excessive rain in September and October, and were therefore considered suitable for cotton cultivation. If cotton were grown in the same place in consecutive years, however, noxious insects would multiply and devastate the crop. Cotton therefore had to be planted in rotation, for instance in Malang and Besuki in the first year, in Surabaya and Bojonegoro in the second year, and in Kediri and Madiun in the third year and so on.

Implementation of this kind of system would require careful planning and strict control by the authorities. Arimura explained that the Japanese wished to make use of the method of the Cultivation System (forced cultivation of export crops) which the Dutch imposed on Javanese villages a century earlier. In this system, *toewijzingen* (assignments) would be sent to each administrative region (residency), which would be then passed down to the villages through the bureau-

cratic channels. The Dutch invented this notorious system in order to save their own country from bankruptcy, Arimura argued, whereas the Japanese wished to adopt the same method and implement it with utmost rigour in order to save the local population from misery.

Indonesian intellectuals on various occasions had expressed their misgivings about the Japanese (and Dutch) methods of administration with regard to the village population. They pointed out that, if the government control were excessive, the villagers' initiatives would be stifled because there would be little left for them in the villages that they could do without either orders or permissions.[22] In response to Arimura's explanation, an Indonesian member of the committee, T.G.S. Mulia, argued that the cotton cultivation plan should be examined more carefully before implementation, taking the points of view of the villagers into consideration. If cotton were planted instead of vegetables, the farmers would have to buy vegetables with the money they would receive for delivering cotton to the government, but the prices of vegetables would rise in such a situation. Even now when vegetables were available in sufficient amounts, the villagers could not be said to be adequately nourished. If they were forced to buy vegetables, their health would deteriorate even further. Java had 524 pawnshops under the control of the Department of Finance. About 60 per cent of the pawns, or 30 million pieces, were clothes and fabrics. The government could write them off and distribute them to the needy.

Arimura retorted emotionally, challenging the Indonesian members of the committee to see with their own eyes how serious the current situation was. The committee members were beautifully clad and talking in Jakarta, Arimura pointed out, but the people in the countryside were in dire need of help. He had just come back from a two-week inspection tour in East Java, and reported that the situations in the plantations in the hills and the villages surrounding them were particularly critical. The management of plantations had been drastically curtailed, and the wages were meagre. Often the clothes the coolies were wearing were the only ones they had. So, instead of trying to earn meagre wages and damage their only clothes, they preferred to stay home and grow edible plants such as maize, cassava, and dry rice. In one or two months those people would be truly naked. Arimura's colleague who inspected the situation with him reported the situation to the residents in a flood of tears. 'We must understand how hard the current situation is', exclaimed Arimura. 'We must cast away the old-fashioned ways of thinking and put the interests of the people of Java first!'

If this crisis were to be overcome, the loss of food crop fields to non-edible crops had to be compensated in one way or another. One of the measures they took was the extension of Java's arable land. In 1940 about 68 per cent of the total land area of Java was already under cultivation in contrast to about 15 per cent in Japan. The Japanese tried to expand Java's agricultural fields even further, by reclaiming marshlands, clearing forests and extending irrigation and drainage channels. These and many other projects for similar purposes required a 'total mobilization' of labour. They launched a labour mobilization campaign from late 1943, and conducted, among other things, large irrigation projects at sixty-two places.[23] Overpopulation and unemployment were once considered the most serious problems threatening people's day-to-day lives in Java. Soon, however, shortage of labour became obvious throughout Java, both in farming villages as well as on construction sites.

Together with the land extension projects, the Japanese embarked on a large-scale campaign to reform rice cultivation under the banner of 'production increase'. They established agricultural schools, dispatched instructors and taught the Japanese way of growing rice, transplanting seedlings early from the nurseries to the fields along straight lines, applying manure and weeding at regular intervals. Soon after the campaign was launched, however, a Japanese authority on tropical agriculture, Terao Hiroshi, made an inspection tour in Southeast Asia and publicly denounced the agricultural reforms that were being undertaken. The gist of his argument was that it was wrong to consider the Japanese methods superior and the local methods inferior. He defended the local methods by explaining that there were good reasons for the local farmers to adopt their own methods. At the same time he presented a list of problems associated with the introduction of the Japanese methods to the tropical environment.[24]

The Japanese in Java were evidently aware of those problems even before Terao inspected the area. Fukuda Shōzō, who visited Java in mid 1943, reported upon return to Tokyo that the Japanese attempt to increase food production in Java had 'failed'; Hōrai rice had been experimentally planted on about fifty hectares of land but it proved vulnerable to insect attacks, and absorbed much more nutrients than the local varieties; moreover, it did not grow well without labour intensive care including manuring and thorough weeding, but the local people detested handling manure, regarding it as dirty.[25]

Observing agricultural conditions was not the main purpose of Fukuda's visit, and he was not an agriculture specialist. His remarks on agriculture were

apparently based on information he obtained from Japanese administrative authorities or agriculture specialists in Java. Some Japanese agricultural technicians were enthusiastic about disseminating the Japanese rizicultural methods in Java, but the policy makers who were better informed about the overall situation were aware of the mounting problems facing food and cotton production. Cotton was, for instance, famous for being vulnerable to insect attacks but pesticides became unavailable during the occupation due to the cessation of importation. The Japanese therefore had to mine for raw materials to produce pesticides. They mined volcanic sulphur but the pesticide made from it proved ineffective, and insects soon devastated cotton plants. They also needed fertilizers, whose importation also stopped. Natural phosphoric acid (hardened layers of excrement of birds and bats) was found. The mined phosphoric acid had to be processed using crushers. The authorities, however, decided to employ all the crushers in Java for processing trass (volcanic earth) instead, to produce a cement substitute. That was because importation of Portland cement also stopped.

In the face of all these problems, the occupation authorities launched and continued their campaign relentlessly. Their propaganda organs constantly emphasized the importance of adopting more sophisticated Japanese agricultural methods, asserting that increasing food production meant increasing war potential. The measures they took were, however, not as 'Japanese' as they looked on the surface. Dutch intelligence officers analysed the Japanese propaganda, identified eight areas of innovation, and sought the opinion of a Dutch specialist. The specialist commented that six out of the eight were 'merely a continuation of methods practised under the Dutch'.[26]

One of the most well-known aspects of 'Japanization' of rice cultivation was seedling transplantation in straight lines. The Dutch, in fact, encouraged this method (called *rijenteelt* or *rijenbouw* in Dutch) before the Japanese occupation, particularly after the Nazis invaded Poland. It was a part of the policy to increase food production in the Indies, initially with a view to securing food for Holland, but subsequently in preparation for the war in the Far East.[27] This method did not spread widely in Indonesia before the Japanese occupation partly because of the time factor and partly because it was not so meaningful unless regular weeding was practised. Regular weeding was not profitable for large land-holders who relied on wage labour. During occupation the Japanese imposed the transplantation method and thorough weeding because they had to introduce Hōrai rice, and Hōrai rice required such methods. It was also impera-

tive for them to try to maximize per area productivity regardless of profitability for the landholders.

The two Japanese 'innovations', according to the Dutch specialist's view, were the introduction of Hōrai rice from Taiwan and importation and production of agricultural tools such as hoes. These two 'innovations', too, were not so 'Japanese'. Dutch technicians had experimented with a wide range of rice varieties (including a Chinese variety called *Padi Cina*) at the agricultural research centre in Bogor and experimental fields elsewhere, and encouraged farmers to adopt the most suitable varieties according to the conditions and needs of each locality. They distributed seeds and seedlings to farmers at low prices. They also guided and supported local blacksmiths to produce improved metal ploughs.

The Hōrai rice that the Japanese brought with them certainly had some advantages. Its productivity per hectare was higher than the local varieties by about 40 per cent on average. Also, since it matured faster, double cropping became easier to practise. As we have seen, however, Hōrai rice had certain drawbacks which made it unsuitable for the local conditions. The essential characteristic of Hōrai rice that appealed to the Japanese planners was not so much that it was intrinsically superior to the existing varieties but rather that it enabled a system of crop rotation using cotton and rice. The varieties the Dutch had promoted in the sugar producing parts of Java suited a crop rotation of sugar and rice.

The second 'innovation', production and importation of tools, was nothing but an empty promise to varnish over the problem the Japanese had made. In reality, the Japanese created serious shortages of farming tools in Java by diverting metal for military purposes and by mobilizing farmers and their farming tools for other construction purposes. There is no evidence that the Japanese produced or imported farming tools in large quantities.

The campaigns for production increase failed to mitigate the problems. Production of cotton was far from satisfactory, and production of food, too, declined for a host of reasons. In October 1943, as part of the overall political and social reforms in Java and other parts of occupied Southeast Asia, the Japanese dissolved the Committee to Investigate Old Customs and Institutions, replacing it with another body called Sanyo Kaigi (Council of Indonesian Advisers). On 14 April 1945, the head of the Department of Industry, Tennichi Kōichi, gave the following explanation to the Sanyo Kaigi.[28] In pre-war years, Java had consumed 1.28 million piculs[29] of cotton per year. The production

target for 1944 was 75,000 piculs while the outcome was 30,000 piculs (or 2.3% of the prewar consumption). The shortfall was due to a severe drought and insufficient know-how. Tennichi announced that the target for 1945 had been raised to 250,000 piculs, of which 120,000 piculs were to be delivered to Jakarta government and 130,000 piculs were to be processed into clothes within the residencies. The portion delivered to the Jakarta government was to be made into military uniforms, canvasses for automobiles and sails, as well as yarns that were to be redistributed to needy residencies.

The ultimate production target during the war was, he explained, about a third of the pre-war consumption level, or 4 yards per person per year, just enough for a pair of shorts and a short jacket. That would require about 430,000 piculs of cotton and 215,000 power spindles. At the beginning of the occupation there were only 42,000 spindles in Java. To ease the situation, the Military Administration took various measures, one of which was to build manual spinning machines. One such machine was able to spin 40 grammes of yarn per day. Their target was to build one million of them (which would require one million spinners behind them), and up to then 210,000 had been built. They also built handlooms, particularly in the Pekalongan and Priangan residencies. This effort needed to be continued.

Another measure was to make clothes from gunny, the coarse jute cloth used to make sacks for the sugar industry. Sack factories in Solo stopped producing sacks, and concentrated on clothes production. In addition, Tennichi pointed out, there was one million tonnes of sugar stored in sacks. By emptying the sacks, twelve million pairs of short pants could be made. Kapotex (made from kapok and latex) was also to be used. It was cheap and easy to make. One drawback was that it did not ventilate well due to low porosity but it could be used for wrapping bodies for burial.

In order to achieve self-sufficiency in clothing, he continued, they needed raw materials, processing apparatus, and manpower. The manpower required was 2.3 million people per day. In addition, owners of houses (500,000 households) were requested to plant cotton in their house gardens. On the Emperor's birthday, 29 April, there would be a special distribution of clothes to farmers, *rōmusha* (drafted labourers), schoolteachers and low ranking public servants.[30]

The above is the gist of Tennichi's exposition. Before long, those who received the special distribution of clothes began appearing in clothes made from gunnysacks. Gunnysacks were normally made of jute that grew in the Bengal

region of British India which was responsible for 97 per cent of the total jute production in the world. The Netherlands Indies imported about 30 million gunnysacks annually, and these became unobtainable during the war. There was therefore a serious shortage of gunnysacks at the beginning of the occupation. The Japanese attempted to grow jute and roselle but the outcomes, particularly for jute, were far from satisfactory for climatic reasons. Indonesia, however, produced a substantial amount of sisal, a very coarse fibre normally used for cordage and brushes. The Japanese decided to use sisal for making sacks. Most of the sacks produced in Indonesia during the occupation were made of sisal, supplemented with other fibres such as roselle, coconut fibre and pineapple leaves. They apparently shifted the stocked sugar from jute sacks to sisal sacks, and used the former for producing makeshift clothes.

Indonesian people also improvised clothes from whatever materials they could lay hands on, such as bed linen, mosquito nets, tablecloths, flour sacks, mats and the bark of trees. People in the upper strata of the society continued to have privileged access to commodities. After the Japanese capitulation they took over the Japanese clothing stockpiles and kept wearing very fine clothes. Many people, in sharp contrast, had to stay in gunnysacks or rags.[31] In April 1946, Dutch officers investigated the conditions of rice mills in Java. All of their reports state that the mill workers were badly clothed. The International Red Cross and the NIGIEO (Nederlands-Indische Gouvernements Import en Export Organisatie) started importing small amounts of clothes soon after the Japanese surrender and distributed them to the needy. Their effort to secure a sufficient amount of clothing was frustrated because production of textiles throughout the world slumped during the war, and even former textile exporting countries were experiencing difficulty in meeting the demands within their own countries. Consequently, in July 1946 in East Java, people still had to pay 20 to 25 guilders for gunnysack clothes.[32] In certain areas in East Java in 1947, as much as 80 per cent of the population still wore gunnysacks for clothes.[33]

Let us now turn our attention to Eastern Indonesia that was administered by the Navy. The situation there was, as can be imagined easily, no less serious. On 31 October 1943 in Bali, the Japanese conducted a survey of prices of basic commodities and found that the average price of clothes was 251.24 per cent of the pre-war level. Three months later, on 31 December, they conducted another survey and reported that the price of clothes could not be identified because there were no more clothes on market.[34] In 1943 the Navy planted cotton ambitiously

using 54,239 hectares of land, or 146 per cent of their own initial plan. Later in the year, however, they decided not to expand cotton fields any further. There were three basic reasons. One was lack of cotton processing machines. Eastern Indonesia was supposed to receive 160,000 spindles and 6,400 looms from Japan in three years, but only a fraction of the target numbers arrived, and processing the harvested cotton proved difficult.[35] Another reason was difficulty in transporting cotton out of the area because by then Japanese shipping was severely crippled.[36] The final reason was shortage of food and labour. Most of the Navy's areas had imported food before the war and these imports diminished or stopped during the occupation. The availability of labour for food production, moreover, was already diminished by the Japanese use of local labour to construct military facilities such as forts, airstrips, roads and storehouses. Under these circumstances, promoting cotton production was a certain recipe for aggravating the already serious food shortages.[37]

While maintaining the cotton production target for 1944 at the 1943 level, the Navy tried to process the cotton as much as possible by building manual spinning machines, fully utilizing traditional handlooms and mobilizing schoolgirls. In this way, in July 1944, they produced 18,000 sarongs in Bali, 9,500 pieces in Lombok and 2,000 pieces in Sumbawa. This was a very small fraction of what people needed but it was all they could achieve. In this area, too, people had to use gunnysacks and tree bark for clothing.[38]

In the West Coast of Borneo, a sarong smuggled from Java cost 150 guilders in August 1943, whereas it would have cost 2.50 guilders before the war. Prices were much higher in South Borneo. By smuggling clothes from Java to Pontianak, and then to Banjarmasin, traders could make handsome profits.[39] Despite the seriousness of clothing issue, the Navy decided in late 1944 to abandon their plans altogether in a number of places and to turn the cotton fields over to food production. Nine Japanese companies had been sent to grow cotton in the Navy's area. Those companies were now requested to concentrate their efforts on producing food. The military administration had to make a choice between food and clothing, and they chose food.[40]

The local people tried to invent their own devices to cope with the situation. On Selayar Island, the Japanese ordered the islanders to increase cotton production tenfold and deliver 90 per cent of it to the Japanese at a fixed price. The islanders concealed their produce as much as possible and sold it on the black market at much higher prices or made clothes for themselves. In this way, they kept pro-

ducing their own clothes to some extent even after the Japanese abandoned their project.[41]

After the Japanese surrendered, in Bolaang-Mongondow in North Sulawesi, some Chinese traders started shifting rice to neighbouring Minahasa, and bringing in clothes in return. Soon the Dutch re-established their authority and imposed a ban on exportation of rice that was scarce in the region. Both the Chinese traders and the local authority were critical of the Dutch measure. The local authority, raja Manoppo, explained that, while the nationalists were shouting *Merdeka atau Mati*, the choice for the population in his region was between *Malu atau Mati* (Embarrassment or Death). By exporting rice and importing clothes, some would be relieved from being *malu*, even though others might have to face *mati* from lack of food.[42] The local population was facing the problems of their own personal survival and embarrassment that would have been more worrying than the freedom for the whole nation.

A report about the situation in the Sula islands during the occupation would illustrate how embarrassment could be a life-threatening problem. An informant states that if a stranger came to visit a family and that family had only one sarong left, the children and younger women would hide and give the sarong to their mother, who could show herself. This was of course no laughing matter because women would have to go out if they were to obtain food. These islands used to export copra and import rice. Importation of rice stopped during the occupation. The islanders, therefore, had to grow their own food but the Japanese took away about 1,500 male coolies from Sanana to Kairatu. Now women had to work the fields. Thus approximately 10 per cent less land was cultivated in 1944 due to manpower shortages. Those women, moreover, could not till the land and mend the fences at the same time. Thus fences suffered from disrepair, and wild pigs ruined the crops. Consequently, food price increased by three to fourfold by mid 1944. Meanwhile the price of an old gunnysack rose from 25 cents to three guilders.[43] Local people apparently perceived the shortage of clothing as a more serious issue than the shortage of food.

The Japanese five-year plans and some other documents show that the 25th Army in Sumatra also had a cotton production plan comparable to that in Java. There are, however, few studies about the situation in Sumatra, and I have not yet gathered many source materials. The following Dutch source, however, affords us a rare glance. Some Dutch officers inspected plantations in Sumatra from late September to early October 1945, and report that 'a very large pro-

portion of the workers wore gunnysacks or rags thereof'. Hospitals were overcrowded with patients clad in gunnysacks, many of whom, including women, children, and infants, were lying on the stone floor, often suffering from severe skin disease or deep wounds.[44]

The above survey has shown that the Japanese attempt to construct a block economy, and the subsequent arrest of textile importation and disappearance of clothing from the market, created problems throughout Indonesia. Shortages of cotton products affected people's lives in a range of other ways as well. Hospitals, for instance, quickly exhausted their stocks of cotton wool or cotton bandages and had to use bandages improvised from stems of banana leaves.[45] Women encountered difficulty finding cloth for sanitary napkins, and had to use kapotex instead, which was much less effective and thus restricted women's activity during their periods.[46] In a normal year about one million people died annually in Java alone. This required six million metres of burial cloth. Lack of white cloth for that purpose also constituted a real problem.

Facing these widespread problems, the occupation authorities tried to control production and distribution of essential items, which required massive labour relocation and overall social and bureaucratic reforms. In every local government office, they instituted a section for increasing production and another for labour mobilization. They also set up agricultural co-operatives and created neighbourhood associations throughout Java. Some of these measures negatively affected the local communities. Forced mobilization of labour and delivery of rice to the government were the two most harmful policies.

The scale of labour mobilization became immense, not so much because the Japanese needed more and more labour for their war offensives but rather because the efficiency of labour dropped during the war. The original Japanese scheme was to secure the Southern Regions as a potential market for industrial products and a supply base for raw materials. Until mid-1943, they also counted on some degree of inter-regional exchange of commodities within the occupied regions, but thereafter they were forced to establish economic self-sufficiency in each of relatively small units such as Java or Sumatra. Cotton, for instance, had to be grown throughout Southeast Asia, even in areas where the soil or climate was not quite suitable, and spinning and weaving had to be carried out even where no modern textile factories existed.[47] The efficiency of forced labour under such conditions was inevitably low. The military administration tried to overcome this low production by mobilizing more and more labour, under the banner of 'production increase'.

The forced delivery of rice to the government has usually been interpreted in terms of exploitation by the Japanese. This policy, too, was basically a Japanese attempt to control food distribution. The method, which created chaos, was a combination of the Dutch policy initiated in the Indies after September 1939 and the policy that began in Japan at about the same time.[48]

We can observe some resemblance between the 'total mobilization' campaigns in the occupied lands and the national mobilization movement that went on in Japan. As one of the reasons for the intensive 'Japanization' of Southeast Asia, Iwatake Teruhiko points out that most of the Japanese administrators sent to occupied Southeast Asia were career bureaucrats such as prefectural governors. Most of them had no experience in colonial administration. Instead, they had firsthand experience of implementing social and industrial reforms; national mobilization in Japan itself that had begun only a few years before, after the outbreak of the second Sino–Japanese war in 1937. He also considers that although the measures they took in the occupied land might look like 'Japanization' on the surface, they had their own rational reasons.[49]

The fundamental aim of 'Japanization' of Indonesian society was, as with the national mobilization in Japan (and the *Staatsmobilisatie* in the pre-war Netherlands Indies), to construct an economic and social structure that would withstand the stress of war, at the same time enabling the maximum mobilization of human and natural resources for the war effort. Among the Japanese rank and file who drove forward the reforms in Indonesia, there were many who fanatically and naively believed in the cultural superiority of the Japanese and attempted to 'Japanize' Indonesia and Indonesians in a range of areas, and in a variety of ways. We can observe both cultural imperialism and economic rationalism in the Japanese military administration for the above reasons.

The reforms in occupied Indonesia were rather defensive than offensive in the sense that many of them were countermeasures against the onslaughts of economic problems that the war had created. At the meeting of the Committee to Investigate Old Customs and Institutions held on 25 September 1943, a Japanese member, Saitō Shizuo, admitted that self-sufficiency in clothing in Java was not going to be achieved during the war, and that the task for the members was to examine what emergency measures could be taken. For the policy makers like Saitō who were better informed and more calculating, whether those measures were Japanese, Dutch, Indian or Indonesian in their origin was not an issue save in propaganda. They were prepared to take any measures so

long as those measures could mitigate the problems. In fact they studied the pre-war Dutch economic policies closely and adopted them whenever appropriate.

The tragic fact was that the war and occupation had created many problems for which no satisfactory solution could be found except through cessation of war. The local Japanese administrators had to grapple with those insoluble problems. The principle of non-interference shown in the guidelines was a luxury that they could not afford. Even more tragically, many of the measures they took proved counterproductive or had many negative side effects and harmed the local communities gravely. Consequently, people dying from starvation on the roadside, clad in rags or nothing at all, became a common sight in many areas. 'Japanization' in Indonesia was an aspect of the Japanese struggle to construct their ill-defined 'Co-Prosperity Sphere' that was, from the outset, destined to become a 'Co-Poverty Sphere'.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, a four-year nationalist revolution by Indonesians put a definitive end to Dutch colonial rule. Dutch and other Western observers easily concluded that the brief Japanese occupation had made a profound contribution to this outcome. They interpreted the occupation as not only having weakened European power and prestige, disrupting Indonesian society and giving prominence to a few nationalist leaders, but also as having deliberately transmitted specifically Japanese political values. These values were said to have included racial hatred of the West, disdain for democracy, a celebration of 'spirit' over technology and an unthinking obedience to authority. These observers not only ignored the fact that these values had been encouraged by Western colonialism but failed to show how the Japanese might have transmitted them, given the short time and the limited facilities available to them. A close examination of Japanese policies shows that they were devised and implemented under a whole range of constraints which hampered their effectiveness and undermined consistency. For many Indonesians the Japanese period was above all a time of hardship in which their first priority was to survive.

AUTHOR'S NOTE

The primary sources cited in this chapter derive from the following archives and collections: BUZA NEFIS/CMI (materials produced or collected by the Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service/Centrale Militaire Inlichtingendienst, held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Hague); NIOD IC (Indonesian

Collection at the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, Amsterdam), Nishijima Collection (materials collected by Nishijima Shigetada et al., held at the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University, Tokyo); Kishi Shiryō (microfilms containing documents collected by Kishi Kōichi, held at the Institute for Developing Economies, Chiba); and Gunsei Shiryō (documents on the Military Administration in the Southern Regions, held at the Defence Agency Library in Tokyo).

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NOTES

1 Cited as an attachment in *Indoneshia ni okeru Nippon Gunsei no Kenkyū* [A study of the Japanese military administration in Indonesia] (Tokyo: Kinokuniya, 1959), p. 593.

2 Excluding Thailand, which remained independent, and French Indochina, which was officially administered by the French until 9 March 1945.

3 For an English translation of the guidelines, see Harry J. Benda et al. (eds), *Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia: Selected Documents* (New Haven: Yale University, 1965), p. 1.

4 This committee met for the first time on 15 November 1942 and decided to form two subcommittees, one on old customs and institutions and the other on welfare and prosperity of the population. The latter, initially consisting of nine Indonesian and seven Japanese members and chaired by another Japanese, was much more active and held a regular meeting every ten days until 5 October 1943. The stenographic record of the discussion in most sessions is available in BUZA NEFIS/CMI, bijlage 3, 2241.

5 In 1937, Japan imported 794,000 tonnes of raw cotton, 55 per cent of it from British India, 32 per cent from the United States and only 3 per cent from China. See *Shiryō Shū Nanpō no Gunsei* [Collected documents on the military administration in the Southern Regions] (Tokyo: Asagumo Shinbunsha, 1985), pp. 218–226.

6 Rōyama Masamichi, 'Daitōa Kyōeiken no Chiseigakuteki Kōsatsu' [Geopolitical examination of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere], in his book, *Tōa to Sekai* [East Asia and the world] (Tokyo: Kaizōsha, 1941), pp. 360–363. 'Kihon Kokusaku Yōkō' uses the expression 'New Order in Greater East Asia'.

7 'Gaikō Kondankai' [Symposia on diplomacy] (Kishi Shiryō, M7–57).

8 *Shiryō Shū Nanpō no Gunsei*, p. 214.

9 Yoshitada Maruyama, 'The Pattern of Japanese Economic Penetration of the Prewar Netherlands East Indies' in Saya Shiraishi and Takashi Shiraishi (eds), *The Japanese in Colonial Southeast Asia* (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1993), p. 109, table 6.2.

10 D.H. Burger, *Sociologisch-Economische Geschiedenis van Indonesia, Deel II* [Sociological and Economic History of Indonesia, Part II] (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), p. 121.

11 *Indisch Verslag 1941,* pp. 300–301, 352–353; C.J.J. van Hall, *Insulinde: Werk en Welvaart* [The Malay archipelago: work and prosperity], tweede druk (Naarden: In Den Toren, c. 1940), pp. 149–151; KNIL, *Nederlands-Indië contra Japan II* [Netherlands Indies against Japan II] (Bandung: G.C.T. van Dorp, 1950), pp. 239–245; Iwatake Teruhiko, *Nanpō Gunseika no Keizai Shisaku: Marai, Sumatora, Jawa no Kiroku* [The economic policies in the Southern Regions under the military administration: record of Malaya, Sumatra and Java], 2 vols (Tokyo: Kunkoshoin, 1981), p. 257; and 'Daitōa Kokudo Keikaku An Yōkō' [Outline of a proposal for construction of Greater East Asia] (Kishi Shiryō, M5).

12 *Shiryōshu Manpō no Gunsei*, p. 224, and 'Daitōa Kokudo Keikaku An Yōkō'.

13 'Jawa ni okeru Shuyō Busshi no Taiyō Gessū' [Durability of main resources in stock in Java] (Kishi Shiryō, M16); 'Jawa ni okeru Shuyō Yunyū Minju Busshi Zaikodaka, Shōwa 42 Nen Ichi Gatsu Tsuitachi' [Stocks of main imported items in Java for consumption by the local population as of 1 January 1942] (Nishijima Collection JV 10).

14 'Jawa ni okeru Shōkōgyō Seisaku' [Commercial and industrial policies in Java] (Nishijima Collection, JV 6–1), pp. 8–11.

15 Table 2 does not include the Philippines for some reason. The Japanese had a large project there. See Nagano Yoshiko, 'Menka Zōsan Keikaku no Zasetsu to Kiketsu' [Frustration and outcome of the cotton production plan], in Ikehata Setsuho (ed.), *Nippon Senryō ka no Firipin* [The Philippines under the Japanese occupation] (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1996), pp. 185–217.

16 Detail of the plan is available in 'Sōmubuchō Kaigi Sekijō Sangyōbuchō Setsumei Yōshi' [Gist of the explanation by the head of the department of industry at the meeting of the heads of the General Affairs Departments] (Gunsei Shiryō, no. 107).

17 'Resume van de Verklarende Redevoering van den Heer Sangyoobutyoo ddo. 14/4-2605 (1945)' [Summary of the Explanatory speech by the head of the Department of Industry delivered on 14 April 1945] (BUZA NEFIS/CMI, deel 1, 1761).

18 Trade statistics are available in Iwatake, *Nanpō Gunseika,* pp. 127–137.

19 Fukuda Shōzō, 'Jawa Kakyō no Kinkyō' [Recent situation of the Chinese in Java] (Tokyo: Tōa Keizai Kondankai Shiryō, no. 16 (March 1944)), pp. 23–26.

20 In Java, two Japanese companies, Tōzan Sangyō and Mitsui Nōrin, were assigned to administer cotton production. Tōzan Sangyō planned to use 59,345 hectares in 1945, of which 15,747 hectares (26.5 per cent) were irrigated land. 'Nijū Nendo Hanshu Yotei Menseki' [Planned area under cultivation for 1945] (BUZA NEFIS/CMI, bijlage 3, 2178).

21 'Panitia Adat dan Tatanegara Dahoeloe. Bahagian Kesedjahteraan dan Kemakmoeran. Rapat jang Kedoeapoeloehampat. Hari Saptoe, 25 September 2603' [The Committee to Investigate Old Customs and Institutions. Division on Welfare and Prosperity. 24th Session. Saturday, 25 September 1943], BUZA NEFIS/CMI, bijlage 3, 2241.

22 Mohammad Hatta, for instance, expressed such a view in the first session of the Committee to Investigate Old Customs and Institutions held on 15 December 1942. Oto Iskandar Dinata, in the 25th session on 25 August 1943, also criticized the Japanese military administration for the same reason.

23 For a detailed study of labour mobilization for agricultural projects, see my forthcoming article, '"Economic Soldiers" in Java: Indonesian Labourers Drafted for Agri-cultural Projects during the Japanese Occupation'.

24 Terao Hiroshi, 'Nanpō Nōgyō Gijutsu Shidō ni Tsuite' [On instructing farming technique in the Southern Regions] (Gunsei Shiryō, no. 107). His criticisms were published in the newspapers in Java as well.

25 Fukuda, 'Jawa Kakyō', pp. 23–26.

26 'Rice Position in Java' (BUZA NEFIS/CMI, deel 1, 1775).

27 See for detail 'Voedselproblemen en Overheidspolitiek op Java en Madoera' [Food problems and the government policies in Java and Madura], *Koloniaal Tijdschrift* December 1940.

28 'Resume van de Verklarende Redevoering van den Heer Sangyoobutyoo'.

29 1 picul = 60.48 kg.

30 The Japanese used clothing materials to manipulate Indonesians. They usually distributed clothing materials only to those who had delivered cotton to them or those who had worked for them for a certain period. On Luang Island near Timor, in contrast, the Japanese confiscated all clothing as a reprisal for the killing of two Japanese by the islanders in August 1944. The islanders therefore had to grow cotton

in order to manufacture their own clothing. 'Compilation of NEFIS Interrogation Reports on Tanimbar and Babar etc.' (NIOD IC 061240) , p. 6.

31 'Economische Toestanden te Malang en Omgeving' [Economic situation in Malang and its environs], 22 June 1946 (BUZA NEFIS/CMI, deel 1, 1767).

32 'Eenige Economische Gegevens uit Oost-Java' [Some economic data from East Java] (BUZA NEFIS/CMI, deel 1, 1761). In December 1940 the wholesale price of one small gunnysack was 30 cents, a large one 39.5 cents, and the average daily wage of coolies was about 25 cents (*Indisch Verslag 1941*, pp. 248, 367). Wages increased by about twofold over the occupation period.

33 William H. Frederick, 'The Appearance of the Revolution: Cloth, Uniforms, and the Pemuda Style in East Java, 1945–1949', in Henk Schulte Nordholt (ed.), *Outward Appearance: Dressing State and Society in Indonesia* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1997), p. 207.

34 'Bari Tō nai Bukka Shisū' [Price indices in Bali] (Nishijima Collection, NV22).

35 For detail of the plan, see 'Bōshokki Ichū Keikaku' [Plan to shift spindles and looms] (Nishijima Collection NV6) and 'Economic Policy in Occupied Southeast Asia' (NIOD IC 063214). For the situation in Sulawesi, see *Serebesu Shinbun* [Celebes Daily] of 28 May, 3 July, 5 and 10 October, 13, 17, 28 November 1943, and 1 and 22 January 1944.

36 For statistics on marine transportation in the region, see 'Jawa ni okeru Kamotsu Yusō no Genkyō' [Current situation of cargo transportation in Java] (Gunsei Shiryō, no. 18).

37 'Rōmu ni tsuite' [On labour] (Nishijima Collection, NV17–11), 'Serebesu, Menado Chiku Shokuryō Kankei Shiryō' [Data on food supply in Menado, Celebes] (Nishijima Collection, NV2), and *Serebesu Shinbun,* 14 January 1944. For a study of labour mobilization in the Navy's jurisdiction, see Remco Raben, 'Arbeid voor Groot-Asië: Indonesische Koelies in de Buitengewesten, 1942–1945' [Labour for Great Asia: Indonesian coolies in the Outer Islands, 1942–1945], in G. Aalders et al. (eds), *Oorlogsdocumentatie '40-'45: Negende Jaarboek van het Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie* (Amsterdam: Walburg Pers, 1998), pp. 81–111.

38 'Rapport inf. Gaspersz (Pradja) betreffende de Toestand op Lombok gedurende het Tijdeperk vanaf het Begin van de Japanse Overheersing tot de Komst der Geallieerden' [Report on the information from Gaspersz (Praja) with regard to the situation in Lombok during the period from the beginning of Japanese Rule to the arrival of the Allies] (BUZA NEFIS/CMI, deel 1, 1929).

39 'Compilation of NEFIS Interrogation Report on Borneo' (NIOD IC 061037), p. 11 and 'Memorandum betreffende de Behandeling van de (Militaire) Krijgsgevangenen in Nederlandsch Indië door de Japanners, 29 Aug. 1945' [Memorandum with

regard to the treatment of the (military) prisoners of war in the Netherlands Indies by the Japanese, 29 Aug. 1945] (NIOD IC 016053).

40 See, among others, 'Seramu Minseibu Kannai Nōrin Chiku-Suisan Zakkan Zakken, [Observations on agriculture, forestry, fishery and the livestock industry in Seram under the Navy's civil administration] (Nishijima Collection, NV15), pp. 17–28.

41 'Interrogation of Three Boeginese Sailors' (NIOD IC 060880), p. 7.

42 'Rapport Inzake de Algemeene Situatie in de Onderafd. Bolaang-Mongondow' [Report on the general situation in the subdistrict of Bolaang-Mongondow], 17 June 1946 (BUZA NEFIS/CMI, deel 2, 1350).

43 'Interrogation of Soeleiman Asik Ex-Prahoe "Doenia Baroe", Zuid-Molukken' (NIOD IC 060882).

44 'Rapport i/z Bezoek aan Olie en Vezel Ondernemingen ulto. September begin October 1945' [Report on the visit to the oil and fibre enterprises at the end of September and early October 1945] (BUZA NEFIS/CMI, deel 1, 1767).

45 'Compilation of NEFIS Interrogation Reports Nos. 351–364' (NIOD IC 061024), p. 5.

46 *Di Bawah Pendudukan Jepang: Kenangan Empat Puluh Dua Orang Yang Mengalaminya* [Under the Japanese occupation: Reminiscences of 42 people who experienced it], (Jakarta: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 1988), p. 42. This book also contains testimonies of the local people's effort to grow cotton in their house gardens for their own consumption.

47 For the Malay peninsula the Japanese initially had no plan to grow cotton but they had to make one after 1944. See Mori Fumio, 'Gunsei Shubo' [Notes on the military administration] (Gunsei Shiryō, No. 60).

48 For more detail see Shigeru Satō, *War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation, 1942–1945* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), chapter 6.

49 Iwatake, *Nanpō Gunseika*, p. 66

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

The Transformation of Taiwanese Attitudes toward Japan in the Post-colonial Period

HUANG CHIH-HUEI

THE PROBLEM

Taiwan was the first colonial territory acquired by Japan as a result of war with the Qing Empire (1895); it was also a territory delivered from Japanese colonial rule (in 1945) as a consequence of another war. Among the territories colonized by Japan in Asia and Oceania, Taiwan's colonial period lasted the longest, even though the 50-year span is but a short period compared with the duration of European colonialism in other parts of the world. Unlike the situations in many former colonies, however, the Taiwanese people retained an amiable attitude toward Japan after the end of colonial rule. This attitude has been frequently mentioned in travel accounts and guidebooks written by Japanese who have visited Taiwan since the war.[1] In the few scholarly writings dealing with Japanese colonial rule, this attitude has often been held in contrast with post-colonial Korean sentiments toward the Japanese, although both Taiwan and Korea have made great efforts in decolonization with regard to education policies and social institutions.[2] These comparisons tend to search for an explanation of this difference of attitudes toward Japan in the dissimilar policies and techniques of rule applied during the colonial period. To understand this phenomenon fully, however, it is necessary to examine the drastic transformation of cultural context in Taiwan in the wake of the regime transition after the end of colonial rule, particularly the polarization of Taiwanese opinions about Japan before and after the 28th February Incident of 1947, and the symbolic role played by Japan in that event.

The term '28th February Incident' actually refers to a period of several weeks in which the most extensive rebellion and severe repression in Taiwan's post-war history took place. Recollections and testimonies of this repression began to be published only after martial law, which had been imposed in 1949, was lifted in 1987. This chapter examines the process of formation and transformation of Taiwanese attitudes toward Japan after the imperial era in the light of these traumatic events.

Recent historical and anthropological research has emphasised the tensions of empire, and has shown how colonialism was shaped in struggles, and how imperial projects were made possible and vulnerable at the same time.[3] However, if the examination of the effects of these imperial projects can be extended to post-colonial times, a more complete picture might be obtained. As an extremely complex socio-psychological mechanism, the so-called discursive resistance by the colonial subjects may not end with the departure of alien rulers from the colony.[4] Instead, as will be shown below, I find that the resistance by the ruled was full of resilience and subjectivity, characterized, among other things, by a readiness to treasure and use the cultural legacy left by a former colonizer as a weapon against oppression by a successor colonial power. The events analysed in this chapter strongly suggest that Taiwanese resistance to successor colonialism (that imposed by the Kuomintang regime) was the primary cause of their seemingly paradoxical pro-Japan attitude.[5] By way of contrast, it must be said that, with the cessation of colonial rule, Japan itself has shown mostly indifference, helplessness and a lack of remorse toward its former colony. All this is an indication of the weakness of Japanese culture in its encounters with other peoples when the pomp and circumstance of imperialism was over.

THE DRAMA OF 'FIRST ENCOUNTER': WELCOMING THE ARRIVAL OF NATIONAL ARMY

The ethnic composition of postwar Taiwan is rather complicated. The two main ethnic categories are Han Chinese and indigenous Austronesians, often called aborigines. The relationship of the Austronesians with the Japanese and with the much larger Han Chinese community raises a separate set of issues and will not be dealt with here. This chapter, rather, will limit its scope to the Han people. Although Han immigration to the islands dated largely from the seventeenth century and after, a major distinction exists within the Han community between

the so-called 'natives' (*Bensheng-ren*)—the majority of the Han population – who began to migrate to Taiwan about 400 years ago and thus lived for 50 years under Japanese colonial rule, and the 'mainlanders' (*Waisheng-ren*) who came from mainland China after the war, especially at the time of the founding of the People's Republic of China and the retreat of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang forces to the island. The terms for these two categories originated in the post-war social context, and were a Chinese nomenclature peculiar to Taiwan. Since the two ethnic categories were distinguished after the war, the ethnic and political conflicts between them have persisted to the present.

In the following discussion, I use the term 'Taiwanese' when referring to the 'natives' lest they be confused with the Austronesian aborigines; 'Taiwanese' is also the term they use for themselves, and has been a common usage from the beginning of Japanese rule. The mainlanders, who began to be called *Waisheng-ren* after their arrival in Taiwan, on the other hand, tend to use 'Chinese' in their self-identification; but in order to separate them from the people of the People's Republic of China, I will retain the term 'mainlanders' for them. Since the latter were citizens of a nation at war with Japan and its former colonial subjects, their attitudes toward Japan were rather different from those of the Taiwanese. But when the war was over and the two ethnic groups came into contact, they were not aware of and did not anticipate the consequences of that difference.

Japan surrendered on 15 August 1945. From press reports and official documents of the time, it is clear that immediately after the Emperor's concession of defeat, the colonial administration in Taiwan was brought to a complete stop. From then on, the colonial government devoted all its efforts to such matters as the disposal of government dossiers and the repatriation of Japanese citizens. Society as a whole did not suffer any disturbance, and the last report from the Office of the Governor (Taiwan Tōchi Shūmatsu Hōkokusho) stated that during this period of time Taiwan was generally peaceful, except for a few cases of revenge against the Japanese. The expressions on the faces of the Taiwanese people were said to be rather cheerful.[6] This political vacuum lasted for 70 days until the establishment of the Administrative Commander's Office by the new regime from the mainland on 24 October. During this time, no police or judicial system was in existence, while the Taiwanese took over all kinds of public utilities. Japanese supervisors and senior officials were no longer at their posts, but electricity and water supplies remained normal and the postal service, telephone, highway and railroad transportation all operated smoothly. Consumer prices were stable and

the economy showed no sign of decline. All in all, this was a surprising period of high autonomy.

On the other hand, the gentry from all over Taiwan were setting up 'Committees for Welcoming the Nationalist Government', printing flags of the Republic of China for the occasion. The populace was taught to sing the national anthem, songs for welcoming the national army were written, celebratory arches were erected, parties were held and parades were arranged. Everywhere there were banners with the slogan, 'Celebrating our return to the mother country's bosom.'

Indeed, at that time the Taiwanese people had limitless expectations of the mother country, and the prospect of returning to its bosom gave them incomparable joy. Although the Taiwanese had been enlisted into the Japanese army during the final stage of the war (1944), they had not been sent to battlefields in China because Japan still had some suspicion about their loyalties. Instead, most of them were dispatched to the Pacific and Southeast Asia, where they served in transportation, supply and maintenance units rather than front-line combat. Thus, most of the Taiwanese soldiers in the Japanese army had had no experience of fighting with Chinese. In the minds of the common people, the Chinese army had to be much stronger than the Japanese one, since it had defeated the Japanese and was – with the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union – one of the four acknowledged great powers of the world. Returning to the mother country's bosom not only meant freedom from the day-to-day reality of colonial restriction but also a transformation of status. The Taiwanese ceased to be second-class citizens (colonial subjects) of a defeated nation and became the citizens of a victorious Great Power. This double advancement in personal identity certainly brought them great happiness.

While they were waiting in hopeful anticipation, the arrival of the replacement army was postponed again and again. On 16 October, the day the national army was scheduled to land at the harbour of Keelung, an excited crowd gathered on the pier without catching any sight of the Chinese forces. When they were told that it would not arrive until the next day, some of them even stayed on the pier overnight. On the 17th, about 12,000 soldiers and 2,000 officers from the national government's 70th Army finally entered the port aboard more than 30 American-made battleships. Amid a sea of waving flags and cheering voices, the army marched into the city. They were welcome by tens of thousands of people; even the soldiers themselves were surprised and moved by such enthusiasm.[7]

But the real surprise was for the Taiwanese public, for the army they saw was a group of men wearing tattered clothes and grass sandals and staggering in their steps. Each of the soldiers carried a broken umbrella and a wok on his back; some even toted bundles with various kinds of woks and bags of rice on poles, as if moving their entire possessions. The soldiers carried their most important equipment – their guns – in disarray, with the muzzles sometimes upward, sometimes downward. This appearance was in great contrast to the Japanese soldiers who brought up the rear of the line, for these were full of spirit, neat and clean, and well disciplined. Taiwanese rationalized their surprise, telling each other that the umbrellas actually could serve as parachutes, or were some sort of shoulder guns, and speculating that the Chinese troops had other weapons hidden inside the leggings. All of those who had witnessed this reception were later, in their recollections made during the 1990s, to express their utter disappointment with this 'first encounter'; people who had not been present at the scene also had a vivid memory of it as the farcical event was widely broadcast by mouth.

The replacement army not only entered larger cities like Keelung and Taipei, but also reached other parts of Taiwan. In remote Taitung, for instance, a former Japanese soldier (veteran) went out to welcome the National Army, and fifty years afterward he had this vivid recollection:

> I didn't expect that the soldiers from the mother country were all like 'beaten soldiers'. They were in rags, dispirited and shuffling in disoriented steps. Some even carried woks, basins, and shoes on their shoulders; I couldn't but tell myself at the time that I could single-handedly fight against ten of such soldiers. Some younger schoolmates with me felt very shameful for what they saw, and were rather disappointed with the 'mother country'.[8]

As a matter of fact, the 70th Army had originally not been designated to take over Taiwan; rather, according to the memoirs of some of the officers involved in the event, the better-disciplined 18th Army had been allocated the task. As it turned out, however, the ship carrying the 18th Army's commander-in-chief encountered a storm not long after its departure and had to return to the mainland; in consequence, the 70th Army were dispatched in short order. These troops were nicknamed 'an army of beggars' on the mainland, because they were from the poverty-stricken inland and their equipment was the worst

in the Chinese army. 'Therefore, they gave the Taiwanese people a quite negative impression; such was the unkindness of history, and it was due to the government's negligence.'[9]

POLARIZED EVALUATION OF JAPANESE EDUCATION: SLAVES VS. WORLD CITIZENS

The drastic shift in Taiwanese attitudes toward the mother country, from high expectation to dismal disappointment, began with the landing of the troops, and was accelerated by a series of policies carried out by the Administrative Commander's Office – the centre of political power in Taiwan – after its inauguration on 25 October.

Apart from military units, the task force which came to take over Taiwan also included several thousand civilians who had been enlisted on the mainland. These comprised three major categories: policemen, administrators and teachers. The first two groups were in charge of registering and appropriating the properties (including material and facilities) left by the Japanese; the teachers were given the duty of propagating Mandarin in schools, and of decolonizing the Japanese legacy in the domain of cultural policy. In all of this process, the Taiwanese had plenty of opportunities to gain a better understanding of the people from the mother country.

First, the troops were without any discipline; they would fire into the air just to scare people, even for trifling matters such as a quarrel between a couple. On one occasion, a group of soldiers opened fire on a train and forced it to stop, so that they could board the train and reach their destination in time. Such actions were quite a surprise to people who had been accustomed to the strict discipline of Japanese troops, and the outrageous events were commented on by society at large. By contrast, such behaviour was nothing unusual on the mainland, which had experienced continual civil war since the 1910s as well as the eight years of fighting against Japan.

Taiwanese were also dumbfounded by the corruption of the officials who came to take over Japanese properties. They often made changes in the property list and put valuable things into their own pockets. Corruption was rampant in the taking over of enterprises and institutions. In his memoirs Chung Yee-ren offers this example: when the former Japanese naval fuel plant, with which he was familiar, was taken over, it was immediately shut down and the workers

driven out; the equipment and machinery were sold as scrap iron so that the officials could profiteer from it.[10] The Administrative Commander frequently reprimanded his officials for this kind of conduct after the establishment of the new government. In his admonitions, such terms as 'extortion' and 'bribery' often appeared; these were strange new words in Taiwan, causing people to wonder what they meant.

Educated people suffered most from the change of language. Japanese was forbidden and the Peking dialect of Chinese (Mandarin) was declared the 'national language'. Although this language was similar in linguistic structure to the southern Fukien dialect used in Taiwan, it was difficult for the Taiwanese to comprehend phonetically. Schoolteachers were required to begin teaching in the new language immediately, even though they were still learning it themselves. Even teachers from the mainland often did not speak fluent Mandarin because they hailed from other parts of China. Taiwanese intellectuals were not opposed to learning the mother country's language; in fact, when place names and street names were changed from those designated by the Japanese to new ones after localities on the mainland, they did not voice any objection. On the other hand, they were shocked and dismayed when in October 1946 the new government prohibited the use of Japanese. At that time there were two newspapers and more than a dozen magazines in Taiwan. After the departure of the Japanese, these publications were printed in two languages: Japanese for the Taiwanese writers and readers, and Chinese for those from the mainland. The prohibition provoked extensive discussions in the press, among which the most representative was the opinion expressed by the critic and writer Wu Zhuoliu. Wu had been a prominent figure during the Japanese period fighting against colonial rule from the stance of Chinese nationalism; he was an intellectual with high expectations for the mother country. In the piece he wrote:

> Why is it that Japanese is a bad thing? It is because it has been armoured. But once the armour is removed and it reverts to its original state, then Japanese is not bad at all. In this disarmed condition, it can serve the positive function of cultural transmission because many cultural works of the world have been translated into Japanese. The prohibition of Japanese has caused some animosity between Taiwanese and mainlanders. In such circumstances, rational debates are useless. From the cultural perspective, could it be true that the existence of Japanese would hinder the spread of Chinese culture? This must be judged in fairer terms. … A

> culture expressed in Japanese is not necessarily a Japanese culture. A lot of information about cultures of the world has been translated into Japanese.[11]

The changed status of the Japanese language was of course connected with the changed status of Japan itself; more intriguingly, it was also connected with the status of the Taiwanese people. Before actually taking over Taiwan, the national government in Chungking had set up an agenda, the first item of which proclaimed: 'The cultural policy after taking over Taiwan should be the strengthening of national consciousness and the eradication of the slave mentality.' This was the first appearance of the phrase 'slave mentality'; later on the term was frequently used in the new government's propaganda. For instance, an editorial in the government newspaper titled 'Cleansing Mental Poisons' declared:

> Taiwan has gone through the oppressive rule by Japanese imperialism. Japan has spread all kinds of cultural and mental poisons to intoxicate and lure the Taiwanese people, attempting to alienate them from the mother country and achieve the goals of 'Japanization' and 'transforming them into imperial subjects'. It is our urgent task to clean up these mental poisons which Japan has inflicted on Taiwan for fifty years.

Another local newspaper retorted, in an editorial entitled 'Taiwan has not been enslaved', by saying: 'Although the Taiwanese have been economically exploited by the Japanese, they have never lived the lives of slaves and been educated to be slaves. Only after the recovery have we begun to hear the term "enslavement"'.[12] From the arrival of the national government through to 1947, the debate on 'enslavement' between Taiwanese and Chinese intellectuals dragged on. Wu Zhuoliu commented:

> The statement that 'Taiwanese have been enslaved through education' is tantamount to the following in political terms: since you have an enslaved mentality, you are spiritually damaged citizens; therefore, you are not to be treated on a par with people of the mother country, and you deserve to be ruled at this time. The endless discussion on 'enslavement education' resulted in the resentment of the Taiwanese. They thought that they were disgraced. And this led to the revulsion against the mainlander. The Taiwanese thought the mainlanders were pigs, doing nothing but eating and sleeping.[13]

Other metaphors were that the Japanese were dogs and the Taiwanese were oxen. Dogs might be fierce and could bark, but they were loyal. Pigs were lazy and greedy (corrupt). Oxen were big and docile; they did work for their masters.[14] All these metaphors indicate how people evaluated the strained ethnic relations after the war, although the Japanese were eagerly waiting to go back to Japan, and there is no indication that they played any role in this debate on 'enslavement education'.

THE SCAPEGOAT: JAPAN'S ROLE IN THE 28TH FEBRUARY INCIDENT

The so-called 28th February incident arose as a simple and trivial event in which the police confiscated some contraband cigarettes; it escalated into the most extensive rebellion and violent suppression in the post-war history of Taiwan. A woman vendor selling illicit cigarettes was beaten and robbed by a bad-mannered mainlander policeman. The woman passed out and fell to the ground; an agitated crowd of passers-by then surrounded the policeman, who responded by opening fire as a warning. In the confusion, a bystander was shot dead. These events happened on 27 February 1947 in a small corner of the city of Taipei; in itself the incident was not all too serious, but because of the number of onlookers news of the event spread throughout the whole city on the grapevine. On the next day, crowds began to gather in front of the main government offices, demanding that the government step forward and resolve the problem, and that the mainlander policeman apologize. A protesting crowd also gathered on the plaza in front of the Administrative Commander's Office (the same building which had been the Governor's office during the colonial period). They were utterly unprepared when the guards opened fire with their machine guns without any warning, killing six youths and causing the protesters to scatter. People then began to set fire to mainlanders' shops and offices in revenge. On the streets, they would ask any mainlander-looking person whether he spoke Japanese, and if not they would beat him up.[15]

In response to the seriousness of the disturbances, the government declared martial law that afternoon. Stores and offices were closed down, violent conflicts gradually subsided; but the mainlanders did not feel the danger was over. People started to hold meetings and give speeches on their own initiative, and within the space of three or four days, 'Task Force Committees for the 28th February

Incident' were established in every major city. Members of the committees included merchants, workers and other urban dwellers, with the gentry and students in the leading roles. The committees' chief concern, however, was not merely the matter of the impounding of contraband cigarettes but, more broadly, a series of demands for political, social and economic reforms. Even though there were no direct links between the committees in the various cities, the specifics of their demands for reform were very similar. For instance, the committee in Taipei proposed thirty-two items on its agenda for reform, the first being that the heads of some important government departments and at least half of the members of the Legal Affairs Council should be Taiwanese. They also demanded that Taiwanese should manage state-owned enterprises. These demands were a reaction to the extreme imbalance of ethnic representation in the ruling echelon within the Kuomintang government. The committee also demanded that county chiefs and mayors be elected, and that freedom of expression, of publication and of assembly be guaranteed. In some places, the committees asked for improvement in the quality of school education. All these demands arose from the dissatisfaction felt by Taiwanese under mainlander rule. The various committees were quickly organized and conducted in a well-ordered manner; this was a surprise for the mainlanders, to whom the goings-on appeared to be some sort of pre-meditated large-scale rebellion. As for their demands, the Taiwanese behaved 'as if they want to overthrow the government and take over political power'.[16]

After the incident, the Commander Chen Yee stepped forward to assuage the public anger, telling the people that their demands would be met; secretly, however, he was requesting that Chiang Kai-shek on the mainland send over troops. Chiang immediately dispatched a campaign force, which landed on Taiwan on 10 March and was afterward stationed in various cities. Unaware of this deception, people continued to hold public meetings discussing the matter of reform. These meetings became the focus of the government suppression of the Taiwanese movement. All the subsequent large-scale massacres occurred at the scenes of public meetings, where the army fired indiscriminately on participants. Meanwhile, security and police personnel were everywhere arresting celebrities and students in their homes. Anyone who had criticized the government, whether they had participated in any committee or not, was subject to arrest and immediate execution without trial. The number of deaths during the entire incident remains unknown up to this day; many estimates place the figure somewhere between 10,000 and 50,000. All those killed belonged to the urban elite;

most of them were household heads or eldest sons of the family, thus leaving behind orphans, widows, bereft mothers and brothers, whose resentments were especially deep felt.

The army's involvement brought a quick end to the movement. From the reports to Chiang Kai-shek written by high-level inspecting officials sent by the central government, we can gain a glimpse of the suppressors' view of the event. Yang Liang-kong, the Inspecting Envoy Extraordinary, identified ten major causes of the incident. First, he stated, the Taiwanese people were misguided in their ideas about the mother country. His second reason was that the Japanese had left a poisonous legacy on the island. Then he cited other factors such as price increases, unemployment, mistakes in the new government's policies, and corruption. As for the 'poisonous legacy of the Japanese', he itemized the following: the worship of Japan by the Taiwanese; their gratitude toward Japan for small favours; the compulsory education enforced by the Japanese which had resulted in 'the total Japanization of the Taiwanese people'; and incitement by Japanese who had stayed on in Taiwan after the war. He also identified nine categories of participants in the incident: hooligans; returned overseas Taiwanese; politicians with hidden agendas; the Communist Party; young students; the Three-People's-Principle Youth Corps; the aboriginal tribes; members of the Royal Subjects Patriotic Society; and remaining Japanese. By 'returned overseas Taiwanese' he meant former Taiwanese soldiers who had been enlisted by the Japanese army and had fought in overseas battles. The Royal Subjects Patriotic Society had been established during the final stage of Japanese rule in response to military mobilization. The remaining Japanese were the few who were irreplaceable because of their skills and hence had been retained by the new government. They numbered only about nine hundred; the remaining 330,000 resident Japanese in Taiwan at the war's end had been sent back to Japan within one year.[17]

Later, Pai Chung-shi, the Secretary of the Defence Department, was sent to Taiwan to 'solace' the people. In a nation-wide (including the mainland) broadcast, he said:

> This incident is the result of the fifty-one-year rule of Taiwanese people by Japan, for the distorted and corruptive education enforced by the Japanese has enfeebled and divided the people, and has misguided them with a negative image of the Chinese government, people, and army. All this has caused the Taiwanese people to have contempt for the people and

> army of the mother country; this is the ultimate cause of the riots. … As to the central government's intention regarding the administration of Taiwan from now on … in the area of education, the national language must be promoted, the mother country's traditional ethics and culture should be promulgated, and the poison left by Japanese education must be cleaned up completely.[18]

From these two high-level officials' statements, it is clear that they both attributed the incident to Japanese influences, even suspecting that some Japanese were actually involved. In fact, there is no historical document indicating the participation of any Japanese. The memoirs of a Taiwanese intellectual who was regarded as one of the principal instigators also assert that no Japanese could have possibly played any role in the event. He puts it this way:

> I was by and large familiar with the condition of the Japanese remaining in Taiwan after the war. Many of them couldn't even have enough food, some had to sell their clothes; the better off, like the principal and the curriculum director of the Chia-yi Middle School had to make a living by riding cycle-rickshaw. Obviously they were at the end of their tethers; there is no way that they could have any influence upon the Taiwanese' behavior in the 28th February incident.[19]

In a manner of speaking, nonetheless, Japan was one of the major actors in the incident. The symbolic role it played was as a scapegoat used by the Kuomintang to explain away the dissatisfaction felt and expressed by the Taiwanese. In other words, in the eyes of the mainlanders, the Taiwanese, no matter how they expressed their actual attitudes, were creatures of Japan.

FORMS OF RESISTANCE: THE COMPARATIVE POLITICS OF THE COLONIZED

Because of the suddenness and seriousness of the incident, reporters kept accounts of it from the mainland and from foreigners resident in Taiwan at the time. Among the Taiwanese themselves, however, almost no one was able to express an opinion about the event in the media, owing to the heightened control on public expression after the suppression. Only a few Taiwanese who had been doing business on the mainland and who returned to Taiwan after the event had the chance to express their views in the mainland media. One of them main-

tained: 'Although the tragic incident of 28th February was caused by fortuitous factors, its inevitability had been determined by many factors long ago.' According to this businessman's analysis, these factors include the following:

> First, the taking over by the new government was merely the appropriation of the privileges enjoyed by Japanese rulers, without also assuming the duties served by Japanese rulers. Second, the question of land ownership. The Japanese had dispossessed the Taiwanese of much of their land. The government did not give this nationalized land back to the people; it just took it over, thus becoming the people's enemy in place of the Japanese. The people's hatred of the Japanese was transmuted into that of the Administrative Commander's Office. With regard to the policemen arresting vendors, when the armed policemen confiscated the contraband cigarettes, they took possession of them for themselves, which was something the Japanese police would have never done.[20]

Another Taiwanese stated agitatedly:

> It's a slur to say that this tragic event was caused by Japanphilia and xenophobia on the part of Taiwanese. We were at first very grateful to return to the bosom of the mother country, and it was because we thought with this we would be truly liberated and regain real freedom. But what had previously happened after more than one year's time was a total disappointment for us, resulting in this tragic event. … The Administrative Commander's Office of today is just a simulation of Japan's Colonial Governor's Office; it is a completely authoritarian ruling apparatus, without paying any attention to people's concerns. Its incompetence and corruption in administration have even surpassed those of Japanese imperial rulers. I am not saying this in praise of Japan's rule, but we may as well make some comparisons: at the end of the war, the price of rice was 30 dollars per catty; afterward, consumer prices began to rise, factories were shut down, and now the price of rice has jumped from 30 to 1,400 dollars per catty. Taiwan has been a rice-producing area; its rice has been exported after feeding its own population. But why after only one year's rule [by the new government] is there not enough for ourselves?[21]

From the above statements, we can see that the Taiwanese had a completely different interpretation of the incident from the central government. But there are some subtle similarities too; namely, they considered the government from

the mainland to be just a substitute for Japanese colonial rulers, only worse than the previous regime. They objected to the government seeing them as pro-Japan and protested that the new authority was actually the old Japanese colonialism in disguise. The mainlanders reminded the Taiwanese of Japanese dictatorship, and this led them toward rebellion. In their comparisons, the earlier colonizers turned out to be a better set.

Such comparisons not only showed up in the discourses by Taiwanese at the time, but also appeared in their recollections fifty years after the event. After the 28th February incident, public opinion in Taiwan was everywhere suppressed. Two years later, in 1949, the Nationalist government was defeated on the mainland and, with an army of 600,000 men and one million civilians, it escaped to Taiwan. Under these circumstances, Taiwan's economic burden was increased and the political regime in Taiwan had to be strengthened. Therefore, the Kuomintang government declared martial law and postponed most elections for the national assembly. In the sphere of education, the campaign to eradicate Japanese mental poisons was continued and anti-communism was propagandized. Over 10,000 political prisoners were put in jail for being 'communist fellow-travellers' during the 1950s. For several decades afterwards, dissidents were often charged with the crime of 'sedition' and imprisoned.

Yang Kuei was one of them. The Japanese had imprisoned this well-known novelist for anti-colonial activities. He was famous for the following statement: 'I was arrested thirteen times for anti-government activities during the Japanese era; all together, I stayed in prison for just one month. During the Kuomintang period, I was arrested just once, but for this I was shut up for thirteen years.' The Kuomintang's suppression of free thought and expression, he said, was worse than that under foreign rule. This comparison, although never aired publicly, remained in people's minds. People avoided any mention of the 28th February incident. In school it was deliberately covered up, so that the generations educated after the war were totally ignorant of what had happened.[22]

Only after the mid-1980s, with the decline of the Chiang regime and the lifting of martial law in 1987, did this event return to public discourse after an absence of almost forty years. The survivors of those killed during and after the incident initiated this re-examination. Ruan Meizhu's father was the manager of a newspaper when the event occurred; after his arrest all trace of him disappeared. The government offered no explanation, and there was no way of knowing if he was alive or dead. Ruan began to make inquiries with family

members of other victims, and from their recollections she tried to get an accurate picture of what had actually happened at the time. She collected these testimonies into a book, which became an immediate best seller.[23] In the meantime, historians also started to track down historical documents; since the official archives were still closed, many researchers had to resort to oral history as a means of investigation. After 1990, a great deal of oral-historical data on the 28th February incident was published. These materials, gathered 40 years after the event, not only contain details of the incident itself but also touch upon the sorrow of losing loved ones (mostly in women's recollections, and very intimate in these cases), the discrimination suffered in daily life (for family members of the traitors) and the long-lasting fear of politics.

The contents of these memoirs show that, both for the participants in the incident and for their families, Japan still served as a point of reference, as a 'backdrop', for their evaluation of the current regime and as a weapon of resistance against that regime. One member of the elite who had worked in a local government stated:

> After the war I have worked in the fishermen's association and run a truck company; all my jobs were in the non-governmental sector because I hated the Kuomintang and didn't want to have anything to do with its institutions. Although the Japanese discriminated against the Taiwanese, Japan after all was a country under the rule of law and the distinction between public and private was clear-cut; under these circumstances, Taiwanese with qualifications could get promoted, even if only slowly. On the other hand, the Japanese were narrow-minded and they often tried to exclude 'non-Japanese'. The Nationalist government was too Han-ethnocentric; under its ruling Taiwan once again reverted to a state of authoritarianism.[24]

The following statement has a similar import:

> During the Japanese era people were more law-abiding and well-disciplined, unlike the dissipated people of today. During World War II, the youths of Taiwan had to speak Japanese, sing Japanese military songs and the national anthem, even if they didn't want to. It is as if history had played tricks with the Taiwanese; when the Nationalist government came to Taiwan, the Taiwanese had to 'learn to be like others' as they had done fifty years previously.[25]

In the circumstances, some Taiwanese resolved not to learn and speak Pekingese. One person reported the following episode: 'Once I was on a train and speaking in Japanese, then a mainlander came over and asked me why I was speaking in Japanese. How strange. Japanese was not allowed. How about English? When we were coming down from the train, the man even gave me a push; I almost got into a fight with him.'[26] In this case, the man was not using the Taiwanese dialect as a weapon against Pekingese; he was using the language of the former colonizer, which he regarded as a world language like English. This indicates not that the Taiwanese wanted to be Japanese again but that they did want to use a foreign language as a means of resistance.

CONCLUSION: REALITY AND ILLUSION REGARDING THE 'MOTHER COUNTRY'

For the past one hundred years the Taiwanese people have been dragged into the seesaw game of political competition between Japan and China. As Ruan Meizhu expresses it: 'On one side there was the Japanese colonial ruler, on the other was the beloved mother country. Facing this double-edged discrimination, we were mired in a deep identity crisis.'[27]

Indeed, after the 28th February incident the Taiwanese were in a crisis of identity. Members of the local elite had to go abroad for fear of being imprisoned.[28] There, they searched for their identity. Some became friends with the communists on the mainland; others migrated to Japan (later to the United States) and became involved in the movement for Taiwanese independence. Left-wing or right-wing, both of these tendencies were the results of the 28th February incident: on one side praise for the communist mother country, on the other a search for a new independent nation.

In 1995, the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party used the phrase 'ending of war' instead of 'recovery' in the celebration of the end of Japanese rule on 25 October. It was a refutation of the orthodoxy view that 50 years earlier China had recovered Taiwan. The president, Lee Teng-hui (a Taiwanese, the first to be elected president after the war) also participated in the celebration. These developments were attacked by the PRC government as a recurrence of the colonial-era 'Become Loyal Subject' movement and Lee's statement that 'I had been a Japanese until I was 22 years old' was cited as a proof that he was a slave of Japan.[29]

During the early period after the war, the mainlanders saw in the Taiwanese a reflection of Japan; on the other hand, the Taiwanese saw the mainlanders as the reflection of Japanese colonialism. But through the dynamics of the comparative politics of the colonized, the Taiwanese attitude toward Japan began to undergo a profound transformation from nationalist aversion to post-colonial nostalgia. Japan itself, however, had nothing to do with this process. Even though it was being used as a scapegoat in post-war politics in Taiwan, Japan was totally evasive on the issue; and when its former colonial subjects were being slaughtered, Japan was indifferent in its response. Less than two years after the end of the imperial era, Japan had so thoroughly shed its imperial mantle that it showed not the slightest interest in the fate of its subjects of 50 years.

NOTES

1 See, for instance, R. Shiba, *Taiwan Kikō* [On a journey to Taiwan] (Tokyo: Asahi-shinbunsha, 1994); Daiyamondosha, C*hikyū no Arukikata: Taiwan* [Knocking about in the Earth: Taiwan] (Tokyo: Daiyamondosha, 1997).

2 Mark R. Peattie, *Shokuminchi: Teikoku Gojunen no Kōbō* (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbunsha, 1996); E. P. Tsurumi, 'Colonial Education in Korea and Taiwan', in Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (eds), *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

3 Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, 'Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda', in Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (eds), *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

4 Ashis Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983).

5 During the early years of Japan's rule of Taiwan, mainland China was under the reign of the Qing Empire and the Kuomintang was not yet in existence. After the Kuomintang established the Republic, it showed no eagerness to recover Taiwan. As for the Taiwanese, the idea of the fatherland which served as the rallying symbol for their resistance to Japanese colonial rule had no particular association with the Kuomintang. Nevertheless, when the war ended in 1945, the Kuomintang regime 'reclaimed' the island. Since Japan did not actually cede sovereignty over Taiwan to the Kuomintang in any definite manner, there is some controversy over Taiwan's status in international law, quite apart from its place in the ROC–PRC dispute.

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8 Cai Hui-yu (ed.), *Zouguo lian ge shidai de ren* [Men across two generations – Japanese soldiers from Taiwan] (Taipei: Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica, 1997), p. 464.

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13 Wu Zhuoliu, *Yoakemae no Taiwan* [Taiwan before dawn] (Tokyo: Shakaishisōsha, 1972), pp. 244–266.

14 Huang Wenxiung, Zhu gou niu – *Zhonguo shazhu, Riben gou, Taiwan niu* [Pigs, dogs, oxen – Chinese chauvinist pigs, Japanese dogs, Taiwanese oxen] (Taipei: Qianwei, 1997).

15 Shi Ming *Taiwanren sibai'nen shi* [Four hundred years of the history of the Taiwanese] (Taipei: Caogenwenhua, 1998), also in various memoirs of the 1990s.

16 Lin Mushun (ed.), *Taiwan er yue geming* [The February revolution of Taiwan] (Taipei: Qianwei, 1990), p. 170.

17 Chen Fanming (ed.), *Essays on the February 28th Incident of 1947* (Irvine: Taiwan Publishing Co., 1988), pp. 196–206.

18 Lin Mushun (ed.), *Taiwan er yue geming*, pp. 170–171.

19 Institute of Modern History (ed.), *Koushulishi 4*, p. 89.

20 Abstracted from Chen Fanming (ed.), *Taiwan zhanhoushi ziliaoxuan – Ererba shijian zhuanji* [Selected historical material on post-war Taiwan – A special collection on the February 28th Incident] (Taipei: Memorial Peace Society for the February 28th Incident, 1991), pp. 258–268.

21 *Ibid*. A catty equals 0.6 kg.

22 To take myself as an example, I am of the generation born after the war, my relatives were not victims of the 28th February Incident, and I only became aware of the event when I was in college in the 1980s. When I asked my parents about it, they responded that they knew about this but did not tell it to the children because of the risk. This attitude is quite common among those born after the war.

23 Ruan Meizhu, *Yuo'an jiaoluo de qisheng* [Weeping from gloomy corners] (Taipei: Qianwei, 1994).

24 Cai Hui-yu (ed.), *Zouguo lian ge shidai de ren*, p. 467.

25 *Ibid*. p. 39.

26 Zhang Yanxian (ed.), *Danshui heyu ererba* [The 28th February Incident at the Tansui waterfront] *(*Taipei: Wu Sanlian, Foundation for Taiwan Historical Material, 1996), p. 239.

27 Ruan, *Yuo'an jiaoluo de qisheng*, pp. 308–309.

28 They were later blacklisted and refused to return to Taiwan until the early 1990s. In a sense they were political exiles.

29 Huang Wenxiung, *Zhu gou niu – Zhonguo shazhu, Riben gou, Taiwan niu*, pp. 12–13.

AFTERWORD



Japanese Imperialism and the Politics of Loyalty

LI NARANGOA AND ROBERT CRIBB

During the five decades from 1895 to 1945, there was both a natural affinity and a deep contradiction between the imperial aims of Japan and the national aspirations of many Asian peoples. The sense of affinity was forged first by Japan's path to modernization which, for all its flaws, showed that the West was not invincible and held no monopoly over modern technology. Whereas Japan's economic success following the Second World War seemed to offer universal lessons – witness the popularity of lessons in Japanese management techniques in Western business schools – the implications of Japan's successes in the second half of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth seemed at the time to be for those countries which had fallen behind the West. Japan's achievements in this earlier era drew the admiration of would-be modernizers from China to Turkey and from Indonesia to Russia. Because Japan had seemed initially just as likely as any other region in Asia to fall victim to Western imperialism, its success gave hope to those who had fallen victim. In this way, Japan's modernization helped to create a sense of common identity. In trawling what they saw as Japanese culture for elements which might produce similar successes in their own societies, people in other regions across a vast and diverse continent developed a new and significant sense of themselves as 'Asians'. When Japanese forces began their military expansion, therefore, using the war cry 'Asia for the Asians (or Asiatics)', the slogan had a powerful resonance.

At the heart of the affinity between Japan and Asian nationalists, however, was their shared opposition to Western and Chinese imperial hegemonies in Asia. By turns anti-Western and anti-Chinese as circumstances demanded, Japan

often seemed a natural ally to those in Asia who aspired to some kind of national liberation. This alliance, moreover, was more than a cynical matter of convenience. As they came into contact again with the outside world after the Meiji Revolution, Japanese intellectuals and officials devoted enormous energy to the question of Japan's identity and the relationship between that identity and other identities in Asia. During this period, Japanese juggled ideas of affinity with and distinction from Asia as a whole and the various parts of Asia, so that there was a rich intellectual storehouse of ideas which could be drawn upon to reinforce almost any geo-political configuration.

Behind these ideas of strategic alliance and cultural resemblance, moreover, lay the vague promise of an East Asian economic bloc, in which economic relations would be based on reciprocity and mutual advantage, rather than colonial exploitation. The term 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere', for all its vagueness and even deliberate obfuscation, summed up the hope – still alive today – that a large economic unit in Asia would be able to deliver prosperity to all its peoples. In the light of long-standing Western colonial exploitation in Asia, co-prosperity within a Japanese sphere was an idea which many people could find comforting, at least in principle.

The contradiction between the aspirations of Japan and those of other Asians lay first of all in the fact that Japan itself was an imperialist power. Its aim was political hegemony over a vast area of Asia and the marshalling of Asia's human and natural resources to support the interests of Japan. The hegemonic format it offered the rest of Asia was not conspicuously more attractive than that of late Western colonialism. The indigenous peoples of the Philippines, Burma and India under Western colonial rule all enjoyed greater real autonomy than did the inhabitants of nominally independent Manchukuo. Taiwan under Japan was not conspicuously more prosperous than the Philippines under the United States. Japan's imperialist intentions were perhaps initially easier to conceal than those of the West because – unlike the West – Japan had no long history of overseas expansionism, apart from its brief sixteenth-century invasions of Korea. The annexation of Korea in 1910, however, made clear to many Asians that Japan was also imperialist.

Perhaps even more significant was the contradiction between Japan's apparent promise of economic development and the reality of economic hardship during the Japanese era. This hardship was created at many levels. The war itself seriously disrupted communication and transport and demanded human and material

resources on a vast scale. The Japanese economy, moreover, for all its pre-war strength, was simply not large enough or developed enough either to absorb the plantation produce of the newly-conquered regions or to supply the manufactured goods and capital needed to sustain daily life. The collective knowledge of the Japanese authorities about their new empire, moreover, was seriously inadequate, both economically and culturally, and Japan simply lacked the trained personnel needed to continue pre-war levels of administration, let alone to build upon them. Especially in the southern regions, where Japanese rule was brief, the dominant style was one of improvisation and ad hoc decision-making rather than careful, long-term planning. Before 1937, Japan could point to many signs of economic progress and development in the regions which comprised its 'old' empire – Taiwan, Korea and Manchukuo – but after 1937 the Japanese presence in Asia brought prosperity only to smugglers and profiteers. It was difficult to concentrate on shaping the more abstract features of national identity when hunger and shortage stalked the land.

The attempt to construct an alliance between Japanese imperialism and Asian nationalism was also fundamentally undermined by Japanese fickleness. One of the persistent themes in this book is the cynical carelessness with which Japan took up and cast off its allies in other parts of Asia. In Siberia and Mongolia, Japan supported and then abandoned a whole series of adventurist forces. In Siberia and Vietnam, they spurned the local groups with which they had most in common and chose alliance instead with conservative, even unsavoury, forces. They toyed with Mongol nationalism and North Chinese regionalism, first encouraging them and then subordinating them to a broader China policy. They largely ignored India and Tibet during those periods when they might have made a significant contribution to national aspirations in either country. They never satisfactorily resolved the status of Koreans in the empire. The independence that they granted The Philippines, Burma, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos was no more than token. And when Taiwan was subject to Kuomintang repression in 1947, Japan had no word of comfort or support for its colony of fifty years.

The sources of this fickleness remain uncertain. Certainly, they do not extend to the individual Japanese who developed strong and lasting ties with one or other of the Asian societies with which they came into contact. Perhaps the most likely explanation is that the Japanese authorities believed in the malleability of identity. Although they made a serious, though limited, effort to understand local cultures and to adapt their policies to those cultures throughout the regions

they controlled and aspired to influence, they remained profoundly confident of their ability to shape cultures and identities. They saw the existing cultures in the rest of Asia as crying out for modernization and they imagined that this modernization could be achieved quickly by administrative decree and public re-education. And they saw national identity as essentially contingent, something which could be eradicated within a generation by means of education and repression (as in Korea), created from nothing in a decade or so (as in Manchukuo), turned on and off at will (as in Mongolia), ignored (as in Siberia, Vietnam and Indonesia) or shifted arbitrarily within different political frameworks (as in China). Japan's willingness to re-draw borders and to create new political units which met some of the aspirations of peoples who had previously been incorporated into other empires, Western or Chinese, gave the impression that it took a serious interest in the national identities of its Asian neighbours. But Japan's respect for national identity as a political force was never matched by a consistent understanding of individual identities and what they mean to Asian peoples. Whenever it suited their broader interests, therefore, the Japanese showed a confident disregard for local cultures and local political aspirations. Thus the assistance they gave to local nationalist movements was more than counter-balanced by the actions they took in defiance of local wishes – whether it came to dividing Indonesia administratively against the will of Indonesian nationalists, handing unwilling Malay, Cambodian, Lao and Burmese territories over to Thailand, preserving French rule in Indochina, toying with Mongol nationalists or manipulating regionalist feelings in China.

In the end, Japan failed to convince its subjects that it took their national identity seriously after all.

APPENDIX

Postage Stamps and Japanese Imperialism

LI NARANGOA AND ROBERT CRIBB

For more than a century – from the appearance of pre-paid postage in 1840 until the emergence of electronic communication in the late twentieth century – postage stamps played a special role in nationalist politics. For established states, they were a showcase of national iconography, an advertising space which, although tiny, could reach in principle not only to every corner of the state but to every part of the globe. Stamps portrayed important aspects of state and society as the state itself wished to have them seen, both by its own citizens and by the foreign recipients of its mail.[1]

Postage stamps were also an important symbol of state power, especially for new or contested regimes. Although parts of Germany had experimented with allowing a private postal monopoly under the counts of Thurn and Taxis in the mid-nineteenth century, the management of a postal system as a state monopoly carrying messages rapidly and reliably between citizens quickly came to be seen as one of the important attributes of a modern state. Polities claiming statehood regarded the issue of postage stamps as a badge of their capacity to rule, and inability to maintain a functioning postal system was a serious rebuke to any state.

Issuing postage stamps for international mail, moreover, was an important sign of sovereignty. The Universal Postal Union (UPU), founded in 1874, was the second truly global organization, after the International Telecommunication Union, founded in 1865.[2] Before the existence of the UPU, countries would accept mail from each other only on the basis of a bi-lateral treaty; the UPU provided a framework for the mutual international recognition of pre-paid postage stamps of and by all members without any need for specific bi-lateral agree-

ments. Membership was therefore a real token of international recognition, especially before the foundation of the League of Nations after the First World War.

The postage stamps which we have selected to illustrate each chapter in this book reflect different aspects of the political significance of postage stamps in Asia during the Japanese imperial era.

Contents: Japan, 10 sen, blue, 1899, Imperial chrysanthemum crest.[3] Japanese text reads: 'Dai Nihon Teikoku Yūbin' [Greater Japanese Imperial Postage].

Japan issued its first postage stamps in 1871, three decades after Britain's celebrated 'penny black' of 1840. Japan joined the Universal Postal Union in 1877. The large Imperial crest and the absence of the name 'Japan' in English on this 1899 issue reflect the growing self-confidence of Japan in international affairs.

Preface: Imperial Japanese Postal Administration in China (Foochow [Fuzhou]), postmark used on Japanese stamps, 1880.

During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, several Western powers ran their own post office systems in other countries which they believed did not have the capacity to run an effective postal system of their own. These postal systems generally operated between the consular offices of different powers and relied on the special legal status of diplomatic post. Because they provided a means of communication which was immune to censorship and surveillance by domestic authorities and because the inability to run a postal system was generally seen as a mark of perhaps terminal incapacity, these foreign post offices were deeply disliked by the host authorities and states such as Japan and Siam put a high priority on having them closed. British post offices began operating in Japan in 1859 and French and United States offices followed in 1865 and 1867. In 1873, however, Japan signed a treaty with the United States for the exchange of postal items. This treaty was considered to be Japan's first 'equal' treaty in an era when Western powers freely imposed unequal treaties on Asian states.[4]

Japan was able to have the last British post office on its territory closed in 1879. China, however, remained too weak to prevent the establishment of several foreign post office networks in its territory. Separate post offices in China were run by Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Japan, Italy and the United States on the authority of the 1858 Treaty of Tientsin (Tianjin) which gave Britain, and later other powers, the right to transport documents without inspection by the Chinese authorities.

Japan established its first post office in China in 1876. Until China joined the Universal Postal Union in 1914, these foreign post offices were the only means of sending mail abroad from China; official Chinese post offices sold both Chinese stamps to cover the local postage and foreign stamps for the international sector. By 1918 the number of foreign post offices in China had risen to 344. These separate post offices were abolished in 1922 as part of the protracted international settlement after the First World War, though Japan retained its postal system in Manchuria [5]

List of contributors: Japan, 4 sen, green, 1937, plum blossoms.

Introduction: Japanese military administration of Java, 2 sen, brown, 1943, globe showing eastern Asia. Text: 'Dai Nihon Teikoku Yūbin' [Greater Japanese Imperial Postage].

Japan divided the former Netherlands Indies into three zones: Sumatra (initially combined with Malaya), Java and Eastern Indonesia. The image shows Japan and Northeast Asia in full sunlight, with Southeast Asia and northern Australia in the shade, reflecting both the wartime slogan that Japan was the 'Light of Asia', and the peripheral status of the far south in Japan's Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

van Bijlert: British India, 1/2 anna, green, 1902, head of King Edward VII.

Until 1929, imperial Britain's postage stamps in India featured only the head of the British monarch, who claimed the title Emperor of India.

Stolberg: Priamur provisional government, Vladivostok, 3 kopek, overprint for Russian and Far Eastern Republic stamps, 1921. Text in Russian: 'Priam. zemskii' [Priam(ur) territory].

The Far Eastern Republic issued its own, crudely printed stamps in 1921, but its short-lived Japanese-sponsored rival, the Priamur provisional government (May 1921–October 1922) relied mainly on overprinted Russian and FER stamps.

Hyer: Tibet, 1 tranka, red, 1933, lion. Text: 'bod gzhung sbrags bla' [Tibet Government Postage].

Tibet never joined the Universal Postal Union, and so its stamps were mainly for internal use. During the first half of the twentieth century, mail from Tibet was re-stamped at the Indian border.

Nakami: Mongolian Autonomous Domain (State), 4 cents, red, 1943, stylized horse. Text: in Mongolian (upper left-hand side) reads 'Mongghol ulaghalaqu jasag' [Mongol Courier Post]; in Chinese (below) reads from right to left: 'Menggu zhengfu chengli wuzhounen jinen' [To commemorate the Fifth Anniversary of the Establishment of the Mongol Government].

The Japanese sponsored a Post and Telegraph Service for Inner Mongolia (later Mengkiang [Mengjiang]) from 1937. The service continued to operate through the various political regimes formed in the region under Japanese influence.[6]



Stegewerns: Japan, 80 yen, 6 colours, 1999, Yoshino Sakuzō and the front cover of the first issue of *Shirakaba* [White birch], a monthly journal of literature and the arts.

With the rise of electronic communications, postage stamps lost some of their significance as markers of sovereignty, but they remained a vehicle for states to present a carefully selected vision of their society to the world and to their own people. Yoshino Sakuzo's portrait appeared in the third 'Twentieth Century' stamp series issues by the Japanese postal service in

1999. This series emphasised Japanese culture and society in the Taishō period.

Caprio: Japan, 3 sen, red, 1905. Symbols of Korea and Japan, marking the amalgamation of the Japanese and Korean postal services. Text in Japanese: 'Nichi-Kan tsūshin gyōmu gōdō ki'nen' [To commemorate the amalgamation of the Japanese and Korean postal services].

Korea did not issue its own stamps until 1884. Before that year, Chinese stamps were used on a limited scale. Japan maintained post offices in Korea from 1876 and in 1900 began to overprint Japanese stamps specially for use in these post offices. Japan did not formally annex Korea until 1910, but the process of imposing Japanese administration on the peninsula began immediately after Japan's victory in the Russo–Japanese War of 1904–1905. In 1905 the Korean postal service was one of the first institutions to lose its separate existence. Korea had joined the Universal Postal Union only in 1904.

Mitter, Manchukuo, 4 fen, green and black, 1940, census forms, marking the first national census. Text in Chinese: (top) 'Manzhou Diguo youzheng' [Manchukuo Imperial Postage]; (below) 'Linshi guoshi diaocha jinen. Kangde qi'nen shiyue yiri' [To commemorate the national census. On 1st October of the 7th year of {the Emperor} Kangde]. Lower right hand side in Chinese: 'Guoshi diaocha guo zhi ji zhaoshi tianxie bukexu' [The census is the base of the nation, it must be filled out accurately, not falsely]. Lower left hand side, the same text in Mongolian: 'Ulus-un baidal-yi baichaghaqu anu ulus ger-ün ündüsün kereg bulai. Ünen-yen bichiju medegelenü'.

Manchukuo stamps were never recognized in China; rather, from the founding of Manchukuo until 1941, mail from Manchukuo was handed over to the Chinese authorities in Shanhaikuan or Gubeikou, where the Chinese postal authorities attached Chinese stamps free of charge to each letter and then delivered them to the rest of China.[7]

Batbayar: Mongolian People's Republic, 1 cent, brown, pink and grey, 1924, double *vajra* (lightning bolt, *Eldev Ochir*). Text in Mongolian: 'Poçta marka' [Postage stamp].

This was independent Mongolia's first postage stamp. Russia (from 1909) and the new Republic of China (from 1911) both maintained post offices in Outer (Northern) Mongolia until the Mongolian People's Republic was declared in 1924. The stamps were printed in Shanghai and the new state continued to use Chinese currency until 1926. The Mongolian People's Republic's international status was highly uncertain before 1932 and remained contested well into the 1960s. Although the MPR issued stamps for domestic and international postage, only the Soviet Union and Tibet recognized it and it was not a member of the Universal Postal Union until 1967.[8]

Dryburgh: North China, $30, purple, Taishan mountain. Text in Chinese: (top) 'Zhonghua minguo youzheng' [Chinese Republic Postage]; (lower right hand side): 'Huabei youzheng fen (?) ju chengli qi zhounen ji'nen' [To commemorate the 7th anniversary of the Directorate-General for Posts for North China].

Initially, the Japanese authorities in North China used Republic of China stamps overprinted with the name of the province in which the stamps were issued, but in 1945 the Japanese-dominated Directorate-General for Posts for North China issued its own stamps, even though the region was nominally under the authority of Wang Ching-wei's 'Reorganized National Government' in Nanking, which issued its own stamps.

Guillemot: French Indochina, 10 centime + 2 centime, red and blue, Shield and sword, benefit stamp issued to collect contributions to the National Relief Fund.

After 1940, the French colonial government in Indochina was nominally subordinate to the rump government of France in Vichy (the État Français represented by EF on this stamp),

which collaborated with Nazi Germany. In practice France could do little to influence Indochinese affairs, but the postage stamps of French Indochina reflected the French nationalist imagery which Vichy used to mask its subordination to Germany.

Jose: Japanese-occupied Philippines, 5 centavos, brown, 1943, Mt Mayon and Mt Fuji. Text: 'Pi-shima Yūbin' [Phi-Island Postage].

This design, issued shortly before the Japanese authorities granted nominal independence to the Philippines, was intended to suggest a geographical and cultural similarity between Japan and the Philippines.

Satō: Japanese-occupied Java, 5 sen, green, 1943, wayang puppet. Text: 'Dai Nihon Teikoku Yūbin' [Greater Japanese Imperial Postage]; text on the bottom: 'Jawa' [Java].

Although Japan refrained from promising independence to any part of Indonesia as it had to Burma and the Philippines, its postage stamps on the island made a strong appeal to local cultural images. Other stamps in this series featured a temple, a dancer and terraced rice fields.

Huang: Japanese Taiwan, 5 sen, green, 1945. Text: 'Dai Nihon Teikoku Yūbin' [Greater Japanese Imperial Postage].

Although Taiwan was annexed to Japan in 1895 and thereafter used Japanese stamps, the island was largely isolated from Japan during the last months of the war because of Allied submarine and naval activity. Local authorities therefore prepared the stamp illustrated for postage on the island, though it was only issued just before Chinese troops arrived to accept the Japanese surrender.

Afterword: Japanese Naval Administration in Eastern Indonesia, 10 sen, red, 1943, Japanese flag and palms. Text on top: 'Dai Nihon teikoku' [Greater Imperial Japan]; text on the bottom: 'Kaigun minseifu' [Marine civil government].

Appendix: Japanese occupation of Java, 5 sen, blue-grey, 1943, girl with savings certificate. Text in Indonesian (top): Postal Savings stamp; text in Japanese (rōmaji, bottom): 'Postal Savings'.

Although Japanese postage stamps in Indonesia, were at first inscribed only in Japanese, practical necessity meant that Indonesian had to be used in some contexts. The postal savings system in Java was intended both to raise funds for government expenditure and to develop habits of thrift amongst the Javanese. The simple system of buying stamps enabled people to invest very small amounts at irregular intervals. The success of the system, however, rested on public confidence in the Japanese currency, which steadily declined as the war turned against Japan and as the Japanese authorities took to printing currency to meet their costs. In financial matters, too, the Japanese proved to be unreliable.

Bibliography: Japan, 3 sen, red, 1930, map of Japan and Korea marking 2nd census.

The map shows Japan proper and its main colonial territories – Korea, Taiwan and Sakhalin (Karafuto) – but the design of the stamp reflects the centrality of Korea to Japanese constructions of colonialism.

Index: *Azad Hind* ('Free India'), 12 anna + 1 rupee, maroon, 1943, map of India and broken chain.

In preparation for the expulsion of Britain from India, Japanese postal authorities prepared stamps for use in the foreshadowed puppet state of Azad Hind. Only small areas of India along the Burmese border fell in Japanese hands, and the stamps were never issued. This degree of preparation was unusual: in other occupied regions, the Japanese initially made do with overprinted stamps of the previous administration.

NOTES

1 Perhaps there are obvious problems both in determining the forces which produce postage stamp designs and in understanding the way in which users actually respond to these tiny, useful pieces of page, there has been relatively little academic attention to the iconography of postage stamps. The research value of postage stamps is discussed in Donald M. Reid, 'The Symbolism of Postage Stamps: A Source for the Historian', *Journal of Contemporary History* 19, no. 2 (April 1984), pp. 223–249; Dennis Altman, *Paper Ambassadors: The Politics of Stamps* (North Ryde, NSW: Angus & Robertson, 1991).

For some useful studies, see James A. Leith, 'Postage stamps and ideology in Communist China', *Queen's Quarterly* 78, no. 2 (1971), pp. 176–186; Jacques Leclerc, 'The political iconography of the Indonesian postage stamp (1950–1970)', *Indonesia* 57 (1994), pp. 15–48; Robert A Jones, 'Heroes of the nation? The celebration of scientists on the postage stamps of Great Britain, France and West Germany', *Journal of Contemporary History* 36, no. 3 (July 2001), pp. 403–422.

2 For a history of the UPU stressing technical features of its development, see George A. Codding, *The Universal Postal Union: Coordinator of the international mails* (New York: New York University Press, 1964).

3 Technical information on this and the other stamps depicted is derived principally from the *Stanley Gibbons Simplified Whole World Stamp Catalogue 1967* (London: Stanley Gibbons, 1966).

4 Erving E. Beauregard, 'Samuel Magill Bryan: creator of Japan's international postal service', *Journal of Asian History* 26, no. 1 (1992), pp. 31–41.

5 See 'A brief history of China Post' chapter 1, section 1, chapter 3, section2 (http://www.chinapost.gov.cn/upuxx/posthistory/china/contents.htm).

6 Briefly discussed in Greg Lewis, 'Chinese currencies and stamps, 1932–1949', *The Historian* 57 no. 3 (Spring 1995), pp. 503–510.

7 See 'A brief history of China Post' chapter 4, section 1 (http://www.chinapost.gov.cn/upuxx/posthistory/china/contents.htm).

8 We are grateful to Dr Klaus Sagaster for technical information on this stamp.

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THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

Nationalism was a powerful force in Asia during the era of Japanese imperial expansion (1895–1945). Asia's peoples sought freedom from the Western and Chinese empires which dominated the continent, while challenging each other over borders and systems of government.

From the earliest Japanese intrusions on the mainland in 1895 until final defeat in 1945, Japanese authorities had to grapple with the national identities of the people they sought to dominate. This book traces Japan's impact on these national identities, from its clumsy intervention in Siberia, through its ambitious attempts to create the new state of Manchukuo on the Asian mainland and to reshape the politics of the Chinese and Mongols, to its brief but dramatic foray into Southeast Asia. The book compares the perspective of societies such as India and Tibet, which observed Japan from a distance, with the experience of societies which experienced Japanese intervention at close hand.

The authors highlight the contradictions in Japanese policy, which sometimes encouraged other Asian nationalist movements, sometimes suppressed or undermined them, and sometimes sought to create new identities out of little more than romantic imagination. This book provides a valuable resource for students of East Asia.

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